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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies, and a single server instance can host many companies. > - The auth middleware (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`) supports a `cloud_tenant` mode where a trusted hosting proxy injects per-request identity headers, designed originally for one-deployment-per-tenant setups. > - In that original setup, granting every cloud tenant the `instance_admin` role was harmless; on a **shared, multi-tenant pool** it means any paying tenant is admin of the whole instance and can reach every other tenant's data. > - A tenant only needs to own its own company — which it already gets via the company membership the same code path upserts — so instance-level admin is never appropriate for `cloud_tenant` actors. > - This PR removes the `instance_admin` grant from the cloud-tenant path and pins `isInstanceAdmin: false` on the resolved actor. > - Greptile review then surfaced a follow-up gap: deployments that ran the pre-hardening build still have stale `instance_admin` rows in `instance_user_roles`, which other lookups (BetterAuth session path, board API keys, and the authorization service's own DB re-check) would still honor. > - The follow-up commit closes that gap by purging stale rows at the cloud-tenant auth boundary and by teaching the authorization service that `cloud_tenant` actors are never instance admins. > - The benefit is that shared-pool hosting becomes structurally safe: tenants are company-scoped owners, never instance admins — including on deployments upgrading from the older behavior. ## Linked Issues - Refs #966 — managed SaaS multi-tenant hosting is the deployment shape this hardening protects. - Refs #5015 — same problem space: instance-admin-scoped credentials are too broad for multi-company instances; tenants need company-scoped access. Neither issue is fully closed by this PR; it removes the instance-admin grant from the `cloud_tenant` trusted-header path specifically. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/auth.ts` - Removed the `instanceUserRoles` insert that granted every cloud tenant `instance_admin`; `resolveCloudTenantActor` now returns `isInstanceAdmin: false` (was `true`). - `resolveCloudTenantActor` now **deletes** any stale `instance_admin` row for the authenticated tenant user on every trusted-header request, so grants left behind by pre-hardening deployments are purged at the source (closes the Greptile P2: stale rows could otherwise re-elevate the user via the BetterAuth session path, board API keys, or the authorization service). - The function is `export`ed so it can be unit-tested directly. - `server/src/services/authorization.ts` - `authorizationService` previously re-checked `instanceUserRoles` from the DB regardless of the actor flag, which would have elevated even hardened `cloud_tenant` actors while a stale row lingered. Actors with `source === "cloud_tenant"` are now never elevated to instance admin; other board actors keep the existing lookup. - `server/src/services/authorization.ts` + `server/src/middleware/auth.ts` (follow-up commit `dc57a71c7`) - CI on the merge ref surfaced that elevation removal alone strands real cloud tenant users: board actors only ever reached `issue:read` / `issue:mutate` through instance-admin elevation (`permissionForAction` maps both to no grant key). `decide()` now grants `cloud_tenant` actors with an **active membership in the resource company** the same read surface as a same-company agent (`agent:read`, `company_scope:read`, `issue:read`, `project:read`) plus `issue:mutate` for non-viewer members — cross-company access stays denied (new `allow_company_member` reason). - `resolveCloudTenantActor` seeds the standard role-default permission grants (`ensureHumanRoleDefaultGrants`) so granted actions (e.g. `tasks:assign`, `agents:create` for owners) work without elevation. - Master-side route tests that stubbed cloud tenant actors with `isInstanceAdmin: true` now seed a real membership and assert under the hardened contract (`issue-identifier-routes`, `multilingual-issues-routes`, `issue-comment-redaction`). - Tests - `server/src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` (new): cloud tenant is never instance-admin, is scoped to exactly the one company from its stack, still upserts user/company/membership, purges stale `instance_admin` rows, returns null without the server token, and maps non-owner stack roles without elevating. - `server/src/__tests__/auth-session-route.test.ts`: end-to-end middleware regression — a user with a stale `instance_admin` row stops being elevated via the session path once they authenticate through the cloud-tenant path (with a control assertion showing the pre-purge elevation). - `server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` (embedded Postgres): a `cloud_tenant` actor with a stale `instance_admin` row in the real DB cannot cross company boundaries, while a `session` actor with the same row still resolves `allow_instance_admin`. ## Verification Run from the repo root after `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`: ```bash cd server npx vitest run src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts src/__tests__/auth-session-route.test.ts # 9 tests passed npx vitest run src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts # 16 tests passed (embedded Postgres) pnpm typecheck # clean ``` Also ran the broader auth-related suites locally (`auth-routes`, `authz-company-access`, `better-auth`, `adapter-routes-authz`, `express5-auth-wildcard`): 8 files, 58 tests, all passing. ## Risks - **This touches authentication and authorization paths directly.** Mistakes here are security bugs in both directions; review accordingly. - **Behavioral change for existing `cloud_tenant` deployments:** tenants that previously (incorrectly) had instance-admin lose it — including the ability to see/manage other companies on the instance. This is the intended hardening, but any single-tenant deployment that relied on the cloud-tenant identity for instance administration must provision a separate admin identity. - **The purge is destructive by design:** if an operator's instance-admin identity is *also* provisioned through the cloud-tenant headers (same user id), its `instance_admin` row will be deleted on the next trusted-header request. Operators should hold admin through a non-cloud-tenant identity. - **Residual gap (documented, not fixed here):** a deployment that ran the old cloud_tenant build and then *disabled* cloud-tenant mode keeps stale rows until the affected user re-authenticates through the cloud path. A data migration was considered and deliberately avoided: there is no reliable SQL predicate for "cloud-tenant-provisioned user" (no source column), so a migration risks deleting legitimate admins. - No schema or migration changes; no UI changes. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (claude-fable-5, 1M context), extended thinking + tool use, via Claude Code — this revision; original PR authored in an earlier Claude Code session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above (none duplicate this; related issues Refs #966 / #5015 are linked in the issue section) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots (no UI changes) - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (no existing docs reference `cloud_tenant` mode) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
219 lines
7.1 KiB
TypeScript
219 lines
7.1 KiB
TypeScript
import express from "express";
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import request from "supertest";
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import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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import { instanceUserRoles } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { actorMiddleware } from "../middleware/auth.js";
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function createSelectChain(rows: unknown[]) {
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return {
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from() {
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return {
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where() {
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return Promise.resolve(rows);
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},
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};
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},
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};
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}
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function createDb() {
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return {
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select: vi
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.fn()
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.mockImplementationOnce(() => createSelectChain([]))
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.mockImplementationOnce(() => createSelectChain([])),
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} as any;
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}
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describe("actorMiddleware authenticated session profile", () => {
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const originalCloudTenantToken = process.env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN;
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afterEach(() => {
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if (originalCloudTenantToken === undefined) delete process.env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN;
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else process.env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN = originalCloudTenantToken;
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});
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it("preserves the signed-in user name and email on the board actor", async () => {
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const app = express();
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app.use(
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actorMiddleware(createDb(), {
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deploymentMode: "authenticated",
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resolveSession: async () => ({
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session: { id: "session-1", userId: "user-1" },
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user: {
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id: "user-1",
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name: "User One",
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email: "user@example.com",
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},
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}),
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}),
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);
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app.get("/actor", (req, res) => {
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res.json(req.actor);
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});
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const res = await request(app).get("/actor");
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body).toMatchObject({
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type: "board",
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userId: "user-1",
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userName: "User One",
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userEmail: "user@example.com",
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source: "session",
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companyIds: [],
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memberships: [],
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isInstanceAdmin: false,
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});
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});
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it("trusts Cloud tenant identity headers and seeds board access", async () => {
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process.env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN = "tenant-token";
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const inserts: Array<{ values: Record<string, unknown> }> = [];
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const db = {
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insert: vi.fn(() => {
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const chain = {
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values(values: Record<string, unknown>) {
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inserts.push({ values });
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return chain;
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},
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onConflictDoUpdate() {
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return chain;
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},
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onConflictDoNothing() {
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return chain;
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},
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returning() {
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return Promise.resolve([{
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companyId: inserts.at(-1)?.values.companyId,
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membershipRole: inserts.at(-1)?.values.membershipRole,
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status: inserts.at(-1)?.values.status,
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}]);
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},
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};
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return chain;
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}),
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delete: vi.fn(() => ({ where: () => Promise.resolve(undefined) })),
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select: vi.fn(),
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} as any;
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const app = express();
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app.use(
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actorMiddleware(db, {
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deploymentMode: "authenticated",
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resolveSession: async () => null,
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}),
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);
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app.get("/actor", (req, res) => {
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res.json(req.actor);
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});
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const res = await request(app)
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.get("/actor")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-tenant-token", "tenant-token")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-user-id", "global-user-1")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-user-email", "owner@example.com")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-user-name", "Stack Owner")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-stack-id", "stack-alpha")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-paperclip-company-id", "paperclip-stack-alpha")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-stack-role", "owner");
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body).toMatchObject({
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type: "board",
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userId: "global-user-1",
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userName: "Stack Owner",
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userEmail: "owner@example.com",
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source: "cloud_tenant",
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isInstanceAdmin: false,
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memberships: [expect.objectContaining({ membershipRole: "owner", status: "active" })],
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});
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expect(res.body.companyIds[0]).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/);
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// authUsers, companies, companyMemberships, and the role-default
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// principalPermissionGrants seeded in place of instance-admin elevation.
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expect(inserts).toHaveLength(4);
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expect(inserts[0]?.values).toMatchObject({
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id: "global-user-1",
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email: "owner@example.com",
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emailVerified: true,
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});
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});
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it("purges a stale instance_admin row so the session path stops elevating the cloud-tenant user", async () => {
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process.env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN = "tenant-token";
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// Simulates a deployment that previously ran the pre-hardening cloud_tenant
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// path: instance_user_roles still holds an instance_admin row for the
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// tenant user, who can also resolve a BetterAuth session for the same id.
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const state = { staleInstanceAdminRow: true };
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const insertChain = {
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values() {
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return insertChain;
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},
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onConflictDoUpdate() {
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return insertChain;
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},
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onConflictDoNothing() {
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return insertChain;
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},
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returning() {
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return Promise.resolve([{ companyId: "company-1", membershipRole: "owner", status: "active" }]);
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},
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then(resolve: (value: unknown) => unknown) {
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return Promise.resolve(undefined).then(resolve);
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},
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};
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const db = {
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select: vi.fn(() => ({
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from: (table: unknown) => ({
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where: () =>
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Promise.resolve(
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table === instanceUserRoles && state.staleInstanceAdminRow ? [{ id: "stale-role-row" }] : [],
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),
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}),
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})),
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insert: vi.fn(() => insertChain),
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delete: vi.fn((table: unknown) => ({
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where: () => {
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if (table === instanceUserRoles) state.staleInstanceAdminRow = false;
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return Promise.resolve(undefined);
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},
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})),
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} as any;
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const app = express();
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app.use(
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actorMiddleware(db, {
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deploymentMode: "authenticated",
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resolveSession: async () => ({
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session: { id: "session-1", userId: "global-user-1" },
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user: { id: "global-user-1", name: "Stack Owner", email: "owner@example.com" },
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}),
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}),
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);
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app.get("/actor", (req, res) => {
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res.json(req.actor);
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});
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// Control: while the stale row exists, the session path still elevates.
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const before = await request(app).get("/actor");
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expect(before.body).toMatchObject({ source: "session", isInstanceAdmin: true });
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// One trusted-header authentication purges the stale grant.
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const cloud = await request(app)
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.get("/actor")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-tenant-token", "tenant-token")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-user-id", "global-user-1")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-user-email", "owner@example.com")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-stack-id", "stack-alpha")
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.set("x-paperclip-cloud-stack-role", "owner");
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expect(cloud.body).toMatchObject({ source: "cloud_tenant", isInstanceAdmin: false });
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expect(state.staleInstanceAdminRow).toBe(false);
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// The same user no longer gets instance admin via the session path.
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const after = await request(app).get("/actor");
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expect(after.body).toMatchObject({
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source: "session",
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userId: "global-user-1",
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isInstanceAdmin: false,
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});
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});
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});
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