DottaandPaperclip
db8a273562
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Native tasks save a provider session for later comments and monitor checks. > - The goal projection also records the run that owns the session event sequence. > - A fresh retry uses a new native session, but the projection accepted only the old session. > - The accepted checkpoint then rejected session publication because the goal source still named the old run. > - This pull request lets the current task executor advance that source after a terminal predecessor with no unfinished goal. > - Later turns can then use the fresh retry's saved session. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related: #12669, #18343. I searched open and closed PRs for source epochs and native task-session publication. I found no duplicate repair. **What happened?** A successful fresh native retry could retain its predecessor's task-session pointer. A later comment or monitor selected the old provider session. The goal source transition required both runs to have the same native session. The terminal checkpoint then saved a `suppressed_newer` publication result. **Expected behavior** The current task executor can publish its accepted fresh session. A later turn resumes that session. Delayed events cannot restore the old source or revive a cleared goal. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Complete a native turn and retain its task-session row. 2. Admit a fresh session on the same task without deleting the row. 3. Complete that turn, then send an ordinary follow-up. 4. Before this change, the saved pointer can still name the first session. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced on source commit `36df8933f0` with a PostgreSQL regression before the production change. **Deployment mode** Source checkout. The affected producer runs for local and remote native sessions. ## What Changed - Permit a different native session to advance the goal source only when its run holds the task execution lock and assignee, and the task is in progress. - Keep the terminal predecessor, native runtime, runner identity, absent or completed goal, source sequence, and conversation reset checks. - Test accepted session publication, a fresh heartbeat followed by an ordinary resumed turn, stale events, current-owner loss, and unfinished or unreadable goals. - Add an opt-in live Codex file-persistence check. Update execution documentation and both recovery maps. ## Verification - Red: the new PostgreSQL publication regression failed before the producer change. The saved session, display ID and goal source still named the predecessor. - Green: 72 distinct tests passed across the final focused runs of `runner-goals.test.ts`, `native-task-session-publication.test.ts`, `native-session-resumption.test.ts`, and `remote-warm-session-recovery.test.ts`. - The assembled heartbeat test admits three turns, opens two provider sessions, resumes the second session once, and stores three results. It uses a deterministic provider backend. - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` and `git diff --check` passed. - Real local Codex acceptance passed on macOS arm64 with `gpt-6.1-sol` and explicit warm mode. Three heartbeat turns saved three exact file lines. The fresh second turn published its new normalized and provider session IDs. The ordinary third turn retained both IDs. The fixture closed its warm owners and removed its private credential copy and workspace. The production code was at `450e15e`; the final test-only commit selects explicit warm mode and uses the existing owned-home cleanup helper. The production change is identical in the final head. - The earlier per-turn fixture preserved all three file steps and selected the correct normalized session, but provider-thread reuse failed. `run.attach` reported that the Codex provider had pending events; the safe fallback used another provider thread. This remains a separate failure. The first fixture cleanup also failed on immutable instruction assets. The owned-home helper fixed cleanup, and the second per-turn attempt exposed the provider identity assertion directly. - Full current-head CI passes, including typecheck, build, general and serialized tests, Rust/Runner checks, all eight E2E shards, and the `ci / e2e` and `ci / verify` aggregate gates. Greptile is 5/5 on the current commit, with no unresolved review threads. Broad local workspace checks were not duplicated; the focused regressions and actual provider acceptance above were run locally. No merge, deployment, or recovery of an original task is included. ## Risks - Source epoch changes affect saved goal state. The fresh-session path requires current task authority and refuses unfinished or unreadable saved goals. - The change starts no provider work and changes no prior-owner recovery guard. Unknown external outcomes retain their reconciliation hold. - A prior session remains held when it lacks the required authority or state proof. - Per-turn provider-thread reuse remains an open coverage gap described above. This change does not alter that attachment guard. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family. The exact model ID and context window are unavailable in this session. The agent used code inspection, tools, and executable tests. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.
Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file:
onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps.
The feature index lists feature and
capability IDs; IDs and references
explains entry-point references and stable naming.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server,
company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require
Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer
connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource
and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the
rollout policy
and connection authorization.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.