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PaperClipAI/doc/plugins/AGENT_RUNTIME_SYNC.md
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip a3e8fa568a Reduce repeated work during plugin Runner admission (#17377)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages agents and their execution authority.
> - A plugin can host Runner tasks on a persistent execution host.
> - Admission checks must observe current lifecycle state and
credentials.
> - The current runtime reader also resolves files, skills, and
connections for each check.
> - Some providers also repeat the same project authentication check
during submit.
> - This pull request adds a compact fresh reader and an explicit
submit-time validation contract.
> - Providers can remove repeated work while Core keeps lease and scope
checks.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Plugin Runner startup before task submission.

**Current behavior**

One measured startup made 30 full runtime reads during bootstrap. These
reads took 5.759 seconds. Each guard can resolve instructions, skills,
and connection assignments even when it only needs current identity and
lifecycle state. Providers that already enforce project authentication
in submit must also perform a separate Core preflight.

**Proposed behavior**

Use a lifecycle-owned runtime identity reader for guards. Keep the full
runtime reader for synchronization inputs. A trusted provider can
declare `projectAuthCheckAtSubmit: true` in its prepared result. Core
pins the exact configuration, provider, and project set on the lease.
The provider must reject authentication conflicts before credential
installation or task start. Providers that omit the flag retain the
existing preflight.

**Reason and benefit**

Estimated savings with a paired consumer: 4–5 seconds from compact
runtime checks, plus roughly 0.5–0.9 seconds from removing the duplicate
authentication operation. These estimates overlap and are not a measured
deployed result. Refs #17367 for the separate run-log HEAD optimization;
this PR does not duplicate it.

**Breaking changes**

No migration. The SDK adds a host method and an optional prepared-result
field. Consumers that use them require this Core host version. Older
providers retain their existing flow.

## What Changed

- Add `agents.getRuntimeIdentity` across SDK, RPC, host service, and
test fixtures.
- Reuse the existing company, plugin ownership, readiness, and
capability checks. Read lifecycle state and protected instance secrets
fresh on every call.
- Skip instruction, organization, skill, and connection hydration in the
compact reader.
- Allow explicit submit-time authentication enforcement, with prepared
scope pinned and checked again at dispatch.
- Emit fixed preparation, project-auth, submit, and connection timing
phases.

## Verification

- 72 targeted SDK capability, plugin task-owner, and environment-task
mediator tests passed.
- 33 real embedded-Postgres lifecycle and secret tests passed, including
pause, content revision, company isolation, plugin disablement, and
secret rotation.
- SDK and server TypeScript checks passed. Local Runner/eval TypeScript
outputs were built to satisfy server type resolution.
- Local Postgres required missing library aliases in ignored
dependencies; no product source was changed for that repair.
- Full repository suites are delegated to GitHub CI. No live rollout or
speedup claim.

## Risks

The submit-time flag delegates enforcement to a trusted provider. It is
not proof that prepare already checked authentication. The provider must
check before VM credential installation or task admission. Core still
checks exact prepared scope, active lease, run identity, credential
type, and dispatch fencing. Existing providers keep the separate check.
Roll back a paired consumer before rolling back this host.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 (Codex), with code execution and repository tools. Exact
deployment build and context-window size are not exposed.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue
template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
ticket id
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-23 14:54:25 -07:00

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Markdown

# Agent runtime synchronization
Plugins can opt into committed agent runtime changes with
`resourceLifecycle: ["agent_runtime"]` and `events.subscribe`.
Implement `onResourceLifecycle` and handle `update` and `delete`.
Existing agent and project subscriptions do not receive this new resource type.
Manual inbox reads retain both legacy streams regardless of automatic subscriptions.
They include runtime events only when the manifest opts into `agent_runtime`.
An event contains company identity, agent identity in `resourceId`, a numeric
sequence serialized as `id`, and its action. It contains no file contents,
configuration, or credentials. Treat `id` as an opaque decimal revision, not a
JavaScript floating-point value. Delivery is at least once and ordered per agent.
Return `acknowledged` only after external effects finish. Return `retry` after an
unfinished operation, or `deferred` when configuration is missing. Startup,
plugin startup, and configuration changes recover unacknowledged work.
The host records configuration changes at the database mutation boundary. This
covers API saves, rollback, plugin writes, and background writers. No-op updates
and heartbeat accounting do not create runtime work. Instruction edits, file
deletions, restores, and run writeback use the file audit boundary. Pending hires
produce no update until approval. Returning to the ready lifecycle phase requests
synchronization after preparation or resume. Existing agents receive a one-time
baseline when the migration runs. Agent deletion leaves a durable delete event.
PostgreSQL notifications wake the existing durable dispatcher only after commit,
including writes through independent clients. Notifications carry no identifiers
or contents. The journal remains authoritative. The listener scans on connection
and reconnection so a dropped notification does not lose committed work. There
is no recurring empty-inbox poll. Existing retry deadlines still retry failed work.
A process opens one listener connection only after a ready plugin opts into
`agent_runtime`. The database connection must support session-level `LISTEN`;
transaction-mode poolers are not supported for this opt-in feature. Startup waits
for listener registration. It releases the listener after the last runtime
subscriber is disabled or removed. Legacy subscriptions keep process-local work signals.
A plugin that also has `agents.lifecycle.manage` can call
`ctx.agents.getRuntime(agentId, companyId)` from a company-scoped invocation.
Only the enabled, ready plugin selected in that agent's required lifecycle set
can read these inputs. The result supplies the latest runtime revision, the
normalized agent configuration, instruction root and entry filename, and that
plugin's own instance secrets. Instruction paths use the same managed-folder
recovery as the instruction reader. A missing or cross-company agent returns null.
The instruction root identifies host files that the trusted worker can package
through its existing filesystem access. This API grants no arbitrary path reads.
Never expose instance secrets through UI data, logs, plugin state, or agent files.
Use `ctx.agents.getRuntimeIdentity(agentId, companyId)` for freshness checks.
It returns only the revision, agent ID, company ID, status, lifecycle state and
version, and this plugin's current instance secrets. It uses the same ownership,
capability, and company checks as `getRuntime`. Each call reads current state;
it does not cache grants or secrets. It does not resolve instruction files,
company reporting relationships, skills, or connection assignments. Read the full
runtime once to obtain synchronization inputs, then use the identity reader to
fence effects against changes.
Re-read current state before external effects. A queued event can be older than
the returned revision. Fence stale revisions at the destination and use its
conditional writes. Current configuration is desired state, not a frozen run
snapshot or permission to change an active provider session. Execution admission
and provider activation keep their existing checks. The private transport consumer
is a separate integration.
Filesystem changes outside Paperclip's managed write APIs do not emit these
hooks. Filesystem publication and the database journal are not one filesystem
transaction. A failed managed write must be repaired through the same API before
claiming synchronization. Upstream repository detection remains owned by the
source integration.
Successful file saves record the current desired state. Identical retries and
already-applied deletions repair a missing journal event if a prior save published
bytes before its database transaction failed. Audit rows carry their runtime
revision, so repeated identical saves against that revision create no audit rows
or events. Later runtime changes invalidate that deduplication. The file API still
returns `changed: false` for identical content and keeps conditional-write checks.
Consumers can skip rewriting content whose hash already matches.
## Skills
Migration 0348 invalidates referencing agents when installed skill content,
companion files, versions, source bindings, or identities change. Rename checks
both old and new keys. String selections, structured selections, and supported
legacy aliases are recognized. Unrelated agents and other companies receive no
content invalidation. Private-source bindings, membership, and privacy changes
invalidate only agents assigned skills from the affected sources. Project workspace
authorization-policy changes use the same boundary. Company policy
changes conservatively invalidate the company.
Source retry/lease bookkeeping and skill popularity counters do not emit changes.
Multi-skill source publication defers its skill invalidation until transaction
commit, after it acquires all skill rows. This avoids an agent-lock/skill-lock
cycle with concurrent version saves. Individual file edits retain immediate
journaling and their existing filesystem rollback behavior.
Assignment edits already use the configuration boundary. The runtime reader
returns selected skill entries with host source paths and immutable version IDs.
It uses the execution resolver, current agent access, the instance pin flag, and
legacy operational-skill rules. It performs no upstream refresh. The resolver can
rebuild an expired version cache from saved bytes. Slow materialization happens
outside the agent row lock. The reader rechecks ownership and revision afterward;
it retries concurrent changes three times and then returns a conflict.
Pinned assignments receive conservative content invalidations too. Their resolved
version and bytes stay pinned when pin support is enabled. Consumers can compare
versions or destination hashes and avoid rewriting unchanged trees. Task-only
skill mentions and a running task's saved version selection remain task-owned.
## Standing connection assignments
`getRuntime` also returns `connectionAssignments`: effective `publicMcp` and
`chatConnectors` feature switches, installed connections with `id`, `name`,
`transport`, `enabled`, and `status`, and active profile IDs. It includes both
company assignments and assignments for the requested agent. It excludes other
agents' assignments and has no credential values, grant details, or tool schemas.
The owning-plugin checks for the runtime reader apply to this field too.
Migration 0354 records committed changes to every stored field used by this
snapshot. Agent-targeted installation and profile binding edits invalidate only
their old and new target agents. Company-targeted assignments invalidate company
agent runtimes. Project, routine, issue, and gateway bindings are outside this
snapshot and do not invalidate it. Connection metadata, profile activation or
removal, and connector feature switches still use conservative company-wide
invalidation. Empty writes and changes to health bookkeeping do not. Multiple
assignment statements in one transaction coalesce to one update per agent.
Journal writes and their triggering changes commit or roll back together.
Company-wide invalidation remains synchronous: it locks eligible company agents
in order and journals one update per agent. Its work grows with company size;
there is no fanout ceiling or cross-transaction mutation quota.
The reader orders and deduplicates assignments. It rejects more than 512
connections or 128 active profiles with status 422 instead of returning a partial
snapshot. It rechecks the revision after reading assignments and skills, with the
same three-attempt conflict behavior described above.
Each delivery-service startup records one company baseline when an enabled
runtime subscriber becomes active. This covers feature overlays supplied at
process startup. It does not add a recurring scan. Plugins must compare desired
state and destination hashes before rewriting external files.
Standing assignments express desired state; they do not prove task-specific
authorization. Existing agent and skill invalidations still apply independently.
## Tool definitions and configuration
Migration 0355 extends runtime invalidation to application and connection
configuration, catalog contents, profile entries, policies, and MCP gateways.
These changes use the same content-free journal, atomic commit behavior, and
transaction coalescing. Bulk discovery invalidates once per company per committed
chunk instead of once per tool. Unchanged rediscovery, health bookkeeping, and
trust-rule usage counters do not request preparation. Binding and installation
notifications retain the scoped recipients described above. Profile-entry changes
notify agents from the old and new profiles' standing bindings. Policies use
their old and new `agentId` and `agentIds` selectors, including their intersection
when both are set. Unscoped policies and company-bound profiles retain atomic
company fanout. Other definition changes still use conservative company-wide
fanout with the same documented company-size cost.
Profile entry mutations lock referenced applications, connections, and catalog
rows before the parent profile. They then change the entries and parent in one
transaction, using the reserved connection for validation and profile reads.
Profile replacement locks both old and new references before the parent. It
rechecks the reference set under the parent lock and retries up to three times
if a concurrent entry edit changes it. Continued churn returns a conflict.
Setup finalization and
catalog publication can run concurrently without acquiring these locks in the
opposite order. Policy reorder locks all affected policies in ID order and changes
their priorities in one statement so scoped agent locks are ordered across the
set. Connection removal locks the managed profile before deleting its entries in
the same transaction.
The bounded assignment snapshot remains the API described above. An invalidation
can advance its revision without changing its assignment fields. Consumers must
use their existing authorized readers for tool definitions and configuration.
## Access, credentials, and endpoints
Migration 0356 adds connection grants, grant audiences and delegations, company
membership and permissions, secret bindings, chat/email endpoint configuration,
and referenced credential rotation or revocation. Vault configuration and status
changes invalidate companies whose connector credentials reference that vault.
Vault health checks, OAuth grant refresh leases, Vercel verification timestamps,
GitHub webhook health, and endpoint publication timestamps do not request work.
Credential identifiers, expiry, and repository access changes remain covered.
Events contain no credential values, phone numbers, or provider payloads.
Access changes conservatively invalidate eligible company agents because
responsible-user and task-time access can vary across runs. Agent secret bindings
instead invalidate their owning agent. Personal delegation creation, reassignment, and revocation invalidate only
their old and new target agents. Whole-grant revocation and membership cleanup
retain company invalidation. Unchanged grant audiences preserve their rows after
membership validation.
OAuth persistence and membership cleanup lock affected grants before connection
inputs and credential mutations. Each affected set is locked in ID order. Task
completion locks existing grants before assignment inputs. Permission-only saves
lock membership before replacing permissions, as role and status saves do.
Slack search refresh, callbacks, and disconnect lock only the subject's grants
before their connection. After locking the connection, they recheck the grants
without waiting. A newly discovered busy grant rolls back and retries before
provider work or credential persistence. Three failed attempts return a retryable
conflict. Each operation adds two grant queries, bounded to the subject and
connection. The existing connection lock still serializes provider refresh work.
Membership cleanup locks credential deletion candidates without waiting before
company agent locks. A busy credential rolls back the complete membership
transaction, including its membership and grant locks. All four cleanup entry
points re-read their state on retry, with at most three attempts. Company-access
changes process companies in ID order.
Personal delegation creation locks its grant, connection reference, and target
agent before insertion. Delegation revocation locks its grant and target before
deletion. Whole-grant and membership cleanup lock eligible company agents in ID
order before deleting scoped delegations. Static-key reconnect locks grants and connection inputs
before credential writes. Secret removal locks company agents in ID order before
cascading into bindings. Plugin instance secrets cannot use ordinary bindings,
so their removal retains its owner lock without a company sweep. It tries the secret lock without waiting, releases its
transaction locks if that lock is busy, and retries up to three times. Continued
contention returns a retryable conflict. Provider deletion stays outside that
transaction; retrying resumes removal of the already disabled secret. These
guards accompany the hooks that require them.
The runtime snapshot still excludes credentials and arbitrary configuration.
Task-scoped profile bindings, responsible-user consent, gateway sessions,
automatic connector skill overlays, and connection instructions remain in the
existing run preparation path. Invalidation does not create a run identity or
activate a provider session. Transport consumers must preserve those boundaries.