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DottaandPaperclip
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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The feature map describes product capabilities and user journeys. > - Small fixes and test changes have added long notes to that map. > - These notes make substantial features harder to find. > - This pull request removes those additions from the last week's changes and sets a clear rule for future additions. > - The benefit is a smaller map with stable capability IDs and accurate entry points. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Issue type** Unclear or confusing documentation. **Where is the issue?** `maps/feature-map/`, the map maintenance instructions, and repository rules. **What's wrong?** Between October 27 and November 3, 2026, 115 commits changed the feature map. Many additions describe bug fixes, performance details, small UI changes, or new tests. They do not introduce substantial product features. The old synchronization instructions also encouraged a map edit for every behavior change. **Suggested fix** Add a rule that requires a substantial new feature before expanding the map. Remove minor-update notes. Keep genuine feature additions and minimal corrections to existing instructions. The review covers master through `b22ef22d56`; it does not revert application code. Conflict resolution preserves later map changes from master outside that audit snapshot. Searched open GitHub PRs and issues for related feature-map work. No duplicate cleanup was found. Substantial feature additions retained here include Coordinator (#17983), the agent YAML editor (#18036), document image galleries (#18157), remote workspace storage (#18403), native Kimi (#18391), proactive chat messages (#18374), and the Sentry receiver added in #18714. ## What Changed - Add `rules/feature-map-scope.mdc` and register its `maps/**` scope with Greptile. - Align `AGENTS.md` and the shared map contract with that rule. Routine fixes and test changes no longer require incidental map edits. - Remove 755 net lines from 23 feature recipes. Preserve all 35 areas and 192 capability IDs. - Keep substantial features and the corrections needed for current navigation, provider availability, and access boundaries. Examples from the reviewed changes: | Removed or shortened addition | Why it does not need a feature-map expansion | | --- | --- | | Rounded composer image thumbnails (#18689) | Small UI change within existing task creation. | | Connection profile reads and review-count queries (#18687, #18688) | Performance details within existing app permissions. | | Warm-session, Retry, export-capacity, and tool-wait cases | Regression details for existing execution and recovery. | | New task-search, project-context, document-persistence, and routine test journeys | Test additions for existing capabilities. The tests remain in place. | | New task button placement (#18703) | Another entry to an existing task form. | | Local browser verification notes | Run evidence belongs in the PR or test report. | ## Verification - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passes: 35 areas, 192 capability IDs, valid references and contract fields. - `node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs` passes: 328 files and 3,068 stories. Generated indexes remain ignored. - Compared capability keys and navigation metadata in every edited recipe with the original source. All are unchanged. - Checked rule frontmatter, Greptile registration, representative scope matches, and `git diff --check`. - `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass on `9a60eef8eb8da9bc7c3a02203c79bec12e8c8b6b`. The final `a0801e8a939494ecde3739097a80258917428e94` commit only corrects two lines in the plugin-panel recipe; map and catalog checks pass again. - Greptile reviewed the final `a0801e8a939494ecde3739097a80258917428e94` head at 5/5 with no findings. The earlier review found one inaccurate phrase about unavailable plugin panels. The hook confirms that readiness gates automatic opening, while declared panels remain selectable. The final documentation commit corrects that phrase and the thread is resolved. Paperclip's refreshed review is advisory and remains queued. - The earlier CI run failed two assertions: [server 4/12](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/41634761842/job/125914173960) counted three Anthropic identity calls instead of two in `connection-management.integration.test.ts`; [chat 1/3](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/41634761842/job/125914174257) observed zero publications instead of one in the same-principal endpoint-settlement case. Both exact tests pass locally on the rebased head. This PR changes neither their source nor their expectations. These failed results remain historical evidence. - Final-head CI passed server 4/12 and all other suites except the first [chat 1/3 attempt](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/41637834618/job/125925926131), which repeated the same zero-publication assertion. The browser gate passed. The single failed-job retry was accepted for this unchanged head in [workflow attempt 2](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/41637834618/attempts/2). [Chat 1/3 passed on that retry](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/41637834618/job/125933199635), and the aggregate verification gate passed. Both required gates, `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e`, are green on `a0801e8a939494ecde3739097a80258917428e94`. The one retry allowance is consumed. - The first full local `pnpm test:run` attempt was interrupted before completion so master could be rebased without changing source under running tests. It is not a passing test result. Full current-head CI remains required. - No application code, tests, schemas, or lockfiles changed. ## Risks - Low runtime risk. This change only edits documentation and review guidance. - Detailed regression instructions become less visible in the feature map. Their tests and technical documentation remain available. - Some additions mix a new feature with a small fix. Those blocks retain the feature and shorten the incidental detail. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, Git history inspection, repository tools, and code execution. The session does not expose a more specific model deployment ID or context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass — map, catalog, capability-ID, and rule-scope checks; full Vitest limits are stated above - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable — no new runtime tests apply to this documentation change - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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85 lines
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Markdown
---
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navigation: {"section":"Apps, channels, and extensions","sectionOrder":50,"order":50}
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---
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# Secrets and proposals
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Operators manage company secret references, users supply their own credentials where required, and reviewers decide proposed secret changes without exposing secret values in ordinary UI evidence.
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Feature ID: `secrets`.
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Implementation: [secrets page](../../ui/src/pages/Secrets.tsx), [personal secrets](../../ui/src/pages/secrets/MyUserSecretsTab.tsx), [proposals](../../ui/src/pages/secrets/ProposalsTab.tsx).
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Agent access: [companion](../agent-access-map/secrets.md).
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## Sub-features
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- `company-secrets`: `secrets/company-secrets` — create/update secret references and control their bindings.
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- `user-secrets`: `secrets/user-secrets` — define required user credentials and set a value for the current user.
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- `proposals`: `secrets/proposals` — review proposed changes with the appropriate authority.
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- `vault-import`: `secrets/vault-import` — import eligible external-vault references through the offered flow.
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- `runtime-delivery`: `secrets/runtime-delivery` — deliver only the secret references authorized for the run/actor. Agent-owned instance secrets stay in the trusted server runtime and are never delivered to an agent.
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## How to get to it (user POV)
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### `secret-management`
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Open company Settings → Secrets and the company/personal secret views.
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### `proposal-import`
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Use the Proposals tab or Import from vault where available.
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## Driving it with Playwright and the Paperclip CLI
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Preconditions: follow the [baseline](./README.md#before-driving-a-journey). Use dummy credentials in an isolated company, two user identities, and a test agent. Never print actual secret values in evidence.
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**Operation checkpoints**
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Use these checks alongside the entry-point recipes below and the operation records in the [access companion](../agent-access-map/secrets.md). Record the actual actor, surface, saved result and denial separately. Source review and linked tests do not establish a live pass.
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| Capability ID | Action and persisted result | Denial, race and retry checks |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `secrets/company-secrets` | Create a dummy company reference; inspect metadata, usage and access history; update, rotate, bind, and remove separate disposable references. | Reload each change and test read versus manage authority, foreign IDs, stale bindings and in-use deletion. Metadata, errors and audit must omit values. Rotation and metadata edits have different effects. |
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| `secrets/user-secrets` | Manage a credential definition and inspect coverage as an authorized operator; create, update, rotate and remove the current person’s dummy value. | Use two signed-in people. Definition/coverage authority does not grant another person’s value. Check missing values, wrong definitions, cross-company references and owner-scoped persistence. |
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| `secrets/proposals` | Use an actual permitted run to propose a new secret or binding; inspect its redacted preview, withdraw one, reject one, and approve a fresh one. | Check target/value authority before applying. Test expiry, duplicate/conflicting decisions, revoked context and malformed run attribution. Inspect created reference/binding and audit once, without displaying the dummy value. |
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| `secrets/vault-import` | Manage a disposable provider configuration, default and health check; preview eligible AWS references and import only selected test entries. | Check provider/admin authority, unsupported vaults, failed discovery/health, duplicate imports and foreign IDs. Imported references still need permitted value resolution; provider registration does not prove a working vault. |
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| `secrets/runtime-delivery` | Bind a dummy reference to a permitted environment/config path and use the actual run to check delivery without printing the value. Inspect the agent’s permitted metadata catalog separately. | Deny ordinary agent-key value reads, user/instance-scope reads through the agent value API, and missing/wrong run or binding. Check Stop/revocation, redacted logs/errors and isolation of another person’s value. |
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### `secret-management`
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Automated: [secrets service](../../server/src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts) and [user ownership](../../server/src/__tests__/secrets-service-user-secret-owner-scoped.test.ts) cover storage/access contracts. [Instance-secret tests](../../server/src/__tests__/agent-instance-secrets.test.ts) cover local encrypted storage, owner isolation, and exclusion from ordinary bindings.
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Manual: Create a dummy secret reference, bind it through a supported field, and verify its use in a harmless run without logging the value. Update it and reload. Switch users and confirm personal values remain owner-scoped and missing credentials produce an actionable state.
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### `proposal-import`
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Automated: [proposal routes](../../server/src/__tests__/secret-proposals-routes.test.ts) and [vault import dialog](../../ui/src/pages/secrets/ImportFromVaultDialog.test.tsx) cover route/UI layers; a real vault integration needs live validation.
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Manual: Review a dummy proposal, reject one and accept another, then inspect the resulting reference state and history. Preview a vault import, select only disposable entries, and verify imported references and denied-access errors after reload.
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## Gotchas
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- Vault import currently targets eligible AWS Secrets Manager providers.
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Organization-secret checks in local-trusted mode do not establish two-user
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personal-secret ownership or actual external-vault import.
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- A displayed reference name is not proof that the actor can resolve its value at runtime.
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- Company secrets and user-specific values have different ownership.
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- Redaction needs verification in errors, activity, and run logs as well as the form.
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### Storybook verification
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#### `proposals`
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Capability ID: `secrets/proposals`.
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Scope: ui
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Storybook: Mount ProposalsTab pending secret/binding proposals, blocked authority, expired/resolved proposal, approval/rejection pending/error, and redacted metadata.
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Production: GET /companies/{id}/secret-proposals and POST approve/reject must enforce company/admin/target authority, durable resolution and redaction; verified run-bound agent proposal creation is separate.
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Sources: Source: [ProposalsTab.tsx](../../ui/src/pages/secrets/ProposalsTab.tsx), [secrets.ts](../../server/src/routes/secrets.ts), [secret-proposal-authorization.ts](../../server/src/services/secret-proposal-authorization.ts). Tests: [ProposalsTab.render.test.tsx](../../ui/src/pages/secrets/ProposalsTab.render.test.tsx), [secret-proposals-routes.test.ts](../../server/src/__tests__/secret-proposals-routes.test.ts)
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### Documentation scope: Secrets and secret proposals
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Company/user/proposal/vault and runtime-binding paths are mapped; every secret provider, rotation scenario, and delivery context needs separate validation.
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