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PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map/workspaces.md
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DottaandPaperclip 59a70dc9e2 fix(workspaces): expire reproducible Git files and restore exact commits (#16457) 
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages AI agents and their task workspaces.
> - Isolated Git worktrees and private repository copies remain on the
host after tasks finish.
> - These files can fill the disk even when every commit is available
upstream.
> - Cleanup must retain unique files, local Git state, live work, and
recovery data.
> - This pull request records and verifies an exact-commit restoration
recipe before expiration.
> - Normal reopening restores that commit even after upstream advances.
> - The benefit is lower host disk use while finished tasks remain
available for later work.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #10285 and #2022. Follows #16433 for skill-cache expiration.
Related #11936 provides separate host-local cleanup tooling; this change
extends the existing company-scoped lifecycle worker and normal
workspace reopening. ROADMAP.md does not specify a competing
implementation.

## What Changed

- Add opt-in expiration for verified Paperclip-owned Git worktrees after
their whole task tree has been done or cancelled for 24 hours.
- Preserve active and scheduled runs, previews, pending reopening,
unresolved recovery, dirty files, unknown ignored files, and unsupported
or unique Git state.
- Verify an authenticated fetch in a fresh object store. Save repository
identity, exact commit, branch, and ownership before any deletion.
- Rename eligible files into recorded managed trash. Resume interrupted
cleanup under source and lifecycle locks.
- Expire private base clones only after consumer, file, reference,
reflog, and object checks pass. Preserve shared project base clones.
- Rebuild missing bases and worktrees through normal reopening at the
recorded commit. Return an explicit retryable error when repository
access fails.
- Add independent workspace/base switches, dry-run reports,
reclaimed-byte counts, and operational documentation. No table, public
API, UI, or recovery-retention change.

## Verification

- Real local bare remote plus Postgres: create at A, advance upstream to
B, expire the worktree and private base, reopen at A, then make and
retain a subsequent commit.
- Final lifecycle suite: all 20 tests passed in 46.41 seconds at
`d72947a2e45be5d0c912debb03c46b15863b4798`. Review fixes cover
second-cycle expiration, newer-branch recovery, normal preparation after
restoration, branch adoption, and Git administration path controls.
Eleven existing branch reconciliation controls also passed. Covers
unique files and Git state, live descendants, scheduled runs, recovery,
previews, unauthorized access, upstream failure, concurrent reopening,
interrupted deletion, shared bases, and nested private worktrees.
- Final guard regressions: 3 affected tests passed. Existing
workspace/runtime/preparation/source controls: 328 tests passed in
238.69 seconds.
- Full repository typecheck and build passed locally. The full local
test attempt did not pass: initial native-session cases hit macOS
Postgres shared-memory exhaustion, source changes invalidated two
discovery cases, and the checkout disappeared near the end. The
final-code retry of the remaining skill and unrelated controls passed
all 103 tests. All checks passed on this exact head, including
typecheck, general and serialized tests, Runner checks, build, canary
dry-run, browser E2E, and security scans. Greptile reviewed the head at
5/5 with all findings resolved.
- Fixed a blocking CI policy false positive for
`docker-compose-secrets.test.mjs`. The test still rejects GitHub secret
expressions, including dot, bracket, and multiline forms. Its full
15-test suite passes.
- Map validation and `git diff --check` passed.
- Staging dry-run inspection, measured reclamation, and ordinary product
acceptance remain pending. No live acceptance is claimed.

## Risks

- Git restoration depends on continued upstream availability and
credentials. Cleanup skips unverified commits; restoration never
substitutes the default branch.
- File deletion requires multiple conservative proofs. Unknown or
unsupported state is retained and can limit reclamation.
- Source and lifecycle locks serialize preparation, reopening, and
expiration. Remote verification has a deadline but can delay work on the
same source.
- Start with both expiration switches disabled. When enabled, dry-run
remains the default. Rollback disables further deletion while retaining
restoration support.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, repository inspection, tool
use, and code execution. The exact backend model ID and context-window
size are not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (focused tests; full local
limitation documented above)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-15 13:09:59 -05:00

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# Execution workspaces, services, and files — agent access
Product map: [Execution workspaces, services, and files](../feature-map/workspaces.md).
Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: `58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b`.
Native REST transport reconciled in this change; see the
[shared transport contract](README.md#native-rest-transport).
This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps.
Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be
qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the [map contract](../README.md)
for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.
## `binding`
Review: `baseline`.
API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
- `GET /api/issues/{id}/heartbeat-context`.
- `GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}`.
- `GET /api/issues/{id}/workspace` inspects the durable task binding.
- `PUT /api/issues/{id}/workspace` requests the next binding.
- `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/execution-workspaces?summary=true&selectableForTask=true`
lists authorized task-selectable workspaces.
Agent access: `available` — Native get_task_context / REST / CLI / MCP workspace read.
The task-bound native tools `get_workspace`, `list_workspaces`, and
`select_workspace` use the ordinary authenticated APIs. Legacy agents can call
those APIs with their admitted run token. These paths do not require a project.
Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
preset and task ownership where required.
Task workspace writes require `issue:mutate`, an active owned task/run for agents,
and current source visibility. Shared physical roots also require source-project
workspace write authority. Accepting a new pending choice advances its binding
revision; superseded retries fail while current-choice retries remain idempotent.
Binding revisions and request keys fence retries;
selection applies at the next normal admission without interrupting a live run.
Fresh standard-trust tasks with an implicit repository default can use an owned
remote clone when the shared default source fails the restricted-task workspace
guard. This does not grant access to the private local checkout or its Git metadata.
The normal admitted Git identity must already authorize the configured remote.
Creation of a fallback source is unavailable for explicit, parent/channel, reused
or low-trust selections, or branch templates without a task-derived placeholder;
an existing verified owned source remains reusable. Literal branch selections
retain the original denial without cloning or replacing their unpublished commits.
New implicit Git defaults record project-source provenance. Untyped explicit,
inherited and older ambiguous checkout bindings retain the denial; admission reads
the current company-scoped binding before considering the fallback.
Local paths, unsupported transports and credential-bearing URLs are not fallback
sources. Company/task/remote bindings, real paths, Git storage and the exact origin
are revalidated for reuse, cleanup and reopening. A failed save removes only the
owned task worktree. The [isolated-source service](../../server/src/services/isolated-remote-workspace-source.ts)
and its local regression tests establish source and lifecycle boundaries; live
agent/provider qualification remains separate.
Reconstructable Git expiration adds no agent endpoint or permission. It records
company/workspace/repository identity and an exact commit before removing owned
cache files. Existing task/workspace reopening retains current company, source,
and trust checks. Missing upstream access returns a retryable error; it does not
choose a newer commit or grant access to another company's source. Shared project
bases and unresolved recovery remain protected. Local lifecycle evidence is in
[expiration tests](../../server/src/__tests__/git-workspace-expiration.test.ts).
Writable aliases must also be compatible with current and retained physical
source projects' trust boundaries. Incompatible choices are rejected before
dispatch; a projectless alias cannot bypass required sandbox containment.
Source-copy checks apply the same trust boundary before provisioning. The
authoritative sandbox or SSH selection suppresses configured and built-in
controller worktree and runtime provisioning regardless of task trust, source
write grants or board sponsorship. Genuine isolated worktrees still permit
authorized read-only source copying. Source write permission does not authorize
controller execution. Explicit, channel, inherited, foreign or nondefault isolated
source choices remain copy-only for controller provisioning even on local runs.
Their deny-only workspace marker survives metadata and binding changes; a board
reopen does not turn it into approval. Implicit trusted local defaults and explicit
SSH remote provisioning retain their existing placement; no new sandbox provision transport
is claimed. The implicit default follows task creation: configured policy pointer,
then primary source, creation time and ID. A missing or foreign configured source
does not authorize controller hooks. This precedence neither changes existing
creation validation nor rotates bindings or clears retained copy-only markers.
Closed-worktree reopening checks current task, agent, organizational and source policies without assuming a future driver. Effective low-trust reopens suppress configured and built-in host scripts. Returned checkpoints must have directory parents for every nested entry before merging, including unchanged entries; invalid output leaves retained host files intact and keeps recovery evidence.
Skipping the host scan for a fully unchanged returned snapshot grants no new
access. The merge still holds its canonical writer lock and runs both authority
and publication hooks. Denials still propagate, and checkpoint/archive validation
is unchanged. [Regression coverage](../../packages/adapter-utils/src/workspace-restore-unchanged.test.ts)
is source-level evidence only.
Child creation by an admitted agent checks an explicit prospective-task context before the child is saved. The creator run must have an authoritative saved policy and a verified company/agent/parent lineage. Current parent, prospective child and physical source policies must fit that boundary. This creation path does not relax exact task/run checks for existing-task writes. The [child trust regression](../../server/src/__tests__/task-workspace-child-trust.test.ts) is automated source-level evidence, not live agent qualification.
Source review for these additions: PR #15749 and
[task workspace routes](../../server/src/routes/task-workspaces.ts),
[native authority](../../server/src/services/native-runtime/paperclip-runner-tool-authority.ts),
and [semantic transport](../../server/src/services/task-workspace-tools.ts).
Evidence: `source-only` —
[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
reviewed commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Run/task context identifies its actual realized workspace; record existence is not
a running service.
## `provisioning`
Review: `baseline`.
API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
- `GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}`.
- `GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/workspace-operations`.
- `POST /api/issues/{id}/workspace/repositories` requests repository preparation.
Agent access: `partial` — REST / native call_api reads; task/project assignment triggers
server provisioning.
Native `prepare_repository` and admitted legacy REST callers can request a
catalog repository or validated repository URL for their current task.
Preparation occurs at normal admission; the agent cannot supply a host path or
controller identity. Current source permissions, responsible-user intersection,
trust restrictions, immutable receipts, and retained physical-root ownership are
checked before acquisition and publication. Low-trust callers cannot trigger a
new controller-side Git acquisition. Evidence remains source-only here; focused
[repository tests](../../server/src/__tests__/task-workspace-repositories-trust.test.ts)
are separate from live agent qualification.
Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
preset and task ownership where required.
Evidence: `source-only` —
[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
reviewed commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Observing readiness exists. Creating host commands or arbitrary provision targets
is a separate protected operation.
## `services`
Review: `baseline`.
API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
- `POST /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/runtime-services/{action}`.
Agent access: `available` — Authorized agent REST / native `call_api` / CLI runtime
service controls and existing stdio MCP controls.
Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
preset and task ownership where required.
Evidence: `source-only` —
[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
reviewed commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: No dedicated production control_workspace_service binding. Generic native
calls retain runtime trust and workspace/task scope checks. Optional MCP availability
must be recorded.
## `files-git`
Review: `baseline`.
API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
- `GET /api/issues/{issueId}/file-resources/content`.
- `GET /api/issues/{issueId}/file-resources/list`.
Agent access: `partial` — Authorized workspace filesystem tools; Dot workspace bridge
when enabled; board file-resource HTTP UI.
Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
preset and task ownership where required.
Evidence: `source-only` —
[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
reviewed commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Files panel HTTP requires board. Agents can use their admitted workspace file
tools; remote/Dot scope and Git command availability differ.
File reads also enforce retained source privacy after local copy, configuration
move/removal, reopen, and project deletion. A task assignment or repository
receipt does not grant access to private files from another physical owner.
Authorized Git-source capture also retains ownership on the actual shared Git
storage. Source checks use verified checkout identities, including company-known
owners when separate metadata has no primary-checkout registration. Removing that
checkout does not release its private committed files in surviving worktrees.
## `closure`
Review: `baseline`.
API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
- `PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/{id}`.
- `GET /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/close-readiness`.
- `POST /api/execution-workspaces/{id}/reconcile-branch`.
Agent access: `partial` — REST / native fallback for permitted update; CLI workspace;
reconcile-branch requires board.
Policy: Company/project/workspace visibility and runtime authority; active run, trust
preset and task ownership where required.
Evidence: `source-only` —
[implementation](../../server/src/routes/workspace-runtime-service-authz.ts#L76) at the
reviewed commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Closure/readiness exists; not every workspace can be reopened, and branch
reconciliation has a board boundary.
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