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DottaandPaperclip
e22d2a0eba
Preserve import and rotation objectives in the existing setup screen, keep one-time secret copy and retry states bounded, and document authorized self-targeted policy administration. Record fixture evidence separately from live verification. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
983 lines
102 KiB
Markdown
983 lines
102 KiB
Markdown
# External chat and email conversations — agent access
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Product map: [chat-channels](../feature-map/chat-channels.md).
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Feature ID: `chat-channels`.
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Review date: 2026-10-26. Source base: `a1f77821b9cd5c9c846fdf7a0fa5cc620ad2b6bb`; implementation: [#17737](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17737).
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Connection operations reviewed in this working tree. The inventory was reconciled
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against production UI clients, REST registrations and service entry points; it is
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a review checklist, not a runtime registry. [Authorization and evidence contract](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md).
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Fixture evidence is separate from live provider qualification and from empirical
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LLM success. Source-only entries have a reviewed agent path or an explicit boundary,
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but do not claim an individually executed HTTP test.
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## `providers`
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Capability ID: `chat-channels/providers`.
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Review: `operation-reviewed`.
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### `get-companies-chat-endpoints`
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API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-endpoints`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `post-companies-chat-endpoints`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-endpoints`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
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Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
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Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
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### `get-chat-endpoints`
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API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
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Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
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Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
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### `get-companies-chat-slack-setup-options`
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API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-slack/setup-options`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-slack-managed-authorize`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/managed/authorize`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-slack-managed-provision`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/managed/provision`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `delete-companies-chat-slack-manager-grants`
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API: `present` — `DELETE /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-slack/manager-grants/{grantId}`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `get-chat-slack-managed-oauth-callback`
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API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-slack/managed/oauth/callback`; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
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Agent access: `restricted` — browser authentication return.
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Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-slack-registration`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/registration`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-slack-install`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/install`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `get-chat-slack-oauth-callback`
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API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-slack/oauth/callback`; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
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Agent access: `restricted` — browser authentication return.
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Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
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### `get-chat-endpoints-github-configuration`
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API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/configuration`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
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Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
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Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
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### `put-chat-endpoints-github-configuration`
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API: `present` — `PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/configuration`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
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Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
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Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-github-verify`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/verify`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
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Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
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Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
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### `put-chat-endpoints-github-progress`
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API: `present` — `PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/progress`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `get-chat-endpoints-github-personal-connections`
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API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/personal-connections`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-github-people-lookup`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/people/lookup`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-github-registration`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/registration`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
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Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
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Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-github-registration-restart`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/registration/restart`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `put-chat-endpoints-github-draft`
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API: `present` — `PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/draft`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-github-setup`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/setup`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
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||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-github-app`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/app`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api` return a saved human credential-entry handoff; agents may send an empty body.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). A human session imports the App credentials and signing key. Delegated service import is rejected, and agent requests persist no caller-chosen key.
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Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts), [provider service](../../server/src/services/chat-channels/github/app-setup.ts), and [actual-auth fixture](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts). Agent key/JWT handoffs leave vault refs unchanged; human import persists credentials, then agent repository discovery and verification continue.
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Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures, assembled server and [saved-screen tests](../../ui/src/pages/apps/chat/GitHubChatSetup.test.tsx).
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Gaps: Human credential entry is intentional; no live provider qualification.
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### `post-chat-endpoints-github-repositories-refresh`
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API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/repositories/refresh`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
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Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
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||
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
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Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
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||
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### `get-chat-endpoints-github-repositories`
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API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/repositories`; JSON REST.
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Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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### `put-chat-endpoints-github-repositories-access`
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API: `present` — `PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/repositories/access`; JSON REST.
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||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `patch-chat-endpoints`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `PATCH /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
|
||
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-photon-inspect`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/photon/inspect`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-setup`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/setup`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
|
||
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-setup-secret`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/setup-secret`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api` return the saved endpoint's `requiredUserAction` handoff. Only a human session can rotate and receive the signing secret.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Agents cannot generate or export the GitHub webhook signing secret; the service also rejects delegated generation.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts), [provider service](../../server/src/services/chat-channels/github/setup-secret.ts), and [authenticated regression](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts). Actual key/JWT requests return a handoff without changing credential refs; a human session can rotate and persist new refs.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server. The regression failed before the fix; all 42 assembled-server scenarios passed afterward. Rotation remains pending through old health and generation/reconnect failures. A completion marker commits with new vault refs and cleared webhook verification; restored verified health is also required. Saved links open the one-time human rotation screen.
|
||
Gaps: No live GitHub rotation qualification; plaintext signing-secret setup intentionally remains a human step.
|
||
|
||
### `get-chat-endpoints-resources`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/resources`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `put-chat-endpoints-resources`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/resources`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `get-companies-email-connections`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/connections`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
|
||
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
|
||
|
||
### `post-companies-email-connections`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/connections`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
|
||
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
|
||
|
||
### `post-companies-email-connections-inspect`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/connections/{connectionId}/inspect`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-companies-email-connections-check-address`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/connections/{connectionId}/check-address`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `get-companies-email-inboxes`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/inboxes`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
|
||
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-companies-email-inspect`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/inspect`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-companies-email-inboxes`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/inboxes`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `get-companies-email-deliveries`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
|
||
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
## `identity`
|
||
|
||
Capability ID: `chat-channels/identity`.
|
||
|
||
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-github-identity`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/identity`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-github-identity-start`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/identity/start`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
|
||
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-github-identity-confirm`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/identity/confirm`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `get-chat-endpoints-principals`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/principals`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-principals-link-intent`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/principals/{principalId}/link-intent`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `delete-chat-endpoints-principals-link`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `DELETE /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/principals/{principalId}/link`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-identity-links-confirm`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-identity-links/confirm`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-identity-links-request-access`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-identity-links/request-access`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `get-chat-identity-links-preview`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-identity-links/preview`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `get-api-chat-github-manifest-callback`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-github/manifest/callback`; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — browser authentication return.
|
||
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/app.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `get-api-chat-github-cloud-callback`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-github/cloud/callback`; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — browser authentication return.
|
||
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/app.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `get-api-chat-github-identity-callback`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-github/identity/callback`; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — browser authentication return.
|
||
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/app.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
## `conversation`
|
||
|
||
Capability ID: `chat-channels/conversation`.
|
||
|
||
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
|
||
|
||
### `get-chat-endpoints-github-review-detail`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/reviews/{reviewId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Linked task and project visibility apply to every review row in addition to endpoint and credential visibility.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [production-authenticated integration fixture](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) with real database persistence and deterministic provider responses where required.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — Actual agent-key reads return the visible review and omit or return 404 for a review linked to an inaccessible private task. Real database persistence; no live GitHub call.
|
||
Gaps: Fixture evidence does not qualify live provider behavior or an empirical model success rate.
|
||
|
||
### `get-chat-endpoints-github-reviews`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/reviews`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Linked task and project visibility apply to every review row in addition to endpoint and credential visibility.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [production-authenticated integration fixture](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) with real database persistence and deterministic provider responses where required.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — Actual agent-key reads return the visible review and omit or return 404 for a review linked to an inaccessible private task. Real database persistence; no live GitHub call.
|
||
Gaps: Fixture evidence does not qualify live provider behavior or an empirical model success rate.
|
||
|
||
### `get-chat-endpoints-conversations`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/conversations`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-conversations-publications`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/conversations/{conversationId}/publications`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `get-chat-endpoints-conversations-publications-status`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/conversations/{conversationId}/publications/{publicationId}/status`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:use`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `get-issues-chat-binding`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/issues/{issueId}/chat-binding`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`, responsible-user ceiling, task privacy, endpoint resource scope and target-agent visibility.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-api-chat-webhooks`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-webhooks/{publicId}/{provider}`; provider webhook ingress.
|
||
Agent access: `not-applicable` — provider-signed inbound events; agent keys and gateway tokens cannot authenticate this route.
|
||
Policy: The provider verifies the payload signature and binds the endpoint/company. The request has no agent principal.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Provider ingress has no agent invocation path. Provider signature validation remains required.
|
||
|
||
### `post-companies-email-send`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/send`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
|
||
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `get-companies-email-tasks`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/tasks/{issueId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
|
||
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-api-chat-webhooks-agentmail`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-webhooks/agentmail/{publicId}`; provider webhook ingress.
|
||
Agent access: `not-applicable` — provider-signed inbound events; agent keys and gateway tokens cannot authenticate this route.
|
||
Policy: The provider verifies the payload signature and binds the endpoint/company. The request has no agent principal.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Provider ingress has no agent invocation path. Provider signature validation remains required.
|
||
Monitor publication lineage uses the admitted wake and its source run's matching
|
||
`set_task_monitor` receipt, including company, task, immutable agent, requester,
|
||
and scheduled time. A source ID in context cannot grant publication. The normal
|
||
delivery worker rechecks current endpoint and sender authority. Database fixtures
|
||
exercise lineage and finalization recovery; live Slack qualification remains
|
||
separate.
|
||
|
||
Publication, provider-reply, and form-open 403/permission errors fail the rejected
|
||
operation without removing unrelated assigned channel tools. Confirmed
|
||
authentication failures still put the endpoint in attention, which blocks tool
|
||
admission and provider sends; connection enabled intent is retained. Known
|
||
resource denials and explicit revocation keep their narrower or installation-wide
|
||
stops. PostgreSQL provider fixtures verify discovery after 403 and rejection after
|
||
401, including signed installation removal after a 401; they do not establish
|
||
live GitHub credential recovery.
|
||
|
||
GitHub publication recovery (2026-10-14): assigned-agent `submit_review`, `comment`,
|
||
and `update_comment` calls reuse their run-, task-, endpoint-, and argument-bound
|
||
publication on an exact retry. Identity uses the complete durable request rather
|
||
than the shortened audit preview. A changed suffix, changed nested entry, or
|
||
missing publication cannot authorize another write. Exact retries only read the
|
||
receipt; the worker owns pending provider retries. Fresh gateway policy and provider authority remain
|
||
required. The durable worker resumes transient failures after restart and stops
|
||
at its retry cap, revoked authority, or a superseded head. A pending receipt is
|
||
not task completion. Source:
|
||
[publication service](../../server/src/services/chat-github-reviews.ts) and
|
||
[gateway](../../server/src/services/tool-gateway.ts). Verification uses
|
||
PostgreSQL-backed provider fixtures; this entry does not claim live provider
|
||
qualification for the new retry path.
|
||
|
||
GitHub main-response identity (2026-10-19): PR requests share a company-, App-,
|
||
repository- and PR-bound comment. Agents still supply no comment destination.
|
||
Current sender, assignee, repository and publication authority are checked before
|
||
edits, including maintenance failure notices. Leading mentions for another
|
||
recipient are filtered before task work; explicit mentions of this bot still
|
||
follow normal access checks. Provider-fixture coverage is not live GitHub proof.
|
||
Native terminal reconciliation resolves the accepted run identity through the
|
||
existing chat provenance resolver; an older run's reply cannot complete a newer
|
||
request merely because both requests share the same PR comment.
|
||
|
||
Speko browser sessions use `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions`,
|
||
with GET inspection/notification and POST `/{sessionId}/end` operations below
|
||
that collection. These routes require board identity; ordinary agent credentials
|
||
cannot start a private voice session. Start and notification also require the
|
||
experimental chat-connectors gate. Signed provider callbacks use the separate
|
||
voice-webhook routes and their session capability. Evidence: `source-only` —
|
||
[voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts). No live browser answer
|
||
retrieval or telephone playback is established by the UI fixtures.
|
||
|
||
Slack's **Require at-mention** policy applies to channel messages and channel
|
||
thread replies, including queued work. DMs are exempt from mention checks;
|
||
endpoint availability, **Allow direct messages**, and sender authorization still
|
||
apply. Top-level DM replies retain their linear conversation destination. Source:
|
||
[admission](../../server/src/services/chat-channels.ts) and
|
||
[queued run policy](../../server/src/services/durable-chat-wakeup.ts). Live Slack
|
||
verification of this exemption remains separate from provider-fixture coverage.
|
||
|
||
Slack eyes acknowledge the authorized task/comment commit before attachment
|
||
preparation or scheduler acceptance. This server-owned receipt grants no agent
|
||
authority. Generation/credential fencing, durable retries and exact-source final
|
||
cleanup still apply. PostgreSQL fixtures block attachments, subscription and
|
||
wakeup independently to verify that none gates the reaction; live Slack latency
|
||
remains a separate check. See [receipt worker](../../server/src/services/chat-channels/receipt-reactions.ts).
|
||
|
||
Controller-owned receipt reactions accept the SDK's empty thread timestamp for
|
||
linear DMs. Channel IDs and source message timestamps remain validated. This
|
||
does not add an agent tool or change sender, task, or credential authorization.
|
||
The pinned SDK transport regression is covered in
|
||
[receipt tests](../../server/src/services/chat-slack-receipts.test.ts); live
|
||
acknowledgement speed needs a separate provider test.
|
||
|
||
Slack assignment and tool discovery bound concurrent endpoint preparation to
|
||
two. Every endpoint keeps the live task, company, agent and linked-user checks;
|
||
403 denials omit only that endpoint. Preparation waits for both active checks
|
||
before it returns an ordered result or propagates an error. Tool authority reads
|
||
the current bot token without resolving unrelated webhook credentials. See the
|
||
[real-database preparation controls](../../server/src/__tests__/slack-tool-preparation.test.ts)
|
||
and [batch failure controls](../../server/src/services/connectors/slack-endpoint-preparation.test.ts).
|
||
These local controls do not establish live Slack latency or provider access.
|
||
|
||
Native tool gateways use the durable run task binding for discovery and policy
|
||
checks, with legacy JSON task fields as a fallback. GitHub and Slack follow
|
||
accepted request provenance across task continuations. GitHub can retain the
|
||
originating conversation after a board follow-up from the same accepted user.
|
||
An inherited origin cannot cross a task, agent, company, or requester boundary.
|
||
Cycle checks reject invalid history without a fixed limit on valid continuations.
|
||
Endpoint settings, linked identity, tool profiles, and invocation policy still
|
||
apply on each call. The native tool contract rotates older provider sessions so
|
||
an empty retained catalog is not reused. PostgreSQL fixtures cover discovery,
|
||
review publication, Slack reads, and revocation in
|
||
[channel integration](../../server/src/__tests__/chat-channels.integration.test.ts)
|
||
and [provenance controls](../../server/src/services/chat-channels/run-origin.test.ts).
|
||
The [voice gateway fixture](../../server/src/__tests__/voice-session-store.integration.test.ts)
|
||
also verifies durable task binding for a later personal callback invocation.
|
||
Failure replies cannot replace final answers inherited from an earlier run.
|
||
These fixtures do not prove live provider delivery.
|
||
|
||
Catalog authorization projection (2026-10-17): tool discovery uses the same live
|
||
service-owned task, company, agent, requester, endpoint and credential checks as
|
||
full authority resolution. It omits the revision digest and search-action token,
|
||
which catalog descriptors do not consume. Connector assignments and governed
|
||
operations retain full revision resolution; invocation policy is still checked
|
||
by the gateway. Registry replacement and missing-service controls are in
|
||
[authority registration tests](../../server/src/services/connectors/slack-authority.test.ts).
|
||
This is a source and local-database contract; hosted latency needs live evidence.
|
||
|
||
New conversations resolve typed project/workspace defaults from their endpoint
|
||
and destination under the task-creation transaction. Defaults do not authorize
|
||
private sources: admission checks the linked user's authority and assigned agent.
|
||
An existing conversation keeps its task binding. See
|
||
[creation service](../../server/src/services/chat-channels.ts) and
|
||
[defaults contract](../../packages/shared/src/types/chat-channels.ts).
|
||
|
||
### `post-voice-sessions`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `get-voice-session`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions/{sessionId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `get-voice-notification`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions/{sessionId}/notification`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `get-voice-report`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions/{sessionId}/report`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
## `attachments`
|
||
|
||
Capability ID: `chat-channels/attachments`.
|
||
|
||
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
|
||
|
||
### `get-issues-attachments`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/issues/{id}/attachments`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and native `search_api` / `call_api` for the attachment list.
|
||
Policy: Current company membership and task read/privacy authority. Connection management grants do not replace task access.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [asset routes](../../server/src/routes/assets.ts).
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — list attachments with actual agent authentication and deny a foreign or private task.
|
||
Gaps: This operation has source review, not current-head HTTP verification.
|
||
|
||
### `post-companies-issues-attachments`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/issues/{issueId}/attachments`; multipart upload.
|
||
Agent access: `partial` — agent REST upload; native attachment tools and `register_deliverable` use their admitted resource paths and server-owned chat delivery. JSON-only `call_api` does not upload multipart content.
|
||
Policy: Task mutation/privacy authority, company/resource bounds, storage limits, and admitted native tool scope. Server-owned delivery does not grant endpoint administration.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [asset routes](../../server/src/routes/assets.ts) and [native authority](../../server/src/services/native-runtime/paperclip-runner-tool-authority.ts).
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — upload through an admitted agent path, inspect the stored task attachment and outbound delivery, and deny a foreign task.
|
||
Gaps: Multipart upload is not a JSON native API call. Live chat file delivery remains unqualified by this connection setup audit.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-publications-replay`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/publications/{publicationId}/replay`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-publications-resolve`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/publications/{publicationId}/resolve`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-actions-resolve`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/actions/{actionId}/resolve`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `post-companies-email-deliveries-resolve`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}/resolve`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — human connection manager records the outcome of an uncertain external delivery. Agents use normal governed send/status operations.
|
||
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
## `lifecycle`
|
||
|
||
Capability ID: `chat-channels/lifecycle`.
|
||
|
||
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-slack-test-message`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/test-message`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:use`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Test messages and identity-link invitations consume normal action-policy rate limits once before dispatch; saved request receipts prevent duplicate sends.
|
||
Evidence: `verified` — [production-authenticated integration fixture](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) with real database persistence and deterministic provider responses where required.
|
||
Verification: `passed` — Actual agent-key requests honor Off/Allowed policy, consume the configured one-message quota, replay a saved request without another send, and deny distinct test/invitation requests after the quota. Provider responses are fixtures.
|
||
Gaps: Fixture evidence does not qualify live provider behavior or an empirical model success rate.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-slack-resume`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/resume`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-test`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/test`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-finish`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/finish`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `get-chat-endpoints-test-status`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/test-status`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `get-chat-endpoints-activity`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/activity`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:view_audit`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-chat-endpoints-deliveries-replay`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/deliveries/{deliveryId}/replay`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `restricted` — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
|
||
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/chat-channels.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
|
||
|
||
### `post-email-inboxes-control`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/email/inboxes/{endpointId}/control`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
### `post-email-inboxes-reconnect`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/email/inboxes/{endpointId}/reconnect`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
|
||
Policy: `tools:manage_connections`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/email.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
|
||
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
|
||
|
||
GitHub review summary headings use the bot display name. Checks remain
|
||
independently scoped by GitHub App and endpoint/PR/commit identity.
|
||
|
||
After publishing a review, native agents can report `yielded` with
|
||
`response_wake` and no attention requests. Current conversation authorization
|
||
is checked again at commit. The task remains in review without a human card;
|
||
real human dependencies retain the ordinary attention-request path. A timed
|
||
wait requires a confirmed `set_task_monitor` schedule. Database coverage lives
|
||
in `external-chat-wait.integration.test.ts`; this is not live model evidence.
|
||
|
||
### `post-voice-end`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions/{sessionId}/end`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `get-voice-callbacks`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-callbacks/{endpointId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `put-voice-callbacks`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `PUT /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-callbacks/{endpointId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `get-voice-phone`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `put-voice-phone`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `PUT /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `get-voice-incoming`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}/incoming`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `post-voice-incoming-decision`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}/incoming/{callId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `get-voice-phone-history`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}/history`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
### `get-voice-history`
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-history/{endpointId}`; JSON REST.
|
||
Agent access: `operator-only` — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
|
||
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — [voice routes](../../server/src/routes/voice-sessions.ts), reviewed in this working tree.
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
|
||
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
|
||
|
||
## `outbound-email`
|
||
|
||
Capability ID: `chat-channels/outbound-email`.
|
||
|
||
Review: `baseline`.
|
||
|
||
API: `present` — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/inboxes; POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/send for both send/reply; GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/tasks/{issueId}; GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}. Administrative uncertain-outcome resolution uses POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}/resolve.
|
||
|
||
Agent access: `partial` — the assigned agent can use the email REST/CLI path with its actual active run and admitted email.send/email.reply policy. Board writers use their own credential authority. Availability of a CLI or scenario email tool does not establish that a native run has that tool binding or generic fallback admitted.
|
||
|
||
Policy: Agent sends require ownership of the inbox and source task, task read access, an available agent within budget, a running task run that owns execution/checkout, standard work mode, and no restricted external execution. Active endpoint, connection, credential access, and email.send/email.reply policy are rechecked. Authenticated board sends require active company membership and credential access; viewer sends additionally require instance-admin status. Local implicit authority skips the membership check. Agent reads retain task/inbox/company checks; board thread/delivery reads use the route’s company-access boundary. Delivery resolution requires board tools:manage_connections or existing elevated operator authority, not ordinary agent access.
|
||
|
||
Evidence: `source-only` — reviewed at `9ef434fe79c57d976b8b03b14c5242db270b8320`. [Email CLI](../../cli/src/commands/client/email.ts), [request schema](../../packages/shared/src/validators/email.ts), [email routes](../../server/src/routes/email.ts), and [email authority/publication](../../server/src/services/email-channels.ts).
|
||
|
||
Verification: `not-run` — Use the actual permitted writer and run to create one child/publication, confirm recipient delivery and an exact-message reply, and repeat idempotent requests without duplicate sends. Assert run/owner/mode/budget/company/credential/attachment denials and separate read access. Inspect the provider before resolving an unknown write outcome; a 202 or queued publication alone is not proof of delivery.
|
||
|
||
Gaps: Real AgentMail transport, recipient delivery, and each native tool binding still need live proof. Controlled provider receipts and inbound-reply recipes do not establish a newly initiated external email journey.
|