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PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map/gateways-profiles.md
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DottaandPaperclip b8f6d9b23f docs: clarify delegated connection feature and access maps (#17882) 
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - The feature and agent access maps describe user journeys and their
permission boundaries.
> - PRs #17737 and #17739 added delegated connection setup across
several existing areas.
> - The maps include those operations, but some recipes and board-only
statements are stale.
> - This PR adds usable setup recipes and corrects the access
descriptions.
> - The benefit is a clearer verification path that preserves human and
agent authority boundaries.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs: #17737, #17739.

Related: #17862 changes connection setup advice and catalog choices.
This PR only clarifies the existing maps.

**Issue type**

Outdated and missing documentation.

**Where is the issue?**

The paired connection setup, app permissions, chat channels, model
accounts, and gateway maps under `maps/`.

**What's wrong?**

Delegated setup guidance sits under Gotchas without a matching driving
recipe. Some model-account text still groups supported account sign-in
with board-only host controls. A few callback, privacy, and native
admission descriptions omit important limits.

**Suggested fix**

Add the missing recipes. State the current route and service boundaries.
Keep existing capability IDs and distinguish source review, fixture
tests, and live provider proof.

## What Changed

- Add paired entry points and driving recipes for delegated setup,
permission changes, and managed AI sign-in.
- Describe Google consent restoration, GitHub requested credential
fields and saved rotation, and Vercel personal credential attribution.
- Correct the Vercel callback state checks and chat
conversation/test-status privacy scope. Name the separate GitHub
registration handoff endpoint.
- Replace blanket board-only AI login wording with the specific
managed-account and host/session boundaries.
- Link the five access maps to shared native admission and work-mode
limits. State the permitted self-targeted policy administration
boundary.

## Verification

- `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passed: 35 paired areas and 192 stable
capability IDs. This checks structure and references.
- `node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs` passed. Generated output remains
ignored.
- `git diff --check` passed.
- Eleven selected cases in
`server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts` passed
on source `db70c5acd9`, the unchanged base of this documentation commit.
They use a fresh PostgreSQL database, actual agent keys/run JWTs, human
sessions, and deterministic provider fixtures. The other 61 cases were
not selected.
- The selected cases cover connection/profile creation, Google saved
choices, native API entry points, Slack caller/target policy, GitHub
import and identity confirmation, durable gateway authority, AI
accounts/pools, saved human handoffs, revocation, scope, trust, and
Ask/Plan denial.
- Read-only source reviews checked all five areas. The disposable
database was removed after the run.
- Full workspace typecheck, build, and test sweep were not rerun for
this Markdown-only change. Live provider login and browser journeys were
not run. Per-operation source-only/not-run labels remain unchanged.

## Risks

Low risk. Incorrect documentation could misstate a permission boundary
or imply broader verification. The changes cite the owning routes and
services and retain fixture and live-provider limits. No runtime,
schema, lockfile, or workflow files change.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, repository tools, code
execution, and read-only source-review agents. The session does not
expose a more specific deployment ID or context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` /
`Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the
relevant issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable — existing fixtures
verify this documentation-only change
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green — CI is running and Paperclip
Review is queued on the current head
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups —
exact head `4d16f101968d6908f90f72b6ff6ecbb79037f168`
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-27 09:40:41 -05:00

340 lines
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# Tool gateways and access profiles — agent access
Product map: [gateways-profiles](../feature-map/gateways-profiles.md).
Feature ID: `gateways-profiles`.
Delegated native entries inherit the [native admission and work-mode limits](README.md#native-rest-transport).
Review date: 2026-10-26. Source base: `a1f77821b9cd5c9c846fdf7a0fa5cc620ad2b6bb`; implementation: [#17737](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17737).
Connection operations reviewed in this working tree. The inventory was reconciled
against production UI clients, REST registrations and service entry points; it is
a review checklist, not a runtime registry. [Authorization and evidence contract](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md).
Fixture evidence is separate from live provider qualification and from empirical
LLM success. Source-only entries have a reviewed agent path or an explicit boundary,
but do not claim an individually executed HTTP test.
## `gateway`
Capability ID: `gateways-profiles/gateway`.
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
### `get-companies-tools-gateways`
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/gateways`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_connections (responsible user: tools:admin)`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); [authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) inspect the saved gateway after a denied binding change.
Verification: `passed` — local assembled server and real database; gateway visibility and unchanged target assignment after profile-grant revocation. No live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
### `post-companies-tools-gateways`
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/gateways`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_connections (responsible user: tools:admin)`; bindings also require `tools:manage_profiles`. [Shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
### `patch-tool-gateway-gateways`
API: `present` — `PATCH /api/tool-gateway/gateways/{gatewayId}`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_connections (responsible user: tools:admin)`; setting or clearing bindings also requires `tools:manage_profiles`. [Shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); [authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) exercise persisted binding changes and revoked/scoped authority.
Verification: `passed` — local assembled server and real database. Clearing a binding requires retained profile authority; replacement profile/project changes require access to both saved and replacement resources. Authorized changes persist. No live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
## `profiles`
Capability ID: `gateways-profiles/profiles`.
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
### `get-companies-tools-profiles`
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/profiles`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `verified` — [authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) exercise saved application/catalog/tool-name/risk selectors, allow-all profiles, managed empty profiles, personal-account visibility, and scoped grants through actual keys and run JWTs.
Verification: `passed` — local assembled server and real database; inaccessible profile resources are omitted from lists and denied before new-tool or effective-profile data is returned. Proposed broad entries and installed connections use the same authority checks.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
### `post-companies-tools-profiles`
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/profiles`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require `tools:manage_connections`. [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
### `get-companies-tools-profiles-effective-agents`
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/profiles/effective/agents/{agentId}`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `verified` — [authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) exercise saved application/catalog/tool-name/risk selectors, allow-all profiles, managed empty profiles, personal-account visibility, and scoped grants through actual keys and run JWTs.
Verification: `passed` — local assembled server and real database; inaccessible profile resources are omitted from lists and denied before new-tool or effective-profile data is returned. Proposed broad entries and installed connections use the same authority checks.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
### `patch-tool-profiles`
API: `present` — `PATCH /api/tool-profiles/{profileId}`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require `tools:manage_connections`. [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-tool-profiles-duplicate`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-profiles/{profileId}/duplicate`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require `tools:manage_connections`. [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `delete-tool-profiles`
API: `present` — `DELETE /api/tool-profiles/{profileId}`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require `tools:manage_connections`. [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-tool-profiles-entries`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-profiles/{profileId}/entries`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require `tools:manage_connections`. [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `patch-tool-profile-entries`
API: `present` — `PATCH /api/tool-profile-entries/{entryId}`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require `tools:manage_connections`. [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `delete-tool-profile-entries`
API: `present` — `DELETE /api/tool-profile-entries/{entryId}`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require `tools:manage_connections`. [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-companies-tools-profiles-bind`
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/profiles/{profileId}/bind`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require `tools:manage_connections`. [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Resolve issue/routine/gateway targets, private parent/project access, and affected agents. Existing bindings and saved gateway profile references retain the same checks.
Evidence: `verified` — [production-authenticated integration fixture](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) with real database persistence and deterministic provider responses where required.
Verification: `passed` — Actual authenticated requests bind/unbind an authorized task and reject issue/routine/gateway targets outside agent configuration scope. Existing bindings and gateway profile references are rechecked on profile edits.
Gaps: Fixture evidence does not qualify live provider behavior or an empirical model success rate.
### `post-companies-tools-profiles-unbind`
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/profiles/{profileId}/unbind`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_profiles`; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require `tools:manage_connections`. [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Resolve issue/routine/gateway targets, private parent/project access, and affected agents. Existing bindings and saved gateway profile references retain the same checks.
Evidence: `verified` — [production-authenticated integration fixture](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) with real database persistence and deterministic provider responses where required.
Verification: `passed` — Actual authenticated requests bind/unbind an authorized task and reject issue/routine/gateway targets outside agent configuration scope. Existing bindings and gateway profile references are rechecked on profile edits.
Gaps: Fixture evidence does not qualify live provider behavior or an empirical model success rate.
## `client-connect`
Capability ID: `gateways-profiles/client-connect`.
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
### `get-mcp-gateways`
API: `present` — `GET /mcp/gateways/{gatewayPublicId}`; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: `restricted` — GET always returns HTTP 405 with `Allow: POST`. Use the corresponding POST MCP operation.
Policy: GET streaming is unsupported; this is a transport boundary independent of principal permissions. POST still requires the documented MCP authentication and resource policy.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — source-reviewed fixed 405 handler. A protocol check should assert status 405 and `Allow: POST`; use POST to exercise authenticated MCP calls.
Gaps: No GET event stream is implemented. This entry does not advertise a usable GET client connection.
### `post-mcp-gateways`
API: `present` — `POST /mcp/gateways/{gatewayPublicId}`; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: `available` — existing authenticated MCP/provider protocol; not callable as JSON REST.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority. Issuer and target Block/Ask first/rate decisions intersect using the existing evaluator; credentials must select the same identity. Human continuation rechecks current token actions, scope, grants and both policies. Approval attribution records the issuer independently of the target; deleted tokens fail closed. Board clients and run-bound heartbeat clients retain their separate behavior.
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: `passed` — local assembled server and actual gateway-token authentication. Durable clients survive setup-run completion, honor purpose scopes, and reject revoked user/issuer authority and a cleared issuer foreign key. Thirteen actual-auth cases additionally verify issuer/target Block, governed approval, current policy/grant/token revocation and deletion, narrowed actions, independent/shared rates, credential identity and board-issued approval compatibility. No live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
### `get-tool-gateway-gateways-mcp`
API: `present` — `GET /api/tool-gateway/gateways/{gatewayId}/mcp`; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: `restricted` — GET always returns HTTP 405 with `Allow: POST`. Use the corresponding POST MCP operation.
Policy: GET streaming is unsupported; this is a transport boundary independent of principal permissions. POST still requires the documented MCP authentication and resource policy.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — source-reviewed fixed 405 handler. A protocol check should assert status 405 and `Allow: POST`; use POST to exercise authenticated MCP calls.
Gaps: No GET event stream is implemented. This entry does not advertise a usable GET client connection.
### `post-tool-gateway-gateways-mcp`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-gateway/gateways/{gatewayId}/mcp`; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: `available` — existing authenticated MCP/provider protocol; not callable as JSON REST.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `get-tool-gateway-tools`
API: `present` — `GET /api/tool-gateway/tools`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-tool-gateway-tools-call`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-gateway/tools/call`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
## `tokens`
Capability ID: `gateways-profiles/tokens`.
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
### `post-tool-gateway-gateways-tokens`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-gateway/gateways/{gatewayId}/tokens`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_connections (responsible user: tools:admin)`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `verified` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. [Authenticated fixtures](../../server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts) passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: `passed` — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
### `post-tool-gateway-gateway-tokens-revoke`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-gateway/gateway-tokens/{tokenId}/revoke`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_connections (responsible user: tools:admin)`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-tool-gateway-sessions`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-gateway/sessions`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-tool-gateway-sessions-revoke`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-gateway/sessions/{sessionId}/revoke`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
## `activity`
Capability ID: `gateways-profiles/activity`.
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
### `get-companies-tools-runtime-slots`
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/runtime-slots`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_runtime`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-companies-tools-runtime-slots-stop`
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/runtime-slots/{id}/stop`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_runtime`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-companies-tools-runtime-slots-restart`
API: `present` — `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/runtime-slots/{id}/restart`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_runtime`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `get-companies-tools-runtime-health`
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/runtime-health`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_runtime`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `get-companies-tools-runs-decisions`
API: `present` — `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/runs/{runId}/decisions`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:view_audit`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `get-tool-gateway-runtime-slots`
API: `present` — `GET /api/tool-gateway/runtime-slots`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_runtime`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-tool-gateway-runtime-slots-stop`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-gateway/runtime-slots/{slotId}/stop`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_runtime`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `post-tool-gateway-runtime-slots-restart`
API: `present` — `POST /api/tool-gateway/runtime-slots/{slotId}/restart`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:manage_runtime`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
### `get-tool-gateway-audit`
API: `present` — `GET /api/tool-gateway/audit`; JSON REST.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST and default native `search_api` / `call_api`.
Policy: `tools:view_audit`; [shared management policy](../../doc/plans/2026-10-13-connection-api-parity.md#authorization-contract). Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: `source-only` — [route](../../server/src/routes/tool-gateway.ts); reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: `not-run` — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
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