Files
PaperClipAI/doc/connections/GOOGLE-WORKSPACE.md
DottaandPaperclip c8f874311c fix(ui): hide Google connectors only on the Connections page (#14774)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip helps people manage AI agents for work.
> - The Connections page lists the apps and saved accounts that agents
can use.
> - Google Workspace verification is still pending.
> - Google entries must be temporarily hidden from this page without
removing their implementations.
> - This PR filters the final page rows, including saved Google
accounts, after the page resolves their provider.
> - Definitions, direct setup routes, OAuth profiles, credentials, and
runtime access stay intact.
> - Review instances can keep the prior UI by staying on their pinned
app release.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Temporary provider visibility on the Connections landing page.

**Current behavior**

The page can show Google Workspace catalog entries and saved accounts
while verification is pending.

**Proposed behavior**

Hide all nine Google Workspace rows on this page. Keep every other
connector and all Google integration code unchanged. Use an existing
release pin for review instances instead of a hostname exception in the
app.

**Reason and benefit**

Pause public discovery without disabling existing runtime tools or
removing the implementation needed for verification and later
re-enablement.

**Breaking changes**

Google accounts are no longer visible on this landing page. Direct setup
and management routes remain available. This is not an access-control
restriction.

Related completed work: #13551 used catalog-level visibility. This
change is deliberately limited to the landing page and also covers saved
account rows. #14740 reduced Google scopes; this change leaves those
scopes unchanged. No duplicate open PR or matching open issue was found.

## What Changed

- Derive the Google app slugs from the existing Workspace profile
registry.
- Filter the combined catalog and saved-account rows only inside
`Browse`.
- Cover all nine Google entries, active/draft/disabled accounts, legacy
connection metadata, mixed-provider rows, and independently identified
non-Google connectors in regression tests.
- Document the display-only hold, pinned review builds, and how to
restore visibility after approval.

## Verification

- Passed: `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/pages/apps/Browse.test.tsx
ui/src/pages/apps/AppsConnect.test.tsx` (199 tests, including the latest
master changes).
- Passed: `pnpm check:token-gates`.
- Passed: `pnpm build`.
- Passed: `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` after merging the latest
master. An earlier overlapping run hit a local runner codesign race;
sequential checks passed.
- Passed again after the final custom-provider fix: `pnpm --filter
@paperclipai/ui typecheck` and `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui build`.
- The full local `pnpm test:run` was started, then stopped after the
full remote CI suite passed to avoid continuing duplicate long-running
work on the developer machine. It is not claimed as a completed local
pass.
- All 54 latest-head CI checks passed. Two non-applicable Storybook jobs
were skipped. One serialized server job lost its self-hosted runner
connection; its single retry passed.
- Greptile: 5/5 on `aeda167bf4494feed6ee0de2585960511fb02918`, with no
unresolved review threads.
- Confirmed in the existing review instance that all nine Google entries
still appear after its current release was pinned. No new app release
was deployed to that instance.
- Reviewer steps: open Connections on this branch with Google catalog
entries and saved Google accounts. None should appear. Non-Google
connectors must remain. Direct Google setup routes must still load.

## Risks

- Existing Google accounts cannot be found on this page during the hold.
Their data and runtime access remain unchanged.
- This is a UI-only filter, not an authorization gate. Direct routes and
API access still work by design.
- Review instances must not receive this UI build until the hold is
removed. Their existing release pin excludes fleet app upgrades; an
explicit targeted upgrade must still be avoided.
- No migrations, backend changes, broker changes, or credential changes.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex (GPT-5-based coding agent), with reasoning, tool use, code
execution, and browser inspection. The exact deployment model ID and
context window are not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-30 18:22:25 -05:00

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Markdown

# Google Workspace connections
Paperclip presents Google Workspace as nine independent Apps entries, not as
one combined Google connection:
1. Gmail
2. Google Drive
3. Google Docs
4. Google Sheets
5. Google Slides
6. Google Calendar
7. Google Chat
8. Google People
9. Google Workspace Search
Each entry creates its own connection, consent grant, capability catalog,
policy, audit trail, and reconnect/revoke lifecycle. Connecting Drive does not
create a Docs or Sheets connection, and connecting Gmail does not enable
Workspace Search.
Google's hosted Workspace MCP servers are Developer Preview services. The app
cards remain independent even when several services use the same customer-owned
Google OAuth client or the same Paperclip Cloud broker deployment.
## Temporary Connections page visibility hold
While Google OAuth verification is pending, the Connections landing page
(`ui/src/pages/apps/Browse.tsx`) hides all nine Google Workspace entries,
including their saved accounts. This is a display-only filter. App definitions,
direct setup and management routes, OAuth profiles, saved credentials, and
runtime tools remain unchanged. This is not an access-control restriction.
Keep verification instances pinned to their pre-hold app release so reviewers
can still find and test the integrations. After approval, remove the page's
`GOOGLE_CONNECTOR_SLUGS` filter and update its visibility tests before upgrading
those instances. Do not disable the shared definitions or broker profiles to
control this page's visibility.
## Developer Preview enrollment
Google grants preview access to the specific Workspace email addresses and
Google Cloud project numbers registered with the program. Submitting the form
is not the approval signal:
1. Google first sends a Google Group membership notification after verifying
the Workspace account.
2. Google then sends a final confirmation after registering the Cloud project,
usually within a couple of days. This final email is the signal that MCP
testing can begin.
3. If no final confirmation arrives within a week, check spam and contact the
Developer Preview program team from the
[program page](https://developers.google.com/workspace/preview).
Enrollment does not authorize every user of an OAuth client. Additional tester
emails and Cloud projects must be added through Google's member request forms.
Google's preview terms also prohibit making a pre-GA integration available to
end users outside the enrolled company or domain unless Google grants explicit
permission. Consequently, Paperclip-managed Google OAuth is limited to
registered internal testers during preview. Other companies must enroll their
own Workspace testers and Cloud project and use a customer-owned OAuth app until
Google makes Workspace MCP generally available.
## App matrix
| App card | MCP endpoint | Capability choices |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Gmail | `https://gmailmcp.googleapis.com/mcp/v1` | Read only; read and create drafts |
| Google Drive | `https://drivemcp.googleapis.com/mcp/v1` | Read only; read and create files |
| Google Docs | `https://docsmcp.googleapis.com/mcp/v1` | Read only; read and edit |
| Google Sheets | `https://sheetsmcp.googleapis.com/mcp/v1` | Read only; read and edit; share selected sheets with the robot account |
| Google Slides | `https://slidesmcp.googleapis.com/mcp/v1` | Read only; read and edit |
| Google Calendar | `https://calendarmcp.googleapis.com/mcp/v1` | Read only; read and manage events |
| Google Chat | `https://chatmcp.googleapis.com/mcp/v1` | Read only; read and send messages |
| Google People | `https://people.googleapis.com/mcp/v1` | Read contacts |
| Google Workspace Search | `https://workspacemcp.googleapis.com/mcp/v1` | Search Workspace |
The setup flow asks for the capability first. When the managed method is
available, it uses Paperclip by default. A small **Use your own Google OAuth app**
link reveals the custom client fields; **Use Paperclip instead** returns to the
managed method. The available authentication methods are:
- **Connect with Paperclip** uses the Paperclip Cloud broker when that exact
profile is returned for this enrolled instance by the signed
`POST https://my.paperclip.app/v1/connector/instance-status` request. The
anonymous capabilities document is global discovery only and never enables
an internal-pilot method locally.
- **Use your own Google OAuth app** uses customer-supplied OAuth credentials and
the app definition's exact reviewed scopes.
- **Use the Paperclip robot account** remains an additional Google Sheets-only
option for explicitly shared spreadsheets.
Before Google consent, the setup flow asks whether the credential is for just
the connecting user or for any human in the company. A personal choice stores
the tokens only on that user's grant. A company choice stores them on the
default organization grant, while still recording which signed-in Google
principal completed consent so refresh and reconnect stay bound to that
principal.
Catalog discovery and connection creation use the same signed, instance-specific
profile availability. Local enrollment files and Cloud-delivered environment
identities follow this same path; neither enables managed methods globally in
the static app definitions. Saved connections remain recognizable for OAuth
callback, refresh, and revoke, while the broker enforces current profile access.
Switching capability or authentication methods preserves the selected credential
owner when the new method supports that owner.
## Broker profiles
The Paperclip-managed method signs every broker request with one explicit
profile. The broker binds that profile into sessions, one-time claims, sealed
token envelopes, and refresh. Per-profile removal is local-only for managed
Google grants. Google's revocation endpoint can invalidate all grants for the
same user and managed client, so Paperclip does not call it while removing one
Workspace profile.
| App | Read profile | Write profile |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Gmail | `gmail.read` | `gmail.draft` |
| Drive | `drive.read` | `drive.write` |
| Docs | `docs.read` | `docs.write` |
| Sheets | `sheets.read` | `sheets.write` |
| Slides | `slides.read` | `slides.write` |
| Calendar | `calendar.read` | `calendar.write` |
| Chat | `chat.read` | `chat.write` |
| People | `people.read` | — |
| Workspace Search | `workspace-search.read` | — |
Every new signed request includes a profile. The Cloud broker rejects a request
whose provider, profile, or exact scope set does not match its closed registry.
## Instance configuration
All Paperclip-managed Google methods use the existing enrolled-instance keys:
```dotenv
PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_CONNECTOR_BASE_URL=https://my.paperclip.app
PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_CONNECTOR_ENVIRONMENT=production
PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_CONNECTOR_INSTANCE_ID=inst_example
PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_CONNECTOR_SIGN_PRIVATE_KEY=...
PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_CONNECTOR_SEAL_PRIVATE_KEY=...
```
No per-app client secret is stored on the Paperclip instance for the managed
path. For customer-owned OAuth, the setup flow collects that customer's Google
OAuth client ID and secret and stores them through the normal instance-vault
path.
Cloud-hosted stacks receive these values through the existing per-stack secret
delivery path. A self-hosted instance creates its keys during enrollment and
stores them with owner-only permissions in the instance's ignored secret
directory. The setup page supplies its authenticated same-origin HTTPS address
to enrollment, so a normal Tailscale-hosted self-hoster does not need to edit
`config.json` or set `PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL`; the enrolled origin becomes the
durable callback binding. The former `PAPERCLIP_ID_CONNECTOR_*` values use an incompatible
Paperclip ID protocol and are not read aliases. Enroll with Paperclip Cloud and
reconnect legacy grants before their old access tokens expire.
The gallery requests the broker capability document with a short cache. A
Paperclip-managed method is omitted unless its exact profile is enabled at the
broker; the independent app card and customer-owned OAuth method remain
available. This supports profile-by-profile rollout and rollback without
collapsing the nine cards into one app.
See [Gmail connection](./GMAIL.md) for the detailed enrollment, signing,
encryption, environment-isolation, and security review runbook inherited by all
profiles.
## Safety boundary
Every Google profile has an explicit MCP tool allowlist. Unknown Developer
Preview tools default to disabled. Read profiles expose only reviewed read
operations. Write profiles add only the reviewed write operations for their app;
destructive or unreviewed tools do not become available merely because Google
adds them upstream.
### Service-specific minimum scopes (2026-09-30)
Docs, Sheets, and Slides request only their service's read-only scope in the
read profile and its read/write scope in the write profile. They do not also
request `drive.readonly` or `drive.file`: those are authorization alternatives,
not additional requirements. Drive and Workspace Search retain their separate
Drive permissions. Calendar write requests `calendar.calendarlist.readonly`
and `calendar.events`; the latter also authorizes `suggest_time`. Calendar read
retains `calendar.events.freebusy` alongside list/event read-only access.
References: Google's [Docs read](https://developers.google.com/workspace/docs/api/reference/mcp/tools_list/read_doc)
and [update](https://developers.google.com/workspace/docs/api/reference/mcp/tools_list/update_doc),
[Sheets read](https://developers.google.com/workspace/sheets/api/reference/mcp/tools_list/get_spreadsheet)
and [update](https://developers.google.com/workspace/sheets/api/reference/mcp/tools_list/update_values),
[Slides read](https://developers.google.com/workspace/slides/api/reference/mcp/tools_list/read_presentation)
and [update](https://developers.google.com/workspace/slides/api/reference/mcp/tools_list/update_presentation),
and [Calendar suggest_time](https://developers.google.com/workspace/calendar/api/v3/reference/mcp/tools_list/suggest_time).
The write scopes support editing existing accessible files by ID. `drive.file`
is a valid narrower alternative for app-authorized files, but would require a
different per-file authorization workflow. Read-only profiles remain separate;
the project-wide union is not the scope set requested by every connection.
Deploy with the matching Cloud broker registry and test fresh grants in staging
before production. Signed authorization and refresh requests use exact scope
sets, so mixed versions fail closed. The broker rejects old broader grants and
refresh responses without explicit scope evidence for these reduced profiles.
Reconnect affected connections; do not relabel or globally revoke existing
tokens. Customer-owned methods request the same reduced sets on new consent;
previously issued grants are not retroactively narrowed. The 21-scope integration
union is unchanged by these profile-level reductions. Console must still keep
Drive/free-busy entries required by other profiles and separately used identity
scopes. Fresh provider proof is a release requirement, not implied by unit tests.
### Google Chat scope reduction (2026-09-22)
`chat.read` requests only `chat.spaces.readonly` and `chat.messages.readonly`.
`chat.write` adds `chat.messages.create`. The same sets apply to both managed
and customer-owned OAuth methods. Neither requests `chat.memberships.readonly`
nor `chat.users.readstate.readonly`.
Conversation lookup, message history, ordinary message search, and the write
profile's message sending remain supported. Membership listing and marking
messages read/unread remain outside the tool allowlist. `search_messages`
cannot filter by read state: the app hides `isUnread` from its agent and Test
schemas and rejects any explicit `isUnread`/`is_unread` argument, including
`false` or `null`, before dispatch. It never silently drops the filter. The
guard also applies to cached catalogs and existing broader grants.
References: Google's [Chat MCP setup](https://developers.google.com/workspace/chat/api/guides/configure-mcp-server)
and [message-search parameters](https://developers.google.com/workspace/chat/api/reference/mcp/tools_list/search_messages).
Roll out the app and Cloud broker scope registries together in staging and
production: their signed requests and sealed credentials use exact scope sets.
During a mixed-version rollout, Chat authorization/refresh can fail closed.
Existing Google tokens are not retroactively narrowed or revoked by this code
change. A refresh response still containing removed scopes, or omitting the
scope set needed to verify the grant, is rejected by the broker; reconnect
affected Chat grants for new consent. Do not revoke the
shared Google client to migrate one profile, because that can break other
Workspace connections. After deployment, verify fresh reduced-scope consent,
ordinary Chat search/history and sending, then reconcile Google Console and
the verification evidence with the deployed scope set.