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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip lets people manage AI agents and their work. > - The manual AWS E2E workflow records browser and model evidence. > - Public repository Actions artifacts are not a restricted evidence store. > - Some chat evidence needs the existing private-history store. > - A target flag must not grant archive access or enable a public fallback. > - This pull request binds restricted runs to protected exact-source approval and retains their standard evidence with trusted transfer code. > - Operators can retain complete evidence without changing scanner verdicts or scenario outcomes. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** Manual AWS E2E evidence retention for exact reviewed chat-feature selections. **Subsystem affected** The runner E2E manual workflow, standard evidence handoff and private-history transfer. **Current behavior** Manual cell and merged evidence use Actions artifacts. In a public repository, repository readers can download those files. Scheduled private history does not authorize a manual target to use its role. **Proposed behavior** Classify sensitive selections in the trusted workflow. Require one protected original-run approval. Verify existing private storage before target setup or model secrets. Retain scanned standard originals and final packaged results through a workflow-pinned runtime. Deny public artifact and history fallback on failure. **Reason and benefit** Preserve inspectable standard evidence in restricted storage without treating a private bucket as permission to retain credentials. **Additional context** Related source work is separate: #18067 changes paid runner routing, #18100 changes scoped input delivery, and #17888 changes report catalog parsing. This pull request does not include or revert those changes. ## What Changed - Add a trusted manual classification and exact run, attempt, workflow, target, selection and launcher approval contract. - Add a protected manual private job. Prepare a second workflow-pinned checkout and isolated publication dependencies before archive credentials. - Seal standard originals and final result bytes with exact inventories. Reject credential contamination, unscanned carriers and changed files. - Use existing immutable private-history archives and transfer receipts for cells and merged reports. Keep the existing bounds. - Use per-cell exact-key read sessions and a separate report writer. Check every inline policy against the 2,048-character STS limit. - Scan and seal fresh generated report logs and files with the actual report-step credential roots before transfer. - Require a positive nonprivate route for Actions uploads and public history. Private failures have no public fallback. Preserve normal catalog semantics for nonprivate selections with more than 32 IDs or duplicate IDs. - Authenticate generated-report fonts and every reserved trace-viewer static asset against the exact trusted producer path and bytes, including HTML and JavaScript. Keep standard cell evidence and unknown carriers closed. - Document the first eight supported IDs, deployment gates and the operator trust boundary. ## Verification - 57 new pure, actual-helper and actual-workflow-shell controls pass. - 50 affected existing workflow, routing, target and private-history controls pass. The final committed workflow security controls also pass. - Targeted helper/test and actual launcher noEmit checks pass. - `actionlint -shellcheck= -pyflakes= .github/workflows/runner-full-stack-e2e.yml` passes. - Parent `2f46336d7` required CI is green. The server 11/12 shard first failed on database cleanup/test timing and passed one bounded recheck with unchanged source. The original failure remains recorded. - The preserved docs-only parent `d721c170f` had 59 terminal, nonblocking checks and fresh Greptile 5/5. Three later review comments exposed a genuine static-report asset failure and nonprivate selector regression; their parent counterexamples remain recorded. - The reviewed parent passes 76 focused controls across nine files. The final dependency preflight successor passes all six affected controls, including two new actual `prepare` subprocess controls, and targeted helper/test noEmit. Unchanged suites were not repeated. A synthetic Node-only Playwright HTML/blob/JUnit report and the real dashboard renderer/brand stager pass the actual sealer, strict archive and immutable receipt path; only AWS transport is synthetic. No browser or product setup runs in that test. - Default cell fonts/SVGs, unknown report files, forged paths, altered static bytes, recomputed inventory tampering and registered credential matches remain rejected. Eligibility and remaining-byte checks run before body reads in both sealer and transfer validator; both independent parent read-order failures are preserved. - The pre-credential target comparison also binds the new generated-report asset helper byte for byte. A genuine tampered-dependency parent failure is preserved. - Six additional actual sealer/validator controls expose the standard-extension trace-owner bypass on the parent. All 34 affected controls pass on its correction, including the real producer/archive/receipt test; targeted noEmit passes. Ordinary dynamic report HTML outside the reserved trace directory is unchanged. - Final head `43683c4e0` passes both required gates, `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e`, in normal CI run `40849916302` attempt 1. All 59 rollup checks/statuses are terminal and nonblocking (55 success, two neutral, two skipped). - Fresh exact-head Greptile is 5/5; automated review is terminal and all technical threads are resolved. Human CODEOWNER approval remains a separate gate. Earlier source, genuine counterexamples and CI history remain preserved. - Full local build and live E2E were not run. This task prohibits local SDK/native/server builds and paid or AWS operations. Normal pull request CI must pass before merge readiness. - No existing artifact bodies, archives, media or provider reasoning were inspected. Synthetic owned fixtures prove the privacy boundaries. ## Risks - Deployment still needs the existing private bucket, role and protected environments. Both environments need the exact original-run approval variable. - Targets need the compatible handoff protocol and a separately reviewed exact launcher digest. Existing target branches do not become ready automatically. - Complete duplicated originals and packaged evidence can exceed existing archive limits. Such a transfer fails; files are not silently removed. - Required evidence omissions remain fatal to PASS. Safe failed evidence is retained with an explicit missing list and incomplete required-evidence verdict. Credential contamination still blocks all original uploads. Restricted storage does not waive PNG, HTML, blob or scanner checks. - This is operator-approved source execution. Target processes can inherit the job's OIDC request environment and may re-assume a role. Inline session attenuation is not isolation from malicious approved source. - Operator authorization must bind the actual exact source and original run. A proven administrator-controlled record may supply it without an environment reviewer UI. No new approval UI or environment change is required by this PR. - Required repository CODEOWNER review is still pending. Commented reviews and review requests are not approvals. This PR stays open and unmerged. - This PR does not deploy infrastructure, change IAM, dispatch workflows, publish report payloads, change grades or transfer prior scenario passes. ## Model Used OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` in Codex. Used code execution, source analysis and tool calls. The host does not expose the context window size. Independent peer review used the same model family in a separate agent. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
198 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript
198 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import { appendFile, cp, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, readdir, realpath, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
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import { canonicalGeneratedReportAsset, isTrustedGeneratedReportAsset } from "./manual-private-report-assets.js";
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import { sealManualResultEvidence } from "./manual-private-handoff.js";
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import { normalizedSecrets } from "./redaction.js";
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import { CREDENTIAL_NAMES } from "./types.js";
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import { isStandardEvidenceFile } from "./evidence.js";
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import { BoundedHistoryPublisher } from "./history-budget.js";
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import { privateArtifactKey, retainPrivateTransfer, transferPrivateArtifact, verifyPrivateHistory, type PrivateEvidenceCompleteness } from "./private-history.js";
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import { authorizeManualPrivateEvidence, MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, manualCellKind, manualPrivateSessionPolicy } from "./manual-private-retention.js";
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const hash = (bytes: string | Buffer) => createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex");
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function request(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
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const ids = JSON.parse(env.MANUAL_PRIVATE_IDS ?? "null") as string[];
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const approval = authorizeManualPrivateEvidence({ workflowSha: env.GITHUB_SHA ?? "", targetSha: env.TARGET_SHA ?? "",
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runId: env.GITHUB_RUN_ID ?? "", attempt: env.GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT ?? "", executionIds: ids }, env.MANUAL_PRIVATE_APPROVALS_JSON ?? "");
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return { ids, approval, bucket: env.RUNNER_E2E_PRIVATE_HISTORY_S3_BUCKET ?? "" };
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}
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async function output(name: string, value: string) {
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if (/[\r\n]/.test(value)) throw new Error("Invalid private evidence step output");
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await appendFile(process.env.GITHUB_OUTPUT!, `${name}=${value}\n`);
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}
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async function prepare(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
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const { ids, approval, bucket } = request(env), id = env.SELECTED_EXECUTION_ID;
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if (!id || !ids.includes(id)) throw new Error("Private evidence cell is not approved");
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const target = await realpath(env.TARGET_ROOT ?? ""), trusted = path.resolve(import.meta.dirname, "../..");
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if (target === trusted) throw new Error("Trusted transfer code must be separate from target checkout");
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const launch = await readFile(path.join(target, "tests/runner-e2e/launch.ts"));
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if (hash(launch) !== approval.launchSha256) throw new Error("Target evidence launcher differs from protected approval");
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for (const file of ["manual-private-handoff.ts", "manual-private-retention.ts", "manual-private-report-assets.ts"]) {
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if (!(await readFile(path.join(target, "tests/runner-e2e", file))).equals(await readFile(path.join(trusted, "tests/runner-e2e", file))))
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throw new Error("Target private evidence protocol differs from trusted implementation");
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}
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const temporary = await realpath(env.RUNNER_TEMP ?? ""), root = await mkdtemp(path.join(temporary, "manual-private-evidence-"));
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await writeFile(path.join(root, "identity.json"), JSON.stringify({ ...approval, executionIds: [id], root, status: "pending" }), { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
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await output("root", root); await output("session_policy", JSON.stringify(manualPrivateSessionPolicy({ bucket, runId: approval.runId, executionIds: [id], mode: "cell-write" })));
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}
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function requireSession(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
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if (![env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, env.AWS_SESSION_TOKEN].every(value => typeof value === "string" && value.length > 0))
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throw new Error("Explicit private archive session is required; no credential fallback");
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}
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async function verify(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
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requireSession(env); const { approval, bucket } = request(env), root = await realpath(env.PRIVATE_EVIDENCE_ROOT ?? "");
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const identity = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "identity.json"), "utf8"));
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if (identity.approvalSha256 !== approval.approvalSha256 || identity.targetSha !== approval.targetSha || identity.workflowSha !== approval.workflowSha
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|| identity.runId !== approval.runId || identity.attempt !== "1" || identity.root !== root) throw new Error("Private preflight identity changed");
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const publisher = new BoundedHistoryPublisher(path.join(root, "preflight-requests.json"));
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await verifyPrivateHistory(publisher, bucket);
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await writeFile(path.join(root, "preflight.json"), JSON.stringify({ ...identity, status: "verified" }), { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
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}
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export async function validateSealedInventory(directory: string, inventory: string, id?: string, treeKind: "standard" | "generated-report" = "standard") {
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const receipt = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(directory, inventory), "utf8"));
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if (receipt.protocol !== MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL || id !== undefined && receipt.executionId !== id || receipt.complete !== true
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|| !Array.isArray(receipt.files) || !receipt.files.length || receipt.files.length > 4096
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|| hash(JSON.stringify(receipt.files)) !== receipt.inventorySha256) throw new Error("Original evidence inventory is incomplete");
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if (id === undefined && receipt.treeKind !== treeKind) throw new Error("Private evidence tree kind differs from its inventory");
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const expected = new Set<string>(inventory.startsWith("../") ? [] : [inventory]); let bytes = 0;
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for (const row of receipt.files) {
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if (!row || Object.keys(row).sort().join() !== "bytes,path,sha256" || typeof row.path !== "string"
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|| row.path.split("/").some((part: string) => !part || part === "." || part === "..") || row.path.includes("\\")
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|| expected.has(row.path) || !Number.isSafeInteger(row.bytes) || row.bytes < 0 || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(row.sha256)) throw new Error("Invalid original evidence inventory row");
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const standard = isStandardEvidenceFile(id === undefined ? `html-report/${row.path}` : row.path);
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const canonical = id === undefined && treeKind === "generated-report" ? canonicalGeneratedReportAsset(row.path) : undefined;
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const staticReportOwner = id === undefined && treeKind === "generated-report" && (row.path.startsWith("html/trace/") || canonical !== undefined);
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if (staticReportOwner ? !canonical : !standard) throw new Error("Invalid original evidence inventory row");
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if (row.bytes > 256 * 1024 * 1024 - bytes) throw new Error("Original evidence byte accounting changed");
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expected.add(row.path); bytes += row.bytes;
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const file = path.join(directory, row.path), metadata = await lstat(file);
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if (!metadata.isFile() || metadata.isSymbolicLink() || metadata.size !== row.bytes) throw new Error("Original evidence changed after its scan");
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const data = await readFile(file);
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if (hash(data) !== row.sha256) throw new Error("Original evidence changed after its scan");
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if (staticReportOwner && !await isTrustedGeneratedReportAsset(row.path, data)) throw new Error("Invalid original evidence inventory row");
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}
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if (bytes !== receipt.sourceBytes || bytes > 256 * 1024 * 1024) throw new Error("Original evidence byte accounting changed");
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const actual = new Set<string>();
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async function visit(relative: string) {
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for (const entry of await readdir(path.join(directory, relative), { withFileTypes: true })) {
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const name = relative ? `${relative}/${entry.name}` : entry.name;
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if (entry.isSymbolicLink() || !entry.isFile() && !entry.isDirectory() || name.split("/").length > 24) throw new Error("Invalid sealed evidence entry");
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if (entry.isDirectory()) { await visit(name); continue; }
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if (!expected.has(name)) throw new Error("Unscanned file added to sealed evidence");
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actual.add(name);
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}
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}
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await visit("");
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if (actual.size !== expected.size) throw new Error("Sealed evidence is incomplete");
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return receipt;
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}
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export async function validateSealedOriginals(root: string, id: string) {
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const receipt = await validateSealedInventory(path.join(root, "originals", manualCellKind(id)), "original-evidence-inventory.json", id);
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const missing = receipt.missingRequiredEvidence;
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const allowed = new Set(["final-state.png", "result.json", "junit.xml", "html-report/index.html", "snapshots/fixtures.json", "snapshots/api-state.json", "blob-report/*.zip"]);
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if (![true, false, null].includes(receipt.requiredEvidenceComplete) || !Array.isArray(missing) || new Set(missing).size !== missing.length
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|| missing.some((name: unknown) => typeof name !== "string" || !allowed.has(name))
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|| (receipt.requiredEvidenceComplete === false) !== (missing.length > 0)) throw new Error("Required evidence completeness is unknown");
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return receipt;
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}
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function cellCompleteness(id: string, receipt: { requiredEvidenceComplete: boolean | null; missingRequiredEvidence: string[] }): PrivateEvidenceCompleteness {
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return { meaning: "available-files-and-transfer-only", doesNotAttestFeatureOutcome: true,
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cells: [{ executionId: id, availableFileInventoryComplete: true, requiredPassEvidenceComplete: receipt.requiredEvidenceComplete, missingRequiredEvidence: receipt.missingRequiredEvidence }] };
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}
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async function uploadCell(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
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requireSession(env); const { approval, bucket } = request(env), id = env.SELECTED_EXECUTION_ID!;
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if (!approval.executionIds.includes(id)) throw new Error("Private evidence cell is not approved");
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const root = await realpath(env.PRIVATE_EVIDENCE_ROOT ?? ""), context = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "preflight.json"), "utf8"));
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if (context.status !== "verified" || context.approvalSha256 !== approval.approvalSha256 || context.targetSha !== approval.targetSha
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|| context.runId !== approval.runId || context.executionIds.join() !== id || context.root !== root) throw new Error("Private evidence preflight identity changed");
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if (await lstat(path.join(root, "contamination.json")).then(() => true, error => { if (error.code === "ENOENT") return false; throw error; }))
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throw new Error("Contaminated private evidence cannot be uploaded");
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const originals = await validateSealedOriginals(root, id);
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const evidenceCompleteness = cellCompleteness(id, originals);
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const bundle = path.join(root, "sealed-bundle"); await mkdir(bundle, { mode: 0o700 });
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const results = path.join(root, "sealed-results");
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await validateSealedInventory(path.join(results, "html-report"), "../result-evidence-inventory.json");
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await mkdir(path.join(bundle, "originals"), { mode: 0o700 });
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await cp(path.join(root, "originals", manualCellKind(id)), path.join(bundle, "originals", manualCellKind(id)), { recursive: true, errorOnExist: true, force: false });
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await cp(results, path.join(bundle, "sealed-results"), { recursive: true, errorOnExist: true, force: false });
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await writeFile(path.join(bundle, "identity.json"), JSON.stringify({ ...context, evidenceCompleteness }), { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
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const receipt = path.join(root, "cell-transfer.json"), publisher = new BoundedHistoryPublisher(receipt);
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await retainPrivateTransfer({ operation: "upload", kind: manualCellKind(id), runId: approval.runId, directory: bundle, bucket, publisher, evidenceCompleteness }, receipt,
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() => new BoundedHistoryPublisher(`${receipt}.retention.json`));
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}
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async function reportSession(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
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const { approval, bucket } = request(env);
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await output("session_policy", JSON.stringify(manualPrivateSessionPolicy({ bucket, runId: approval.runId, executionIds: [...approval.executionIds], mode: "report-write" })));
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await output("cell_count", String(approval.executionIds.length));
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for (const [index, id] of approval.executionIds.entries()) {
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await output(`read_policy_${index}`, JSON.stringify(manualPrivateSessionPolicy({ bucket, runId: approval.runId, executionIds: [id], mode: "cell-read" })));
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}
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}
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async function downloadCell(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
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requireSession(env); const { approval, bucket } = request(env), root = await realpath(env.PRIVATE_REPORT_ROOT ?? "");
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const index = Number(env.SELECTED_CELL_INDEX);
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if (!/^[0-7]$/.test(env.SELECTED_CELL_INDEX ?? "") || !approval.executionIds[index]) throw new Error("Invalid exact private cell index");
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const selected = path.join(root, "selected-runner-e2e"); await mkdir(selected, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
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const id = approval.executionIds[index]!;
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{
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const directory = path.join(root, manualCellKind(id)), publisher = new BoundedHistoryPublisher(path.join(root, `${manualCellKind(id)}-download.json`));
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const receipt = await publisher.downloadJson<{ evidenceCompleteness?: PrivateEvidenceCompleteness; transfer?: { status?: string; sha256?: string } }>(bucket,
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`${privateArtifactKey(manualCellKind(id), approval.runId)}.upload-receipt.json`, path.join(root, `${manualCellKind(id)}-receipt.json`));
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if (receipt?.transfer?.status !== "complete" || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(receipt.transfer.sha256 ?? "")) throw new Error("Private cell transfer receipt is unavailable");
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const downloaded = await transferPrivateArtifact({ operation: "download", kind: manualCellKind(id), runId: approval.runId, directory, bucket, publisher });
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if (downloaded.sha256 !== receipt.transfer.sha256) throw new Error("Private cell archive differs from retained transfer receipt");
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const identity = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(directory, "identity.json"), "utf8"));
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if (identity.targetSha !== approval.targetSha || identity.workflowSha !== approval.workflowSha || identity.runId !== approval.runId
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|| identity.executionIds.join() !== id || identity.protocol !== MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL) throw new Error("Private cell archive has a foreign identity");
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const originals = await validateSealedOriginals(directory, id), summary = cellCompleteness(id, originals);
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if (hash(JSON.stringify(identity.evidenceCompleteness)) !== hash(JSON.stringify(summary))
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|| hash(JSON.stringify(receipt.evidenceCompleteness)) !== hash(JSON.stringify(summary))) throw new Error("Private evidence completeness receipt differs from archive");
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await validateSealedInventory(path.join(directory, "sealed-results", "html-report"), "../result-evidence-inventory.json");
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await cp(path.join(directory, "sealed-results", "html-report"), path.join(selected, manualCellKind(id)), { recursive: true, errorOnExist: true, force: false });
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await writeFile(path.join(root, `manual-cell-completeness-${index}.json`), JSON.stringify(summary), { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
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}
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}
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async function verifyDownloads(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
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const { approval } = request(env), root = await realpath(env.PRIVATE_REPORT_ROOT ?? "");
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const cells: PrivateEvidenceCompleteness["cells"] = [];
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for (const [index, id] of approval.executionIds.entries()) {
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const summary = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, `manual-cell-completeness-${index}.json`), "utf8")) as PrivateEvidenceCompleteness;
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if (summary.meaning !== "available-files-and-transfer-only" || summary.doesNotAttestFeatureOutcome !== true
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|| summary.cells.length !== 1 || summary.cells[0]!.executionId !== id) throw new Error("Private report lacks an exact cell transfer");
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cells.push(...summary.cells);
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}
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await writeFile(path.join(root, "manual-report-input-completeness.json"), JSON.stringify({ meaning: "available-files-and-transfer-only", doesNotAttestFeatureOutcome: true, cells }), { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
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}
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export async function uploadReport(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
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requireSession(env); const { approval, bucket } = request(env), source = await realpath(env.PRIVATE_REPORT_SOURCE ?? ""), root = await realpath(env.PRIVATE_REPORT_ROOT ?? "");
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if (!source.startsWith(`${root}${path.sep}`)) throw new Error("Private report escaped owned staging");
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const evidenceCompleteness = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(root, "manual-report-input-completeness.json"), "utf8")) as PrivateEvidenceCompleteness;
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if (evidenceCompleteness.meaning !== "available-files-and-transfer-only" || evidenceCompleteness.doesNotAttestFeatureOutcome !== true
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|| evidenceCompleteness.cells.map(cell => cell.executionId).sort().join() !== [...approval.executionIds].sort().join()) throw new Error("Private report lacks exact cell completeness receipts");
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const secrets = normalizedSecrets([...CREDENTIAL_NAMES.map(name => env[name]), env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, env.AWS_SESSION_TOKEN]);
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await sealManualResultEvidence({ root, protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, private: true, workflowSha: approval.workflowSha,
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targetSha: approval.targetSha, runId: approval.runId, attempt: approval.attempt, executionIds: [...approval.executionIds] }, secrets, source, "generated-report");
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const sealed = path.join(root, "sealed-results");
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await validateSealedInventory(path.join(sealed, "html-report"), "../result-evidence-inventory.json", undefined, "generated-report");
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const receipt = path.join(root, "report-transfer.json"), publisher = new BoundedHistoryPublisher(receipt);
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await retainPrivateTransfer({ operation: "upload", kind: "manual-report", runId: approval.runId, directory: sealed, bucket, publisher, evidenceCompleteness }, receipt,
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() => new BoundedHistoryPublisher(`${receipt}.retention.json`));
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}
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async function main() {
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const action = process.argv[2];
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if (process.argv.length !== 3) throw new Error("Invalid private evidence command");
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if (action === "prepare") await prepare(process.env);
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else if (action === "verify") await verify(process.env);
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else if (action === "upload-cell") await uploadCell(process.env);
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else if (action === "report-session") await reportSession(process.env);
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else if (action === "download-cell") await downloadCell(process.env);
|
|
else if (action === "verify-downloads") await verifyDownloads(process.env);
|
|
else if (action === "upload-report") await uploadReport(process.env);
|
|
else throw new Error("Invalid private evidence command");
|
|
}
|
|
if (process.argv[1] && import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(path.resolve(process.argv[1])).href) {
|
|
main().catch(() => { process.stderr.write("Restricted manual evidence operation failed; no public fallback\n"); process.exitCode = 1; });
|
|
}
|