DottaandPaperclip
1640c5b6ab
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agents deliver reports as task attachments and workspace files. > - The board already renders Markdown, but it shows HTML reports as source or rejects their preview. > - Reports can need inline scripts to build charts and tables. > - Artifact scripts must not read board cookies, storage, or the parent page. > - This pull request adds an opaque-origin HTML preview and view controls beside Download. > - Users can explore a report, inspect its source, and download the original file. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** The task attachment panel and workspace file viewers. **Subsystem affected** ui/ and the server workspace file preview service. **Current behavior** HTML attachments show source text. Workspace HTML files cannot be previewed. **Proposed behavior** Render self-contained HTML reports in a sandboxed iframe. Place eye and code controls beside Download. Preserve the original file for raw view and download. **Reason and benefit** Users can read and filter agent reports in Paperclip without giving artifact scripts access to the board session. **Breaking changes** HTML previews now open rendered. Scripts and styles must be embedded in the report. Remote resources, API requests, forms, popups, and host navigation are blocked. Workspace HTML content uses the existing bounded UTF-8 JSON response. **Additional context** Related closed proposals: #3293 and #4857. This change uses the current attachment and workspace viewers and adds no report-serving endpoint. The Artifacts and Work Products roadmap item is complete; this improves its existing preview behavior. ## What Changed - Add a shared HTML iframe renderer with `sandbox="allow-scripts"` and no `allow-same-origin`. - Install a restrictive CSP before artifact markup. Keep inline report scripts and styles. - Add shared rendered/raw icon controls beside Download in the attachment panel, workspace panel, and file sheet. - Return workspace HTML as bounded text inside JSON. Keep download and path-access protections. - Add Storybooks for reports, security probes, workspace viewers, a task journey, and mobile layouts. - Document the security boundary and browser test command. ## Verification - `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass. - Token gates and the static Storybook build pass. - Four browser tests pass. They cover report filters, raw mode, task entry, workspace viewers, cookies, storage, host DOM, resource requests, forms, popups, and host navigation. - The focused UI suite passes 26 tests. The file-resource server suite passes 36 tests. - Local full-stack acceptance passes with an actual 52 KB HTML report. Its chart and filter render. Raw mode preserves the source. Download bytes match the original file. - The complete local UI suite passes: 698 files and 7,754 tests. - `pnpm test:run` was attempted. Its server group recorded two unrelated timeouts and eight connector failures. All failed cases pass in isolated reruns, including the complete 388-test connector suite. The remaining local run was stopped after the full CI test coverage passed, to release test database resources. The full local command did not complete cleanly. - The separate local CLI group passes 511 tests. Three worktree database cases fail to start embedded PostgreSQL because this Mac has exhausted its shared-memory allocation. One isolated rerun fails at the same database startup step. No CLI code was changed. The corresponding CI test jobs pass. - All 56 PR checks are clean on `c771255f1a2e86bd8825f22eafb5d14a5e342cce`. Greptile gives 5/5 with no actionable findings. The security scan passes. The branch has no merge conflict. - Review the **HTML artifacts** section in Storybook. Run `pnpm exec playwright test --config tests/html-preview/playwright.config.ts` for the browser checks. ## Risks - Never add `allow-same-origin` to this iframe. Its opaque origin is the cookie, storage, and host-DOM boundary. - Reports that depend on CDN assets need to embed their dependencies. - The frame can navigate itself. Sandbox restrictions remain after navigation. This is not full network isolation. - Inline scripts can consume browser resources. This change does not isolate CPU or memory use. - No database migrations or API shape changes are required. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, repository editing, code execution, and browser tool use. The runtime does not expose a more specific model ID or context window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass — feature and UI checks pass; the full local run has the infrastructure limits recorded above. All CI test jobs pass. - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2.4 KiB
HTML artifact previews
HTML attachments and workspace .html/.htm files open rendered by default.
The eye and code icons beside Download switch between the report and its original
source. Download always returns the original file. Empty and oversized attachments
use the existing text-viewer states and limits.
The shared HtmlArtifactPreview uses srcdoc in an iframe with
sandbox="allow-scripts". Never add allow-same-origin. Its opaque origin
prevents artifact JavaScript from reading Paperclip cookies, storage, or the parent
DOM. Forms, popups, downloads from inside the frame, and top navigation are not
granted. The host does not accept messages or privileged requests from artifacts.
A trusted CSP is installed before any artifact markup. It permits inline scripts and styles for self-contained tables, charts, filtering, and other report controls. It blocks API connections, remote scripts/styles/images/fonts/media, child frames, objects, base URLs, and form submissions. Embedded data images/fonts/media work. An artifact's own CSP cannot weaken the first policy. No artifact HTML is parsed or inserted into the host DOM. The iframe sends no referrer.
This supports self-contained reports. Reports that need CDN libraries or external resources must embed them instead. Ordinary external links cannot open new tabs or navigate the host. The sandbox does allow navigation within the artifact frame; its opaque-origin restrictions remain after navigation. This is not a claim of complete network isolation or protection against resource exhaustion by scripts.
Attachment HTTP serving retains forced download, nosniff, and its existing
sandbox CSP. Workspace previews return bounded UTF-8 inside JSON, and workspace
downloads retain Content-Disposition: attachment. No database or API shape changes
are needed.
Review HTML artifacts in Storybook for the production viewer, security probes, workspace panel/file sheet, and a task-to-report journey. Run the browser security checks with:
pnpm exec playwright test --config tests/html-preview/playwright.config.ts
These checks use Chromium and simulated report data. They verify working report controls, raw mode, cookie/storage/parent access denials, blocked resource and API requests, and denied top navigation/popups. They do not replace testing the actual attachment journey in a running Paperclip instance.