PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map/chat-channels.md

External chat and email conversations — agent access

Product map: External chat and email conversations.

Feature ID: chat-channels.

Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b. Native REST transport reconciled in this change; see the shared transport contract.

This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps. Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the map contract for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.

providers

Capability ID: chat-channels/providers.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• POST /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-endpoints.

Agent access: restricted — Board setup APIs; native connection request can ask for setup.

Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture; verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its own policy and access review.

Gaps: Provider installation and account enrollment are not available to an ordinary agent actor.

Speko UI reconciliation (2026-10-13): experimental voice setup uses the same board-managed endpoint boundary. Source review follows the merged voice runtime and the UI integration; live provider qualification is still separate.

identity

Capability ID: chat-channels/identity.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• POST /api/chat-identity-links/confirm.

Agent access: restricted — Human identity-link flow.

Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture; verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its own policy and access review.

Gaps: Identity linking requires a signed-in board user, rollout admission and provider checks at the HTTP route. Native call_api preserves these permissions.

conversation

Capability ID: chat-channels/conversation.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/conversations/{conversationId}/publications.

Agent access: partial — Assigned-agent reply pipeline; native completion; provider tools where assigned.

Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Normal agent replies work through server delivery. Explicit endpoint publication APIs are board management paths.

Monitor publication lineage uses the admitted wake and its source run's matching set_task_monitor receipt, including company, task, immutable agent, requester, and scheduled time. A source ID in context cannot grant publication. The normal delivery worker rechecks current endpoint and sender authority. Database fixtures exercise lineage and finalization recovery; live Slack qualification remains separate.

Publication, provider-reply, and form-open 403/permission errors fail the rejected operation without removing unrelated assigned channel tools. Confirmed authentication failures still put the endpoint in attention, which blocks tool admission and provider sends; connection enabled intent is retained. Known resource denials and explicit revocation keep their narrower or installation-wide stops. PostgreSQL provider fixtures verify discovery after 403 and rejection after 401, including signed installation removal after a 401; they do not establish live GitHub credential recovery.

GitHub publication recovery (2026-10-14): assigned-agent submit_review, comment, and update_comment calls reuse their run-, task-, endpoint-, and argument-bound publication on an exact retry. Identity uses the complete durable request rather than the shortened audit preview. A changed suffix, changed nested entry, or missing publication cannot authorize another write. Exact retries only read the receipt; the worker owns pending provider retries. Fresh gateway policy and provider authority remain required. The durable worker resumes transient failures after restart and stops at its retry cap, revoked authority, or a superseded head. A pending receipt is not task completion. Source: publication service and gateway. Verification uses PostgreSQL-backed provider fixtures; this entry does not claim live provider qualification for the new retry path.

GitHub main-response identity (2026-10-19): PR requests share a company-, App-, repository- and PR-bound comment. Agents still supply no comment destination. Current sender, assignee, repository and publication authority are checked before edits, including maintenance failure notices. Leading mentions for another recipient are filtered before task work; explicit mentions of this bot still follow normal access checks. Provider-fixture coverage is not live GitHub proof. Native terminal reconciliation resolves the accepted run identity through the existing chat provenance resolver; an older run's reply cannot complete a newer request merely because both requests share the same PR comment.

Speko browser sessions use POST /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions, with GET inspection/notification and POST /{sessionId}/end operations below that collection. These routes require board identity; ordinary agent credentials cannot start a private voice session. Start and notification also require the experimental chat-connectors gate. Signed provider callbacks use the separate voice-webhook routes and their session capability. Evidence: source-only — voice routes. No live browser answer retrieval or telephone playback is established by the UI fixtures.

Slack's Require at-mention policy applies to channel messages and channel thread replies, including queued work. DMs are exempt from mention checks; endpoint availability, Allow direct messages, and sender authorization still apply. Top-level DM replies retain their linear conversation destination. Source: admission and queued run policy. Live Slack verification of this exemption remains separate from provider-fixture coverage.

Slack eyes acknowledge the authorized task/comment commit before attachment preparation or scheduler acceptance. This server-owned receipt grants no agent authority. Generation/credential fencing, durable retries and exact-source final cleanup still apply. PostgreSQL fixtures block attachments, subscription and wakeup independently to verify that none gates the reaction; live Slack latency remains a separate check. See receipt worker.

Controller-owned receipt reactions accept the SDK's empty thread timestamp for linear DMs. Channel IDs and source message timestamps remain validated. This does not add an agent tool or change sender, task, or credential authorization. The pinned SDK transport regression is covered in receipt tests; live acknowledgement speed needs a separate provider test.

Slack assignment and tool discovery bound concurrent endpoint preparation to two. Every endpoint keeps the live task, company, agent and linked-user checks; 403 denials omit only that endpoint. Preparation waits for both active checks before it returns an ordered result or propagates an error. Tool authority reads the current bot token without resolving unrelated webhook credentials. See the real-database preparation controls and batch failure controls. These local controls do not establish live Slack latency or provider access.

Native tool gateways use the durable run task binding for discovery and policy checks, with legacy JSON task fields as a fallback. GitHub and Slack follow accepted request provenance across task continuations. GitHub can retain the originating conversation after a board follow-up from the same accepted user. An inherited origin cannot cross a task, agent, company, or requester boundary. Cycle checks reject invalid history without a fixed limit on valid continuations. Endpoint settings, linked identity, tool profiles, and invocation policy still apply on each call. The native tool contract rotates older provider sessions so an empty retained catalog is not reused. PostgreSQL fixtures cover discovery, review publication, Slack reads, and revocation in channel integration and provenance controls. The voice gateway fixture also verifies durable task binding for a later personal callback invocation. Failure replies cannot replace final answers inherited from an earlier run. These fixtures do not prove live provider delivery.

Catalog authorization projection (2026-10-17): tool discovery uses the same live service-owned task, company, agent, requester, endpoint and credential checks as full authority resolution. It omits the revision digest and search-action token, which catalog descriptors do not consume. Connector assignments and governed operations retain full revision resolution; invocation policy is still checked by the gateway. Registry replacement and missing-service controls are in authority registration tests. This is a source and local-database contract; hosted latency needs live evidence.

New conversations resolve typed project/workspace defaults from their endpoint and destination under the task-creation transaction. Defaults do not authorize private sources: admission checks the linked user's authority and assigned agent. An existing conversation keeps its task binding. See creation service and defaults contract.

attachments

Capability ID: chat-channels/attachments.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• GET /api/issues/{id}/attachments.
• POST /api/companies/{companyId}/issues/{issueId}/attachments.

Agent access: partial — Native register_deliverable / attachment tools when admitted; agent REST; server-owned delivery.

Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Uploading/registering is supported. Provider delivery status and board replay are separate operations.

lifecycle

Capability ID: chat-channels/lifecycle.

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/activity.
• PATCH /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}.
• PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/resources configures destination defaults.

Agent access: restricted — Board lifecycle APIs; agent requests repair when blocked.

Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture; verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its own policy and access review.

Gaps: Activity/repair/replay/disable use board endpoint access, not the agent's ability to reply.

Endpoint/destination execution defaults use the same board-only management boundary. Agents select an authorized workspace for their current task through the workspace APIs, rather than editing channel configuration.

Speko callback preferences, incoming phone configuration/approval, and call history use the company-scoped voice-callbacks, voice-phone, and voice-history routes. Their UI controls do not grant agents board authority. See voice routes; service-level caller/session permissions and real provider delivery need separate verification.

GitHub review summary headings use the bot display name. Checks remain independently scoped by GitHub App and endpoint/PR/commit identity.

After publishing a review, native agents can report yielded with response_wake and no attention requests. Current conversation authorization is checked again at commit. The task remains in review without a human card; real human dependencies retain the ordinary attention-request path. A timed wait requires a confirmed set_task_monitor schedule. Database coverage lives in external-chat-wait.integration.test.ts; this is not live model evidence.

outbound-email

Capability ID: chat-channels/outbound-email.

Review: baseline.

API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/inboxes; POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/send for both send/reply; GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/tasks/{issueId}; GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}. Administrative uncertain-outcome resolution uses POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}/resolve.

Agent access: partial — the assigned agent can use the email REST/CLI path with its actual active run and admitted email.send/email.reply policy. Board writers use their own credential authority. Availability of a CLI or scenario email tool does not establish that a native run has that tool binding or generic fallback admitted.

Policy: Agent sends require ownership of the inbox and source task, task read access, an available agent within budget, a running task run that owns execution/checkout, standard work mode, and no restricted external execution. Active endpoint, connection, credential access, and email.send/email.reply policy are rechecked. Authenticated board sends require active company membership and credential access; viewer sends additionally require instance-admin status. Local implicit authority skips the membership check. Agent reads retain task/inbox/company checks; board thread/delivery reads use the route’s company-access boundary. Delivery resolution requires board tools:manage_connections or existing elevated operator authority, not ordinary agent access.

Evidence: source-only — reviewed at 9ef434fe79c57d976b8b03b14c5242db270b8320. Email CLI, request schema, email routes, and email authority/publication.

Verification: not-run — Use the actual permitted writer and run to create one child/publication, confirm recipient delivery and an exact-message reply, and repeat idempotent requests without duplicate sends. Assert run/owner/mode/budget/company/credential/attachment denials and separate read access. Inspect the provider before resolving an unknown write outcome; a 202 or queued publication alone is not proof of delivery.

Gaps: Real AgentMail transport, recipient delivery, and each native tool binding still need live proof. Controlled provider receipts and inbound-reply recipes do not establish a newly initiated external email journey.