Files
PaperClipAI/tests/runner-e2e/chat-campaign-initdb-diagnostic.py
T
f4337bb5fb test(evals): land the chat catalog eval harness on master (#19614)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The chat-feature evals measure whether agents complete real chat
requests through the product
> - The chat catalog eval harness and its repairs live on the
`chat-eval/master-candidate` branch, not on master
> - Today's work made 139 of 242 chat evals pass in verified single-case
live runs. Each product fix landed on master as its own pull request
> - The eval-side changes (setups, graders, fault seams, evidence
capture) still exist only on the candidate
> - This pull request lands the harness on master. Master stays the
source of truth for product behavior
> - The benefit is one tree: evals run against master commits, and
product fixes reach the evals as soon as they merge

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19441, Refs #19599, Refs #20270, Refs #20334, Refs #20342, Refs
#20344, Refs #20354, Refs #20360, Refs #20373, Refs #20382, Refs #20409

**What existing behavior does this improve?**
The chat catalog eval harness and the product it evaluates live on a
long-running branch outside master. Eval fixes do not reach master, so
master-based eval runs use old setups and graders.

**Subsystem affected**
`tests/runner-e2e` chat catalog harness, plus a small set of product
changes that exist only on the candidate.

**Proposed change**
Land the harness on master. Every product fix from this eval work
already merged to master as its own pull request. Conflicts keep
master's product behavior.

## What Changed

- Most of the diff (808 of 851 files) is under `tests/runner-e2e/`:
chat-catalog domains, scenarios, descriptors, the TestOps manifest,
private evidence tooling, and their tests.
- Graders now check saved state, setup literals and rendered or clicked
links. Many keyword and regex checks on free-form replies are removed.
Each changed grader has a bumped `oracleVersion` and calibration tests
(a valid reply, a reworded valid reply, and broken variants that must
fail).
- The shared link helper `hasLink` no longer treats a list link (for
example `/COM/issues?view=mine`) as a link to every task without a URL
key.
- Setup fixes build real state through supported product routes: routine
history, agent grants through the board grant route, budget holds with a
real cap, and a storage-layer archive fault for
`inbox-search.archive-partial-failure`.
- Browser boundary journeys (sign-in, chat-disabled, onboarding) now
write the standard pass evidence files.
- Retargeted cases, approved by the maintainer:
`agent-chat.chat-disabled` (Conference Room gate),
`agents.restore-instructions` (no saved instruction history),
`access.manage-membership` (member permission edits stay board-only).
- The private evidence trusted files (`manual-private-handoff.ts`,
`manual-private-retention.ts`, `manual-private-report-assets.ts`) are
byte-identical to master.
- Product files outside `tests/` (43 files, +1,328 −49) carry
candidate-only changes that master does not yet have. Most are tests.
The main code changes are in `request-human-input.ts`,
`heartbeat-run-summary.ts`, `native-completion-feedback.ts`,
`native-run-finalizer.ts`, `openapi.ts`, `secrets.ts` and
`IssueChatLongThreadPerf.tsx`.

## Verification

- `pnpm vitest run chat-catalog-domains chat-catalog-contract.test.ts
chat-catalog-consistency.test.ts unit-launcher.test.mjs
--testTimeout=180000` in `tests/runner-e2e`: 269 files pass, 3,550 tests
pass.
- `node --test chat-full-catalog-testops-manifest.test.mjs`: 10 pass.
- `node tests/runner-e2e/source-sdk-public-inputs.mjs <HEAD> --check`:
no change.
- `tsc` for `server` and `tests/runner-e2e`: clean.
- Live single-case verification: 139 of 242 cases passed on paid runs,
and a person read the saved evidence for each. These are single-case
runs, not one full-cohort run.

## Risks

- Large diff. Most of it is test-only, but the 43 non-test files change
product code paths. Review those files first.
- Some graders are now less strict on reply wording. A person must read
replies for meaning on those cases.
- 42 cases need disposable outside accounts (Notion, Slack, GitHub,
Daytona and others) and stay blocked. `access.invite-teammate` stays
failing until local agent isolation lands, because the runner's durable
state keeps a live invite token.
- The paid workflow compares the trusted private-evidence files with
master. They are unchanged, so this risk is low.

## Model Used

Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), with tool use and code
execution, in Claude Code. Subagents used the same model.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-10 08:02:11 -06:00

169 lines
8.7 KiB
Python

"""One explicitly authorized, owned initdb bootstrap diagnostic; no server/model/case.
Raw stderr remains private. Never stops unrelated processes or removes host IPC.
"""
import argparse
import datetime
import hashlib
import json
import os
import pathlib
import re
import secrets
import shutil
import signal
import stat
import subprocess
import tempfile
import time
SNAPSHOT = pathlib.Path('/private/tmp/paperclip-chat-candidate-0fdcb539a8')
PACKAGE = 'node_modules/.pnpm/@embedded-postgres+darwin-arm64@18.1.0-beta.16/node_modules/@embedded-postgres/darwin-arm64'
BINARY = SNAPSHOT / PACKAGE / 'native/bin/initdb'
PREFIX = 'paperclip-chat-initdb-diagnostic-'
def sha(filename):
return hashlib.sha256(pathlib.Path(filename).read_bytes()).hexdigest()
def private_json(filename, value):
with os.fdopen(os.open(filename, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600), 'w') as output:
json.dump(value, output, indent=2)
output.write('\n')
def validate(binary, digest, root, token):
binary, root = pathlib.Path(binary), pathlib.Path(root)
if binary != BINARY or binary.resolve(strict=True) != BINARY or sha(binary) != digest:
raise ValueError('Unverified embedded initdb executable')
parent = pathlib.Path('/private/tmp').resolve()
if root.parent != parent or not root.name.startswith(PREFIX) or root.is_symlink():
raise ValueError('Wrong owned diagnostic root')
info = root.lstat()
if not stat.S_ISDIR(info.st_mode) or info.st_uid != os.getuid() or stat.S_IMODE(info.st_mode) != 0o700:
raise ValueError('Unsafe diagnostic root ownership')
marker = root / 'owner.json'
mark_info = marker.lstat()
if marker.is_symlink() or mark_info.st_uid != os.getuid() or stat.S_IMODE(mark_info.st_mode) != 0o600:
raise ValueError('Unsafe owner marker')
value = json.loads(marker.read_text())
if value != {'version': 1, 'creatorPid': os.getpid(), 'uid': os.getuid(), 'token': token}:
raise ValueError('Diagnostic ownership receipt mismatch')
return root / 'pgdata'
def group_members(group):
rows = []
output = subprocess.check_output(['ps', '-axo', 'uid=,pid=,ppid=,pgid=,comm='], text=True)
for line in output.splitlines():
parts = line.strip().split(None, 4)
if len(parts) == 5 and int(parts[3]) == group:
rows.append({'uid': int(parts[0]), 'pid': int(parts[1]), 'parentPid': int(parts[2]), 'group': int(parts[3]), 'executable': parts[4]})
return rows
def verify_members(rows):
for row in rows:
path = pathlib.Path(row['executable'])
if row['uid'] != os.getuid() or path.parent != BINARY.parent or path.name not in ['initdb', 'postgres']:
raise RuntimeError('Owned diagnostic process group cannot be safely verified')
def record_members(members, observed, ownership_findings):
observed.update({row['pid']: row for row in members})
try:
verify_members(members)
except RuntimeError:
ownership_findings.append('Process-group member failed strict executable ownership guard')
def cause(stderr, password):
lines = [line.replace(password, '[REDACTED]') for line in stderr.splitlines()
if re.search(r'FATAL:|PANIC:|ERROR:|initdb: error:|could not|No space left|Invalid argument', line, re.I)]
return lines[:10]
def run(expected_digest):
# Actual profile credentials and the campaign oracle key are never inherited.
original = SNAPSHOT.parent / 'paperclip-chat-candidate-e652b0de6e' / PACKAGE / 'native/bin/initdb'
if sha(original) != expected_digest or sha(BINARY) != expected_digest:
raise ValueError('Immutable dependency binary receipts differ')
version = subprocess.check_output([str(BINARY), '--version'], text=True, env={'PATH': '/usr/bin:/bin', 'LC_ALL': 'C'}).strip()
root = pathlib.Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=PREFIX, dir='/private/tmp'))
token = secrets.token_hex(24)
private_json(root / 'owner.json', {'version': 1, 'creatorPid': os.getpid(), 'uid': os.getuid(), 'token': token})
data = validate(BINARY, expected_digest, root, token)
if data.exists():
raise ValueError('Diagnostic cluster must not exist before admission')
password = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
password_file = root / 'password'
with os.fdopen(os.open(password_file, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600), 'w') as output:
output.write(password + '\n')
arguments = [str(BINARY), '--pgdata=' + str(data), '--auth=password', '--username=paperclip', '--pwfile=' + str(password_file), '--lc-messages=C', '--encoding=UTF8', '--locale=C', '--lc-messages=C']
started = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).isoformat()
observed = {}
timed_out = False
ownership_findings = []
with os.fdopen(os.open(root / 'stdout.log', os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600), 'wb') as stdout, os.fdopen(os.open(root / 'stderr.log', os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600), 'wb') as stderr:
child = subprocess.Popen(arguments, stdout=stdout, stderr=stderr, start_new_session=True,
env={'PATH': '/usr/bin:/bin', 'LC_ALL': 'C', 'LC_MESSAGES': 'C', 'HOME': str(root), 'TMPDIR': str(root)})
print(json.dumps({"phase": "owned-bootstrap-started", "pid": child.pid, "privateRoot": str(root)}), flush=True)
deadline = time.monotonic() + 60
while child.poll() is None:
members = group_members(child.pid)
# Never lose stderr/status or signal an unverified transient member.
record_members(members, observed, ownership_findings)
if time.monotonic() > deadline:
timed_out = True
# The private session was created by this Popen. Verify all current
# members before either signal; never signal an unverified group.
try:
verify_members(group_members(child.pid))
except RuntimeError:
ownership_findings.append('Unverified group at deadline; only direct owned child may be stopped')
if ownership_findings:
child.terminate()
else:
os.killpg(child.pid, signal.SIGTERM)
try:
child.wait(timeout=5)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
if ownership_findings:
child.kill()
else:
verify_members(group_members(child.pid))
os.killpg(child.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
break
time.sleep(0.05)
exit_code = child.wait(timeout=5)
remaining = group_members(child.pid)
if remaining:
ownership_findings.append('Diagnostic process group still has participants; cluster/password retained')
validate(BINARY, expected_digest, root, token)
stderr_text = (root / 'stderr.log').read_text(errors='replace')
# Only this freshly allocated marker-bound cluster is eligible for removal.
if data.is_symlink():
raise RuntimeError('Diagnostic pgdata became a symlink; root retained')
if not remaining:
if data.exists():
shutil.rmtree(data)
password_file.unlink()
receipt = {'schema': 'paperclip.initdb-infrastructure-diagnostic/v1', 'infrastructureOnly': True,
'canonicalAttempts': 0, 'providerCalls': 0, 'nativeRuns': 0, 'sourceSnapshot': str(SNAPSHOT),
'binary': str(BINARY), 'binarySha256': expected_digest, 'binaryVersion': version,
'helperSha256': sha(__file__), 'packageVersion': json.loads((SNAPSHOT / PACKAGE / 'package.json').read_text())['version'],
'command': arguments, 'startedAt': started, 'finishedAt': datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).isoformat(),
'pid': child.pid, 'processGroup': child.pid, 'observedOwnedProcesses': list(observed.values()),
'exitCode': exit_code, 'timedOut': timed_out, 'ownershipGuardFindings': sorted(set(ownership_findings)), 'stderrSha256': sha(root / 'stderr.log'),
'stdoutSha256': sha(root / 'stdout.log'), 'sanitizedCause': cause(stderr_text, password),
'cleanup': {'ownedProcessGroupEmpty': not remaining, 'ownedClusterDataRemoved': not data.exists(), 'passwordFileRemoved': not password_file.exists(), 'diagnosticLogsRetainedPrivately': True}}
private_json(root / 'receipt.json', receipt)
return {'receiptPath': str(root / 'receipt.json'), 'exitCode': exit_code, 'sanitizedCause': receipt['sanitizedCause'], 'cleanup': receipt['cleanup']}
if __name__ == '__main__':
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument('--expected-sha256', required=True)
args = parser.parse_args()
print(json.dumps(run(args.expected_sha256)))