Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/middleware/redact-sensitive.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip a2bf936f9a feat(workspaces): sign the workspace login handoff and gate readiness (#11671)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Managed worktree services run isolated Paperclip instances with
cloned databases.
> - A reachable service was reported as ready even when its database,
runtime identity, or login path was not usable.
> - The first candidate added verified database seeding and managed
repair in #11665.
> - This pull request consolidates that candidate with signed login
handoff and a complete readiness contract.
> - Post-QA fixes close five defects in repair identity, repair
responses, UI retry, seed journal handling, and seed-source trust.
> - The benefit is a workspace that either opens safely or reports one
accurate recovery action.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public GitHub issue exists for this work, so the problem is described
here.

**What happened**

Managed workspace URLs could return HTTP 200 and report ready while
login failed. QA also found cases where repair used the wrong instance
identity, returned a generic error, left the UI stuck, rejected a safe
journal lag, or trusted a mutable workspace manifest.

**Expected behavior**

Opening a ready workspace signs the board user in to the correct
isolated instance. Provisioning and repair use a registered source and
report a structured recovery state.

**Actual behavior**

Entry depended on a password copied into the clone. Several failure
paths could publish stale readiness, hide the repair precondition, or
trust state that the workspace could modify.

**Additional context**

This pull request includes the commits first published in #11665. That
pull request keeps the original base head for review history. This
consolidated pull request is the merge candidate. Related open readiness
work includes #11575 and #11621.

## What Changed

- Adds a short-lived, signed, single-use login ticket. It binds the
user, workspace, instance, and runtime origin.
- Exchanges the ticket through Better Auth. It creates the session and
cookie through the supported adapter path.
- Adds protected workspace readiness fields for the database, clone
data, login handoff, seed phase, and runtime identity.
- Fails readiness closed when the guest has no company or
execution-workspace binding.
- Binds ticket issuance to the exact cloned user and active company
membership selected for the handoff.
- Verifies every current active board identity through the exact-user
handoff before publication or reuse.
- Gates managed runtime publication on the readiness contract and the
recorded worktree instance identity.
- Refreshes runtime work products from the live runtime row after a port
change.
- Adds one workspace access card with ready, degraded, repairing, and
failed states.
- Uses the runtime response identity for repair. It returns structured
repair precondition errors.
- Lets a valid source journal lag converge during provisioning.
- Binds seed and repair manifests to a source registered outside the
agent-writable worktree.
- Clears recovered UI errors so a successful retry can open the
workspace.
- Makes runtime tests register canonical sources and avoid ports owned
by live host listeners.
- Keeps Vitest on source suites when compiled `dist` trees exist.
- Isolates CLI and adapter tests from ambient AWS and runtime API
environment variables.
- Preserves a 404 response for cross-company workspace ID lookups before
runtime authorization.
- Makes concurrent single-flight coverage independent of
path-canonicalization scheduling order.

## Verification

The following checks passed on the integrated head:

```sh
pnpm -r typecheck
pnpm build
pnpm check:token-gates
pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations
```

- The server source lane passed 420 files and 4,953 tests. Five tests
were skipped.
- The CLI lane passed 57 files and 385 tests.
- The database lane passed 26 files and 97 tests.
- The shared package passed 58 files and 506 tests.
- The adapter utility lane passed 640 tests. Four tests were skipped.
- The Claude adapter passed 220 tests. One test was skipped.
- The Codex adapter passed 323 tests.
- The OpenClaw adapter passed 13 tests.
- The OpenCode adapter passed 42 tests.
- The plugin SDK passed 45 tests.
- The workspace runtime suite passed 124 tests.
- The caller-scoped readiness and handoff suite passed 52 tests.
- The workspace provisioning shell suite passed 7 tests.
- The runtime exposure suite passed 17 tests while live host mappings
occupied fixed test ports.
- `git diff --check` passed and the worktree is clean.

The serialized route lane will run in GitHub CI with its normal shards.
No deployment or active-workspace migration was performed.

## Risks

- This is a medium-risk authentication and runtime-readiness change.
- The login ticket uses exact origin, workspace, instance, and user
binding. It has a short expiry and a one-time nonce.
- Runtime publication is stricter. A real readiness, identity, per-user
handoff, or control-plane database disagreement now blocks publication.
- This pull request supersedes #11665 as the merge candidate. Close
#11665 after this pull request merges.
- No new database migration is included. The lockfile and workflow files
are unchanged.
- Deployment and active-workspace migration are intentionally outside
this pull request.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 5 (`claude-opus-5[1m]`), 1M context, extended thinking, tool
use, and code execution produced the main candidate. OpenAI GPT-5
(`gpt-5`) through Codex, with agentic reasoning, tool use, and code
execution, integrated the post-QA fixes and hardened the test gates. The
Codex context-window size was not exposed.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-19 02:37:02 -05:00

116 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript

// Redaction for HTTP log payloads.
//
// `customProps` in logger.ts copies `req.body` / `req.params` / `req.query`
// verbatim into the 4xx/5xx log lines so operators can diagnose. That means
// Better Auth's `POST /api/auth/sign-in/email` body (which has the user's
// plaintext password) and similar payloads (sign-up, reset-password, API
// keys via Authorization header equivalents) end up on disk.
//
// This walker returns a shallow copy of the input with values for sensitive
// keys replaced with the literal string "[REDACTED]". Recurses into nested
// objects/arrays. Caps depth so a hostile or accidental cycle can't pin
// the logger.
const SENSITIVE_KEYS = new Set<string>([
"password",
"currentpassword",
"newpassword",
"passwordconfirmation",
"password_confirmation",
"passwordconfirm",
"password_confirm",
"confirmpassword",
"confirm_password",
"secret",
"client_secret",
"clientsecret",
"access_token",
"accesstoken",
"refresh_token",
"refreshtoken",
"id_token",
"idtoken",
"api_key",
"apikey",
"authorization",
"auth_token",
"authtoken",
"session_token",
"sessiontoken",
"private_key",
"privatekey",
// The Claude setup-token login fields. `browserCode` carries the one-time
// sign-in code and `authorization_code` carries the OAuth code; neither may
// reach a log line.
"browsercode",
"authorization_code",
"authorizationcode",
// The workspace login handoff ticket (PAP-17572). It is a signed bearer
// credential carried as a query parameter, so it must never reach a log line
// even though the exchange itself answers 302.
"ticket",
]);
const MAX_DEPTH = 6;
const REDACTED = "[REDACTED]";
const URLISH_KEYS = new Set<string>([
"href",
"locator",
"source",
"source_locator",
"sourcelocator",
"source_url",
"sourceurl",
"uri",
"url",
// The Claude setup-token login URL. A structured `loginUrl` that reaches a log
// sink keeps its origin and path only; the OAuth query, fragment, and any
// credentials are stripped (SR-5 backstop).
"loginurl",
"login_url",
]);
function isSensitiveKey(key: string): boolean {
return SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key.toLowerCase());
}
function isUrlishKey(key: string): boolean {
return URLISH_KEYS.has(key.toLowerCase());
}
function stripSecretBearingUrlParts(value: string): string {
try {
const url = new URL(value);
if (!url.username && !url.password && !url.search && !url.hash) return value;
url.username = "";
url.password = "";
url.search = "";
url.hash = "";
return url.toString();
} catch {
return value;
}
}
export function redactSensitive(value: unknown, depth = 0): unknown {
if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) return undefined;
if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return value;
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
if (depth + 1 > MAX_DEPTH) return undefined;
return value.map((entry) => redactSensitive(entry, depth + 1));
}
const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
for (const [key, entry] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {
if (isSensitiveKey(key)) {
out[key] = REDACTED;
continue;
}
if (typeof entry === "string" && isUrlishKey(key)) {
out[key] = stripSecretBearingUrlParts(entry);
continue;
}
out[key] = redactSensitive(entry, depth + 1);
}
return out;
}