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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
DottaandPaperclip	a2bf936f9a	feat(workspaces): sign the workspace login handoff and gate readiness (#11671) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Managed worktree services run isolated Paperclip instances with cloned databases. > - A reachable service was reported as ready even when its database, runtime identity, or login path was not usable. > - The first candidate added verified database seeding and managed repair in #11665. > - This pull request consolidates that candidate with signed login handoff and a complete readiness contract. > - Post-QA fixes close five defects in repair identity, repair responses, UI retry, seed journal handling, and seed-source trust. > - The benefit is a workspace that either opens safely or reports one accurate recovery action. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this work, so the problem is described here. **What happened** Managed workspace URLs could return HTTP 200 and report ready while login failed. QA also found cases where repair used the wrong instance identity, returned a generic error, left the UI stuck, rejected a safe journal lag, or trusted a mutable workspace manifest. **Expected behavior** Opening a ready workspace signs the board user in to the correct isolated instance. Provisioning and repair use a registered source and report a structured recovery state. **Actual behavior** Entry depended on a password copied into the clone. Several failure paths could publish stale readiness, hide the repair precondition, or trust state that the workspace could modify. **Additional context** This pull request includes the commits first published in #11665. That pull request keeps the original base head for review history. This consolidated pull request is the merge candidate. Related open readiness work includes #11575 and #11621. ## What Changed - Adds a short-lived, signed, single-use login ticket. It binds the user, workspace, instance, and runtime origin. - Exchanges the ticket through Better Auth. It creates the session and cookie through the supported adapter path. - Adds protected workspace readiness fields for the database, clone data, login handoff, seed phase, and runtime identity. - Fails readiness closed when the guest has no company or execution-workspace binding. - Binds ticket issuance to the exact cloned user and active company membership selected for the handoff. - Verifies every current active board identity through the exact-user handoff before publication or reuse. - Gates managed runtime publication on the readiness contract and the recorded worktree instance identity. - Refreshes runtime work products from the live runtime row after a port change. - Adds one workspace access card with ready, degraded, repairing, and failed states. - Uses the runtime response identity for repair. It returns structured repair precondition errors. - Lets a valid source journal lag converge during provisioning. - Binds seed and repair manifests to a source registered outside the agent-writable worktree. - Clears recovered UI errors so a successful retry can open the workspace. - Makes runtime tests register canonical sources and avoid ports owned by live host listeners. - Keeps Vitest on source suites when compiled `dist` trees exist. - Isolates CLI and adapter tests from ambient AWS and runtime API environment variables. - Preserves a 404 response for cross-company workspace ID lookups before runtime authorization. - Makes concurrent single-flight coverage independent of path-canonicalization scheduling order. ## Verification The following checks passed on the integrated head: ```sh pnpm -r typecheck pnpm build pnpm check:token-gates pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations ``` - The server source lane passed 420 files and 4,953 tests. Five tests were skipped. - The CLI lane passed 57 files and 385 tests. - The database lane passed 26 files and 97 tests. - The shared package passed 58 files and 506 tests. - The adapter utility lane passed 640 tests. Four tests were skipped. - The Claude adapter passed 220 tests. One test was skipped. - The Codex adapter passed 323 tests. - The OpenClaw adapter passed 13 tests. - The OpenCode adapter passed 42 tests. - The plugin SDK passed 45 tests. - The workspace runtime suite passed 124 tests. - The caller-scoped readiness and handoff suite passed 52 tests. - The workspace provisioning shell suite passed 7 tests. - The runtime exposure suite passed 17 tests while live host mappings occupied fixed test ports. - `git diff --check` passed and the worktree is clean. The serialized route lane will run in GitHub CI with its normal shards. No deployment or active-workspace migration was performed. ## Risks - This is a medium-risk authentication and runtime-readiness change. - The login ticket uses exact origin, workspace, instance, and user binding. It has a short expiry and a one-time nonce. - Runtime publication is stricter. A real readiness, identity, per-user handoff, or control-plane database disagreement now blocks publication. - This pull request supersedes #11665 as the merge candidate. Close #11665 after this pull request merges. - No new database migration is included. The lockfile and workflow files are unchanged. - Deployment and active-workspace migration are intentionally outside this pull request. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used Claude Opus 5 (`claude-opus-5[1m]`), 1M context, extended thinking, tool use, and code execution produced the main candidate. OpenAI GPT-5 (`gpt-5`) through Codex, with agentic reasoning, tool use, and code execution, integrated the post-QA fixes and hardened the test gates. The Codex context-window size was not exposed. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-08-19 02:37:02 -05:00
3 people	e31951a17d	feat: Claude agent setup-token login in a sandbox (#11286) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Claude agents that run in a remote sandbox need a safe in-product login path > - The existing host login route cannot open a pseudo-terminal inside that sandbox > - The login flow must protect the browser code, the login URL, and the OAuth token at every step > - This pull request adds the parser, the runner, a Daytona pseudo-terminal transport, and a guarded, owner-bound session route behind an injectable transport > - The route stays inert in the default build and fails closed until a sandbox provider binds the live transport > - The benefit is a company-scoped setup-token flow with one-time secret delivery, redaction, and fail-closed transport checks, ready for a later staged production rollout ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Agent or provider** Claude Code setup-token login for sandbox agents. **Why this adapter is useful** Sandbox agents need a supported way to sign in without host credentials. An authorized owner completes the browser step and receives the token one time. **How the agent is invoked** When a sandbox provider binds the injectable transport, the server starts `claude setup-token` through a sandbox pseudo-terminal, sends the browser code to the matched prompt, and returns the token through the guarded session route. The default build does not bind the transport. In that state the start route fails closed with a fixed no-secret `503`. It does not start a process and it does not hold a sandbox lease. **Additional context** The transport is injectable, so each sandbox provider binds its own pseudo-terminal. This pull request adds the Daytona transport but does not bind it in the production server. A production wiring needs a lease manager, a live pseudo-terminal factory, a durable token store, and its own security review. The route keeps secrets out of logs, activity details, errors, telemetry, and non-owner responses. ## What Changed - Add strict parsers for the setup-token URL, the prompt, and the success token. - Add a login runner that drives the `claude setup-token` command through a pseudo-terminal. - Add the Daytona pseudo-terminal transport and the sandbox plugin wiring. - Add a company-scoped, owner-bound login session service with rate limits, a reaper, cleanup, and one-time token delivery. - Add the guarded session routes at `/agents/:id/setup-token-login-sessions/*` behind an injectable transport. The routes become the live login path only when a provider binds the transport. - Keep the start route fail-closed in the default build. It returns a fixed no-secret `503` and it does not bind `setupTokenLogin`. - Keep the existing host route `POST /agents/:id/claude-login` in place. This pull request does not replace it. - Keep confidential responses behind a fail-closed TLS transport guard with `Cache-Control: no-store`, and extend redaction for the new fields. - Export the parser and the runner from the Claude local server entry, and document the new session routes in the OpenAPI spec. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run setup-token-route setup-token-session` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local exec vitest run` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server run typecheck` - Confirm that the pull request checks pass on GitHub. ## Risks - Low user-facing risk on merge. The default build does not bind the transport, so the production start route stays fail-closed with a `503`. The merge does not change the production login behavior. - When a provider later binds the transport, the flow starts a live sandbox process and holds a short-lived in-memory secret. Cleanup must stop the child before it releases the sandbox lease. - The transport guard fails closed when the deployment does not provide a trusted TLS path. A wrong proxy allowlist can block a valid request. - The production wiring is out of scope. It needs a lease manager, a live pseudo-terminal factory, a durable token store, and its own security review before the server binds `setupTokenLogin`. ## Model Used Anthropic Claude Opus 4.8 assisted the implementation. It used extended reasoning, code execution, repository tool use, and a 200,000-token context window. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (the OpenAPI spec covers the new session routes; no user-facing documentation needs changes) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-12 13:02:49 -07:00
4 people	89ce36d7af	feat(skills): open-by-default company skill policy and core UX (#9564) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip uses company skills to make agent capabilities reusable across an organization. > - Skill operations currently mix capability availability with permission checks, which creates avoidable setup friction and inconsistent denial handling. > - The policy contract needs to remain open by default while allowing company-scoped restrictions for governed deployments. > - Core owns the canonical policy actions, persistence, evaluation, API behavior, safe import boundaries, and generic denial/read-only UI. > - Enterprise policy-editor implementation belongs in the separate `paperclip-ee` repository and is intentionally excluded from this PR. ### Problem or motivation Company skill operations can encounter permission dead ends even when no explicit restriction has been configured, and import-source classification can drift between policy evaluation and execution. ### Proposed solution Define eight canonical skill policy actions, default all actions to allowed, persist company-scoped restrictions, expose policy evaluation APIs, normalize import sources at the boundary, and update Skill Studio to present actionable restriction states without embedding Enterprise Edition implementation in the core repository. ### Alternatives considered Keeping capability checks distributed across routes and UI surfaces was rejected because it duplicates policy logic and makes denial behavior inconsistent. Shipping the Enterprise policy editor in this repository was rejected because `paperclip-ee` is a separate repository and must receive its own PR. ### Roadmap alignment Extends the completed **Skills Manager** roadmap area by adding coherent governance and removing workflow dead ends. ### Additional context The core API contract remains suitable for a separate Enterprise Edition editor, but this PR contains no `paperclip-ee` package or EE-specific UI integration code. ## What Changed - Added the company skill policy contract to product and implementation documentation, including the open-by-default rule, eight canonical actions, decision shape, and core/EE ownership boundary. - Added the company-scoped policy schema, migration `0170`, shared validators, policy service, REST routes, OpenAPI coverage, and focused server tests. - Hardened import policy enforcement by normalizing import sources and keeping source classification consistent between policy evaluation and execution. - Updated core Skill Studio behavior to remove generic permission dead ends and show actionable policy/platform denial states only when an operation is actually denied. - Removed the `plugin-paperclip-ee` package, Docker wiring, EE discovery/deep-link helpers, and EE-specific UI tests/stories from this PR so that implementation can be submitted separately to the EE repository. - Preserved open-by-default behavior when no explicit company restriction exists. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec vitest run src/components/skill-studio/SkillPolicySurfaces.test.tsx src/lib/skill-policy-denial.test.ts` — 20/20 passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec tsc --noEmit` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/worktree-config.test.ts` — 12/12 passed. - `pnpm check:token-gates` — passed with all gates clean. - `git diff --check` — passed. - `git diff --name-only origin/master | rg 'paperclip-ee|ee-skill-policy'` — no matches. ## Risks - Migration `0170` introduces company policy persistence; rollout depends on the migration applying before policy routes are exercised. - Open-by-default is an intentional behavioral policy: deployments expecting implicit denials must configure explicit restrictions. - Import normalization is security-sensitive and should retain focused review. - The separate EE editor must stay contract-compatible with the core policy API as policy actions evolve. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex CLI, runtime model identifier and context-window size not exposed by this execution environment; reasoning, repository tool use, shell execution, and code review capabilities enabled. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details available to this runtime) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked or described the result above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run focused tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green on the latest head - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Evyatar Bluzer <bluzername@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-15 11:42:40 -05:00
3 people	bb7978327e	fix(logger): redact passwords and tokens from HTTP error log lines (#8013) ... Resubmits #5820 by @echokos. The original PR's head fork could not accept maintainer edits (organization-owned fork without cross-org maintainer-edit access), so we've resubmitted the commits here with original authorship preserved. Thanks to @echokos for the contribution. --- ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies; the server is an Express app with structured HTTP logging via pino-http. > - The middleware in `server/src/middleware/logger.ts` defines a `customProps` hook that attaches request context (`req.body` / `req.params` / `req.query`) to every 4xx/5xx log entry so operators can diagnose failed requests. > - That hook copies the body verbatim. Better Auth's `POST /api/auth/sign-in/email` carries an `{ email, password }` body — on a wrong-password attempt the request lands in the 4xx branch and the plaintext password is written to `~/.paperclip/logs/server.log`. > - Two existing issues raise this (#3072 plaintext-password leak, #4759 similar concerns) and neither has a fix. > - Same exposure surface applies to sign-up, reset-password, API key creation, and any endpoint that accepts a credential in the body and can return 4xx. > - This pull request introduces a small `redactSensitive` walker that returns a shallow copy of the input with values for known credential-shaped keys replaced with `[REDACTED]`, and applies it at every body/params/query log site in `customProps`. > - The benefit is that operators can keep diagnostic logging on without their disk silently accumulating user passwords and bearer tokens. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/redact-sensitive.ts` (new): depth-capped, case-insensitive walker. Sensitive keys covered: `password`, `currentPassword`, `newPassword`, `passwordConfirmation`, `passwordConfirm`, `confirmPassword` (+ snake_case variants), `secret`, `client_secret`, `access_token`, `refresh_token`, `id_token`, `auth_token`, `session_token`, `api_key`, `authorization`, `private_key`. Bare `token` deliberately not in the list — pagination cursors and CSRF tokens are not credentials (per Greptile review). - `server/src/middleware/logger.ts`: wraps the six log sites in `customProps` (3 ctx-path + 3 fallback-path) with `redactSensitive`. - `server/src/__tests__/redact-sensitive.test.ts` (new): covers plaintext password, case-insensitive matching, multiple credential keys, nested objects/arrays, bare `token` left untouched, primitives untouched, cycle safety. - Depth-cap returns `undefined` (field absent from log line) rather than a sentinel string, per Greptile review. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server test redact-sensitive` should run the new test file green. - Manual: tail `~/.paperclip/logs/server.log`, hit `POST /api/auth/sign-in/email` with a deliberately wrong password, confirm the logged `reqBody.password` reads `[REDACTED]` (not the plaintext) and the surrounding fields still appear for diagnosis. ## Risks Low. The walker only rewrites values at the log-emit boundary — the actual `req.body` object handed to downstream handlers is unchanged because `redactSensitive` returns a new object. Standard log fields (email, route path, status code) remain visible. The sensitive-key list is conservative enough that the only risk is over-redacting a non-credential field that happens to share a name with a known credential; the bare `token` carve-out in this revision addresses the most obvious such case. ## Model Used - Claude Opus 4.7 (`claude-opus-4-7`), Anthropic, extended thinking mode, working through Claude Code CLI. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass (no `node_modules` in my disposable PR-prep checkout; CI vitest will exercise) - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots (N/A — server-only) - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (no doc surface affected) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Closes #3072. Refs #4759. --- ## Original Context `customProps` in the HTTP logger copies `req.body` / `req.params` / `req.query` verbatim into 4xx/5xx log entries. Better Auth's wrong-password flow therefore writes: ``` {"reqBody":{"email":"…","password":"founding6gomez6croaking"},"msg":"POST /api/auth/sign-in/email 401"} ``` …to disk. This PR rewrites credential-shaped values to `[REDACTED]` at that boundary. --- ## Cross-references and status (maintainer) Closes #5820 Closes #3095 Closes #4760 Closes #4886 --------- Co-authored-by: Aurora <aurora@majorimpact.com> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-06-11 17:09:32 -07:00