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DottaandPaperclip
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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Contributors use the feature map to understand and verify product capabilities. > - Agents need APIs and usable entry points within their permission boundaries. > - Product recipes and agent access need separate records with shared capability IDs. > - This pull request establishes that contract and gives maintenance ownership of both maps. > - The benefit is repeatable access review without changing product behavior or permissions. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs: #15983, which added the portable verification skills and updated the feature map. This is its contract-only follow-up. Related: #15288 added the original feature map. **Issue type** Missing documentation and maintenance contract. **Where is the issue?** The product map, its missing agent access companions, and the verification skills. **What's wrong?** There is no shared convention for API presence, agent entry points, permission boundaries, access gaps, or evidence. An API declaration does not prove that a permitted native or remote agent can use it. **Suggested fix** Keep the product and agent access maps as siblings under `maps/`. Reuse capability IDs. Record representative source inventory separately from operation review and live proof. Keep both maps aligned through the maintenance skill. ## What Changed - Move the existing product map to `maps/feature-map/`. Preserve its recipes and Poteto format. Update relative links and add companion links. - Add `maps/agent-access-map/` with 35 area files and 171 matching capability IDs. Seed representative API operations, agent paths, policies and known gaps from the reviewed source inventory. Mark entries as `baseline`, `source-only`, and live verification `not-run`. - Define the shared contract in `maps/README.md`. Track API presence, agent availability, policy, evidence and review depth separately. Require operation enumeration before marking a broad capability operation-reviewed. - Extend `maintain-verification-skill` to reconcile both maps and inspect actual route policy and production tool admission. Update creation, verification, notices and contributor references to use the shared contract. - Add `scripts/check-maps.mjs` and ten regression tests. Check matching areas/IDs, indexes, references, contract fields, API method/path examples, justified exceptions and evidence-state consistency. - Keep the coverage inventory unchanged. Preserve skill invocation policies and both MIT license blocks. No product API, permission, UI, runtime helper, migration, dependency or workflow changes. ## Verification - Passed: `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` reports 35 paired areas and 171 matching capability IDs. All local map references resolve. - Passed: `node --test scripts/check-maps.test.mjs` runs ten tests. Fixtures cover missing companions, renamed/orphan/duplicate IDs, broken references, missing operation fields, empty exceptions, missing API examples, empty policy fields, and verified evidence without passed verification. - Passed: metadata validation for all three verification skills. Skill and contributor links resolve. Invocation policies and both license blocks are unchanged. - Compared relocated recipes with current master. Contents differ only in relative links and companion links. `coverage.json` is byte-for-byte unchanged. Master's updated read-only interaction test reference is retained. - Passed: `git diff --check`. The branch starts from current master and contains only this contract change. - Repository-wide typecheck, tests and build were not run locally for this documentation and Node structural-check scope. Live agent access was not exercised. Those gaps are explicit in the baseline entries; the structural check does not certify behavior. CI and automated review are pending. ## Risks - The companions are representative source baselines. They are not complete operation inventories or passed agent journeys. - The checker cannot establish actual permissions, native tool admission, operation completeness or truthful live evidence. Maintenance must inspect source and verify with the actual permitted agent context. - External links to the old product-map directory may need updates. Repository references have been updated. - Existing access gaps and board/user restrictions remain recorded. This contract does not change authority or implement missing paths. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex assisted with this change. The session does not expose the exact serving model ID, configured context-window size, or reasoning setting. Capabilities used: source analysis, file edits, shell commands, and structural regression tests. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
133 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
133 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
# App access, action permissions, and testing — agent access
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Product map: [App access, action permissions, and
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testing](../feature-map/app-permissions.md).
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Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: `f981fa3cc10cb8663a87dec60345fbff46d54d0a`.
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This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps.
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Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be
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qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the [map contract](../README.md)
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for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.
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## `agent-access`
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `PUT /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/installs`.
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Agent access: `restricted` — Board management API; agents use their resulting assigned
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app tools.
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Policy: Connection/profile/policy management routes require a board user; tool use
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separately evaluates agent grants and action policies.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts#L517)
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at the reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
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verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
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own policy and access review.
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Gaps: Granting access is distinct from using access. No equivalent agent management path
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exists in these routes.
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## `action-policy`
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `POST /api/tool-profiles/{profileId}/entries`.
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Agent access: `restricted` — Board management API; agent execution follows
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off/ask/allowed.
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Policy: Connection/profile/policy management routes require a board user; tool use
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separately evaluates agent grants and action policies.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts#L517)
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at the reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
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verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
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own policy and access review.
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Gaps: An agent cannot authorize itself by editing the policy. Decide whether any
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explicitly delegated administration should be supported.
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## `catalog-change`
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `POST /api/tool-profiles/{profileId}/new-tools/review`.
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Agent access: `restricted` — Board catalog-review API; agents can discover authorized
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tools.
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Policy: Connection/profile/policy management routes require a board user; tool use
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separately evaluates agent grants and action policies.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts#L517)
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at the reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
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verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
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own policy and access review.
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Gaps: Catalog refresh/review and quarantined-action enablement are management
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operations.
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## `test-action`
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/test-calls`.
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Agent access: `restricted` — Board test-as-agent API; agent executes its own assigned
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tools normally.
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Policy: Connection/profile/policy management routes require a board user; tool use
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separately evaluates agent grants and action policies.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts#L517)
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at the reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
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verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
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own policy and access review.
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Gaps: A board test performed as an agent is not proof the agent can manage or invoke the
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testing endpoint.
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## `account-maintenance`
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Review: `baseline`.
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API: `present` — representative operation IDs:
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- `POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/reconnect`.
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- `GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/activity`.
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Agent access: `restricted` — Board account management; native
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connections_search/connection_request can request human setup.
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Policy: Connection/profile/policy management routes require a board user; tool use
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separately evaluates agent grants and action policies.
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Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/tool-access.ts#L517)
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at the reviewed commit above.
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Verification: `not-run` — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
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verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
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own policy and access review.
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Gaps: Agent requests and continued tool use exist; reconnect/revoke/audit management are
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human paths.
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