mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-11-03 17:51:58 +01:00
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Completed tasks leave workspaces that need safe cleanup. > - Providers without ancestry inspection currently need a recorded merged PR before cleanup can start. > - A squash merge changes commit identity, so direct ancestry cannot prove that delivery. > - This change proves delivery from the finalized HEAD and captured destination before storage inspection. > - Fresh storage checks and a second delivery check still protect removal. > - This reuses the existing worker and receipts. It adds no table or timer. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #18410. Related: #13400 addresses workspace identity during inspection; this change adds destination-aware delivery discovery. ## What Changed - Resolve direct ancestry or discover an associated merged GitHub PR without a recorded work product. Require exact HEAD, destination repository and branch, and a reachable integration commit. - Use the latest settled finalization receipt as a candidate. Reject missing, failed, pending, conflicting, or changed evidence. - Inspect storage only after positive remote proof for providers that disable ancestry inspection. Recheck HEAD, branch, source identity and delivery before removal intent. - Add an optional provider capability for a specific PR recovery hint and an optional prepared destination receipt. Older providers keep their existing protocol. - Wake cleanup when finalization writes settle or gain a workspace binding. Keep remote-only retries for concrete unresolved delivery. Park missing or unsupported candidate identity. - Reuse the source project's explicit GitHub consent for delivery checks through the existing authorization service. Revalidate the bound repository and consent before removal; missing or revoked consent retains storage without switching identities. Public sources remain anonymous. - Update the contracts, documentation, access map, and targeted regressions. ## Verification - Initial-head GitHub CI passed at `5acd4c818be6f1764f8319f42891f9956c357c26`, including full build and typecheck. Standard Greptile is 5/5 with no open threads. The first Apex review scored 3/5 and found startup latency from remote proof lookups and removal retry identity changes across provider capability changes. Both corrections are pushed in `9d1a38df3d`, with the qualified destination-ref length fix. Red regressions reproduced each issue. Latest targeted checks passed: cleanup/worker 26, provider integration 41, SDK contract 8. Head `9d1a38df3d` passed standard and Apex reviews at 5/5 with no open threads, plus all CI including full build/typecheck. Canary Dry Run initially failed on an npm 404 fetching `rollup-4.67.3.tgz`; the exact tarball subsequently returned HTTP 200, and one targeted retry passed without source changes. Aggregate verification also passed. After #18403 merged, master introduced conflicts in shared workspace cleanup and metadata handling. Resolved them in `7700832536`, preserving remote snapshot cleanup and Git delivery-proof cleanup. Targeted merge verification: 93 tests passed in the first run (59 opt-in skips), then all 16 remote lifecycle tests passed with explicit database opt-in; map checks passed. The isolated database is stopped. The merge head received standard review 5/5. Its CI found two failures in unchanged test cleanup paths: native runtime temporary-directory ENOTEMPTY and agent-chat cancellation lock timeout. Those failures remain recorded and require successful final-head verification. The subsequent project-consent change has targeted coverage: authorization36, resolver33 and cleanup19 tests passed, including revoked consent, anonymous public access and source-binding races. The positive consent test failed before the fix. Current head `c772679e05` has green GitHub CI, including full build/typecheck and both previously failing test jobs, plus standard Greptile 5/5 with no open threads. Neither cleanup failure required changes to its test path. Apex also completed at 5/5 on this exact head (check `124651548532`, summary updated 2026-10-31 20:45 UTC), with no open review threads. The PR remains draft. Earlier failures remain recorded above. - Final focused run on the rebased branch: **182 tests passed across six files**, covering the resolver, delivery cleanup, provider bridge, finalization notifications, existing workspace service and SDK contracts. The disposable test database was stopped afterward. - Targeted resolver tests: 33 passed. These cover ancestry, discovered squash PRs, wrong HEAD/base/repository, removed integration commits, bounded responses, cancellation and credential isolation. - Targeted cleanup integration tests: 17 passed. Provider bridge integration: 36 passed. SDK contract tests: 7 passed. Finalization notification tests: 9 passed. - A negative control that removed the final delivery check failed the race regression as expected. The check was restored. - Read-only live GitHub probe: the new resolver discovered PR #18410 from HEAD `3f5ade4cd42b707040e9a82fdaed343e3d736a09`, without PR hints. It proved integration commit `6484f96c28bfb11a793ce4be6cc5ac15643a5a02` reachable from observed master `5bc029bf6c1db6647e96acea323f3723fd1d3eba`. GitHub also advertised the exact original HEAD at `refs/pull/18410/head`. - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passed. Structural checks do not prove deployment behavior. - Local tests are targeted by user request. Full build, typecheck and test suite run in GitHub CI. A standalone server typecheck could not complete because local Runner build declarations were absent; no changed-file diagnostics were reported. - Initial local execution hit a stalled pnpm wrapper, sandbox socket denial and stale generated SDK declarations. Direct installed binaries, the authorized isolated test database and rebuilt SDK resolved those setup failures. No deployment was performed. ## Risks - Destructive cleanup still requires fresh storage safety and lifecycle checks. Remote proof alone never authorizes removal. A persisted removal intent preserves existing recovery semantics. - Legacy workspaces without an unambiguous destination or completion HEAD remain retained. This does not guess the original default branch. - Private repositories use the explicit standing GitHub consent on the bound source project, with current membership, grant, repository access and trust checks. No separate company token is required when that consent is valid. Missing or revoked consent and unavailable or rate-limited access retain storage; the worker does not borrow a task or agent identity. - A known undelivered commit keeps the existing five-minute retry because external GitHub changes have no guaranteed ingress to this lane. This can keep cleanup scheduled. Missing evidence parks instead. - Providers need the new recovery capability to clean a squash merge whose original HEAD is reachable only through its PR ref. Providers without it remain conservative. - The resolver currently supports GitHub.com. Existing local and other-provider ancestry paths stay in place. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, repository tools and parallel code agents. The exact runtime model ID and context-window size were not exposed to this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
346 lines
20 KiB
Markdown
346 lines
20 KiB
Markdown
# Plugin Runner execution
|
|
|
|
Core can run `paperclip_runner` tasks in a plugin environment.
|
|
The plugin owns the execution host and its files.
|
|
Core owns run identity, selected policy, assigned tools, and the PRP journal.
|
|
|
|
## Required hooks
|
|
|
|
Set `supportsTasks: true` on the environment driver.
|
|
Declare the `environment.drivers.register` capability.
|
|
Implement these hooks:
|
|
|
|
- `onEnvironmentAcquireLease`
|
|
- `onEnvironmentTask`
|
|
- `onEnvironmentReleaseLease`
|
|
- `onEnvironmentDestroyLease`
|
|
|
|
Task execution does not require `onEnvironmentExecute` or
|
|
`onEnvironmentRealizeWorkspace`. The task API has no shell command or file installation
|
|
operation. Use a separate workflow to install agent files. Providers that
|
|
advertise `workspaceFileReadVersion: 1` can return task output files through the
|
|
bounded `read_file` operation for attachments and deliverables.
|
|
|
|
Core supports per-turn workspace sessions with Codex, OpenCode, and ACPX.
|
|
OpenCode and ACPX require the existing qualified provider profiles.
|
|
Workspace-free providers are not supported here. Drivers opt into warm retention through `warmTaskVersion: 1`. Core prefers warm execution for new task runs on capable drivers, including ACPX; existing provider admission still determines which harnesses the driver supports.
|
|
The plugin owns project workspace preparation. Core does not prepare or reuse
|
|
a Core Git worktree for a task-only environment.
|
|
Selecting a plain task directory does not add redundant default configuration.
|
|
Retaining that directory does not itself change the run configuration.
|
|
For plugin-backed project storage, Core uses the workspace provider contract.
|
|
The storage plugin must also provide the selected execution environment.
|
|
Its declared workspace modes and strategies remain in effect.
|
|
Core passes the pinned workspace binding with each task operation.
|
|
Core rejects configured workspace services for task-only environments.
|
|
Fresh retries that import retained files are not supported for plugin storage.
|
|
An agent-owned workspace cannot move to another agent or environment.
|
|
Core also rejects reuse of a local workspace in a task-only environment.
|
|
Keep its original owner, or use the workspace storage provider contract.
|
|
|
|
## Prepare and launch
|
|
|
|
1. Return an opaque task ID from lease acquisition as `providerLeaseId`.
|
|
2. Return the installed Runner version and SHA-256 digest from `describe`.
|
|
3. Return `launchPreparationVersion: 1` from `describe`.
|
|
4. Handle `prepare` with the [launch preparation contract](../runner-launch-preparation.md).
|
|
5. Save the result under its configuration ID.
|
|
6. Handle `submit` with that ID in `preparedLaunchId`.
|
|
7. Return an authenticated WSS endpoint from `connection`.
|
|
|
|
Preparation must not start a process. It must preserve Core's provider, model,
|
|
policy, instructions, and resource assignment identities. Resolve assigned
|
|
resources to execution-host paths. Use `bindRunnerLaunchResources` and
|
|
`createRunnerProviderLaunch` when the built-in descriptor builder is suitable.
|
|
|
|
Core checks the returned requirements digest and descriptor before it registers
|
|
PRP or submits the task. A failed check does not enable a fallback launch.
|
|
Recovery within the same run must return the exact saved configuration.
|
|
|
|
The plugin supplies executable paths and the provider workspace in the
|
|
descriptor. It owns the process environment and account installation.
|
|
For example, a persistent computer can use these locations:
|
|
|
|
```text
|
|
HOME=/home/agent
|
|
AGENT_HOME=/home/agent/.agents
|
|
CODEX_HOME=/home/agent/.codex
|
|
instructions=/home/agent/.agents/AGENTS.md
|
|
skills=/home/agent/.agents/skills/<name>/SKILL.md
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
These are execution-host locations. Core does not copy the home for each run.
|
|
The plugin must declare `projectAuthCheckVersion: 1` for all native tasks.
|
|
Core requires an allowed `check_project_auth` result, or a prepared result with
|
|
`projectAuthCheckAtSubmit: true`. The latter delegates the check to the trusted
|
|
plugin's submit handler before credential installation or task start. The plugin
|
|
must reject conflicting project or parent authentication settings. It must keep
|
|
the checked configuration fixed until submission. See
|
|
[launch authentication validation](PLUGIN_ENVIRONMENT_TASKS.md#launch-authentication-validation).
|
|
|
|
Core sends authorized project IDs, the PRP identity, launch limits, and the
|
|
bootstrap ticket through `submit`. It does not send a process command.
|
|
The plugin must submit each task at most once. A lost reply requires status
|
|
reconciliation for the same task.
|
|
|
|
## Credentials and tools
|
|
|
|
Core can transfer a selected Codex account or a direct Claude credential.
|
|
Other managed routes fail closed until they have a typed credential contract.
|
|
Do not put credentials in task metadata, journals, logs, or errors.
|
|
|
|
Assigned MCP tools run through the Core gateway over PRP.
|
|
The gateway credentials stay on Core.
|
|
The plugin must preserve the MCP binding identity in the prepared context.
|
|
|
|
Core records credential writeback authority before dispatch.
|
|
After process termination, Core saves refreshed credentials before it completes
|
|
the task. A failed save retains the task grants for cleanup.
|
|
|
|
## Stop and recovery
|
|
|
|
A terminal phase does not prove process termination.
|
|
Return `executionStopped: true` only after the task and its descendants stop.
|
|
Return `sessionStateAvailable: true` only when the suspended state remains usable.
|
|
Keep retained state when Core completes the task.
|
|
Core checks managed plugin workspaces through their storage provider before
|
|
completion, including after a restart. Core does not inspect these folders locally.
|
|
If this check fails, Core defers the run and continues recovery for other runs.
|
|
Core keeps known branch and owner error codes with the repair instructions.
|
|
|
|
The task contract exposes two checkpoint operations:
|
|
|
|
- `read_state` returns the exact Runner durable state for the supplied identity.
|
|
- `archive_state` moves a suspended Runner authority checkpoint under the supplied
|
|
archive key. It returns the same state on retry. It keeps provider session files.
|
|
|
|
These operations do not accept paths. Core checks the active lease and retained
|
|
source task before it calls the plugin. The existing Runner transport validates
|
|
state identity and suspension before it rotates authority.
|
|
|
|
For controller replacement, Core restores its encrypted PRP journal from Postgres
|
|
and reuses the original active task lease. The task owner checks running status
|
|
and exact Runner identity, then reacquires the connection. It does not call
|
|
`prepare`, `submit`, or `stop`. The running artifact remains pinned even if
|
|
`describe` reports a newer installed version. Launch preparation files on the
|
|
old controller are not required to adopt an already running task.
|
|
The five-minute outage contract and its prerequisites are described in the
|
|
[continuity recipe](../testing-native-remote-continuity.md#replacing-the-main-server).
|
|
|
|
Core checks company, agent, environment, workspace, driver, and termination
|
|
receipts before it supplies `resumeFrom`. Historical controller recovery without
|
|
the durable journal first stops and releases the old task. A failed stop prevents replacement.
|
|
A new run prepares its current assignments. Provider compatibility checks remain
|
|
in the existing backends. Missing or incompatible retained state fails closed.
|
|
|
|
## Setup verification
|
|
|
|
Core creates a private probe lease with an expiry.
|
|
It runs the same describe, prepare, submit, and WSS/PRP path.
|
|
The probe checks provider authentication and the selected model with tools denied.
|
|
Core bounds Runner lifetime to the remaining probe time.
|
|
It then requires suspension, confirmed termination, and task cleanup.
|
|
For a new agent-owned computer, the saved-agent lifecycle runs verification
|
|
after it saves the agent. Core does not require a computer before this save.
|
|
|
|
## Verification
|
|
|
|
- [Lease and SDK RPC integration](../../server/src/__tests__/plugin-runner-task.integration.test.ts)
|
|
- [Real Runner setup and recovery](../../server/src/services/native-runtime/plugin-runner-probe.test.ts)
|
|
- [Task ownership and cancellation](../../server/src/services/native-runtime/plugin-runner-task.test.ts)
|
|
- [Credential transfer](../../server/src/services/native-runtime/plugin-runner-credentials.test.ts)
|
|
|
|
The Runner fixture uses a synthetic Codex provider and local sockets.
|
|
It does not qualify a deployed plugin, live account, or production WSS proxy.
|
|
|
|
## Workspace completion and maintenance
|
|
|
|
A storage provider can declare `workspaceProvider.finalizationVersion: 1`.
|
|
Core then sends `workspaceOperation` with `operation.kind: "finalize"`, the retained
|
|
binding, lifecycle generation, and originating `runId` and `agentId`. The operation
|
|
must verify workspace identity and make the run's retained writes durable before
|
|
returning `{ kind: "finalized", headSha, branchName }`. Git workspaces must still
|
|
report the assigned branch. Non-Git workspaces return null Git fields.
|
|
|
|
Completion permits dirty, untracked, ignored, and unpublished work. It does not
|
|
prove remote recoverability or authorize deletion. The provider chooses how to
|
|
meet this contract; Core does not prescribe a VM, filesystem, or Git layout.
|
|
Core gives completion a 30-second deadline. An unavailable execution host or an
|
|
unconfirmed durability barrier must fail retryably, never return success.
|
|
Recovery receives the original run and agent context.
|
|
|
|
The existing agent-independent `inspect` and `remove` operations continue to
|
|
protect storage maintenance. Providers that do not declare finalization version 1
|
|
retain the inspection-based completion path. No stored binding migration is required.
|
|
|
|
A provider whose inspection cannot prove merge ancestry may declare
|
|
`workspaceProvider.supportsMergeAncestry: false`. Omission preserves the existing
|
|
ancestry inspection behavior. For an opted-out provider, automatic cleanup uses
|
|
its latest successful finalization HEAD as a hint for destination-aware GitHub
|
|
checks. It discovers associated PRs without requiring a recorded work product.
|
|
A direct ancestry proof or a merged PR with the exact final HEAD, intended base
|
|
repository/branch, and reachable integration commit must precede storage
|
|
inspection. A fresh matching HEAD and branch, remote recoverability, no local
|
|
data, terminal tasks, and the existing lifecycle fences still govern deletion.
|
|
Open or unknown delivery for a known commit retains a bounded remote-only retry.
|
|
Missing candidate identity parks until a relevant write or startup recovery.
|
|
Explicit close-readiness and pending lifecycle recovery retain their checks.
|
|
|
|
A provider may declare `workspaceProvider.recoveryPullRequestVersion: 1`. Core
|
|
can then include `recoveryPullRequest: { number, headSha }` in `inspect` and
|
|
`remove`. This is a narrow recovery hint, not permission to delete. The provider
|
|
must use its trusted source repository, validate that the specific PR recovery
|
|
reference still identifies `headSha`, and independently check the actual workspace
|
|
and all owned data. Arbitrary remote URLs and reference names are not accepted.
|
|
Absent capability means Core does not send the extra field. Before dispatch,
|
|
Core persists the negotiated removal payload and its operation ID. Retries replay
|
|
both unchanged, even if capabilities change, while still enforcing company,
|
|
provider enablement, binding and generation checks. A downgraded provider can
|
|
reject an unsupported payload; Core does not silently change its identity.
|
|
Legacy intents without a recovery hint retain their deterministic ID. A hinted
|
|
intent without a recorded ID is ambiguous and fails closed. None of these
|
|
receipts replaces the provider's checks.
|
|
|
|
The optional `prepared.destinationRef` records the resolved delivery branch as
|
|
`refs/heads/<branch>`, up to 266 characters including the prefix. Providers should
|
|
return null when preparation cannot establish an unambiguous branch destination
|
|
or its canonical ref exceeds this receipt limit; an optional receipt must not
|
|
fail an otherwise successful preparation. Core stores this alongside the source
|
|
snapshot; callers cannot overwrite it through workspace metadata updates. Older
|
|
providers omit it. Core only falls back to their captured explicit source refs,
|
|
not a mutable project configuration or a newly chosen default branch. A source
|
|
SHA or tag may support direct ancestry, but does not imply a PR base branch.
|
|
Provider upgrades, activation, company re-enablement, and finalization settlement
|
|
wake cleanup transactionally. No table, independent timer, or background scan of
|
|
all remote PR refs is required.
|
|
|
|
## Warm task retention
|
|
|
|
A driver declares `warmTaskVersion: 1`, implements `onEnvironmentResumeLease`,
|
|
and returns `warmTaskVersion: 1` from `describe` only when its execution host
|
|
supports authorized run attachment. Newly hired agents targeting such a driver
|
|
are configured for warm execution. Existing agents keep their explicit policy;
|
|
plugin runs without an explicit policy prefer warm execution. There is no
|
|
provider-specific warm gate or additional setting. Existing runs retain their
|
|
admitted lifecycle policy during restart recovery. The existing
|
|
`runnerIdleTimeoutMs` controls bounded retention. Fresh warm admission requires
|
|
a Core-managed credential identity before lease acquisition. Plugin-owned installed
|
|
accounts continue per-turn until such an identity is available; the saved warm
|
|
preference does not bypass account ownership checks. Drivers without warm
|
|
capability and setup probes remain ephemeral.
|
|
|
|
Plugin task execution uses the public, run-scoped GitHub credential broker
|
|
when the provider advertises its versioned contract. Warm preparation updates
|
|
the command capability before admitting the new run. Restart recovery retains
|
|
the original run binding; new work must not reactivate an older capability.
|
|
Project authorization is still checked for each new run.
|
|
|
|
A Launcher task owns one Runner process, independently of Core heartbeat runs.
|
|
Successful warm run completion retains the task and its mounts. The reuse
|
|
policy is saved with the selected native runtime, independently of workspace
|
|
copy-back records. Recovery uses that policy when no workspace-sync record exists,
|
|
so it does not stop a Runner that foreground completion retains. Failed and
|
|
cancelled runs still stop instead of staying warm. The reuse
|
|
fingerprint includes the authorized project set; changing it retires the previous
|
|
task before checkpoint recovery. Adoption and each warm handoff require a current,
|
|
configuration-bound project-auth check against the exact retained mount scope. Core atomically
|
|
hands its retained provider identity to one new run lease, revalidates current
|
|
project authentication, prepares the new run's resources, and uses PRP
|
|
`run.attach`. Preparation includes the exact `priorIdentity` and stable
|
|
`accountIdentity`. The provider journals that transition idempotently before
|
|
allowing the new authority. The original ingress address remains unchanged.
|
|
Runner accepts `connection: { mode: "external" }` on warm attachment to preserve
|
|
the process owner's listener and TLS settings while rotating the run identity.
|
|
|
|
Core permits connection refresh for the saved successful run while its warm task
|
|
lease is retained, unexpired, and not retiring or stopped. PRP authentication
|
|
still applies. A superseded lease cannot acquire a connection. Retention does
|
|
not authorize preparation or submission of new work through the completed lease.
|
|
|
|
Idle retirement suspends and stops Runner, saves its exact checkpoint, writes
|
|
credentials through the durable lease handoff, then completes the provider task.
|
|
Core permits read-only suspension proof for the exact saved identity of a
|
|
successful warm run after its reuse lease is retained or superseded. This does
|
|
not authorize new work or file access through that lease.
|
|
Temporary credential homes are not needed after the originating run ends.
|
|
An explicit reset to a different normalized session can retire a warm owner
|
|
whose close failed only because it could not prove checkpoint suspension. Core
|
|
requires the exact lease-bound task's `executionStopped: true` receipt, a
|
|
successful `complete` handoff, and settled Core tool results first. It then
|
|
collects stopped instruction files before it releases the in-memory owner. The old checkpoint remains evidence;
|
|
it is not reused by the new session. A failed handoff, failed file collection,
|
|
unsettled Core tool result, other close error, or continuation of the same
|
|
session still blocks replacement.
|
|
A controller restart is not required for this stopped-owner reset path.
|
|
|
|
Termination receipts cover all run leases that owned the retired physical task.
|
|
A stopped task gets a new provider task ID for checkpoint resumption. Inspection
|
|
precedes in-memory session selection so a replacement cannot inherit the stopped
|
|
session. Core saves the fresh provider expiry and forwards and enforces any
|
|
caller-imposed deadline. A missing
|
|
or unreachable computer never authorizes a replacement. Controller recovery can
|
|
adopt a verified surviving idle process through its authenticated PRP connection;
|
|
ambiguous transitions remain fenced by the existing durable recovery checks.
|
|
|
|
Changes to account, credential generation, workspace, runtime or process policy
|
|
retire the old owner before recovery. A new authority epoch archives the stopped
|
|
checkpoint under its stable archive key and preserves provider session files.
|
|
Warm status monitoring relies on PRP after startup and does not poll an idle
|
|
Launcher. ACPX uses this task-provider contract; other execution transports retain
|
|
their provider-specific lifecycle policies.
|
|
|
|
### Operation-time GitHub credentials
|
|
|
|
A task provider can advertise `githubCredentialBrokerVersion: 1` in its
|
|
`describe` result. Core then supplies an optional `githubBroker: { url, token }`
|
|
in each `prepare` operation. This is a runtime capability, not a GitHub token.
|
|
No controller path, executable, script, or command implementation is part of
|
|
this contract. Plugin authors own how their command environment uses it.
|
|
|
|
At the start of each authenticated operation, send `POST` with body `{}` to
|
|
`<url without trailing /api>/runtime-tools/github/credentials`, with
|
|
`Authorization: Bearer <token>`. The response is either
|
|
`{ status: "available", env: { ... } }` or
|
|
`{ status: "unavailable", reason: "..." }`. Core rechecks the live run, accepted
|
|
instruction identity, grants, and trust policy on each request. Use the returned
|
|
environment only in the command and its descendants. Never retain raw GitHub
|
|
credentials in plugin state, launch descriptors, logs, or files.
|
|
|
|
A warm task must replace its broker capability before admitting the next run's
|
|
commands. An absent broker clears the old capability and allows anonymous/local
|
|
operations only. Isolate ambient host credentials and Git/GitHub configuration;
|
|
an unavailable broker must never select a host account. Capture once per
|
|
operation so steering does not split a command's Git descendants across people.
|
|
The runtime capability may be staged privately for command-time access; it must
|
|
not enter the returned launch descriptor or entity records. Core's managed
|
|
launchers are an optional reference implementation. Compatible native helpers,
|
|
credential helpers, or command proxies can implement the same semantics.
|
|
|
|
Deploy the updated Core and plugin together. A configured
|
|
GitHub connection on an older task provider returns an explicit upgrade error.
|
|
Unconfigured providers continue ordinary work without authenticated GitHub access.
|
|
|
|
Managed GitHub command providers must retain the qualified provider executable
|
|
and arguments. Supply helper discovery through the task environment instead of
|
|
wrapping that executable. Claude ACPX preserves explicit `BASH_ENV`, `ZDOTDIR`,
|
|
`GH_CONFIG_DIR`, and `PAPERCLIP_GITHUB_LAUNCHER_DIR` selectors across the sidecar
|
|
boundary. It does not forward GitHub tokens or broker capabilities to the provider.
|
|
The helper reads the current task capability at invocation, including after warm
|
|
reuse. These selectors must come from the trusted environment owner.
|
|
Reference helpers mark only their child operation and reject re-entry before resolving
|
|
another executable or capturing credentials. A PATH shim that calls a helper's
|
|
absolute path fails with `launcher_recursion_rejected` (exit 126), preventing
|
|
recursive process growth. Offline Git fixtures must resolve the native binary
|
|
outside managed helper paths and exclude runtime shell startup hooks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
The pure launch factory exports `RUNNER_GITHUB_LAUNCHER_VERSION = 1` for this
|
|
contract. A provider must check it as well as the host broker schema and its
|
|
Launcher capability before advertising managed GitHub commands. The installed
|
|
Runner must match the factory's source revision.
|
|
|
|
The helper projection is marked by the controller-owned
|
|
`PAPERCLIP_GITHUB_LAUNCHER_DIR`. Task overrides cannot supply that marker or the
|
|
shell selectors. Run preparation strips stored bindings before secret resolution,
|
|
and configured task-environment projections reject the shell selectors too.
|