## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The native runtime preserves task execution across server restarts. > - Remote workspace preparation can finish before the executor claims its first provider attempt. > - The recovery classifier required a provider checkpoint even when the durable coordinator proved that execution had never started. > - A deployment during this interval therefore left safe startup work on a permanent recovery hold. > - This pull request admits that narrow startup state to the existing same-run bootstrap path. Existing execution and ownership checks remain in force. > - The original preparation yields when recovery owns the coordinator. It cannot fail or clean up the recovered run. > - Tasks can continue after this interruption without an operator retry or a duplicate provider turn. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A server deployment interrupted a prepared remote workspace before the native executor's first claim. The coordinator had attempt zero, controller generation zero, and no owner, process, provider event, or checkpoint. Restart classification returned `ambiguous_remote_recovery_evidence` and blocked the task. **Expected behavior** The server should recognize this durable never-claimed state and continue the original run through normal execution admission. A prior claim, uncertain ownership, or contradictory execution evidence must retain the recovery hold. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Prepare a remote workspace for a native run. 2. Stop the controller before the executor commits its first claim. 3. Restart the controller and classify the running native task. 4. Observe that the old classifier blocks it because no provider checkpoint exists. Related: #16341 preserves remote recovery failure reasons. #16344 strengthens remote restart qualification. Neither changes admission for an untouched remote startup. ## What Changed - Require a server-owned fencing version written only with fresh native identities. Older unmarked preparations stay held during rolling upgrades; caller profile data cannot add that marker to an existing run. - Leave the current server's active preparation with its existing execution. - Yield through the controller-detachment path when a different execution owns the coordinator lease. Lease expiry does not grant takeover authority. - Preserve run-scoped gateway tokens during detachment so stale preparation cannot revoke the recovered worker's tools. - Admit a valid prepared remote workspace only when the locked coordinator proves attempt and controller generation zero, no owner, and no prior session or execution evidence. - Check launch receipts and provider source events before granting bootstrap recovery. - Keep the original run and session. Preserve atomic recovery claims, executor durable-state checks, and normal admission gates. - Add real PostgreSQL regression tests for competing controllers and seven contradictory evidence cases. - Update recovery documentation, the run-log reason, and both capability maps. ## Verification - The competing-controller regressions failed before the ownership fix and pass for both live and expired foreign leases. - On the final revision, 77 runtime-selection, restart recovery, real PostgreSQL, and heartbeat boundary tests pass with no skips, including all local runner process fixtures. The full native executor file passes all 698 tests. - Another 91 live-run route tests pass locally. An earlier CI timeout in that unrelated file passed on retry; the complete final-head CI passed without that failure. - `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, `node scripts/check-maps.mjs`, and `git diff --check`: passed locally. The map check verifies structure only. - Local `pnpm test:run` did not finish: an early attempt had build-related collection failures, and later full-suite execution was stopped after complete CI passed. Targeted suites passed after build preparation. This is not a local full-suite pass. - The complete [PR workflow](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38669996667) passed on `2baffb3652bfeb4705a30ca3706fbda6c3d72aa4`, including all test shards, build/typecheck, runner verification, and browser E2E. All 55 applicable review/security/CI checks succeeded; two Storybook checks were skipped. - [Greptile Apex](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/16349#issuecomment-6180848957): 5/5 on the same final head, with no unresolved findings. - No live remote provider restart is claimed by the database regression. ## Risks - A bare executor can no longer take a foreign coordinator lease after expiry. A verified recovery claim must transfer authority first. - Existing preparations without the server-owned fencing marker retain their recovery hold during rolling upgrades. - Incorrect admission could duplicate provider work. This path requires a positive durable never-claimed receipt, rejects contradictory launch evidence, and keeps the executor's existing durable-root verification. - Previously claimed or incomplete remote recovery evidence remains blocked. This change does not clear historical terminal holds. - No schema, API, dependency, or UI changes. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, tool use, code execution, and browser inspection. The exact serving snapshot ID and context window size are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Devin Foley <devin@paperclip.ing>
14 KiB
Recovery — agent access
Product map: Recovery.
Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b.
Native REST transport reconciled in this change; see the
shared transport contract.
This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps. Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the map contract for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.
diagnosis
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
GET /api/issues/{id}/diagnostics/blockers.GET /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions.
Agent access: available — REST / native call_api; CLI issue diagnostics.
Policy: Task/run visibility, run ownership and source/action policy; workspace export retry and some operator controls require board. The server can recover a prepared remote bootstrap only with a durable never-claimed executor receipt and no contradictory execution evidence. This automatic classification grants no new agent action or permission; normal execution admission and durable runner-state verification still apply. The current server's active preparation remains with its existing execution. A preparation that loses the coordinator lease cannot fail the shared run or revoke the new owner's gateway tokens, even after lease expiry. Only normal recovery can establish a takeover claim; no agent permission is added. Older unmarked preparations do not qualify for this automatic path during an upgrade. The fencing marker comes from fresh server-owned identity creation; caller profile data cannot upgrade an existing preparation.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at
the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Diagnostics expose recorded cause and boundaries; source-backed reading does not prove successful recovery.
bounded-continuation
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions/resolve.
Agent access: partial — Eligible agent REST / native call_api / CLI under
source-bound recovery authority.
Policy: Task/run visibility, run ownership and source/action policy; workspace export retry and some operator controls require board.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at
the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Eligible resolutions use native call_api. The route retains owner and
management authority, active-run/source-trust checks, board-only outcomes and
reconciliation controls.
Scoped source review: 2026-10-13, recovery correction against
ea6c8eb5e16d61111968f633a66748b397b64a3e. The
recovery service reuses the
existing completed-onboarding handoff validator. It checks the source company,
onboarding origin, Done parent, assignee and Done child, with no unfinished
siblings, before exempting the report from the issue-terminal backstop. Other
terminal work and process-death/controller ownership checks remain enforced.
This internal wake handling adds no recovery-resolution or cross-company agent
authority. Real PostgreSQL regressions cover allowed and rejected bindings;
revised live agent authorization and callback delivery remain not-run.
source-action
The recovery-actions read API includes settled execution reconciliation holds
with an automatic replay: blocked receipt, as well as retained workspace holds.
The existing company and task-read checks remain in force. The board notice
reads this history to explain its current hold; this adds no agent mutation
authority. Route and notice regressions cover the source contract, without
claiming live agent or provider qualification.
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
GET /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions.POST /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions/resolve.
Agent access: partial — Eligible agent REST / native call_api / CLI; source-bound
recovery state.
Policy: Task/run visibility, run ownership and source/action policy; workspace export retry and some operator controls require board. Completion or cancellation of a task does not clear its exact unresolved native workspace owner hold. Physical owner release still requires the operator stop-verification procedure.
For a resolved legacy action that retains a file hold, the same resolution API supports source-only file repair. Board runtime management and recovery-resolution authority are required. The request identifies the exact source action/run and records recovered-file evidence; the server verifies the original stop receipt. It preserves the current task status and does not wake or replay the agent. The task form fails closed without permission or source bindings. Agent Chat retains the file diagnosis while this hold exists. The repair route regressions and file form cover the local contract; they do not independently recover files or qualify a live provider.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at
the reviewed commit above. Exact owner hold retention in the
recovery state helper
was reviewed at 89770ba707fb1ebd4cabd184eec2e7fee226e0c3.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability. Local
recovery route regressions
verify one unchanged hold across reads and sweeps on done/cancelled tasks, no
physical copyback, and cleanup after the receipt is cleared. Exercise this
sequence in a disposable instance; automatic cleanup must use the system actor
and must not create reader participation. No live recovery proof is claimed.
Gaps: Permitted resolutions use native call_api under existing eligibility
and ownership checks. Source/action policy determines whether continuation is allowed.
A recorded operator Stop before legacy runtime selection releases only that run's task locks and preserves deferred input for normal later admission. This does not grant an agent a new retry or provider-stop authority. Local database regressions cover the release boundary and a competing active routine cycle; they are not live provider-stop proof.
exhaustion
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
GET /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions.GET /api/heartbeat-runs/{runId}.
Agent access: partial — REST / native call_api reads; operator escalation flow.
Policy: Task/run visibility, run ownership and source/action policy; workspace export retry and some operator controls require board.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at
the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Reading exhaustion is supported. Continuing past the recorded gate requires the specified owner/action.
workspace
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions/retry-workspace-export.POST /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions/resume-workspace-finalization.POST /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions/resolvefor retained-source file repair.POST /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/reconcile-branch.
Agent access: restricted — Board/runtime management APIs; agent reads diagnosis and
performs permitted workspace work.
Policy: Export retry and branch reconciliation require board runtime management.
Retained legacy file-only repair requires the board, exact stopped-source receipts,
and recovered-file evidence. It can record repair for a successful legacy turn
without changing its result or authorizing replay. Queued and running sources
remain denied. Source-only reconciliation regressions cover this boundary.
Physical-owner stop confirmation uses the separate runtime:confirm_owner_stop
action. It requires active company owner/admin membership, trusted local board
access, or instance administration. Agents and ordinary runtime managers are denied.
The exact source task, running native run, accepted result and owner receipt must
match; active copyback locks, live local writers, and newer runs prevent admission.
An authorized administrator must first verify through the deployment platform that
the exact controller and all copyback children stopped, then attest that evidence.
Elapsed time, an expired coordinator lease or a lost advisory connection is not proof.
Only the exact owner receipt is released; normal reconciliation performs export and
commitment without another provider turn or bypassing existing task waits.
Evidence: source-only — route,
administrator authorization, and
owner admission
reviewed for this change. Local authorization, route, UI and finalization regressions
cover member/agent denial, exact-owner admission and the real reconciler preserving
monitor and approval waits. This is not live provider-stop proof.
Verification: not-run for live agent/deployment execution — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: Export retry and branch reconciliation require board runtime:manage at their HTTP routes. The exact-owner operator fallback additionally requires runtime:confirm_owner_stop. Native call_api preserves these agent denials. Automatic managed-cloud recovery uses independently verified, signed platform proof through the finalization reconciler; agents cannot attest owner shutdown.
unknown-outcome
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/publications/{publicationId}/resolve.
Agent access: restricted — Board provider-outcome resolution; agent may inspect
assigned provider tools.
Policy: Task/run visibility, run ownership and source/action policy; workspace export retry and some operator controls require board.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at
the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: Uncertain-side-effect resolution is operator/source-specific; do not replay to obtain apparent parity.
user-continuation
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/issues/{id}/comments.
Agent access: partial — User comment API and server-owned wake reconsideration; native
agent consumes bound wake.
Policy: Task/run visibility, run ownership and source/action policy; workspace export retry and some operator controls require board.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at
the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Receiving the continuation is supported; impersonating a saved user message or retry control is not.
reconnect
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
GET /api/companies/{companyId}/events/ws.GET /api/issues/{id}.
Agent access: partial — Existing event protocol; REST refresh of persisted task state.
Policy: Task/run visibility, run ownership and source/action policy; workspace export retry and some operator controls require board.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at
the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Streaming reconnect needs its protocol client. Polling/read APIs remain available; replay is not proof of a fresh successful action.