test(e2e): add Copilot denial and attached settlement cases

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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DottaandPaperclip committed 2026-09-29 16:01:39 -05:00
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@@ -1,15 +1,25 @@
# Copilot 1.0.88 rich ACP capability audit
Audited 2026-09-28 against repository base `c65fc9e3c81c41aafe421aa90a00514b84343285`.
Status: **candidate, not qualified**. Authenticated model discovery and exact model
selection now pass. One canonical local protocol case and the local Product hello,
file-edit, semantic plan and controller-restart cases passed through the real runner.
A separate local question delivered and resumed, but failed its exact terminal-marker
requirement. Daytona and the remaining qualification matrix remain pending. Two
narrow real-service permission and detached-command probes also passed.
Real executable offline probes cost $0; the live token receipt has no verified USD charge. The allocated live budget remains $25, subject to
the shared $100 hard stop and verifiable spend. Do not expose this profile as
supported until the required local and Daytona qualification passes.
Initially audited 2026-09-28 against repository base `c65fc9e3c81c41aafe421aa90a00514b84343285`;
updated 2026-09-29. Status remains **candidate, not qualified**. On frozen source
`bd4cc29c3017ed5e1484423e842fd48e3b2f49f3`, profile v4 local hello, question/answer,
semantic plan, controller restart and file-edit cases passed. Daytona hello passed
one native `gpt-5.6-luna` run with six matchers on immutable image
`sha256:bff4c3f291087a0eeae37e4c20dd51857b92833eaf73ba3aca4157f37de1e109`.
Earlier question-marker, recovery, startup-timeout and PostgreSQL failures remain
retained; later success does not establish causes for unresolved earlier failures.
The new native-protection Product cases below have not run on the new source.
Daytona sandbox-specific analytics stabilized across three reads at a provisional
$0.0039682144 for the closed attempt interval; invoice finality and native per-run
Copilot USD remain unknown. The Product list-price estimate was $0.0040321867.
One exact owned sandbox was absent after the full 360-second cleanup observation;
45 local PIDs retired and semaphore counts returned 255→266→255. The conditional
720-second infrastructure bound was $0.053496. These are distinct accounting claims,
not a zero-cost assertion. The allocated provider budget remains $25 within the
shared $100 ceiling; no new paid attempt follows automatically from registration.
Mac x64, the remaining Daytona workflows, broader permissions/background variants
and complete rich-field projection remain unqualified.
## Connection policy audit, 2026-09-29
@@ -741,3 +751,32 @@ preflight still rejects. Two earlier operator invocations used the wrong image
repository or Node path and failed before provider launch; both are retained.
This is Linux packaging evidence, not an authenticated Daytona Product run or
model qualification. The profile remains pending.
### Bounded native tool observations and protection evaluations
The sidecar now projects an allowlist of active-turn ACP tool/permission fields into
existing `provider.notice.recorded` details and provenance: validated relative target,
request/tool identities, command SHA-256, explicit mode/detach, and linked shell
start/completion with provider-reported exit code. Session passthrough notifications
remain uncorrelated and cannot supply this evidence. Native ACP exposes an execution
kind, not a trustworthy `bash` name in the title. Strings use semantic redaction;
ambiguous identities, exhausted bounds or failed projection make evidence incomplete.
Projection cannot change permission delivery or terminal authority. This is an additive
observation change: Copilot profile v4 is unchanged, while source/pack provenance
changes. Older sessions lacking these notices cannot pass the new evidence oracles.
The manual local `copilot-protection` Product suite registers an exact browser-denial
case with explicit cancellation and a finite attached-command settlement case. Both
remain unqualified until separately built and run. The denial case expects an unfinished
task/cancelled run; full restrictive workflow completion is still a gap because later
MCP permissions must not be auto-approved from provider-controlled titles.
A separate credential-free real-binary fixture on 2026-09-29 exercised Copilot1.0.88
(executable SHA-256 `a9ff8babb10b7e443182ae96a8bc50a9c826ef1c773e1344c396eb5bf7f512c3`)
against a loopback synthetic model. It started an eight-second attached async command;
the model immediately returned terminal text while the process was still live. The
binary itself issued a read-shell update, and process absence plus the marker were
observed before the ACP prompt result. The model never called `read_bash`. The private
`copilot-v4-protection-preparation/adversarial-attached-v2` receipt retains monotonic
ordering and process identity. This verifies one pinned finite attached scenario and
is distinct from detached-policy rejection or comprehensive background qualification.
+5
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@@ -362,3 +362,8 @@ Copilot and Pi ACP profiles on local and Daytona. See the
[fixture admission, credentials and budget contract](../tests/runner-e2e/README.md#extended-acp-harnesses-explicit-only).
The private Runner Evals campaign of the same name provides complementary
semantic protocol cases; catalog membership is not live qualification.
The explicit local [Copilot protection fixtures](../tests/runner-e2e/FIXTURES.md#copilot-native-protection)
exercise native permission denial with operator cancellation and bounded attached
command settlement. Their registration remains separate from paid qualification;
source/pack provenance and complete persisted evidence are required.
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@@ -276,3 +276,39 @@ file under `deny-all`. All runs count toward spend and teardown. Browser reload
is reconnect evidence only; these cases do not establish provider-death recovery.
They use public product APIs, real browser answers, and ordinary isolated files;
no database writes, private hooks, or fabricated provider results are allowed.
## Copilot native protection
The explicit-only `copilot-protection` suite has two local, one-run cells (120s
provider timeout, 300s attempt budget). `native-permission-deny-write` denies one
exact native edit through its browser card, waits for the delivered rejection and
failed tool, then cancels through the public run API. Its expected outcome is a
cancelled run and an unfinished task, not successful task completion. It rejects
extra native operations/runs and observes the absent target through process
retirement. Filesystem event loss or an unexplained parent-directory timestamp
change makes no-effect coverage incomplete; stat polling alone cannot pass.
`attached-async-settlement` starts a fixed finite command with explicit async mode
and `detach:false`, then asks the model to attempt immediate completion. A one-shot
private local socket accepts only the fixture nonce, never an executable or command;
the test owns/reaps a predeclared child and records its actual exit before releasing
the provider-launched client. The independent marker, client retirement, native shell
linkage and actual durable turn terminal must agree. Fixture resources close in a
finally block. This establishes the tested finite attached-command behavior, not all
background modes or detached-process settlement.
Both cells consume bounded, origin-correlated `copilot_tool_evidence_v1` notices
persisted through the ordinary run-event API. Missing, redacted, ambiguous or
explicitly incomplete notices fail qualification. Old runtime artifacts therefore
cannot qualify these cases. No prompt/title substitutes for native input, no raw
command or arbitrary tool input is added to production event payloads, and no private
runner hook or database write is used. The cases are registered but require a newly
built source/pack and separately authorized paid execution before claiming Product
qualification. Full restrictive-workflow completion remains separate: the negative
case never auto-approves an uncorrelated later MCP permission.
The Copilot protection cells explicitly select `per_turn` lifecycle. Their read-only
process journal accepts the API runner PID only after checking its OS start time,
process group, exact run ID argument and `per_turn` argument; it never treats a
retained warm daemon as a leaked per-run process or signals an API-provided PID.
Directory-watch coverage also rejects parent device/inode replacement or removal.
+6
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@@ -1298,3 +1298,9 @@ file persistence uses two fresh task runs and independent byte checks; restricti
denial uses one run and requires both a failed tool receipt and no file effect.
See [the fixture contract](FIXTURES.md#pi-native-boundaries) for the exact oracles
and the limits of reconnect evidence.
The manual `copilot-protection` suite selects only two local Copilot candidate
cells. Discover them with `pnpm test:e2e:runner -- --list --suite copilot-protection`.
See [Copilot native protection](./FIXTURES.md#copilot-native-protection) for the
expected cancelled negative test, finite attached-process oracle, evidence limits,
and required rebuilt runtime. Registration is not a qualification claim.
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@@ -292,3 +292,11 @@ Cursor, Copilot, GitHub and GH environment variables are stripped from the
server environment. GitHub PAT shapes are included in retained-evidence scans.
Candidates have no automatic infrastructure retries; spending must be reconciled
before a deliberate repeat.
Copilot protection fixtures use production browser/public API permission and
cancellation paths. Their local one-shot socket accepts a nonce/PID only and owns
one fixed bounded child; it cannot select commands, arguments, or paths. The exact
native client command is supplied by the fixture, while production notices retain
only its SHA-256. The fixture keeps private process identities local, closes its
owned socket/child in cleanup, and never signals API-reported PIDs. Directory
watch loss makes the denial oracle incomplete; it must not become a no-effect pass.
+3 -3
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@@ -91,10 +91,10 @@ describe("runner E2E catalog", () => {
expect(localIntegrityTasks).toHaveLength(2);
expect(openRouterBreadthTasks).toHaveLength(3);
expect(runnerSuites.map((suite) => suite.expectedMatrixSize)).toEqual([
3, 30, 3, 16, 16, 2, 8, 46, 23, 47, 20, 52, 28, 18, 6, 6, 10, 48, 16, 10, 2,
3, 2, 30, 3, 16, 16, 2, 8, 46, 23, 47, 20, 52, 28, 18, 6, 6, 10, 48, 16, 10, 2,
]);
expect(validateRunnerCatalog()).toHaveLength(410);
expect(new Set(runnerMatrix.map((entry) => entry.id)).size).toBe(410);
expect(validateRunnerCatalog()).toHaveLength(412);
expect(new Set(runnerMatrix.map((entry) => entry.id)).size).toBe(412);
expect(
runnerMatrix.filter((entry) => entry.suite.id === "core-compatibility"),
).toHaveLength(48);
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@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import { copilotProtectionTasks } from "./copilot-protection-tasks.js";
import { piNativeTasks } from "./pi-native-cases.js";
import { instructionPersistenceTask } from "./instruction-persistence.js";
import { apiResponseReadingTask } from "./api-response-reading.js";
@@ -1036,6 +1037,13 @@ export const runnerSuites: readonly RunnerSuiteFixture[] = [
environments: [localEnvironment], tasks: piNativeTasks, expectedMatrixSize: 3,
definitionMetadata: { version: 1, qualification: "pending", scheduling: "explicit-only", profileVersion: QUALIFIED_ACPX_PROFILES.pi.agentProfileVersion },
},
{
id: "copilot-protection", label: "Copilot native protection", manualOnly: true,
description: "Exact native denial with explicit operator cancellation, and attached command settlement with independent process evidence.",
groups: ["native"], profiles: extendedHarnessProfiles.filter(profile => profile.qualificationCandidate === "copilot"),
environments: [localEnvironment], tasks: copilotProtectionTasks, expectedMatrixSize: 2,
definitionMetadata: { version: 1, qualification: "pending", scheduling: "explicit-only", evidence: "copilot_tool_evidence_v1", profileVersion: QUALIFIED_ACPX_PROFILES.copilot.agentProfileVersion, denialTerminal: "explicit-public-cancellation", settlement: "attached-finite-command-only" },
},
{
id: "extended-harnesses", label: "Extended ACP harnesses", manualOnly: true,
description: "Explicit candidate qualification through real Paperclip tools, browser interactions, file edits and restart recovery.",
@@ -1374,6 +1382,7 @@ export function validateRunnerCatalog(): MatrixExecution[] {
const allProfiles = [...extendedHarnessProfiles, ...runnerProfiles, ...legacyAcpxProfiles, ...pendingContextIntegrityProfiles, ...openRouterBreadthProfiles, ...everydayProfiles.filter(p => !runnerProfiles.some(existing => existing.id === p.id))];
const allTasks = [
...piNativeTasks,
...copilotProtectionTasks,
extendedHarnessFileTask,
...contextIntegrityTasks,
...accountingTasks,
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@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
/** Strict reader for bounded notices persisted through the public run-event API. */
export interface CopilotToolNotice {
runId: string; sessionId: string; turnId: string; toolCallId: string;
observedAtMs: number; seq: number;
stage: "tool" | "permission_requested" | "permission_delivered";
status?: "pending" | "in_progress" | "completed" | "failed";
operation?: "edit" | "execute"; target?: string; requestId?: string;
declineOffered?: boolean; outcome?: "allow_once" | "allow_always" | "reject_once" | "cancel";
commandSha256?: string; mode?: "sync" | "async"; detach?: boolean;
shellId?: string; commandToolCallId?: string; shellState?: "started" | "completed"; exitCode?: number;
}
const rec = (v: unknown): Record<string, any> => v !== null && typeof v === "object" && !Array.isArray(v) ? v as Record<string, any> : {};
const id = (v: unknown): v is string => typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 && v.length <= 240 && !/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/u.test(v) && !v.includes("[REDACTED]");
const enums = { stage: ["tool", "permission_requested", "permission_delivered"], status: ["pending", "in_progress", "completed", "failed"], operation: ["edit", "execute"], outcome: ["allow_once", "allow_always", "reject_once", "cancel"], mode: ["sync", "async"], shellState: ["started", "completed"] };
const names = new Set(["stage", "toolCallId", "status", "operation", "target", "requestId", "declineOffered", "outcome", "commandSha256", "mode", "detach", "shellId", "commandToolCallId", "shellState", "exitCode"]);
export function readCopilotToolEvidence(rows: readonly unknown[], expectedRunId: string): CopilotToolNotice[] {
const result: CopilotToolNotice[] = [];
for (const row of rows) {
const r = rec(row), envelope = rec(rec(r.payload).prpEvent), p = rec(envelope.payload);
if (r.eventType !== "provider.notice.recorded" || p.category !== "copilot_tool_evidence_v1") continue;
const origin = rec(p.provenance);
if (p.schema !== "paperclip.provider.notice.v1" || p.scope !== "turn" || envelope.schema !== "paperclip.prp.event.v1" || envelope.sourceKind !== "runner" || envelope.eventType !== r.eventType || envelope.runId !== expectedRunId || !id(origin.sessionId) || !id(origin.turnId) || origin.turnId !== envelope.turnId || !Array.isArray(p.details) || p.details.length > 20 || !Number.isSafeInteger(r.seq)) throw new Error("Invalid Copilot evidence binding");
const fields: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const detail of p.details) {
const d = rec(detail);
if (d.name === "stage" && d.value === "evidence_incomplete") throw new Error("Copilot evidence is explicitly incomplete");
if (!names.has(d.name) || Object.hasOwn(fields, d.name) || typeof d.value !== "string" || d.value.length > 1024 || d.value.includes("[REDACTED]")) throw new Error("Invalid Copilot evidence detail");
fields[d.name] = d.value;
}
if (!id(fields.toolCallId) || !enums.stage.includes(fields.stage!) || origin.eventType !== fields.stage || origin.method !== (fields.stage === "tool" ? "session/update" : "session/request_permission")) throw new Error("Invalid Copilot evidence origin");
const observedAtMs = Date.parse(envelope.emittedAt);
if (!Number.isFinite(observedAtMs)) throw new Error("Copilot evidence has no producer timestamp");
const notice: Record<string, unknown> = { runId: expectedRunId, sessionId: origin.sessionId, turnId: origin.turnId, toolCallId: fields.toolCallId, stage: fields.stage, observedAtMs, seq: r.seq };
for (const [key, choices] of Object.entries(enums)) if (fields[key] !== undefined) { if (!(choices as readonly string[]).includes(fields[key]!)) throw new Error("Invalid Copilot evidence enum"); notice[key] = fields[key]; }
for (const key of ["requestId", "commandToolCallId"]) if (fields[key] !== undefined) { if (!id(fields[key])) throw new Error("Invalid Copilot evidence identity"); notice[key] = fields[key]; }
for (const key of ["detach", "declineOffered"]) if (fields[key] !== undefined) { if (!["true", "false"].includes(fields[key]!)) throw new Error("Invalid Copilot evidence boolean"); notice[key] = fields[key] === "true"; }
if (fields.target !== undefined) {
if (!fields.target || fields.target.startsWith("/") || /[\\:\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/u.test(fields.target) || fields.target.split("/").some(x => x === "." || x === ".." || !x)) throw new Error("Invalid Copilot evidence target");
notice.target = fields.target;
}
if (fields.commandSha256 !== undefined) { if (!/^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$/u.test(fields.commandSha256)) throw new Error("Invalid command digest"); notice.commandSha256 = fields.commandSha256; }
if (fields.shellId !== undefined) { if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,80}$/u.test(fields.shellId)) throw new Error("Invalid shell identity"); notice.shellId = fields.shellId; }
if (fields.exitCode !== undefined) { if (!/^-?\d{1,10}$/u.test(fields.exitCode) || !Number.isSafeInteger(Number(fields.exitCode))) throw new Error("Invalid exit code"); notice.exitCode = Number(fields.exitCode); }
result.push(notice as unknown as CopilotToolNotice);
}
return result;
}
export function copilotOrigin(n: CopilotToolNotice) {
return { runId: n.runId, sessionId: n.sessionId, turnId: n.turnId, toolCallId: n.toolCallId };
}
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@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
import { spawn, execFileSync, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";
import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { watch, lstatSync, type FSWatcher } from "node:fs";
import { lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { createServer, type Socket } from "node:net";
import { join } from "node:path";
export const sha256 = (value: string) => `sha256:${createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex")}`;
const quote = (value: string) => `'${value.replaceAll("'", "'\\''")}'`;
export async function exists(path: string): Promise<boolean> {
try { await lstat(path); return true; } catch (error) { if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") return false; throw error; }
}
export function watchDeniedTarget(directory: string, name: string) {
const startedAtMs = Date.now(); let complete = true, targetMutationCount = 0;
const before = lstatSync(directory, { bigint: true });
let final: { startedAtMs: number; endedAtMs: number; complete: boolean; targetMutationCount: number } | undefined;
const watcher: FSWatcher = watch(directory, (_kind, filename) => {
if (filename === null) complete = false;
else if (String(filename) === name) targetMutationCount++;
});
watcher.on("error", () => { complete = false; });
return { finish() {
if (final) return final;
let after: import("node:fs").BigIntStats | undefined;
try { after = lstatSync(directory, { bigint: true }); } catch { complete = false; }
// FSEvents may coalesce a rapid create/delete. A changed directory version
// with no attributed event is a coverage gap, never proof of no mutation.
if (!after || after.dev !== before.dev || after.ino !== before.ino || !after.isDirectory()) complete = false;
if (after && (after.mtimeNs !== before.mtimeNs || after.ctimeNs !== before.ctimeNs) && targetMutationCount === 0) complete = false;
final = { startedAtMs, endedAtMs: Date.now(), complete, targetMutationCount }; watcher.close(); return final;
} };
}
interface ProcessIdentity { pid: number; parent: number; start: string }
function processTable(): ProcessIdentity[] {
const output = execFileSync("/bin/ps", ["-axo", "pid=,ppid=,lstart="], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000, maxBuffer: 8 * 1024 * 1024, env: { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin", LC_ALL: "C" } });
return output.split("\n").flatMap(line => { const m = /^\s*(\d+)\s+(\d+)\s+(.+?)\s*$/u.exec(line); return m ? [{ pid: Number(m[1]), parent: Number(m[2]), start: m[3]! }] : []; });
}
export interface RunProcessAuthority { pid: number; groupId: number; startedAt: string; runId: string }
export function isPerTurnRunProcess(authority: RunProcessAuthority, observed: ProcessIdentity, command: string): boolean {
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,128}$/u.test(authority.runId) || authority.pid !== observed.pid || authority.groupId !== observed.pid) return false;
const started = Date.parse(authority.startedAt), actual = Date.parse(observed.start);
if (!Number.isFinite(started) || !Number.isFinite(actual) || Math.floor(started / 1000) !== Math.floor(actual / 1000)) return false;
const args = command.trim().split(/\s+/u);
return [["--run-id", authority.runId], ["--lifecycle-mode", "per_turn"]].every(([flag, value]) => {
const at = args.indexOf(flag!); return at >= 0 && args.lastIndexOf(flag!) === at && args[at + 1] === value;
});
}
/** Read-only PID/start journal; never signal an API-reported or reused PID.
* Native onSpawn publishes the runnerd child. Bind its current argv to this run
* and per_turn lifecycle before treating its retirement as run cleanup.
*/
export function observeRunProcesses() {
const owned = new Map<number, ProcessIdentity>(); let root: ProcessIdentity | undefined;
return {
sample(authority?: RunProcessAuthority) {
const table = processTable();
if (!root && authority && authority.pid > 1 && authority.pid !== process.pid) {
const candidate = table.find(p => p.pid === authority.pid);
if (candidate) {
let command: string;
try { command = execFileSync("/bin/ps", ["-p", String(candidate.pid), "-o", "command="], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000, maxBuffer: 64 * 1024 }); }
catch { command = ""; } // A vanished/uninspectable PID supplies no authority.
if (isPerTurnRunProcess(authority, candidate, command) && processTable().some(p => p.pid === candidate.pid && p.start === candidate.start)) { root = candidate; owned.set(root.pid, root); }
}
}
let changed = true;
while (changed) {
changed = false;
for (const p of table) if (!owned.has(p.pid)) {
const parent = owned.get(p.parent);
if (parent && table.some(t => t.pid === parent.pid && t.start === parent.start)) { owned.set(p.pid, p); changed = true; }
}
}
return { captured: Boolean(root), journal: [...owned.values()], live: table.filter(p => owned.get(p.pid)?.start === p.start).map(p => p.pid) };
},
};
}
/** A one-shot local fixture, not a command service: input selects no executable,
* arguments or file path. The test owns/reaps the fixed finite child, records its
* OS exit status, and holds the exact provider-launched client until that exit.
*/
export async function createAttachedCommandFixture(markerPath: string, delayMs = 4000) {
if (!Number.isInteger(delayMs) || delayMs < 100 || delayMs > 8000) throw new Error("Invalid bounded fixture delay");
const root = await mkdtemp("/tmp/pc-copilot-"); await mkdir(join(root, "private"), { mode: 0o700 });
const socketPath = join(root, "private", "socket"), scriptPath = join(root, "client.cjs");
const nonce = randomBytes(16).toString("hex"), marker = `${randomBytes(24).toString("hex")}\n`;
const script = `const net=require('node:net');const s=net.connect(process.argv[2]);let b='';s.setTimeout(15000,()=>process.exit(3));s.on('error',()=>process.exit(4));s.on('connect',()=>s.write(JSON.stringify({nonce:process.argv[3],pid:process.pid})+'\\n'));s.on('data',x=>{b+=x;if(b.includes('\\n')){const r=JSON.parse(b);s.end();process.exit(r.code===0?0:5);}});`;
await writeFile(scriptPath, script, { mode: 0o400 });
const command = `${quote(process.execPath)} ${quote(scriptPath)} ${quote(socketPath)} ${quote(nonce)}`;
const commandSha256 = sha256(command);
let markerWrittenAtMs: number | null = null;
let clientExitedAtMs: number | null = null;
let clientObservation: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | undefined;
let connections = 0, child: ChildProcess | undefined, client: ProcessIdentity | undefined, failure: string | null = null;
let exit: { observedAtMs: number; code: number; ownedProcessIdentityVerified: boolean; commandSha256: string } | null = null;
const sockets = new Set<Socket>();
let closed = false;
const server = createServer(socket => {
sockets.add(socket); socket.on("close", () => sockets.delete(socket)); socket.on("error", () => { failure = "fixture_socket_error"; });
let buffer = "";
socket.on("data", data => {
buffer += data; if (buffer.length > 1024) { failure = "fixture_request_too_large"; socket.destroy(); return; }
if (!buffer.includes("\n")) return;
connections++;
try {
const request = JSON.parse(buffer); buffer = "";
if (connections !== 1 || request.nonce !== nonce || !Number.isSafeInteger(request.pid) || request.pid <= 1) throw new Error("fixture_request_invalid");
const observed = processTable().find(p => p.pid === request.pid);
const argv = execFileSync("/bin/ps", ["-p", String(request.pid), "-o", "command="], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000 });
if (!observed || !argv.includes(scriptPath) || !argv.includes(socketPath) || !argv.includes(nonce)) throw new Error("fixture_client_identity_invalid");
client = observed;
clientObservation = setInterval(() => {
try {
if (!processTable().some(p => p.pid === client!.pid && p.start === client!.start)) {
clientExitedAtMs = Date.now(); clearInterval(clientObservation);
}
} catch { failure = "fixture_client_observation_failed"; clearInterval(clientObservation); }
}, 25);
child = spawn(process.execPath, ["-e", `setTimeout(()=>process.exit(0),${delayMs})`], { env: { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" }, stdio: "ignore" });
child.once("error", () => { failure = "fixture_child_start_failed"; socket.destroy(); });
child.once("exit", (code, signal) => {
exit = { observedAtMs: Date.now(), code: code ?? -1, ownedProcessIdentityVerified: Number.isInteger(child?.pid), commandSha256 };
void (async () => {
if (code !== 0 || signal) { failure = "fixture_child_failed"; socket.destroy(); return; }
if (await readFile(scriptPath, "utf8") !== script) { failure = "fixture_script_changed"; socket.destroy(); return; }
await writeFile(markerPath, marker, { flag: "wx" }); markerWrittenAtMs = Date.now(); socket.end(`${JSON.stringify({ code })}\n`);
})().catch(() => { failure = "fixture_completion_failed"; socket.destroy(); });
});
} catch { failure = "fixture_request_rejected"; socket.destroy(); }
});
});
try { await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => { server.once("error", reject); server.listen(socketPath, resolve); }); }
catch (error) { server.close(); await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); throw error; }
return {
command, commandSha256, marker,
snapshot() { const table = processTable(); return { connections, failure, markerWrittenAtMs, clientExitedAtMs, commandExit: exit, childPid: child?.pid ?? null, clientPid: client?.pid ?? null, clientGone: Boolean(client) && !table.some(p => p.pid === client!.pid && p.start === client!.start), childGone: Boolean(exit), observedAtMs: Date.now() }; },
async close() {
if (closed) return; closed = true; clearInterval(clientObservation);
let cleanupError: unknown;
try {
if (child && child.exitCode === null && child.signalCode === null) {
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
const hard = setTimeout(() => { child!.kill("SIGKILL"); }, 3000);
const deadline = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("Fixture child did not settle within cleanup bound")), 5000);
child!.once("exit", () => { clearTimeout(hard); clearTimeout(deadline); resolve(); }); child!.kill("SIGTERM");
});
}
} catch (error) { cleanupError = error; }
finally {
for (const socket of sockets) socket.destroy();
try { await new Promise<void>(resolve => server.close(() => resolve())); }
finally { await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
}
if (cleanupError) throw cleanupError;
},
};
}
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ const terminal = { observedAtMs: 50, runId: "run", turnId: "turn", status: "succ
const cleanup = { observedAtMs: 60, ownedProcessesRemaining: 0 };
function denied(): CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence {
return {
expected: identity, terminal, cleanup, requestId: "permission-0", expectedRelativePath: "copilot-denied-nonce.txt",
expected: identity, terminal: { ...terminal, status: "cancelled" }, cleanup, cancellation: { requestedAtMs: 40, acknowledged: true, scope: "run" }, requestId: "permission-0", expectedRelativePath: "copilot-denied-nonce.txt",
request: { ...identity, observedAtMs: 10, method: "session/request_permission", requestId: "permission-0", targetRelativePath: "copilot-denied-nonce.txt", offeredActions: ["accept", "decline"] },
decision: { ...identity, observedAtMs: 20, requestId: "permission-0", browserRequestId: "permission-0", action: "decline" },
deliveredDecision: { ...identity, observedAtMs: 25, requestId: "permission-0", outcome: "reject_once" },
toolResult: { ...identity, observedAtMs: 30, status: "failed" }, nativeAttemptsForTarget: 1,
fileObservations: [
{ phase: "before-request", observedAtMs: 0, exists: false }, { phase: "pending", observedAtMs: 15, exists: false },
@@ -20,25 +21,30 @@ function denied(): CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence {
function attached(): CopilotAttachedSettlementEvidence {
const digest = `sha256:${"a".repeat(64)}`;
return {
expected: identity, terminal, cleanup, expectedCommandSha256: digest, expectedShellId: "0",
nativeCall: { ...identity, observedAtMs: 10, tool: "bash", mode: "async", detach: false, commandSha256: digest },
expected: identity, terminal: { ...terminal }, cleanup: { ...cleanup }, expectedCommandSha256: digest, expectedShellId: "0",
nativeCall: { ...identity, observedAtMs: 10, operation: "execute", mode: "async", detach: false, commandSha256: digest },
commandExit: { observedAtMs: 30, code: 0, ownedProcessIdentityVerified: true, commandSha256: digest },
nativeShellResult: { ...identity, toolCallId: "read-shell-tool", commandToolCallId: "tool", observedAtMs: 40, shellId: "0", status: "completed", exitCode: 0 },
terminalMarkerMatches: true, afterCleanupMarkerMatches: true,
};
}
describe("prepared Copilot protection Product cases", () => {
it("declares one bounded run and leaves discovery integration explicitly pending", () => {
describe("Copilot protection Product oracles", () => {
it("declares one bounded run and explicit discovery integration", () => {
expect(copilotProtectionCases.map(c => c.id)).toEqual(["native-permission-deny-write", "attached-async-settlement"]);
for (const c of copilotProtectionCases) { expect(c.expectedRunCount).toBe(1); expect(c.providerTimeoutSec).toBe(120); expect(c.integration).toMatch(/^pending-/); }
for (const c of copilotProtectionCases) { expect(c.expectedRunCount).toBe(1); expect(c.providerTimeoutSec).toBe(120); expect(c.integration).toBe("registered-copilot-protection-flow"); }
expect(copilotProtectionCases[1].prompt("nonce")).toContain("detach false");
});
it("accepts an origin-bound browser denial with an independent continuous absence oracle", () => {
expect(gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(denied())).toEqual({ passed: true, failures: [] });
});
it.each(["request", "decision", "toolResult", "terminal", "cleanup", "mutationObservation"] as const)("rejects missing %s instead of treating no write as denial", field => {
it.each(["request", "decision", "deliveredDecision", "toolResult", "terminal", "cleanup", "mutationObservation"] as const)("rejects missing %s instead of treating no write as denial", field => {
const e = denied(); e[field] = null; expect(gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(e).passed).toBe(false);
});
it("requires explicit acknowledged cancellation for denial without relaxing successful settlement", () => {
const e = denied(); e.cancellation = null; expect(gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(e).passed).toBe(false);
const finished = denied(); finished.terminal!.status = "succeeded"; expect(gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(finished).passed).toBe(false);
const cancelled = attached(); cancelled.terminal!.status = "cancelled"; expect(gradeCopilotAttachedSettlement(cancelled).passed).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects a transient create/delete even when all five stat samples are absent", () => {
const e = denied(); e.mutationObservation!.targetMutationCount = 2; expect(gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(e).failures).toContain("missing-or-mutated-filesystem-watch");
});
+15 -11
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
/** Prepared Copilot Product cases. Registration waits for the evidence hooks below. */
/** Registered manual cases; paid Product qualification remains separate. */
export const copilotProtectionCases = [
{
id: "native-permission-deny-write",
permissionMode: "approve-reads",
expectedRunCount: 1,
providerTimeoutSec: 120,
integration: "pending-native-permission-browser-flow",
integration: "registered-copilot-protection-flow",
prompt: (nonce: string) => [
`Attempt exactly one native file edit creating copilot-denied-${nonce}.txt with DENIED-${nonce}.`,
"Wait for the native permission decision. If denied, do not retry through another tool, shell, path, or agent.",
`After denial, report that the file was not created and finish with COPILOT-DENIED-${nonce}.`,
"After denial, do not invoke any further tool or workaround. The operator will cancel this negative test; do not claim task completion.",
].join("\n"),
},
{
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ export const copilotProtectionCases = [
permissionMode: "approve-all",
expectedRunCount: 1,
providerTimeoutSec: 120,
integration: "pending-native-mode-and-process-settlement-evidence",
integration: "registered-copilot-protection-flow",
prompt: (nonce: string) => [
`Run the supplied copilot-settlement-${nonce} command exactly once with the native bash tool, mode async and detach false.`,
"Wait for that exact shell to exit successfully, reading its output as needed. Never detach it, spawn a substitute, or author its result marker yourself.",
"Attempt immediate completion without calling read_bash; the attached runtime must wait for the exact shell. Never detach, substitute, or author its result marker yourself.",
`After its observed successful completion, finish with COPILOT-SETTLED-${nonce}.`,
].join("\n"),
},
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ interface Identity {
interface TimedIdentity extends Identity { observedAtMs: number }
interface Lifecycle {
expected: Identity;
terminal: { observedAtMs: number; runId: string; turnId: string; status: "succeeded" | "failed" } | null;
terminal: { observedAtMs: number; runId: string; turnId: string; status: "succeeded" | "failed" | "cancelled" } | null;
cleanup: { observedAtMs: number; ownedProcessesRemaining: number } | null;
}
interface FileObservation {
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ interface FileObservation {
exists: boolean;
}
export interface CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence extends Lifecycle {
deliveredDecision: (TimedIdentity & { requestId: string; outcome: string }) | null;
cancellation: { requestedAtMs: number; acknowledged: boolean; scope: string } | null;
request: (TimedIdentity & { method: "session/request_permission"; requestId: string; targetRelativePath: string; offeredActions: string[] }) | null;
decision: (TimedIdentity & { requestId: string; action: string; browserRequestId: string }) | null;
requestId: string | null;
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ export interface CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence extends Lifecycle {
}
export interface CopilotAttachedSettlementEvidence extends Lifecycle {
/** Requires origin-correlated native input; a prompt/title is not evidence. */
nativeCall: (TimedIdentity & { tool: string; mode: string; detach: boolean; commandSha256: string }) | null;
nativeCall: (TimedIdentity & { operation: string; mode: string; detach: boolean; commandSha256: string }) | null;
expectedCommandSha256: string;
commandExit: { observedAtMs: number; code: number; ownedProcessIdentityVerified: boolean; commandSha256: string } | null;
nativeShellResult: (TimedIdentity & { shellId: string; commandToolCallId: string; status: string; exitCode: number }) | null;
@@ -67,15 +69,17 @@ export interface CopilotAttachedSettlementEvidence extends Lifecycle {
export interface CopilotProtectionGrade { passed: boolean; failures: string[] }
const same = (a: Identity, b: Identity) => ["runId", "sessionId", "turnId", "toolCallId"].every(k => a[k as keyof Identity] === b[k as keyof Identity]);
const time = (n: number) => Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0;
function lifecycle(e: Lifecycle, failures: string[]) {
function lifecycle(e: Lifecycle, failures: string[], expectedStatus: "succeeded" | "cancelled" = "succeeded") {
if (!Object.values(e.expected).every(v => typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0)) failures.push("missing-origin-identity");
if (!e.terminal || e.terminal.runId !== e.expected.runId || e.terminal.turnId !== e.expected.turnId || e.terminal.status !== "succeeded" || !time(e.terminal.observedAtMs)) failures.push("missing-successful-origin-terminal");
if (!e.terminal || e.terminal.runId !== e.expected.runId || e.terminal.turnId !== e.expected.turnId || e.terminal.status !== expectedStatus || !time(e.terminal.observedAtMs)) failures.push("missing-expected-origin-terminal");
if (!e.cleanup || e.cleanup.ownedProcessesRemaining !== 0 || !time(e.cleanup.observedAtMs) || !e.terminal || e.cleanup.observedAtMs < e.terminal.observedAtMs) failures.push("unsettled-cleanup");
}
export function gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(e: CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence): CopilotProtectionGrade {
const failures: string[] = []; lifecycle(e, failures);
const failures: string[] = []; lifecycle(e, failures, "cancelled");
if (!e.cancellation || !e.cancellation.acknowledged || !time(e.cancellation.requestedAtMs) || e.cancellation.scope !== "run" || !e.toolResult || e.cancellation.requestedAtMs < e.toolResult.observedAtMs || !e.terminal || e.cancellation.requestedAtMs > e.terminal.observedAtMs) failures.push("missing-explicit-settled-cancellation");
if (!/^copilot-denied-[a-z0-9-]+\.txt$/.test(e.expectedRelativePath) || !e.request || !same(e.request, e.expected) || e.request.method !== "session/request_permission" || e.request.requestId !== e.requestId || e.request.targetRelativePath !== e.expectedRelativePath || !e.request.offeredActions.includes("decline") || !time(e.request.observedAtMs)) failures.push("missing-exact-native-write-request");
if (!e.requestId || !e.decision || !same(e.decision, e.expected) || e.decision.requestId !== e.requestId || e.decision.browserRequestId !== e.requestId || e.decision.action !== "decline" || !time(e.decision.observedAtMs) || !e.request || e.decision.observedAtMs < e.request.observedAtMs) failures.push("missing-exact-browser-denial");
if (!e.deliveredDecision || !same(e.deliveredDecision, e.expected) || e.deliveredDecision.requestId !== e.requestId || e.deliveredDecision.outcome !== "reject_once" || !time(e.deliveredDecision.observedAtMs) || !e.decision || e.deliveredDecision.observedAtMs < e.decision.observedAtMs || !e.toolResult || e.deliveredDecision.observedAtMs > e.toolResult.observedAtMs) failures.push("missing-delivered-native-rejection");
if (!e.toolResult || !same(e.toolResult, e.expected) || e.toolResult.status !== "failed" || !time(e.toolResult.observedAtMs) || !e.decision || e.toolResult.observedAtMs < e.decision.observedAtMs || !e.terminal || e.toolResult.observedAtMs > e.terminal.observedAtMs) failures.push("missing-denied-tool-result-before-terminal");
if (e.nativeAttemptsForTarget !== 1) failures.push("missing-or-retried-native-write");
const phases = ["before-request", "pending", "after-decision", "terminal", "after-cleanup"] as const;
@@ -89,7 +93,7 @@ export function gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(e: CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence): CopilotP
export function gradeCopilotAttachedSettlement(e: CopilotAttachedSettlementEvidence): CopilotProtectionGrade {
const failures: string[] = []; lifecycle(e, failures);
const call = e.nativeCall;
if (!/^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(e.expectedCommandSha256) || !call || !same(call, e.expected) || call.tool !== "bash" || call.mode !== "async" || call.detach !== false || call.commandSha256 !== e.expectedCommandSha256 || !time(call.observedAtMs)) failures.push("missing-exact-attached-async-call");
if (!/^sha256:[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(e.expectedCommandSha256) || !call || !same(call, e.expected) || call.operation !== "execute" || call.mode !== "async" || call.detach !== false || call.commandSha256 !== e.expectedCommandSha256 || !time(call.observedAtMs)) failures.push("missing-exact-attached-async-call");
const exit = e.commandExit;
if (!exit || !exit.ownedProcessIdentityVerified || exit.commandSha256 !== e.expectedCommandSha256 || exit.code !== 0 || !time(exit.observedAtMs) || !call || exit.observedAtMs < call.observedAtMs || !e.terminal || exit.observedAtMs >= e.terminal.observedAtMs) failures.push("command-not-settled-before-terminal");
const result = e.nativeShellResult;
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
import { readFile, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile, unlink, rename, mkdir } from "node:fs/promises";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { createCopilotToolEvidence } from "../../packages/paperclip-runner/src/cli/copilot-tool-evidence.js";
import { validateAcpxRichEvent } from "../../packages/paperclip-runner/src/drivers/acpx/profile-extensions.js";
import { copilotOrigin, readCopilotToolEvidence } from "./copilot-evidence.js";
import { gradeCopilotAttachedSettlement, gradeCopilotDeniedWrite } from "./copilot-protection-cases.js";
import { createAttachedCommandFixture, watchDeniedTarget, exists, isPerTurnRunProcess } from "./copilot-local-fixtures.js";
import { runnerMatrix } from "./catalog.js";
import { selectRunnerExecutions, parseRunnerSelectors } from "./selectors.js";
const fixture = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL("../../packages/paperclip-runner/src/cli/fixtures/copilot-tool-evidence.json", import.meta.url), "utf8"));
function projected(name: string) {
const frames = fixture[name], rows: any[] = []; let clock = 10;
const projector = createCopilotToolEvidence({ sessionId: frames[0].params.sessionId, turnId: "turn", workingDirectory: "/fixture/workspace", active: () => true,
emit: event => { validateAcpxRichEvent(event); rows.push({ seq: rows.length + 1, eventType: event.eventType, payload: { prpEvent: { schema: "paperclip.prp.event.v1", sourceKind: "runner", eventType: event.eventType, runId: "run", turnId: "turn", emittedAt: new Date(clock++).toISOString(), payload: event.payload } } }); } });
for (const frame of frames) {
if (frame.method === "session/update") projector.tool({ ...frame.params.update, type: "tool_call", tag: frame.params.update.sessionUpdate });
else projector.permission({ raw: frame.params }, "permission", ["decline"])?.("reject_once");
}
return { rows, notices: readCopilotToolEvidence(rows, "run") };
}
describe("Copilot Product protection integration", () => {
it("registers exactly two explicit local cells with honest terminal expectations", () => {
const cells = runnerMatrix.filter(x => x.suite.id === "copilot-protection");
expect(cells).toHaveLength(2); expect(cells.every(c => c.environment.id === "local" && c.profile.qualificationCandidate === "copilot" && c.task.expectedRunCount === 1)).toBe(true);
expect(cells.find(c => c.task.id === "native-permission-deny-write")!.task.expectedTerminalState).toEqual({ issue: "in_progress", run: "cancelled" });
expect(selectRunnerExecutions(parseRunnerSelectors(["--all"])).some(x => x.suite.id === "copilot-protection")).toBe(false);
});
it("feeds actual native denied-edit wire through canonical persistence shape and the Product oracle", () => {
const { notices } = projected("deny-write");
const request = notices.find(n => n.stage === "permission_requested")!, delivered = notices.find(n => n.stage === "permission_delivered")!, failed = notices.find(n => n.status === "failed")!;
const e = { expected: copilotOrigin(request), requestId: "permission", expectedRelativePath: "copilot-denied-nonce.txt",
request: { ...request, requestId: "permission", method: "session/request_permission" as const, targetRelativePath: request.target!, offeredActions: request.declineOffered ? ["decline"] : [] },
decision: { ...delivered, requestId: "permission", browserRequestId: "permission", action: delivered.outcome === "reject_once" ? "decline" : "accept" },
deliveredDecision: { ...delivered, requestId: "permission", outcome: delivered.outcome! },
toolResult: { ...failed, status: "failed" as const }, terminal: { runId: "run", turnId: "turn", observedAtMs: 50, status: "cancelled" as const }, cancellation: { requestedAtMs: 40, scope: "run", acknowledged: true },
cleanup: { observedAtMs: 60, ownedProcessesRemaining: 0 }, nativeAttemptsForTarget: 1,
fileObservations: (["before-request", "pending", "after-decision", "terminal", "after-cleanup"] as const).map((phase, index) => ({ phase, observedAtMs: [0, request.observedAtMs, 30, 50, 60][index]!, exists: false })), mutationObservation: { startedAtMs: 0, endedAtMs: 60, complete: true, targetMutationCount: 0 } };
expect(request.target).toBe("copilot-denied-nonce.txt");
expect(gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(e).passed).toBe(true);
e.request.targetRelativePath = "foreign.txt"; expect(gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(e).passed).toBe(false);
e.request.targetRelativePath = e.expectedRelativePath; e.cancellation.acknowledged = false; expect(gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(e).passed).toBe(false);
});
it("feeds actual attached wire through canonical notices and rejects early terminal or missing linkage", () => {
const { notices } = projected("attached-shell"); const call = notices.find(n => n.commandSha256)!;
const started = notices.find(n => n.shellState === "started")!, result = notices.find(n => n.shellState === "completed")!;
const e = { expected: copilotOrigin(call), nativeCall: { ...call, operation: call.operation!, mode: call.mode!, detach: call.detach!, commandSha256: call.commandSha256! }, expectedCommandSha256: call.commandSha256!, expectedShellId: started.shellId!,
commandExit: { observedAtMs: result.observedAtMs - 1, code: 0, ownedProcessIdentityVerified: true, commandSha256: call.commandSha256! },
nativeShellResult: { ...result, shellId: result.shellId!, commandToolCallId: result.commandToolCallId!, status: result.status!, exitCode: result.exitCode! },
terminal: { observedAtMs: 50, runId: "run", turnId: "turn", status: "succeeded" as const }, cleanup: { observedAtMs: 60, ownedProcessesRemaining: 0 }, terminalMarkerMatches: true, afterCleanupMarkerMatches: true };
expect(gradeCopilotAttachedSettlement(e).passed).toBe(true);
e.terminal.observedAtMs = call.observedAtMs + 1; expect(gradeCopilotAttachedSettlement(e).passed).toBe(false);
e.terminal.observedAtMs = 50; e.nativeShellResult.commandToolCallId = "foreign"; expect(gradeCopilotAttachedSettlement(e).passed).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects foreign, redacted, malformed and explicitly incomplete persisted notices", () => {
for (const mutate of [
(r: any) => { r.payload.prpEvent.runId = "other"; },
(r: any) => { r.payload.prpEvent.payload.provenance.turnId = "old"; },
(r: any) => { r.payload.prpEvent.payload.details.push({ name: "stage", value: "tool" }); },
(r: any) => { r.payload.prpEvent.payload.details[0].value = "evidence_incomplete"; },
(r: any) => { r.payload.prpEvent.payload.details[1].value = "[REDACTED]"; },
]) { const { rows } = projected("attached-shell"); mutate(rows[0]); expect(() => readCopilotToolEvidence(rows, "run")).toThrow(); }
expect(readCopilotToolEvidence([], "run")).toEqual([]); // Missing proof never fabricates an event.
});
it("observes a transient create/delete even when final stat is absent", async () => {
const root = await mkdtemp("/tmp/pc-copilot-watch-"); const watcher = watchDeniedTarget(root, "denied");
try { await writeFile(join(root, "denied"), "x"); await unlink(join(root, "denied")); await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 30)); const proof = watcher.finish(); expect(proof.targetMutationCount > 0 || !proof.complete).toBe(true); expect(await exists(join(root, "denied"))).toBe(false); }
finally { watcher.finish(); await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
});
it("rejects replacement or disappearance of the watched parent directory", async () => {
const base = await mkdtemp("/tmp/pc-copilot-parent-"); const root = join(base, "workspace"); await mkdir(root);
const watcher = watchDeniedTarget(root, "denied");
try { await rename(root, join(base, "old")); await mkdir(root); expect(watcher.finish().complete).toBe(false); }
finally { watcher.finish(); await rm(base, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
const gone = await mkdtemp("/tmp/pc-copilot-parent-"); const deleted = watchDeniedTarget(gone, "denied");
await rm(gone, { recursive: true }); expect(deleted.finish().complete).toBe(false);
});
it("binds cleanup to the exact per-turn runner PID/start/run, never a warm or reused process", () => {
const startedAt = new Date(1_700_000_000_000).toISOString();
const authority = { pid: 100, groupId: 100, startedAt, runId: "run-id" };
const observed = { pid: 100, parent: 1, start: new Date(startedAt).toString() };
const args = "/private/runner --run-id run-id --lifecycle-mode per_turn";
expect(isPerTurnRunProcess(authority, observed, args)).toBe(true);
for (const bad of [args.replace("per_turn", "warm"), args.replace("run-id run-id", "run-id other"), args + " --run-id run-id", "/server"]) expect(isPerTurnRunProcess(authority, observed, bad)).toBe(false);
expect(isPerTurnRunProcess({ ...authority, groupId: 101 }, observed, args)).toBe(false);
expect(isPerTurnRunProcess(authority, { ...observed, start: new Date(1_700_000_001_000).toString() }, args)).toBe(false);
});
it("reaps a real finite child before its provider-style client can exit", async () => {
const root = await mkdtemp("/tmp/pc-copilot-command-"); const fixture = await createAttachedCommandFixture(join(root, "marker"), 150);
try {
const client = spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fixture.command], { stdio: "ignore" });
const code = await new Promise<number | null>(resolve => client.once("exit", resolve)); const observedAtMs = Date.now(); const proof = fixture.snapshot();
expect(code).toBe(0); expect(proof).toMatchObject({ connections: 1, failure: null, childGone: true, clientGone: true });
expect(proof.commandExit?.code).toBe(0); expect(proof.commandExit!.observedAtMs).toBeLessThanOrEqual(observedAtMs);
expect(await readFile(join(root, "marker"), "utf8")).toBe(fixture.marker);
} finally { await fixture.close(); await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
});
});
+137
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { expect, type Page } from "@playwright/test";
import { pollUntil, type RunnerApi } from "./api.js";
import { collectRunEvents } from "./run-observations.js";
import { createTaskThroughUi } from "./user-actions.js";
import { copilotOrigin, readCopilotToolEvidence, type CopilotToolNotice } from "./copilot-evidence.js";
import { createAttachedCommandFixture, exists, observeRunProcesses, watchDeniedTarget } from "./copilot-local-fixtures.js";
import { gradeCopilotAttachedSettlement, gradeCopilotDeniedWrite, type CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence } from "./copilot-protection-cases.js";
import type { LiveFixtureValues } from "./live-fixtures.js";
import type { MatrixExecution } from "./types.js";
type Row = Record<string, any>;
type Check = { id: string; passed: boolean; detail: string };
export async function runCopilotProtectionFlow(input: {
page: Page; api: RunnerApi; fixtures: LiveFixtureValues; execution: MatrixExecution; nonce: string; workspacePath: string; deadlineAt: number;
observe(issue: Row, runs: Row[]): void; capture(id: string, label: string, file: string): Promise<void>; evidence(name: string, data: unknown): Promise<void>;
}) {
const { page, api, fixtures, execution, nonce, workspacePath } = input;
if (execution.environment.id !== "local" || execution.profile.qualificationCandidate !== "copilot") throw new Error("Copilot protection fixtures require the isolated local candidate");
const deny = execution.task.id === "native-permission-deny-write";
if (!deny && execution.task.id !== "attached-async-settlement") throw new Error("Unknown Copilot protection case");
const checks: Check[] = []; let issue: Row = {}, runs: Row[] = [], runEvents: Row[] = [];
let notices: CopilotToolNotice[] = [];
const processObserver = observeRunProcesses(); let processes = processObserver.sample();
const target = `copilot-denied-${nonce}.txt`, targetPath = join(workspacePath, target);
const fileObservations: CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence["fileObservations"] = [];
const sample = async (phase: CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence["fileObservations"][number]["phase"]) => { fileObservations.push({ phase, observedAtMs: Date.now(), exists: await exists(targetPath) }); };
const watcher = deny ? watchDeniedTarget(workspacePath, target) : undefined;
const markerPath = join(workspacePath, `copilot-settlement-${nonce}.txt`);
const command = deny ? undefined : await createAttachedCommandFixture(markerPath);
let watchReceipt: ReturnType<ReturnType<typeof watchDeniedTarget>["finish"]> | undefined;
const check = (id: string, passed: boolean, detail: string) => { checks.push({ id, passed, detail }); expect(passed, detail).toBe(true); };
async function load() {
if (issue.id) issue = await api.get<Row>(`/api/issues/${issue.id}`);
const listed = await api.get<Row[]>(`/api/companies/${fixtures.company.id}/heartbeat-runs?limit=100`);
runs = await Promise.all(listed.map(r => api.get<Row>(`/api/heartbeat-runs/${r.id}`)));
if (runs.length > 1) throw new Error("Copilot protection case dispatched an extra run");
input.observe(issue, runs);
runEvents = runs[0] ? await collectRunEvents<Row>((afterSeq, limit) => api.get(`/api/heartbeat-runs/${runs[0]!.id}/events?afterSeq=${afterSeq}&limit=${limit}`)) : [];
notices = runs[0] ? readCopilotToolEvidence(runEvents, runs[0].id) : [];
const run = runs[0];
processes = processObserver.sample(run?.processPid ? { pid: run.processPid, groupId: run.processGroupId, startedAt: run.processStartedAt, runId: run.id } : undefined);
return { issue, runs, runEvents, notices, processes };
}
const wait = (label: string, accept: (state: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof load>>) => boolean) => pollUntil({ label, deadlineAt: input.deadlineAt, load, accept, intervalMs: 200,
reject: state => state.runs.some(r => ["failed", "timed_out"].includes(r.status)) ? "Copilot provider run failed" : undefined });
try {
const agent = await api.get<Row>(`/api/agents/${fixtures.agent.id}`);
await api.patch(`/api/agents/${fixtures.agent.id}`, { adapterConfig: { ...agent.adapterConfig, acpxPermissionMode: deny ? "approve-reads" : "approve-all", timeoutSec: 120, lifecycleMode: "per_turn" } });
check("per-turn-process-lifecycle", (await api.get<Row>(`/api/agents/${fixtures.agent.id}`)).adapterConfig?.lifecycleMode === "per_turn", "This case explicitly requires a per-turn runner process, never a retained warm daemon");
const project = await api.post<Row>(`/api/companies/${fixtures.company.id}/projects`, {
name: `Copilot protection ${nonce}`, executionWorkspacePolicy: { enabled: true, defaultMode: "shared_workspace", sharedWorkspaceConcurrency: "serialize", allowIssueOverride: false, environmentId: fixtures.environment.id, workspaceStrategy: { type: "project_primary" } },
workspace: { name: "Primary", sourceType: "local_path", cwd: workspacePath, isPrimary: true },
});
if (deny) { await sample("before-request"); check("target-initially-absent", !fileObservations[0]!.exists, "The exact isolated target is absent before dispatch"); }
const prompt = `${execution.task.buildPrompt(nonce)}${command ? `\nThe exact supplied command is:\n${command.command}\nDo not inspect or modify fixture code, fabricate its marker, or launch a substitute command.` : ""}`;
await createTaskThroughUi({ page, issuePrefix: fixtures.company.issuePrefix!, agentName: fixtures.agent.name, title: execution.task.buildTitle(nonce), prompt, workMode: "standard", projectName: project.name });
const found = await pollUntil({ label: "browser-created Copilot protection task", deadlineAt: input.deadlineAt, load: async () => (await api.get<Row[]>(`/api/companies/${fixtures.company.id}/issues?limit=100`)).find(r => r.title === execution.task.buildTitle(nonce)), accept: Boolean });
if (!found) throw new Error("Browser-created task was not found"); issue = found;
await page.goto(`/${fixtures.company.issuePrefix}/issues/${issue.identifier ?? issue.id}`);
if (deny) {
await wait("exact native write permission", s => s.notices.some(n => n.stage === "permission_requested" && n.operation === "edit" && n.target === target && n.declineOffered && s.runEvents.some(r => r.eventType === "runtime_request.created" && r.payload?.prpEvent?.payload?.request?.requestId === n.requestId)));
const request = notices.find(n => n.stage === "permission_requested" && n.operation === "edit" && n.target === target)!;
const pending = runEvents.filter(r => r.eventType === "runtime_request.created" && r.payload?.prpEvent?.payload?.request?.requestId === request.requestId).map(r => r.payload.prpEvent.payload.request);
check("one-bound-permission", pending.length === 1 && pending[0].requestKind === "permission_approval" && pending[0].origin?.method === "session/request_permission", "The notice maps to the exact durable native permission card");
const retired = new Set(runEvents.filter(r => ["runtime_request.resolved", "runtime_request.cancelled", "runtime_request.expired"].includes(r.eventType)).map(r => r.payload?.prpEvent?.payload?.requestId));
const activeRequests = runEvents.filter(r => r.eventType === "runtime_request.created" && r.payload?.prpEvent?.payload?.request && !retired.has(r.payload.prpEvent.payload.request.requestId));
check("only-one-pending-native-request", activeRequests.length === 1, "Only the exact denied edit is awaiting a decision");
await sample("pending"); await page.reload();
const card = page.getByTestId("task-chat-runtime-request").filter({ visible: true });
await expect(card).toHaveCount(1); await input.capture("permission-pending", "Copilot native write awaiting denial", "permission-pending.png");
const url = `/api/heartbeat-runs/${request.runId}/runtime-requests/${encodeURIComponent(request.requestId!)}/resolve`;
const sent = page.waitForRequest(r => new URL(r.url()).pathname === url && r.method() === "POST");
const clickedAtMs = Date.now(); await card.getByRole("button", { name: "Deny", exact: true }).click();
const posted = (await sent).postDataJSON();
check("browser-exact-denial", posted.turnId === request.turnId && posted.requestKind === "permission_approval" && posted.resolution?.action === "decline", "Browser submitted denial for the exact run/request/turn");
await wait("delivered rejection and failed native edit", s => s.notices.some(n => n.stage === "permission_delivered" && n.requestId === request.requestId && n.outcome === "reject_once") && s.notices.some(n => n.stage === "tool" && n.toolCallId === request.toolCallId && n.status === "failed"));
await sample("after-decision");
const cancelRequestedAtMs = Date.now(); await api.post(`/api/heartbeat-runs/${request.runId}/cancel`);
await wait("explicitly cancelled native run and retired processes", s => s.runs[0]?.status === "cancelled" && s.processes.captured && s.processes.live.length === 0);
await sample("terminal"); await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100)); await load(); await sample("after-cleanup");
watchReceipt = watcher!.finish();
const cancellation = runs[0]!.resultJson?.nativeCancellation;
const toolResult = notices.find(n => n.stage === "tool" && n.toolCallId === request.toolCallId && n.status === "failed")!;
const terminalFrame = runEvents.find(r => ["turn.cancelled", "turn.interrupted"].includes(r.eventType) && r.payload?.prpEvent?.turnId === request.turnId)?.payload.prpEvent;
check("correlated-cancel-terminal", Boolean(terminalFrame) && terminalFrame.runId === request.runId, "An actual durable cancellation terminal belongs to the denied turn");
const terminalAt = Date.parse(terminalFrame.emittedAt);
const evidence: CopilotDeniedWriteEvidence = {
expected: copilotOrigin(request), requestId: request.requestId!, expectedRelativePath: target,
request: { ...request, requestId: request.requestId!, targetRelativePath: request.target!, method: "session/request_permission", offeredActions: request.declineOffered ? ["decline"] : [] },
decision: { ...request, observedAtMs: clickedAtMs, requestId: request.requestId!, browserRequestId: request.requestId!, action: "decline" },
deliveredDecision: (() => { const n = notices.find(n => n.stage === "permission_delivered" && n.requestId === request.requestId && n.outcome === "reject_once"); return n ? { ...n, requestId: n.requestId!, outcome: n.outcome! } : null; })(),
toolResult: { ...toolResult, status: "failed" },
terminal: { runId: terminalFrame.runId, turnId: terminalFrame.turnId, observedAtMs: terminalAt, status: runs[0]!.status },
cancellation: { requestedAtMs: cancelRequestedAtMs, acknowledged: cancellation?.dispatchState === "acknowledged" && cancellation?.dispatched === true, scope: cancellation?.scope },
cleanup: { observedAtMs: fileObservations.at(-1)!.observedAtMs, ownedProcessesRemaining: processes.live.length }, fileObservations, mutationObservation: watchReceipt,
nativeAttemptsForTarget: new Set(notices.filter(n => n.stage === "tool" && n.operation === "edit" && n.target === target && n.status === "pending").map(n => n.toolCallId)).size,
};
await input.evidence("copilot-denial-proof.json", { evidence, processes, notices });
const grade = gradeCopilotDeniedWrite(evidence); check("denial-without-side-effects", grade.passed, grade.failures.join(", ") || "Exact browser denial, explicit cancellation and absence through process cleanup");
check("negative-task-unfinished", issue.status === "in_progress", "The negative test does not claim the task is done");
check("no-extra-native-operation", new Set(notices.filter(n => n.stage === "tool" && n.status === "pending").map(n => n.toolCallId)).size === 1, "No alternate native edit, command or delegated operation is permitted");
} else {
await wait("attached command and task settlement", s => s.issue.status === "done" && s.runs[0]?.status === "succeeded" && s.processes.captured && s.processes.live.length === 0);
const call = notices.find(n => n.stage === "tool" && n.status === "pending" && n.commandSha256 === command!.commandSha256);
check("single-exact-command", Boolean(call) && new Set(notices.filter(n => n.stage === "tool" && n.status === "pending" && n.commandSha256 === command!.commandSha256).map(n => n.toolCallId)).size === 1, "Exactly one native execution contains the supplied command digest");
const started = notices.find(n => n.toolCallId === call!.toolCallId && n.shellState === "started");
const result = notices.find(n => n.commandToolCallId === call!.toolCallId && n.shellState === "completed");
const terminal = runEvents.find(r => r.eventType === "turn.completed" && r.payload?.prpEvent?.turnId === call!.turnId)?.payload.prpEvent;
const external = command!.snapshot();
check("trusted-command-exit", !external.failure && external.connections === 1 && external.childGone && external.clientGone, "Fixed controller-owned child exited and its native client is gone");
const markerMatches = await readFile(markerPath, "utf8") === command!.marker;
check("native-client-before-terminal", Boolean(terminal) && external.clientExitedAtMs !== null && external.clientExitedAtMs < Date.parse(terminal.emittedAt), "Independent PID/start observation confirms native client retirement before turn completion");
check("marker-before-terminal", Boolean(terminal) && external.markerWrittenAtMs !== null && external.markerWrittenAtMs < Date.parse(terminal.emittedAt), "The independent fixture wrote its undisclosed marker before turn completion");
const grade = gradeCopilotAttachedSettlement({ expected: copilotOrigin(call!), nativeCall: call ? { ...call, operation: call.operation!, mode: call.mode!, detach: call.detach!, commandSha256: call.commandSha256! } : null,
expectedCommandSha256: command!.commandSha256, commandExit: external.commandExit,
expectedShellId: started?.shellId ?? "", nativeShellResult: result ? { ...result, shellId: result.shellId!, commandToolCallId: result.commandToolCallId!, status: result.status!, exitCode: result.exitCode! } : null,
terminal: terminal ? { observedAtMs: Date.parse(terminal.emittedAt), runId: terminal.runId, turnId: terminal.turnId, status: "succeeded" } : null,
cleanup: { observedAtMs: Date.now(), ownedProcessesRemaining: processes.live.length }, terminalMarkerMatches: markerMatches, afterCleanupMarkerMatches: markerMatches });
await input.evidence("copilot-attached-proof.json", { external, processes, notices, grade, commandSha256: command!.commandSha256, markerMatches });
check("attached-settlement-before-terminal", grade.passed, grade.failures.join(", ") || "Owned finite process and native shell settled before the actual turn terminal");
}
await load(); check("one-native-run", runs.length === 1 && runs[0]!.runtimeMode === "native", "Exactly one native run was accounted");
const comments = await api.get<Row[]>(`/api/issues/${issue.id}/comments`), interactions = await api.get<Row[]>(`/api/issues/${issue.id}/interactions`);
await input.evidence("api-state.json", { issue, run: runs[0], runs, comments, interactions, checks, runEvents, runEventsByRun: [{ runId: runs[0]!.id, events: runEvents }] });
await page.reload();
const label = deny ? "In Progress" : "Done";
await expect(page.getByTestId("issue-detail-header").getByRole("button", { name: `Change status (current: ${label})`, exact: true })).toBeVisible();
if (!deny) check("exact-completion-marker", comments.filter(c => c.authorAgentId === fixtures.agent.id && c.body?.trim() === execution.task.buildVisibleMarker(nonce)).length === 1, "The successful attached task has exactly one terminal marker");
await input.capture("final-state", "Copilot protection outcome", "final-state.png");
return { issue, runs, checks };
} finally {
watchReceipt ??= watcher?.finish();
try { await command?.close(); }
finally { await input.evidence("copilot-protection-checks.json", { issue, runs, checks, fileObservations, watchReceipt, processes }); }
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
import type { RunnerTaskFixture } from "./types.js";
import { copilotProtectionCases } from "./copilot-protection-cases.js";
export const copilotProtectionTasks: readonly RunnerTaskFixture[] = copilotProtectionCases.map(c => ({
id: c.id, label: c.id === "native-permission-deny-write" ? "Deny one native write, then stop safely" : "Attached command settles before completion",
groups: [], workMode: "standard", flow: "copilot_protection", expectedRunCount: 1,
attemptTimeoutMs: { local: 300_000, daytona: 300_000 },
expectedTerminalState: { issue: c.id === "native-permission-deny-write" ? "in_progress" : "done", run: c.id === "native-permission-deny-write" ? "cancelled" : "succeeded" },
buildTitle: nonce => `Copilot ${c.id} ${nonce}`,
buildVisibleMarker: nonce => `COPILOT-PROTECTION-${c.id}-${nonce}`,
buildPrompt: nonce => c.id === "native-permission-deny-write" ? c.prompt(nonce) : [
"Run the supplied exact command once using native bash with mode async and detach false.",
"After starting it, attempt to finish immediately without calling read_bash or another waiting tool. The attached-process runtime must settle the command before ending the turn.",
"Do not modify fixture code, manufacture its result, or start another command.",
`Call paperclip_finish with reportedWorkDisposition done, summary COPILOT-PROTECTION-${c.id}-${nonce}, current completion contract revision, satisfied objective criterion, no remaining work, evidence [], verification []. After acceptance reply with that exact summary.`,
].join("\n"),
buildMatchers: () => [], // Flow grades public durable origin and independent OS/filesystem observations.
}));
+11 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import { runCopilotProtectionFlow } from "./copilot-protection-flow.js";
import { runPiNativeFlow } from "./pi-native-flow.js";
import { completionQualityControls, completionQualityStatus, judgeCompletionQuality, reserveCompletionQuality, type CompletionQualityRecord } from "./completion-quality.js";
import { completionDelivery, type CompletionObservation } from "./completion-updates.js";
@@ -550,7 +551,7 @@ for (const execution of executions) {
const credentials = credentialValues();
const secrets = normalizedSecrets(Object.values(credentials));
const api = new RunnerApi(request);
const companyRunFlow = ["continuation_accounting", "continuation", "context_integrity", "agent_chat", "everyday_workflow", "first_task", "instruction_persistence", "pi_native"].includes(execution.task.flow);
const companyRunFlow = ["continuation_accounting", "continuation", "context_integrity", "agent_chat", "everyday_workflow", "first_task", "instruction_persistence", "pi_native", "copilot_protection"].includes(execution.task.flow);
const consoleDiagnostics: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
const networkDiagnostics: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
const pageLifecycleDiagnostics: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
@@ -897,6 +898,15 @@ for (const execution of executions) {
});
issue = story.issue as IssueRecord; selectedRuns = story.runs as RunRecord[];
matcherResults = story.checks.map(check => ({ matcher: { kind: "json_path" as const, path: `piNative.${check.id}`, expected: true }, passed: check.passed, detail: check.detail }));
} else if (execution.task.flow === "copilot_protection") {
const story = await runCopilotProtectionFlow({
page, api, fixtures, execution, nonce, workspacePath, deadlineAt: startedAtMs + deadlineMs,
observe: (currentIssue, currentRuns) => { issue = currentIssue as IssueRecord; selectedRuns = currentRuns as RunRecord[]; },
capture: captureScreenshot,
evidence: (name, data) => writeSanitizedJson(snapshotsDir, name, data, secrets),
});
issue = story.issue as IssueRecord; selectedRuns = story.runs as RunRecord[];
matcherResults = story.checks.map(check => ({ matcher: { kind: "json_path" as const, path: `copilotProtection.${check.id}`, expected: true }, passed: check.passed, detail: check.detail }));
} else if (execution.task.flow === "instruction_persistence") {
const story = await runInstructionPersistenceFlow({
page, api, fixtures, execution, nonce, secrets, deadlineAt: startedAtMs + deadlineMs,
+2 -1
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ export type RunnerTaskFlow =
| "plan_approval_completion"
| "warm_three_turn"
| "instruction_persistence"
| "pi_native";
| "pi_native"
| "copilot_protection";
export interface SecretReference {
type: "secret_ref";