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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip helps people manage AI agents and their work. > - The inbox collects decisions, requests, and updates for the people in a company. > - People need a clear personal queue and a consistent way to answer each request. > - Repeated headings, inconsistent card actions, and separate review flows make that work harder. > - This pull request connects the inbox UI to the routing foundation in #20959. > - Compact cards use shared task controls and open supporting work in a side panel. > - People can answer, claim, transfer, archive, and inspect outcomes from one place. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** The inbox cards, personal views, shared task controls, and decision history. **Subsystem affected** UI. This PR targets master and uses the routing foundation merged in #20959. **Current behavior** The inbox repeats headings and counts. Cards have different layouts and action placement. The requester can repeat the signed-in person's name. Review and question controls differ between the inbox and task thread. **Proposed behavior** Open Assigned to you by default. Show one count line above the cards. Use a compact card layout with consistent actions and supporting details. Show the requester's avatar and name only when they differ from the signed-in person. Share question controls, including a radio option for Other that reveals a text field when selected. **Reason and benefit** People can scan their queue and complete requests without losing the surrounding task or creating separate drafts for the same review. **Breaking changes** The default inbox view becomes personal. The all-assignee and shared views remain available. Card close menus distinguish personal archive and snooze from shared withdrawal. **Additional context** Refs #20959, #19363, and #19520. Refs #20268 for related actionable-request work. This stack adds personal routing and shared controls. ROADMAP.md includes Multiple Human Users and Agent Reviews and Approvals. ## What Changed - Add personal, unassigned, company, all-assignee, and archived inbox views. Add claim, transfer, personal close actions, receipts, and history controls. - Use compact decision cards with a single count line, one-pixel borders, and equal space above, below, and to the right of each primary action. - Open artifacts and synchronized confirmation/approval controls in a shared side panel. Share their revision drafts and action state with the task thread. Other requests keep one editable form on the inbox card while reviewing an artifact. - Make Other match the question options and reveal its field only when selected. Apply this to inbox and task question cards. - Hide self-requester labels, space agent avatars, and use the standard canceled status icon for withdrawn requests. - Use connector logos in connector cards. Keep the connector promotion background and sidebar border continuous. - Add company and project decision-owner controls and document the updated inbox behavior. ## Verification - The complete [GitHub Actions CI matrix](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/43141559641) passes on `8d81a75e49b518fff6b6ff4c23dd67979b0b97ee` (Linux/Node 24: typecheck, build, general and serialized tests, Runner support, browser shards, and aggregate gates). Greptile is 5/5 on that exact head with zero open findings, and the security scan passes. - Local UI typechecking passes. Eight focused suites pass 382 tests: 236 inbox/review/question/connector tests plus all 146 composer tests. Regressions passed red to green for attachment links, prompt rendering, single-form artifact review, connector scope copy, accessible headings, and the composer test harness's missing theme provider. The final commit changes only that test harness; production code is unchanged from `59d015833f`. - Browser acceptance on the production implementation confirms preserved selected answers with one editable question form, accessible Markdown prompts, inert image references, accurate connector scope copy, native PDF downloads, image sidebar previews, and Open file requesting the attachment endpoint while preserving the inbox URL. Request reads and file responses were intercepted; no question answers were written. The preview is healthy on the final head. - Visual and interaction checks cover Other radio behavior in both themes and on mobile, the loaded Google Calendar logo, and 20px above, below, and to the right of the primary action across all 23 visible cards. The affected desktop/mobile navigation and sidebar specs pass locally and in the final CI browser matrix. - Real-editor browser checks confirm Ctrl/Cmd+Enter cannot bypass another person's confirmation. Cancel preserves the draft and unlocks silently; Continue submits once. Approval write failures remain visible. - `pnpm verify` returns exit 2 because DESIGN.md requires broader coverage; the final full CI matrix supplies every requested gate. Maps and Storybook catalog structural checks pass. The routing foundation #20959 merged after passing 249 database tests, server typechecking, full CI, Greptile 5/5, and security scanning. Its backend and SDK registry are preserved. - Demo data is retained for testing; database suites and browser specs use separate disposable databases. ## Risks - The inbox uses the routing contracts merged in #20959. Personal filters and history affect shared task entry points; the affected controls are included in local regression coverage and full CI. - Personal defaults and close-menu wording change inbox behavior. Existing resolver permissions still control shared actions. - Shared revision state and live invalidation affect two surfaces. Focused tests cover draft synchronization, action locks, and incoming updates. - Visual changes use the existing design tokens and component primitives. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex. Used repository tools, code execution, and browser checks. This session does not expose a more specific runtime model ID or its context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id - [x] I have run focused tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Scott Tong <scott@scottsmbpm5max.lan> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
160 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown
160 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown
# Projects and repositories — agent access
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Product map: [Projects and repositories](../feature-map/projects.md).
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Feature ID: `projects`.
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Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: `f981fa3cc10cb8663a87dec60345fbff46d54d0a`.
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This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps.
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Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be
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qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the [map contract](../README.md)
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for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.
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## `lifecycle`
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Capability ID: `projects/lifecycle`.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/projects`.
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- `PATCH /api/projects/{id}`.
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- `DELETE /api/projects/{id}`.
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Agent access: `available` — Native create_project/list_projects; REST / CLI / MCP.
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Policy: Company/project visibility, protected configuration/runtime policies; some
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repository/privacy management requires board. Only a board user may set or clear a
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project's `decisionOwnerUserId` (PAP-749 escalation owner); an agent's change is 403,
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and a value that is not an active company member is 422.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/projects.ts#L278) at
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the reviewed commit above; the decision-owner rule is covered by
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[route tests](../../server/src/__tests__/project-decision-owner-route.test.ts).
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
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credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
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Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
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remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
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Gaps: Actual data operations exist; project discovery and private-resource permissions
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still apply.
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## `task-context`
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Capability ID: `projects/task-context`.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/issues`.
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- `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/issues`.
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Agent access: `available` — Native create_task/search_tasks; REST / CLI / MCP.
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Policy: Company/project visibility, protected configuration/runtime policies; some
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repository/privacy management requires board.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/projects.ts#L278) at
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the reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
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credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
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Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
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remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
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Gaps: Use explicit project context; task creation, assignment, and execution remain
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separate checks.
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## `repositories`
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Capability ID: `projects/repositories`.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/project-repositories`.
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- `PUT /api/projects/{id}/repositories`.
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Agent access: `partial` — Native list_project_repositories/create_project for initial
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selection; board-only replacement API.
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Policy: Company/project visibility, protected configuration/runtime policies; some
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repository/privacy management requires board.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/projects.ts#L278) at
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the reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
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credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
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Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
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remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
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Gaps: Authorized initial selection works. Replacement of repositories on an existing
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project hard-requires board and needs a delegation decision.
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## `defaults`
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Capability ID: `projects/defaults`.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `PATCH /api/projects/{id}`.
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- `GET /api/projects/{id}/workspaces`.
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Agent access: `partial` — REST / native call_api for permitted fields; CLI
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project/workspace.
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Policy: Company/project visibility, protected configuration/runtime policies; some
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repository/privacy management requires board.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/projects.ts#L278) at
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the reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
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credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
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Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
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remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
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Gaps: Description/goal/target selection exist; host workspace command mutation is denied
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to agents and budget policy is board-managed.
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Repository attachment also writes a durable skill import binding in its transaction.
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Agent-created bindings derive their refresh person from authenticated responsible-user
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context. Project selection does not grant runtime credentials or override private
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project skill access. Verify automatic import and denial with the actual agent identity.
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Workspace creation, update and deletion require project:write_workspace through
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the shared authorization evaluator in addition to project read access. Repository
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attachment does not bypass skill-import policy for its background discovery.
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## `privacy`
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Capability ID: `projects/privacy`.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/projects; PATCH /api/projects/{id}; GET and POST /api/projects/{id}/access-members; DELETE /api/projects/{id}/access-members/{memberId}. Creation and authorized updates accept visibility; use stable UUID paths for evidence.
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Agent access: `partial` — authorized agent REST or admitted native `call_api` can create a private project, and eligible project/member reads retain their normal API paths. Existing project visibility and audience mutations require board authority; no dedicated agent audience-management tool is established.
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Policy: Company access and project:read apply; inaccessible projects return not found. Listing members requires project read, unlike task-grant listing. Visibility/member mutations require a board privacy/personal owner, active company owner/admin, instance admin, or local implicit board. The server derives the creation owner from the board person or agent’s onBehalfOfUserId. Targets must be company agents or active company users; the owner cannot be removed. Agent access intersects agent and responsible-user access. Opening a project does not publish its protected tasks.
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Evidence: `source-only` — reviewed at `9ef434fe79c57d976b8b03b14c5242db270b8320`. [Project properties](../../ui/src/components/ProjectProperties.tsx), [access members](../../ui/src/components/ProjectAccessMembers.tsx), [project routes](../../server/src/routes/projects.ts), and [authorization](../../server/src/services/authorization.ts).
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Verification: `not-run` — Verify allowed creation and reads as the actual operator/agent, then compare project and task access after adding/removing a person. Reject ordinary members’ audience changes, agent member/visibility mutations, foreign-company targets, and owner removal. After opening the project, inspect protected tasks and independent direct grants rather than inferring task publication from project discovery.
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Gaps: The dedicated create_project tool does not advertise a visibility field; explicit private selection uses REST or admitted call_api. Private-project creation through each client, inherited task audiences, and responsible-user combinations need separate live evidence. The map does not infer filesystem isolation from these app-record permissions.
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Project configuration responses also expose effective workspace storage through
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`workspaceProvider`, separate from the stored execution policy. Existing project
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read/update permissions apply. Omitted provider IDs keep the stored owner; null explicitly selects
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Core/local at creation. An update that changes the owner returns `409` `project_storage_locked`. [Offline API coverage](../../server/src/__tests__/project-workspace-provider.integration.test.ts)
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checks overrides and cross-company denial; live agent credential verification remains unqualified.
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