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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - `AGENTS.md` tells every contributor and agent to read `doc/DEVELOPING.md` for setup, commands, testing, and worktrees > - That file grew to 5,495 lines. Most of it was notes on how one subsystem behaves, added one pull request at a time > - Readers could not find the commands. Agents also read behavior notes as rules > - This pull request cuts `doc/DEVELOPING.md` to a 660-line setup and workflow guide. It moves the subsystem notes to focused docs > - The benefit is a guide that a person or an agent can read in full, and a clear place for each kind of note ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Issue type** Outdated or confusing documentation. **Where is the issue?** `doc/DEVELOPING.md` **What's wrong?** The file was 5,495 lines. It opened with 112 lines about case handoffs before it reached Prerequisites. Unrelated sections sat below the "OpenClaw Docker UI One-Command Script" heading. Statements about current behavior read like policy. **Suggested fix** Keep setup, commands, and workflow in `doc/DEVELOPING.md`. Move each subsystem note to a doc for that subsystem. Add an index. ## What Changed - `doc/DEVELOPING.md` is now 660 lines: prerequisites, start dev, health checks, local run, test drive, Docker, instance layout, database, storage, secrets, worktrees, test commands, Storybook, CLI, and an index of the other docs. - 15 new docs hold the moved text without wording changes: `ci-workflows`, `test-infrastructure`, `worktrees`, `hot-restart-deploys`, `heartbeat-internals`, `runner-internals`, `workspace-repositories`, `workspace-storage`, `skills-and-teams-catalog`, `ui-internals`, `case-handoffs`, `chat-connector-development`, `instance-configuration`, `integration-api-notes`, `database-backups`. - "Publish a branch Storybook" moved to `doc/STORYBOOK-DEPLOYMENT.md`. The privacy rollout notes moved to `doc/ISSUE-PRIVACY.md`. - Deleted about 280 lines: the story-by-story Storybook notes, "Agent Artifact Uploads" (a copy of `doc/AGENT-ARTIFACTS.md`), two pointer-only sections, "Workspace feature checks (2026-10-09)", and "Chat and task navigation caching". The test-drive build-lock paragraph is now four lines. - Repointed every inbound link and every script or workflow comment that named a moved section. - `AGENTS.md` now says where a behavior note goes, so the guide does not grow again. ## Verification - A script split the file by line range. It asserts that each of the 5,495 source lines is kept, moved, or dropped exactly one time. - A link check on every changed Markdown file found 0 missing files and 0 missing anchors. - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passes. - `node --test .github/scripts/tests/*.test.mjs`: 808 pass, 0 fail. - `node --check` passes on the three scripts with changed comments. - `pnpm verify` was not run. This worktree has no installed dependencies, and the change has no runtime code. ## Risks - Low risk. The change is documentation and comments only. - A link to a moved section from outside this repository will land on the top of `doc/DEVELOPING.md`. - The new docs are not in the audited prose list in `.github/scripts/ci-inputs.mjs`. An edit to one of them runs full CI. An edit to `doc/DEVELOPING.md` does not. This PR does not change that list. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5.2 (`claude-fable-5-2`), Claude Code desktop, with tool use. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [ ] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
375 lines
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Markdown
375 lines
22 KiB
Markdown
# Execution workspaces, services, and files — agent access
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Product map: [Execution workspaces, services, and files](../feature-map/workspaces.md).
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Feature ID: `workspaces`.
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Lost-source reconstruction adds the board-only
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`POST /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions/reconstruct-workspace` action. It requires
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`runtime:manage` and ordinary task visibility. Agents cannot authorize it. The
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result is a durable fresh-session admission request, subject to current execution
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gates. It grants no additional tool access, budget, work window or permission to
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repeat completed actions. Attachments must belong to the same task and company.
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The original failed run and lost-export evidence remain unchanged.
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Later native run-only cancellations can coexist only with confirmed lease stops,
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board file-only repair and an external-action outcome of `not_performed`.
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Their immutable evidence is checked again at dispatch. Historical cancellation
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retention runs internally and grants no new agent operation or authority.
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Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: `58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b`.
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Native REST transport reconciled in this change; see the
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[shared transport contract](README.md#native-rest-transport).
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This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps.
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Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be
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qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the [map contract](../README.md)
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for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.
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## `binding`
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Capability ID: `workspaces/binding`.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `GET /api/issues/{id}/heartbeat-context`.
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- `GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}`.
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- `GET /api/issues/{id}/workspace` inspects the durable task binding.
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- `PUT /api/issues/{id}/workspace` requests the next binding.
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- `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/execution-workspaces?summary=true&selectableForTask=true`
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lists authorized task-selectable workspaces.
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Agent access: `available` — Native get_task_context / REST / CLI / MCP workspace read.
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The task-bound native tools `get_workspace`, `list_workspaces`, and
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`select_workspace` use the ordinary authenticated APIs. Legacy agents can call
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those APIs with their admitted run token. These paths do not require a project.
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Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
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preset and task ownership where required.
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Ordinary input may reuse the exact currently bound private task directory after
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an explicitly fresh retry. Preparation rechecks company, source task, current
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binding and canonical path; missing directories, symlinks and foreign roots are
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rejected. This preserves files without granting new access or replaying the
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previous turn. An explicitly fresh retry still creates a clean sibling.
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Task workspace writes require `issue:mutate`, an active owned task/run for agents,
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and current source visibility. Shared physical roots also require source-project
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workspace write authority. Accepting a new pending choice advances its binding
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revision; superseded retries fail while current-choice retries remain idempotent.
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Binding revisions and request keys fence retries;
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selection applies at the next normal admission without interrupting a live run.
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The managed `remoteWorkspaceStorageEnabled` setting defaults on for Cloud and
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self-hosted instances. New native Paperclip Runner sandbox workspaces with
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supported fresh sources reserve company/task-bound remote authority through
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existing admission only when durable Postgres, S3, and a stable key are configured.
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Existing host workspaces and configured local folders stay on the legacy path
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until an explicit import. Stored `false` disables new enrollment unless managed
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configuration overrides it. Enrolled workspaces keep remote authority when new
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enrollment is disabled, and missing persistence prerequisites fail admission
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without a controller checkout fallback. Current authorization and responsible-user
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checks still apply. Authorized referenced Git repositories use writable task
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copies without changing shared source folders or upstream push permissions.
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Explicitly read-only sources and explicitly concurrent shared writers are rejected.
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Managed mutable same-project repositories are supported.
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Portable capture streams validated working files while staging self-contained
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Git metadata. The smaller temporary-space requirement grants no new agent access
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or execution authority. Changed sources still fail before a save receipt.
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Daytona can stream an already captured archive when its guarded download copy
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cannot fit. The sandbox-user read rechecks confinement and refuses symlinks at
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open; it does not grant the privileged download API access to a mutable source.
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Snapshot publication and the single-writer fence keep their existing authority.
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An inherited isolated workspace or operator branch can be reserved through the
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task's current persisted binding. The original source task remains provenance.
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Reservation checks task/run, binding, trust, and retained source visibility before
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claiming the single writer; an unbound task cannot claim that workspace.
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A live writer conflict at atomic reservation uses the existing workspace wait,
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including inherited isolated workspaces and operator branches. The retry retains
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the binding and current admission gates; Stop cancels it. Stale or stopped
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writers with unfinished saves remain fenced. The wait retains the admitted
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assignment role; reassignment during preparation cancels the old assignee's retry.
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The
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[preparation tests](../../server/src/services/heartbeat/workspace-preparation.test.ts)
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and [heartbeat tests](../../server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-remote-workspace-busy.test.ts)
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cover reservation and persisted waits with PostgreSQL; live sandbox
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provider acceptance remains separate.
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The [reservation tests](../../server/src/services/remote-workspace-reservation.test.ts)
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exercise that service boundary with real PostgreSQL, including competing children,
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private sources, foreign companies, and closed records. This is automated evidence,
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not live agent qualification.
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Importing an existing local task folder is an operator source-checkout command,
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not an agent API or tool: see the
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[dry-run/apply runbook](../../doc/workspace-storage.md#experimental-native-remote-workspace-storage).
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It requires deployment storage/key access and blocks unfinished writers/recovery.
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Source: [remote source admission](../../server/src/services/heartbeat/remote-workspace-source.ts)
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and [migration](../../server/src/services/remote-workspace-migration.ts).
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Evidence: `source-only` for these additions; live agent qualification is separate.
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Admission checks current task/run authority and the persisted selected configuration.
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It does not inventory physical aliases or authorize historical sources/readers.
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Explicit workspace-record selection and full workspace metadata disclosure retain
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app-record privacy. Existing isolated remote-source receipts remain restorable;
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new preparation does not create a remote fallback due to historical file ownership.
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Historical `workspace_source_restricted` failures retain existing recovery support.
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An authorized board recovery through `POST /api/issues/{id}/recovery-actions/resolve`
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can schedule a server-owned `recovery` selection for the latest restricted-source
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failure only when its saved evidence proves provider work never started. The
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selection requires task mutation and configured-source access and applies at normal
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admission. It keeps task environment settings and never reads or deletes the denied
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checkout. Pause, budget, approval, interaction, dependency, and ownership gates
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remain effective. Repeated resolution of the same action does not enqueue another
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run. Agents cannot mint recovery provenance through the workspace selection API;
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they can observe the existing recovery action and request board recovery.
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Local paths, unsupported transports and credential-bearing URLs are not fallback
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sources. Company/task/remote bindings, real paths, Git storage and the exact origin
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are revalidated for reuse, cleanup and reopening. A failed save removes only the
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owned task worktree. The [isolated-source service](../../server/src/services/isolated-remote-workspace-source.ts)
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and its local regression tests establish source and lifecycle boundaries; live
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agent/provider qualification remains separate.
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Reconstructable Git expiration adds no agent endpoint or permission. It records
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company/workspace/repository identity and an exact commit before removing owned
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cache files. Existing task/workspace reopening retains current company, source,
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and trust checks. Missing upstream access returns a retryable error; it does not
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choose a newer commit or grant access to another company's source. Shared project
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bases and unresolved recovery remain protected. Local lifecycle evidence is in
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[expiration tests](../../server/src/__tests__/git-workspace-expiration.test.ts).
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Only directly selected configuration policies participate in current execution trust.
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Physical aliases and historical source projects do not contribute filesystem policy.
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The
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authoritative sandbox or SSH selection suppresses configured and built-in
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controller worktree and runtime provisioning regardless of task trust, app configuration
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write grants or board sponsorship. Genuine isolated worktrees still permit
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authorized read-only source copying. Configuration write permission does not authorize
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controller execution. Explicit, channel, inherited, foreign or nondefault isolated
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source choices remain copy-only for controller provisioning even on local runs.
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Their deny-only workspace marker survives metadata and binding changes; a board
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reopen does not turn it into approval. Implicit trusted local defaults and explicit
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SSH remote provisioning retain their existing placement; no new sandbox provision transport
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is claimed. The implicit default follows task creation: configured policy pointer,
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then primary source, creation time and ID. A missing or foreign configured source
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does not authorize controller hooks. This precedence neither changes existing
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creation validation nor rotates bindings or clears retained copy-only markers.
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Closed-worktree reopening checks current task, agent, organizational and source policies without assuming a future driver. Effective low-trust reopens suppress configured and built-in host scripts. Returned checkpoints must have directory parents for every nested entry before merging, including unchanged entries; invalid output leaves retained host files intact and keeps recovery evidence.
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Skipping the host scan for a fully unchanged returned snapshot grants no new
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access. The merge still holds its canonical writer lock and runs both authority
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and publication hooks. Denials still propagate, and checkpoint/archive validation
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is unchanged. [Regression coverage](../../packages/adapter-utils/src/workspace-restore-unchanged.test.ts)
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is source-level evidence only.
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Child creation by an admitted agent checks an explicit prospective-task context before the child is saved. The creator run must have an authoritative saved policy and a verified company/agent/parent lineage. Current parent, prospective child and selected source configuration policies must fit that boundary. This creation path does not relax exact task/run checks for existing-task writes. The [child trust regression](../../server/src/__tests__/task-workspace-child-trust.test.ts) is automated source-level evidence, not live agent qualification.
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Source review for these additions: PR #15749 and
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[task workspace routes](../../server/src/routes/task-workspaces.ts),
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[native authority](../../server/src/services/native-runtime/paperclip-runner-tool-authority.ts),
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and [semantic transport](../../server/src/services/task-workspace-tools.ts).
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Evidence: `source-only` —
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[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
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reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
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credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
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Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
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remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
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Gaps: Run/task context identifies its actual realized workspace; record existence is not
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a running service.
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## `provisioning`
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Capability ID: `workspaces/provisioning`.
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Source preparation keeps its dedicated lock connection active during work on
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other connections. It preserves company/source exclusion and existing admission
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authority; it adds no agent API or permission. The
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[source-lock regression](../../server/src/services/isolated-remote-workspace-source-lock.test.ts)
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covers PostgreSQL idle timeout, competing preparation, ordinary pool availability,
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and failure cleanup. Deployed agent recovery requires separate live evidence.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}`.
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- `GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/workspace-operations`.
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- `POST /api/issues/{id}/workspace/repositories` requests repository preparation.
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Agent access: `partial` — REST / native call_api reads; task/project assignment triggers
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server provisioning.
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Native `prepare_repository` and admitted legacy REST callers can request a
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catalog repository or validated repository URL for their current task.
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Preparation occurs at normal admission; the agent cannot supply a host path or
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controller identity. Current selected-configuration permissions, responsible-user authority, trust
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restrictions, immutable receipts, and concrete binding/path integrity are checked
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before acquisition and publication. Low-trust callers cannot trigger a
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new controller-side Git acquisition. Evidence remains source-only here; focused
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[repository tests](../../server/src/__tests__/task-workspace-repositories-trust.test.ts)
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are separate from live agent qualification.
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An admitted native standard task can read a same-agent completion continuation
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for its own pending repository in its current workspace. An explicit yield may
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use that saved continuation; explicit completion remains completion. Existing
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status decisions and wake admission retain Stop and authorization gates. The
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[workspace API regression](../../server/src/__tests__/task-workspace-api.test.ts)
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and [driver regression](../../packages/paperclip-runner/src/drivers/completion-continuation.test.ts)
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cover this contract; live qualification remains separate.
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Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
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preset and task ownership where required.
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Evidence: `source-only` —
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[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
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reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
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credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
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Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
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remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
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Gaps: Observing readiness exists. Creating host commands or arbitrary provision targets
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is a separate protected operation.
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## `services`
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Capability ID: `workspaces/services`.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `POST /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/runtime-services/{action}`.
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Agent access: `available` — Authorized agent REST / native `call_api` / CLI runtime
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service controls and existing stdio MCP controls.
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Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
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preset and task ownership where required.
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Evidence: `source-only` —
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[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
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reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
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credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
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Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
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remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
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Gaps: No dedicated production control_workspace_service binding. Generic native
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calls retain runtime trust and workspace/task scope checks. Optional MCP availability
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must be recorded.
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## `files-git`
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Capability ID: `workspaces/files-git`.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `GET /api/issues/{issueId}/file-resources/content`.
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- `GET /api/issues/{issueId}/file-resources/list`.
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Agent access: `partial` — Authorized workspace filesystem tools; Dot workspace bridge
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when enabled; board file-resource HTTP UI. Native standard-mode `download_artifact`
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installs an authorized saved asset (up to 10 MiB) into the admitted workspace,
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requiring exact saved size/hash. Linux local and lease-owned remote command
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runners are supported; plugin task providers without an installer and Dot/Muse/Grok
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profiles do not expose it. The tool follows API rollout policy, current task/run,
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issue mutation and asset-content ACLs, including responsible-user capture ownership.
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Publication is create-only after staging/hash checks; conflicting files and symlink
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paths fail. Retry the identical identity after an unknown outcome. Audit records
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contain identity/outcome only; contents remain untrusted and screening still applies.
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The [authority regression](../../server/src/services/native-runtime/artifact-transfer.integration.test.ts)
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and [filesystem faults](../../server/src/services/native-runtime/artifact-transfer.test.ts)
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use disposable data and real files; provider transport qualification is separate.
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Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
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preset and task ownership where required.
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Evidence: `source-only` —
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[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
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reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
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credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
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Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
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remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
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Gaps: Files panel HTTP requires board. Agents can use their admitted workspace file
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tools; remote/Dot scope and Git command availability differ.
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Task-bound file reads authorize the current task, company, and concrete binding;
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selected project roots require selected configuration access. Historical task,
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reader, physical-root, and directory acquisition classifications have no effect.
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Root containment and symlink escape checks remain, and attachments, task records,
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workspace metadata, and operation logs retain their app-data privacy.
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For enrolled remote workspaces the same board file-resource endpoints read the
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authorized live allocation or a verified committed saved version. Returned
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`source.kind` is `live` or `saved`, with `savedAt` for a saved copy. An unavailable
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clean allocation does not prevent reads of its current committed save once
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writer authority is clear; saved reads validate the exact company, workspace,
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and snapshot even while a remote location remains recorded. Cleanup may clear
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only that location during a saved read; logical-authority changes and foreign
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or reintroduced locations still reject it. Live reads retain their full fence. An unavailable
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dirty allocation cannot silently fall back to stale saved bytes. Remote paths
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never become controller filesystem authority. Confined path/symlink checks,
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bounded search/preview, download streaming, and cancellation remain enforced by
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[remote file access](../../server/src/services/remote-workspace-files.ts).
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Evidence: `source-only` here; regression suites are not a live agent read proof.
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise allowed live/saved reads and deny another
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company, changed binding, traversal, and unsaved-allocation fallback.
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## `closure`
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Capability ID: `workspaces/closure`.
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/{id}`.
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- `GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/close-readiness`.
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- `POST /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/reconcile-branch`.
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Agent access: `partial` — REST / native fallback for permitted update; CLI workspace;
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reconcile-branch requires board.
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Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
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preset and task ownership where required.
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Workspace metadata reads do not perform storage inspection or certify delivery.
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The explicit close-readiness API and destructive cleanup retain live safety checks.
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Automatic GitHub delivery checks reuse explicit source-project GitHub consent,
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rechecking the stored repository, selected grant, project access and trust on each
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proof. Missing or revoked consent never falls back to another identity. The resolved destination and
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provider recovery hint cannot be supplied as an authorization override through
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workspace metadata. Ambiguous or inaccessible proof retains storage.
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Evidence: `source-only` —
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[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
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reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
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credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
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Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
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remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
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Gaps: Closure/readiness exists; not every workspace can be reopened, and branch
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reconciliation has a board boundary.
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Remote closure additionally requires a clean committed snapshot and no active
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writer. It releases confirmed remote compute while retaining the saved authority;
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reopen restores from that saved version when the allocation is gone. Custom
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cleanup/teardown commands block remote close. Manual runtime commands, jobs,
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repairs, and services reject remote workspaces before local filesystem access.
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Agent tasks remain the supported execution path. No new agent authority is granted.
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Source: [remote lifecycle](../../server/src/services/remote-workspace-lifecycle.ts)
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and [close readiness](../../server/src/services/execution-workspaces.ts).
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Evidence: `source-only` for the remote extension. Verification: `not-run` —
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reject dirty/unfinished/custom-command close, confirm clean release retains the
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snapshot, then reopen under current task/company authorization.
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