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## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - A planning task runs a native Codex agent in read-only planning mode
before the user approves a Plan
> - On a Daytona sandbox, every Codex planning run failed before its
first turn: `error creating thread: failed to load AGENTS.md
instructions for environment 'local': fs sandbox helper failed ...
bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted`
> - Codex 0.160.0 reads files through a filesystem helper when the
permission profile restricts reads. That helper always runs bubblewrap
with `--unshare-net`. Daytona has no `CAP_NET_ADMIN`, so bubblewrap
cannot bring up loopback in the new network namespace
> - The planning profile must stay read-only. Codex's plan collaboration
mode is only a prompt, so the external-sandbox profile (#20808 tried it,
then reverted it) would let planning runs write files
> - This pull request keeps the read-only profile, but inside an
external sandbox it gives the profile full-disk read, no writes and
network. Codex then reads files directly and runs commands without a new
network namespace, and it still refuses writes
> - The benefit is that Codex planning works on Daytona and stays
read-only
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Refs #20808
**What happened?**
A Codex planning task on a Daytona execution environment failed at
startup. The run ended with `provider_session_open_rejected` and the
Codex message `bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not
permitted`. Standard and ask runs on the same sandbox worked.
**Expected behavior**
A planning run on Daytona starts, writes its Plan and asks for approval.
Codex must still refuse file writes and mutating commands during
planning.
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Configure a native Codex agent with a Daytona execution environment.
2. Create a task in planning mode.
3. The first run fails before its first turn with the bubblewrap
loopback error.
## What Changed
- `createIsolatedCodexAppServerArgs`: when
`PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_EXTERNAL_SANDBOX=1`, the
`paperclip-runner-workspace-read-only` profile is now `{":root"="read"}`
(plus the brokered `GH_CONFIG_DIR` write that planning already had). Its
network still follows `PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_NETWORK_ACCESS`. It has no deny
entries, so Codex 0.160.0 treats it as full-disk read and skips its
filesystem helper, which always unshares the network. Local and SSH
planning keep the narrower profile unchanged.
- The Codex session context now records `rootAccess` `read` (planning)
or `write` (default) in an external sandbox, instead of always `none`.
- The Runner still sends `permissions:
"paperclip-runner-workspace-read-only"` and the plan collaboration mode
on `thread/start` and `turn/start` for planning. A new Rust test pins
that for an externally sandboxed read-only launch (no `sandbox:
danger-full-access`, no `externalSandbox` `sandboxPolicy`).
- A new Rust test proves that a launch saved with the previous planning
profile rules has the same stable launch identity as a launch with the
new rules, so saved sessions carry forward.
- New manual Product E2E suite `codex-planning-read-only`
(`runner-codex` on local and Daytona). The planning turn runs one shell
write, writes a Plan whose first line records the outcome, asks for
approval, and finishes after approval. A grader reads the run events and
fails if no write attempt was seen or if any write succeeded.
- `docs/codex-driver.md` describes the external-sandbox planning
profile, why it avoids the helper, and its read scope.
## Verification
- Red on Daytona, master `123ee31552`: [run
43029207500](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/43029207500),
cell `core-compatibility.runner-codex.daytona.plan-revise-accept` failed
twice with `error creating thread: failed to load AGENTS.md instructions
for environment 'local': fs sandbox helper failed with status exit
status: 1: bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not
permitted`.
- Planning turn completes on Daytona: [run
43031462803](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/43031462803),
cell `core-compatibility.runner-codex.daytona.plan-revise-accept`. The
planning run succeeded, saved a two-step Plan with the draft marker and
opened a confirmation for that revision (all API checks passed). The
cell then failed a later browser check: the Plan preview rendered as the
`task-chat-plan-preview-fallback` card, which the harness does not
accept. That is a separate UI placement gap.
- Write attempt on Daytona: [run
43038547892](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/43038547892),
cell `codex-planning-read-only.runner-codex.daytona.plan-write-refused`
on `f30aeb3e72`. The planning run succeeded and ran the shell write
`printf probe > plan-write-probe-....txt || echo WRITE_REFUSED`. It
ended `failed` with exit 1 and no file, because bubblewrap could not
start the command (`bwrap: setting up uid map: Permission denied`). The
write was refused fail-closed by the sandbox launcher, not by a
read-only filesystem error. The stricter grader in a3d43b7bfd reports
this case as 'sandbox failed to start' rather than a pass. Shell
commands in Daytona planning therefore do not run on the current image;
the driver doc records this as a remaining gap.
- Red/green unit test: `npx vitest run
src/drivers/codex/codex-security-config.test.ts` (in
`packages/paperclip-runner`). The new test failed on the unfixed code
(the profile was `":root"="none"` with `CODEX_HOME` denied and network
off) and passes with the fix.
- `cargo test --locked -p paperclip-runner-core --test codex_provider --
external_sandbox` and `cargo test --locked -p paperclip-runner-core
--lib -- external_sandbox_planning_profile_rules
runtime_launch_rebinding`: pass.
- `npx vitest run --config tests/runner-e2e/vitest.config.ts
tests/runner-e2e/codex-planning-read-only.test.ts
tests/runner-e2e/catalog.test.ts`: pass. `pnpm
test:e2e:runner:typecheck`: pass.
- Real Codex 0.160.0 app-server probe (macOS) with the generated launch
arguments and `PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_EXTERNAL_SANDBOX=1`: `thread/start`
returned sandbox `{"type":"readOnly","networkAccess":true}` and loaded
the workspace `AGENTS.md`; `command/exec` with the planning profile
refused `printf x > plan-write-probe.txt` (exit 1, `Operation not
permitted`, no file) and allowed `cat AGENTS.md`. Trace logs showed 0
filesystem-helper invocations with the new profile and 336 with the
previous restricted profile.
- Codex 0.160.0 source: `exec-server/src/fs_sandbox.rs` always sets
`NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted` for the helper,
`core/src/agents_md.rs` uses the helper only without full-disk read, and
`linux-sandbox` adds `--unshare-net` only for a restricted or proxy-only
network.
## Risks
- Inside an external sandbox, planning commands can now read the whole
sandbox filesystem, including the isolated Codex home. Default-mode
turns in the same sandbox already have full read and write access, so
this does not widen what the sandbox exposes. Local and SSH planning are
unchanged.
- Inside an external sandbox, planning shell commands fail closed on the
current Daytona image because bubblewrap cannot map user IDs there.
Planning still reads files and writes the Plan through Codex and
Paperclip tools.
- If a future Codex release adds deny-read entries or makes the helper
mandatory, planning on Daytona could fail again. The new Daytona E2E
suite detects that.
- Upgrade safety: the profile filesystem and network keys are excluded
from the stable launch identity, so saved sessions resume with the new
rules (new Rust regression). No persisted schema, pack contract or ACPX
profile changes.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, used through Claude
Code with tool use (shell, file edits, GitHub CLI) and extended
reasoning.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
231 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
231 lines
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Markdown
# Codex Skillless Codex Driver
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## Scope
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Codex implements a direct Codex app-server v2 driver behind the package's
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existing `HarnessDriver` contract. The driver, mock core, example CLI, tests,
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and evidence stay inside `packages/paperclip-runner/`. They do not import or
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change Paperclip server, UI, database, or production control-plane behavior.
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The app-server process is local to the execution environment and uses newline
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delimited JSON-RPC over stdio. It is not exposed as a network service.
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## Identity mapping
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| Runner identity | Codex source | Persistence rule |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| run ID | mock-core input | Never replaced during recovery. |
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| normalized session ID | controller-owned mock-core input | A distinct identity, independent of the run and provider IDs, that stays stable across transport/process recovery. |
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| driver session ID | `thread.id` | Resumed by exact ID. A different returned ID fails recovery. |
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| provider session ID | `thread.sessionId` | Kept separately from the driver thread ID. |
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| turn ID | `turn.id` | Required by steer and interrupt preconditions. |
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| item ID | `item.id`, request ID, or deterministic turn/kind key | Preserved on lifecycle and delta events. |
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| source event ID | runner instance + run + source sequence | Source sequence continues from the persisted snapshot. |
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The persisted session snapshot records run, normalized session, driver
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session, provider session, the exact active turn, committed semantic-result
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content/call binding, observed terminal-turn fingerprints, and the last source
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sequence. Recovery starts a new local app-server transport, reads the exact
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persisted thread to validate identity and working directory, resumes that
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thread, and then reads it again for reconciliation. Reconciliation considers
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only the persisted active turn: it retains that turn when active, terminalizes
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that turn when terminal, and fails recoverably when it is missing or a
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different active turn appears. Historical terminal turns never substitute for
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the persisted active turn, and a terminal already in the durable snapshot is
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not emitted again.
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## App-server operations
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| Driver operation | App-server method | Degradation |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| initialize | `initialize`, then `initialized` | Startup fails visibly. |
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| create | `thread/start` | Required. |
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| resume | `thread/resume` | `recovered: false` with a redacted reason. |
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| read | `thread/read` | Explicit `HarnessCapabilityUnavailableError`. |
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| start turn | `turn/start` | Required. |
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| steer | `turn/steer` with `expectedTurnId` | Explicit unsupported diagnostic; no stdin fallback. |
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| interrupt | `turn/interrupt` | Explicit unsupported diagnostic; session is not killed. |
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| usage | `thread/tokenUsage/updated` | Returns the last snapshot or explicit unsupported error. |
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| reconcile | `thread/read` plus `session.reconciled` | Disabled when read is unavailable. |
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Capability flags are descriptive and executable. Unsupported operations emit
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canonical `harness.diagnostic` events with secret-redacted detail. No
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harness-specific branch is required in the mock core.
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## Skillless context boundary
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The model receives one text input containing `paperclip.skillless_task.v1`:
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- objective;
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- completion-contract revision and criteria;
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- task constraints; and
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- the expected canonical result schema name.
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The thread config explicitly disables automatic skill and app instruction
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blocks. Codex's built-in collaboration instructions are enabled by default so
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interactive runs receive native commentary and tool preambles; a driver caller
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may explicitly disable them for a specialized deterministic fixture. This
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does not enable skills, apps, plugins, memories, or extra model-input kinds.
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The model input accepts only text, never a Codex `skill` input. The driver
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captures the returned instruction-source list and requires it to be empty for
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the skillless assertion.
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The trusted app-server process has an allowlisted environment. It retains host
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`HOME` and `CODEX_HOME` only so the provider can authenticate. Model-issued
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commands have a separate boundary: an empty-by-default environment with no
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`HOME` or `CODEX_HOME`, no network, and a named Codex
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permission profile requesting read-only minimal runtime files, no host-home or
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Codex-home access, and write access to the assigned workspace. The driver
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refuses filesystem-root workspaces, workspaces containing host `HOME`, and any
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workspace overlapping host `CODEX_HOME`. A workspace below host `HOME` is
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valid, but when `PAPERCLIP_WORKSPACE_CWD` is present its canonical path must be
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equal to or below that assigned workspace so sibling and symlink escapes fail
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before provider startup.
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When the execution target is itself the sandbox (a remote sandbox such as
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Daytona sets `PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_EXTERNAL_SANDBOX=1`), standard and ask runs use
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the default execution mode. The Runner starts their Codex threads and turns
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with the external sandbox policy and sends no collaboration mode. Ask mode
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restricts Paperclip mutation tools, not the Codex sandbox. Planning runs keep
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the `paperclip-runner-workspace-read-only` profile on `thread/start` and
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`turn/start` everywhere, because Codex's plan collaboration mode is a prompt
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and does not block writes or commands. Inside an external sandbox that profile
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reads the whole filesystem (`":root"="read"`), writes nowhere except a
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brokered GitHub CLI config directory, and keeps the controller's network
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decision (`PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_NETWORK_ACCESS`). A deny entry would make Codex
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read through its filesystem helper again, so this profile has none. Codex then
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reports a `readOnly` sandbox, loads `AGENTS.md` and other files directly
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instead of through the helper, and, with network enabled, runs commands under
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bubblewrap without `--unshare-net`. The helper always isolates the network,
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and a container without `CAP_NET_ADMIN` cannot bring up loopback in a new
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network namespace (`bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR`), which made thread
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creation fail. Writes from commands and patches are still refused. When the
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controller disables network, the thread still starts, but bubblewrap must
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isolate the network, so planning commands fail closed in such a container.
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On the current Daytona image, bubblewrap also cannot map user IDs for
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planning commands (`bwrap: setting up uid map: Permission denied`), so shell
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commands fail closed there in every planning turn. The planning turn still
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reads files and writes its Plan through Codex and Paperclip tools.
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The broader read access matches what default-mode turns already have in the
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same sandbox, and the session context records `rootAccess: "read"` for these
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planning turns. Local and SSH planning keep the narrower profile that denies host
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`HOME` and `CODEX_HOME`. If a remote target still refuses provider startup,
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the run ends as a provider startup failure with Retry (see
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`durable-recovery.md`).
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The returned sandbox facts remain authoritative. Codex 0.132.0 may inject a
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provider-managed writable root such as `~/.codex/memories` after a first run,
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even with `features.memories=false` and an explicit Codex-home deny. That makes
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the Codex-home directory discoverable in a warmed environment, so Codex does
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not claim whole-directory unreadability. Its authenticated proof instead
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requires each readable `auth.json`/`config.toml` file and an unrelated host
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secret to remain unreadable and unwritable, while recording any injected root
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in `context.sandbox.legacyPolicy`.
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Paperclip bearer values, `OPENAI_API_KEY`, arbitrary skill paths, and other
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inherited variables are not passed. Diagnostics redact bearer/basic
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credentials, credentialed proxy URLs, secret query parameters, sensitive JSON
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keys, and common key assignments.
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The context snapshot records configuration and environment **key names**, not
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secret values.
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## Semantic completion
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The provider-facing structured-output schema covers `done` and `needs_review`.
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It uses the strict OpenAI shape: every object rejects additional properties and
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the constant schema field includes both `type: "string"` and `const`.
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Two dynamic semantic tools are registered when supported:
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- `paperclip_finish` accepts `done` or `needs_review`;
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- `paperclip_block` accepts `blocked` and requires a blocker owner, action,
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reason, and scope.
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Both normalize through the canonical `paperclip.run_result.v1` validator. The
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first valid result is proposed. Any canonically identical result retry is
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idempotent even when the provider assigned a new call ID; the original call
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binding remains persisted for audit, while changed content is rejected. Tool
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calls and provider notifications must name the exact opened thread and active turn. Missing,
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pre-turn, cross-thread, cross-turn, and post-terminal bindings fail the provider
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session closed. Canonically identical terminal replays are no-ops; conflicting
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terminal facts are rejected. Process exit or prose alone never implies
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completion.
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The provider cannot commit controller state. It emits `run.result.proposed` and
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a provider turn terminal; the mock core validates the proposal against its
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task envelope, emits `run.result.accepted` or `run.result.rejected`, and alone
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emits `run.terminal`.
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## Canonical event mapping
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- thread lifecycle -> `session.started`, `session.resumed`,
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`session.reconciled`;
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- turn lifecycle -> `turn.submitted`, `turn.accepted`, `turn.started`, and one
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terminal turn event;
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- messages, reasoning, plans, commands, file changes, dynamic tools, and diffs
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-> `item.started`, `item.delta`, `item.completed`;
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- model selection -> a completed `model` item;
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- app-server decisions -> `runtime_request.created` and
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`runtime_request.resolved` with redacted detail;
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- token snapshots -> completed `usage` items;
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- semantic verification rows -> completed `verification` items;
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- provider completion -> at most one `run.result.proposed` and one turn
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terminal;
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- controller decision -> one `run.result.accepted` or `run.result.rejected`,
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followed by one `run.terminal`.
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The JSON-RPC transport limits each input line, pending client requests,
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in-flight server requests, queued notification count and bytes, diagnostic
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lines, and retained provider payloads. Malformed or oversized messages close
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the transport and reject pending work.
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The existing Replay reducer consumes the live stream. Replay crosses a
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serialized JSONL boundary that validates byte and event counts, line size,
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schema, run/session binding, unique source event IDs, continuous per-source
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sequence, and exactly one final run terminal before reducing. The Codex
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tracer requires byte-equivalent live and replay snapshots.
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## Runnable example
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`trace:codex` starts a real local `codex app-server` session through the mock
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core. Its safe task creates `hello.txt` with network disabled. The evidence
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recorder additionally probes all readable host Codex credential/config files
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and an unrelated host secret, requiring reads and writes to be denied while
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workspace output and app-server authentication still succeed. It gates output
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reads on an accepted `done` result and reports missing files by name rather
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than surfacing a raw filesystem `ENOENT`. See the
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[Codex tutorial](tutorials/codex.md).
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This phase changes no browser surface, so no new browser screenshot applies.
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The canonical events are proved through the existing reducer/replay path and
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JSON trace evidence.
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## Explicit assigned skills in native tasks
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A task description can explicitly invoke an assigned skill with `/skill-name`
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or `$skill-name`. The native Codex backend resolves these references against
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that run's assigned runtime context; assignment alone does not invoke a skill.
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Selections are recomputed from the current task description on each wake,
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including approval replies and recovered sessions. Ordinary tasks without an
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explicit reference receive no structured skill invocation.
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The driver sends both the `$skill-name` text reference and Codex's structured
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`{ type: "skill", name, path }` input on every requested turn. Runnerd validates
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the assigned source path, maps it to the provider's isolated
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`codex-home/skills/<name>/SKILL.md` (including remote runners), and preserves it
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through the durable `turn.start` command. `turn.submitted.skillInputs` records
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the controller's selected inputs for inspection; protocol tests separately
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verify the outgoing provider request and mapped path.
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`includeSkillInstructions` is forwarded to Codex on both `thread/start` and
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`thread/resume`. Old persisted configurations without the field retain their
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provider default until a fresh, settled run supplies an explicit value. That
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one-time upgrade reopens the same thread with the new setting. OpenCode does
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not receive Codex's skill configuration or structured skill inputs.
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These are delivery guarantees, not guarantees of model adherence. The onboarding
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`first-task` skill uses this generic mechanism; its prompt and persona are not
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changed by the wiring.
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