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PaperClipAI/doc/plugins/DISTRIBUTION-PLUGINS.md
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip 2168f50741 Forward provider credentials from verified image catalogs (#21186)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages AI agents for work.
> - Application images can ship plugins that provide task environments.
> - Paperclip starts plugin workers with a restricted process
environment.
> - An image author can know which provider credentials an image-bundled
worker needs.
> - The image catalog already identifies selected bundles and verifies
their content.
> - This change adds a way for the image catalog to declare the provider
keys that a verified worker receives.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Image-bundled environment drivers can use the worker credential delivery
already available to built-in providers.

**Current behavior**

The host provides fixed credential forwarding for certain built-in
providers.

**Proposed behavior**

A verified image bundle can receive provider API keys declared on its
own catalog entry.

**Reason and benefit**

Image authors can scope deployment credentials to the verified worker
that needs them.

## What Changed

- Add an optional provider credential declaration to the image-owned
distribution catalog.
- Scope forwarding to the verified worker for the selected bundle.
- Publish distribution catalog support for image builders.

## Verification

- The new loader regression failed before the change because the old
catalog rejected the credential declaration.
- Ran six focused Vitest suites for bundled activation, package
identity, distribution catalog validation, worker environment, and
managed configuration. 166 tests passed and one existing test was
skipped.
- Ran `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`. It passed.
- Reviewed the diff for secret values and personal information. Test
keys are synthetic.
- A downstream image build fixture exercised the catalog reader, bundle
verification, and worker environment together. The supported build
passed only the declared provider key to the verified worker. The build
for an older target omitted the declaration.
- Local verification used embedded PostgreSQL and prebuilt fixtures.

## Risks

- Deploy images with catalog credential declarations only to Core
versions that support the field. Older hosts reject unknown catalog
fields.
- The image author controls which verified bundle receives each provider
API key.

## Model Used

- Implementation: GPT-6.1 Sol (`gpt-6.1-sol`), delegated through Codex.
Independent Codex review and verification.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs
- [x] I have described the issue in the PR
- [x] I have used public references
- [x] My branch name describes the change
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented risks
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address reviewer comments before requesting merge

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-12 20:53:08 +00:00

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8.6 KiB
Markdown

# Plugins supplied by an application distribution
A downstream image can add prebuilt plugins without changing Paperclip's
built-in catalog. The operator owns the image and trusts its plugin code.
This is packaging and activation policy, not a sandbox or entitlement system.
Ordinary self-hosted images need no catalog and keep their existing behavior.
## Image layout
Use `distribution/catalog.json` beneath `PAPERCLIP_BUNDLED_PLUGIN_ROOT`
(default `/app/packages/plugins`). Each plugin has a stable directory below
`distribution/`, containing its `package.json`, compiled manifest, worker and
optional UI. Bundle runtime dependencies; startup never installs them.
```json
{
"schemaVersion": 1,
"plugins": [{
"key": "example-extension",
"pluginKey": "example.extension",
"version": "1.0.0",
"directory": "example-extension",
"digest": "sha256:<64 lowercase hex characters>"
}]
}
```
The digest covers a sorted depth-first file inventory. Each entry is
`[relativePosixPath, "sha256:" + sha256(fileBytes), permissionBits & 0777]`.
Hash the UTF-8 JSON serialization of the inventory and prefix it with
`sha256:`. The server's `distributionBundleDigest` implements this contract.
There are no symbolic links or special files. A bundle is limited to 10,000
files, 256 MiB and 32 directory levels. Catalog keys, plugin IDs and directory
names must be unique; a distribution cannot replace a built-in key or ID.
On startup, the host validates the catalog, hashes the bundle before importing
its executable manifest, and validates package version and confined prebuilt
entrypoints. Malformed catalogs and integrity failures stop startup. Deploy
the catalog and bundles atomically as part of the image; keep them read-only
in operation. This detects packaging errors but does not authenticate an
untrusted image builder. Image provenance and signatures remain deployment
responsibilities.
### Provider credentials
An image author can set `workerCredentialEnv` on a distribution catalog
entry to pass provider API keys from the host environment. For example,
`"workerCredentialEnv": ["EXAMPLE_API_KEY"]` lets the worker receive
`EXAMPLE_API_KEY` when the deployment sets it. List 1 to 16 distinct
uppercase environment variable names ending in `_API_KEY`, each at most
128 characters. Store the names in the catalog and set the values through
the deployment.
Core grants these variables to the selected, digest-verified worker when
it declares `environment.drivers.register`. This grant is available through
managed image activation. The ordinary `plugins.workerEnv` credential
restriction applies independently.
Before emitting this field, image builders can check for
`workerCredentialEnv` in the capability list at
`server/src/services/distribution-plugin-catalog-capabilities.json` in the
target Core source revision. Older versions reject the unknown catalog field.
## Selection, upgrades and rollback
Managed instances select a distribution key through the existing
`plugins.autoInstall` list. Existing install, capability validation, API
compatibility, worker and health mechanisms apply. A worker or install failure
is recorded as a plugin error without taking down the application.
A managed instance can also give a selected plugin process variables through
`plugins.workerEnv`. The document holds variable names, not values. The deployment
sets the values in the server's process environment:
```json
{ "plugins": {
"autoInstall": ["example-extension"],
"workerEnv": { "example-extension": ["EXAMPLE_ORIGIN", "EXAMPLE_CAPABILITY"] }
} }
```
Each key must be in `autoInstall`. Startup fails if a name looks like a host
credential, such as one with `KEY`, `TOKEN`, `SECRET`, `PASSWORD`, `DATABASE` or
`JWT` as a word, or if it controls how the worker loads code, such as
`NODE_OPTIONS`. Give a granted variable a name for its own use, not a reused host
variable. Only the plugin with that catalog key receives the variables. A managed
instance runs a selected plugin only from the current image, so an install from
another source does not start.
A grant does not give access to any company. To let a plugin serve a company with
no saved configuration, name the company in `plugins.enabledCompanies`:
```json
{ "plugins": {
"autoInstall": ["example-extension"],
"enabledCompanies": { "example-extension": ["<company-uuid>"] }
} }
```
The plugin then receives resource lifecycle events for that company and can use
project instance secrets there. A company can still disable the plugin. This does
not give access for background worker calls. Those still need a saved company
configuration. Core reads the list from the document on each use and does not save
it, so a database restore cannot bring back access that the document removed.
The catalog alone does not auto-enable plugins on self-hosted instances.
Operators can explicitly install catalog entries through the normal plugin
CLI. The package's manifest ID and version must match the catalog.
The manifest's worker and optional UI entrypoints must match the verified
`package.json` declarations and stay inside the bundle.
At boot, selected distribution entries adopt the current image's package path
even when a previous npm or local install has the same version. Reconciliation
keeps the registry ID, configuration and stored state. With unchanged permissions,
operator-disabled status is retained. A replacement that adds capabilities is
saved atomically in `upgrade_pending`, even for same-version bundles. It cannot
activate until an operator reviews the manifest and enables it through the normal
plugin lifecycle. Invalid capability declarations are rejected before persistence.
Runtime refreshes also reject unapproved capability additions before starting code.
Rolling back an unapproved replacement refreshes the displayed manifest but
retains `upgrade_pending`. Review the rollback manifest and explicitly enable it
to resume. A smaller capability set alone cannot prove prior approval: it may
retain an unapproved permission, and the plugin may originally have been disabled.
Ordinary upgrades/downgrades of an approved, ready plugin continue automatically.
Keep each key's directory stable across releases. The activation guard also
covers persisted installs: a plugin removed from the image catalog, or no
longer selected in managed configuration, cannot activate on restart. Its
stored image path remains the source marker if the directory disappears; package
resolution cannot substitute an npm copy. Keep the catalog root stable as well.
An explicit operator reinstall changes a package's source; editing database rows
or replacing the catalog root is outside this image-selection contract. Plugin
database records remain for rollback. Plugin data migrations must themselves
support the intended rollback window; removing a bundle does not undo them.
A deployment controller must generate `plugins.autoInstall` from the **target
image's** catalog. A union of catalogs from different releases is insufficient:
an older image rejects a key it does not know. Before reverting to a host
version that predates this catalog contract, disable the distribution plugins
and remove their keys from configuration. Such older hosts do not have the
new activation guard.
## Persistent application UI
The `appShellOverlay` slot requires `ui.action.register`. It receives the usual
`PluginWidgetProps` context. It mounts once in both application shells and
survives route navigation. It is disposed when the account or selected company
changes, during onboarding, and on sign-out. It is not mounted on login pages.
Local-trusted mode has no login requirement: its sessionless board may mount
overlays, but transitions to or from an account still dispose the prior state.
The host positions contributions above the mobile navigation and stacks them
at the bottom right. Each plugin owns its launcher, panel, keyboard handling,
focus restoration, accessible labels and request cancellation. Use a bounded,
responsive panel. This slot is not a launcher placement zone and does not
replace modal/launcher APIs. Errors remain inside the existing plugin mount
error boundary.
UI code is trusted browser code. Host context is display context, never proof
of server authorization. A distribution backend must independently validate
the signed-in session and enforce company, tenant and user access rules for
every read and mutation. Keep provider secrets out of plugin UI and manifests.
The service worker's offline cache accepts only same-origin, hashed build assets
under `/assets/`. It does not store or replay application HTML, extension routes
or API data. This policy remains in effect after worker restarts and does not read
the arbitrary-response caches created by older workers.