PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map/workspaces.md

Execution workspaces, services, and files — agent access

Product map: Execution workspaces, services, and files.

Feature ID: workspaces.

Lost-source reconstruction adds the board-only POST /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions/reconstruct-workspace action. It requires runtime:manage and ordinary task visibility. Agents cannot authorize it. The result is a durable fresh-session admission request, subject to current execution gates. It grants no additional tool access, budget, work window or permission to repeat completed actions. Attachments must belong to the same task and company. The original failed run and lost-export evidence remain unchanged. Later native run-only cancellations can coexist only with confirmed lease stops, board file-only repair and an external-action outcome of not_performed. Their immutable evidence is checked again at dispatch. Historical cancellation retention runs internally and grants no new agent operation or authority.

Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b. Native REST transport reconciled in this change; see the shared transport contract.

This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps. Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the map contract for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.

binding

Capability ID: workspaces/binding.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• GET /api/issues/{id}/heartbeat-context.
• GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}.
• GET /api/issues/{id}/workspace inspects the durable task binding.
• PUT /api/issues/{id}/workspace requests the next binding.
• GET /api/companies/{companyId}/execution-workspaces?summary=true&selectableForTask=true lists authorized task-selectable workspaces.

Agent access: available — Native get_task_context / REST / CLI / MCP workspace read.

The task-bound native tools get_workspace, list_workspaces, and select_workspace use the ordinary authenticated APIs. Legacy agents can call those APIs with their admitted run token. These paths do not require a project.

Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust preset and task ownership where required.

Ordinary input may reuse the exact currently bound private task directory after an explicitly fresh retry. Preparation rechecks company, source task, current binding and canonical path; missing directories, symlinks and foreign roots are rejected. This preserves files without granting new access or replaying the previous turn. An explicitly fresh retry still creates a clean sibling.

Task workspace writes require issue:mutate, an active owned task/run for agents, and current source visibility. Shared physical roots also require source-project workspace write authority. Accepting a new pending choice advances its binding revision; superseded retries fail while current-choice retries remain idempotent. Binding revisions and request keys fence retries; selection applies at the next normal admission without interrupting a live run.

The managed remoteWorkspaceStorageEnabled setting defaults on for Cloud and self-hosted instances. New native Paperclip Runner sandbox workspaces with supported fresh sources reserve company/task-bound remote authority through existing admission only when durable Postgres, S3, and a stable key are configured. Existing host workspaces and configured local folders stay on the legacy path until an explicit import. Stored false disables new enrollment unless managed configuration overrides it. Enrolled workspaces keep remote authority when new enrollment is disabled, and missing persistence prerequisites fail admission without a controller checkout fallback. Current authorization and responsible-user checks still apply. Authorized referenced Git repositories use writable task copies without changing shared source folders or upstream push permissions. Explicitly read-only sources and explicitly concurrent shared writers are rejected. Managed mutable same-project repositories are supported. Portable capture streams validated working files while staging self-contained Git metadata. The smaller temporary-space requirement grants no new agent access or execution authority. Changed sources still fail before a save receipt. Daytona can stream an already captured archive when its guarded download copy cannot fit. The sandbox-user read rechecks confinement and refuses symlinks at open; it does not grant the privileged download API access to a mutable source. Snapshot publication and the single-writer fence keep their existing authority. An inherited isolated workspace or operator branch can be reserved through the task's current persisted binding. The original source task remains provenance. Reservation checks task/run, binding, trust, and retained source visibility before claiming the single writer; an unbound task cannot claim that workspace. A live writer conflict at atomic reservation uses the existing workspace wait, including inherited isolated workspaces and operator branches. The retry retains the binding and current admission gates; Stop cancels it. Stale or stopped writers with unfinished saves remain fenced. The wait retains the admitted assignment role; reassignment during preparation cancels the old assignee's retry. The preparation tests and heartbeat tests cover reservation and persisted waits with PostgreSQL; live sandbox provider acceptance remains separate. The reservation tests exercise that service boundary with real PostgreSQL, including competing children, private sources, foreign companies, and closed records. This is automated evidence, not live agent qualification. Importing an existing local task folder is an operator source-checkout command, not an agent API or tool: see the dry-run/apply runbook. It requires deployment storage/key access and blocks unfinished writers/recovery. Source: remote source admission and migration. Evidence: source-only for these additions; live agent qualification is separate.

Admission checks current task/run authority and the persisted selected configuration. It does not inventory physical aliases or authorize historical sources/readers. Explicit workspace-record selection and full workspace metadata disclosure retain app-record privacy. Existing isolated remote-source receipts remain restorable; new preparation does not create a remote fallback due to historical file ownership. Historical workspace_source_restricted failures retain existing recovery support. An authorized board recovery through POST /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions/resolve can schedule a server-owned recovery selection for the latest restricted-source failure only when its saved evidence proves provider work never started. The selection requires task mutation and configured-source access and applies at normal admission. It keeps task environment settings and never reads or deletes the denied checkout. Pause, budget, approval, interaction, dependency, and ownership gates remain effective. Repeated resolution of the same action does not enqueue another run. Agents cannot mint recovery provenance through the workspace selection API; they can observe the existing recovery action and request board recovery. Local paths, unsupported transports and credential-bearing URLs are not fallback sources. Company/task/remote bindings, real paths, Git storage and the exact origin are revalidated for reuse, cleanup and reopening. A failed save removes only the owned task worktree. The isolated-source service and its local regression tests establish source and lifecycle boundaries; live agent/provider qualification remains separate. Reconstructable Git expiration adds no agent endpoint or permission. It records company/workspace/repository identity and an exact commit before removing owned cache files. Existing task/workspace reopening retains current company, source, and trust checks. Missing upstream access returns a retryable error; it does not choose a newer commit or grant access to another company's source. Shared project bases and unresolved recovery remain protected. Local lifecycle evidence is in expiration tests.

Only directly selected configuration policies participate in current execution trust. Physical aliases and historical source projects do not contribute filesystem policy. The authoritative sandbox or SSH selection suppresses configured and built-in controller worktree and runtime provisioning regardless of task trust, app configuration write grants or board sponsorship. Genuine isolated worktrees still permit authorized read-only source copying. Configuration write permission does not authorize controller execution. Explicit, channel, inherited, foreign or nondefault isolated source choices remain copy-only for controller provisioning even on local runs. Their deny-only workspace marker survives metadata and binding changes; a board reopen does not turn it into approval. Implicit trusted local defaults and explicit SSH remote provisioning retain their existing placement; no new sandbox provision transport is claimed. The implicit default follows task creation: configured policy pointer, then primary source, creation time and ID. A missing or foreign configured source does not authorize controller hooks. This precedence neither changes existing creation validation nor rotates bindings or clears retained copy-only markers. Closed-worktree reopening checks current task, agent, organizational and source policies without assuming a future driver. Effective low-trust reopens suppress configured and built-in host scripts. Returned checkpoints must have directory parents for every nested entry before merging, including unchanged entries; invalid output leaves retained host files intact and keeps recovery evidence.

Skipping the host scan for a fully unchanged returned snapshot grants no new access. The merge still holds its canonical writer lock and runs both authority and publication hooks. Denials still propagate, and checkpoint/archive validation is unchanged. Regression coverage is source-level evidence only. Child creation by an admitted agent checks an explicit prospective-task context before the child is saved. The creator run must have an authoritative saved policy and a verified company/agent/parent lineage. Current parent, prospective child and selected source configuration policies must fit that boundary. This creation path does not relax exact task/run checks for existing-task writes. The child trust regression is automated source-level evidence, not live agent qualification. Source review for these additions: PR #15749 and task workspace routes, native authority, and semantic transport.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Run/task context identifies its actual realized workspace; record existence is not a running service.

provisioning

Capability ID: workspaces/provisioning.

Source preparation keeps its dedicated lock connection active during work on other connections. It preserves company/source exclusion and existing admission authority; it adds no agent API or permission. The source-lock regression covers PostgreSQL idle timeout, competing preparation, ordinary pool availability, and failure cleanup. Deployed agent recovery requires separate live evidence.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}.
• GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/workspace-operations.
• POST /api/issues/{id}/workspace/repositories requests repository preparation.

Agent access: partial — REST / native call_api reads; task/project assignment triggers server provisioning.

Native prepare_repository and admitted legacy REST callers can request a catalog repository or validated repository URL for their current task. Preparation occurs at normal admission; the agent cannot supply a host path or controller identity. Current selected-configuration permissions, responsible-user authority, trust restrictions, immutable receipts, and concrete binding/path integrity are checked before acquisition and publication. Low-trust callers cannot trigger a new controller-side Git acquisition. Evidence remains source-only here; focused repository tests are separate from live agent qualification.

An admitted native standard task can read a same-agent completion continuation for its own pending repository in its current workspace. An explicit yield may use that saved continuation; explicit completion remains completion. Existing status decisions and wake admission retain Stop and authorization gates. The workspace API regression and driver regression cover this contract; live qualification remains separate.

Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust preset and task ownership where required.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Observing readiness exists. Creating host commands or arbitrary provision targets is a separate protected operation.

services

Capability ID: workspaces/services.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• POST /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/runtime-services/{action}.

Agent access: available — Authorized agent REST / native call_api / CLI runtime service controls and existing stdio MCP controls.

Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust preset and task ownership where required.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: No dedicated production control_workspace_service binding. Generic native calls retain runtime trust and workspace/task scope checks. Optional MCP availability must be recorded.

files-git

Capability ID: workspaces/files-git.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• GET /api/issues/{issueId}/file-resources/content.
• GET /api/issues/{issueId}/file-resources/list.

Agent access: partial — Authorized workspace filesystem tools; Dot workspace bridge when enabled; board file-resource HTTP UI. Native standard-mode download_artifact installs an authorized saved asset (up to 10 MiB) into the admitted workspace, requiring exact saved size/hash. Linux local and lease-owned remote command runners are supported; plugin task providers without an installer and Dot/Muse/Grok profiles do not expose it. The tool follows API rollout policy, current task/run, issue mutation and asset-content ACLs, including responsible-user capture ownership. Publication is create-only after staging/hash checks; conflicting files and symlink paths fail. Retry the identical identity after an unknown outcome. Audit records contain identity/outcome only; contents remain untrusted and screening still applies. The authority regression and filesystem faults use disposable data and real files; provider transport qualification is separate.

Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust preset and task ownership where required.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Files panel HTTP requires board. Agents can use their admitted workspace file tools; remote/Dot scope and Git command availability differ.

Task-bound file reads authorize the current task, company, and concrete binding; selected project roots require selected configuration access. Historical task, reader, physical-root, and directory acquisition classifications have no effect. Root containment and symlink escape checks remain, and attachments, task records, workspace metadata, and operation logs retain their app-data privacy.

For enrolled remote workspaces the same board file-resource endpoints read the authorized live allocation or a verified committed saved version. Returned source.kind is live or saved, with savedAt for a saved copy. An unavailable clean allocation does not prevent reads of its current committed save once writer authority is clear; saved reads validate the exact company, workspace, and snapshot even while a remote location remains recorded. Cleanup may clear only that location during a saved read; logical-authority changes and foreign or reintroduced locations still reject it. Live reads retain their full fence. An unavailable dirty allocation cannot silently fall back to stale saved bytes. Remote paths never become controller filesystem authority. Confined path/symlink checks, bounded search/preview, download streaming, and cancellation remain enforced by remote file access. Evidence: source-only here; regression suites are not a live agent read proof. Verification: not-run — exercise allowed live/saved reads and deny another company, changed binding, traversal, and unsaved-allocation fallback.

closure

Capability ID: workspaces/closure.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/{id}.
• GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/close-readiness.
• POST /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/reconcile-branch.

Agent access: partial — REST / native fallback for permitted update; CLI workspace; reconcile-branch requires board.

Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust preset and task ownership where required. Workspace metadata reads do not perform storage inspection or certify delivery. The explicit close-readiness API and destructive cleanup retain live safety checks. Automatic GitHub delivery checks reuse explicit source-project GitHub consent, rechecking the stored repository, selected grant, project access and trust on each proof. Missing or revoked consent never falls back to another identity. The resolved destination and provider recovery hint cannot be supplied as an authorization override through workspace metadata. Ambiguous or inaccessible proof retains storage.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Closure/readiness exists; not every workspace can be reopened, and branch reconciliation has a board boundary.

Remote closure additionally requires a clean committed snapshot and no active writer. It releases confirmed remote compute while retaining the saved authority; reopen restores from that saved version when the allocation is gone. Custom cleanup/teardown commands block remote close. Manual runtime commands, jobs, repairs, and services reject remote workspaces before local filesystem access. Agent tasks remain the supported execution path. No new agent authority is granted. Source: remote lifecycle and close readiness. Evidence: source-only for the remote extension. Verification: not-run — reject dirty/unfinished/custom-command close, confirm clean release retains the snapshot, then reopen under current task/company authorization.