3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Jannes StubbemannandClaude Opus 4.8	606e74d11f	cloud_tenant: company-scoped tenants, never instance-admin (#7525) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies, and a single server instance can host many companies. > - The auth middleware (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`) supports a `cloud_tenant` mode where a trusted hosting proxy injects per-request identity headers, designed originally for one-deployment-per-tenant setups. > - In that original setup, granting every cloud tenant the `instance_admin` role was harmless; on a **shared, multi-tenant pool** it means any paying tenant is admin of the whole instance and can reach every other tenant's data. > - A tenant only needs to own its own company — which it already gets via the company membership the same code path upserts — so instance-level admin is never appropriate for `cloud_tenant` actors. > - This PR removes the `instance_admin` grant from the cloud-tenant path and pins `isInstanceAdmin: false` on the resolved actor. > - Greptile review then surfaced a follow-up gap: deployments that ran the pre-hardening build still have stale `instance_admin` rows in `instance_user_roles`, which other lookups (BetterAuth session path, board API keys, and the authorization service's own DB re-check) would still honor. > - The follow-up commit closes that gap by purging stale rows at the cloud-tenant auth boundary and by teaching the authorization service that `cloud_tenant` actors are never instance admins. > - The benefit is that shared-pool hosting becomes structurally safe: tenants are company-scoped owners, never instance admins — including on deployments upgrading from the older behavior. ## Linked Issues - Refs #966 — managed SaaS multi-tenant hosting is the deployment shape this hardening protects. - Refs #5015 — same problem space: instance-admin-scoped credentials are too broad for multi-company instances; tenants need company-scoped access. Neither issue is fully closed by this PR; it removes the instance-admin grant from the `cloud_tenant` trusted-header path specifically. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/auth.ts` - Removed the `instanceUserRoles` insert that granted every cloud tenant `instance_admin`; `resolveCloudTenantActor` now returns `isInstanceAdmin: false` (was `true`). - `resolveCloudTenantActor` now **deletes** any stale `instance_admin` row for the authenticated tenant user on every trusted-header request, so grants left behind by pre-hardening deployments are purged at the source (closes the Greptile P2: stale rows could otherwise re-elevate the user via the BetterAuth session path, board API keys, or the authorization service). - The function is `export`ed so it can be unit-tested directly. - `server/src/services/authorization.ts` - `authorizationService` previously re-checked `instanceUserRoles` from the DB regardless of the actor flag, which would have elevated even hardened `cloud_tenant` actors while a stale row lingered. Actors with `source === "cloud_tenant"` are now never elevated to instance admin; other board actors keep the existing lookup. - `server/src/services/authorization.ts` + `server/src/middleware/auth.ts` (follow-up commit `dc57a71c7`) - CI on the merge ref surfaced that elevation removal alone strands real cloud tenant users: board actors only ever reached `issue:read` / `issue:mutate` through instance-admin elevation (`permissionForAction` maps both to no grant key). `decide()` now grants `cloud_tenant` actors with an **active membership in the resource company** the same read surface as a same-company agent (`agent:read`, `company_scope:read`, `issue:read`, `project:read`) plus `issue:mutate` for non-viewer members — cross-company access stays denied (new `allow_company_member` reason). - `resolveCloudTenantActor` seeds the standard role-default permission grants (`ensureHumanRoleDefaultGrants`) so granted actions (e.g. `tasks:assign`, `agents:create` for owners) work without elevation. - Master-side route tests that stubbed cloud tenant actors with `isInstanceAdmin: true` now seed a real membership and assert under the hardened contract (`issue-identifier-routes`, `multilingual-issues-routes`, `issue-comment-redaction`). - Tests - `server/src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` (new): cloud tenant is never instance-admin, is scoped to exactly the one company from its stack, still upserts user/company/membership, purges stale `instance_admin` rows, returns null without the server token, and maps non-owner stack roles without elevating. - `server/src/__tests__/auth-session-route.test.ts`: end-to-end middleware regression — a user with a stale `instance_admin` row stops being elevated via the session path once they authenticate through the cloud-tenant path (with a control assertion showing the pre-purge elevation). - `server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` (embedded Postgres): a `cloud_tenant` actor with a stale `instance_admin` row in the real DB cannot cross company boundaries, while a `session` actor with the same row still resolves `allow_instance_admin`. ## Verification Run from the repo root after `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`: ```bash cd server npx vitest run src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts src/__tests__/auth-session-route.test.ts # 9 tests passed npx vitest run src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts # 16 tests passed (embedded Postgres) pnpm typecheck # clean ``` Also ran the broader auth-related suites locally (`auth-routes`, `authz-company-access`, `better-auth`, `adapter-routes-authz`, `express5-auth-wildcard`): 8 files, 58 tests, all passing. ## Risks - **This touches authentication and authorization paths directly.** Mistakes here are security bugs in both directions; review accordingly. - **Behavioral change for existing `cloud_tenant` deployments:** tenants that previously (incorrectly) had instance-admin lose it — including the ability to see/manage other companies on the instance. This is the intended hardening, but any single-tenant deployment that relied on the cloud-tenant identity for instance administration must provision a separate admin identity. - **The purge is destructive by design:** if an operator's instance-admin identity is *also* provisioned through the cloud-tenant headers (same user id), its `instance_admin` row will be deleted on the next trusted-header request. Operators should hold admin through a non-cloud-tenant identity. - **Residual gap (documented, not fixed here):** a deployment that ran the old cloud_tenant build and then *disabled* cloud-tenant mode keeps stale rows until the affected user re-authenticates through the cloud path. A data migration was considered and deliberately avoided: there is no reliable SQL predicate for "cloud-tenant-provisioned user" (no source column), so a migration risks deleting legitimate admins. - No schema or migration changes; no UI changes. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (claude-fable-5, 1M context), extended thinking + tool use, via Claude Code — this revision; original PR authored in an earlier Claude Code session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above (none duplicate this; related issues Refs #966 / #5015 are linked in the issue section) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots (no UI changes) - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (no existing docs reference `cloud_tenant` mode) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-11 17:59:32 -07:00
DottaandPaperclip	ae23e02526	Support Cloud tenant identity bootstrap ... Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-05-03 21:55:52 -05:00
4 people	b9a80dcf22	feat: implement multi-user access and invite flows (#3784) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the control plane for autonomous AI companies. > - V1 needs to stay local-first while also supporting shared, authenticated deployments. > - Human operators need real identities, company membership, invite flows, profile surfaces, and company-scoped access controls. > - Agents and operators also need the existing issue, inbox, workspace, approval, and plugin flows to keep working under those authenticated boundaries. > - This branch accumulated the multi-user implementation, follow-up QA fixes, workspace/runtime refinements, invite UX improvements, release-branch conflict resolution, and review hardening. > - This pull request consolidates that branch onto the current `master` branch as a single reviewable PR. > - The benefit is a complete multi-user implementation path with tests and docs carried forward without dropping existing branch work. ## What Changed - Added authenticated human-user access surfaces: auth/session routes, company user directory, profile settings, company access/member management, join requests, and invite management. - Added invite creation, invite landing, onboarding, logo/branding, invite grants, deduped join requests, and authenticated multi-user E2E coverage. - Tightened company-scoped and instance-admin authorization across board, plugin, adapter, access, issue, and workspace routes. - Added profile-image URL validation hardening, avatar preservation on name-only profile updates, and join-request uniqueness migration cleanup for pending human requests. - Added an atomic member role/status/grants update path so Company Access saves no longer leave partially updated permissions. - Improved issue chat, inbox, assignee identity rendering, sidebar/account/company navigation, workspace routing, and execution workspace reuse behavior for multi-user operation. - Added and updated server/UI tests covering auth, invites, membership, issue workspace inheritance, plugin authz, inbox/chat behavior, and multi-user flows. - Merged current `public-gh/master` into this branch, resolved all conflicts, and verified no `pnpm-lock.yaml` change is included in this PR diff. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issues-service.test.ts ui/src/components/IssueChatThread.test.tsx ui/src/pages/Inbox.test.tsx` - `pnpm run preflight:workspace-links && pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/access-validators.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authz-company-access.test.ts server/src/__tests__/routines-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/sidebar-preferences-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts server/src/__tests__/openclaw-invite-prompt-route.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-cross-tenant-authz-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/routines-e2e.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/auth-routes.test.ts ui/src/pages/CompanyAccess.test.tsx` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` - `pnpm db:generate` - `npx playwright test --config tests/e2e/playwright.config.ts --list` - Confirmed branch has no uncommitted changes and is `0` commits behind `public-gh/master` before PR creation. - Confirmed no `pnpm-lock.yaml` change is staged or present in the PR diff. ## Risks - High review surface area: this PR contains the accumulated multi-user branch plus follow-up fixes, so reviewers should focus especially on company-boundary enforcement and authenticated-vs-local deployment behavior. - UI behavior changed across invites, inbox, issue chat, access settings, and sidebar navigation; no browser screenshots are included in this branch-consolidation PR. - Plugin install, upgrade, and lifecycle/config mutations now require instance-admin access, which is intentional but may change expectations for non-admin board users. - A join-request dedupe migration rejects duplicate pending human requests before creating unique indexes; deployments with unusual historical duplicates should review the migration behavior. - Company member role/status/grant saves now use a new combined endpoint; older separate endpoints remain for compatibility. - Full production build was not run locally in this heartbeat; CI should cover the full matrix. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex coding agent, GPT-5-based model, CLI/tool-use environment. Exact deployed model identifier and context window were not exposed by the runtime. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Note on screenshots: this is a branch-consolidation PR for an already-developed multi-user branch, and no browser screenshots were captured during this heartbeat. --------- Co-authored-by: dotta <dotta@example.com> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-17 09:44:19 -05:00