DottaandPaperclip
2b14ec03a4
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages AI agents and the accounts that supply their model credentials. > - Several runs can use the same AI connection at the same time. > - Runtime preparation treated unfinished credential cleanup as exclusive account ownership. > - Manual account tests also held a company credential mutex for the entire provider test. > - A failed cleanup could therefore cancel fresh runs before the provider started and keep them in automatic retries. > - This pull request removes that execution gate and those read and probe locks. > - Each invocation keeps its own credential home. Credential updates still use the existing freshness and authorization checks. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** Fresh runs stopped with `ai_connection_busy` and the message “The selected AI account is still completing credential cleanup. Retry shortly.” Pending cleanup from an earlier invocation blocked every new invocation of that account. Concurrent manual account tests also waited on a company mutex. **Expected behavior** AI connections support concurrent runs and account tests. Cleanup for one private runtime must not prevent another private runtime from using the same account. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Prepare a managed OpenAI account and retain an earlier runtime whose cleanup has not finished. 2. Prepare another run with that account. The old implementation rejects it before provider work starts. 3. Alternatively, keep one manual account test open and start a second test with the same account. The old implementation prevents the second provider callback from starting. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced with two PostgreSQL regressions on `17e8bd773543d62ab3f444c55255acfd82575efd`. Both fail before the fix and pass after it. **Deployment mode** The reported deployment used authenticated Cloud. Local reproduction uses disposable PostgreSQL and fixture credentials. No live provider credentials are required for these regressions. Related search found #15952, which concerns account removal and provider application archival. It does not remove this runtime cleanup gate. This fix does not introduce the account concurrency cap requested in #14564. ROADMAP.md was checked; this change restores concurrent account use. ## What Changed - Remove the account-wide cleanup assertion and cleanup mutex from run admission. - Read ordinary subscription credentials without acquiring the company file mutex or grant and secret write locks. Only an actual durable replacement recovery enters the existing write transaction. - Remove the mutex held across manual account tests. - Retry retained cleanup without making new runtime preparation wait for it. A home-specific cleanup check considers only that exact private home. - Keep cleanup attempts for one runtime idempotent. Keep physical retirement, credential freshness, reconnect, revocation and company checks. - Update concurrency, refresh and cleanup regressions, and the implementation contract. ## Verification - Before/after: the pending-cleanup and simultaneous-probe regressions both fail on the original code and pass with the fix. - Affected suites: 186 tests passed across `ai-connections.test.ts`, `antigravity-ai-connections.integration.test.ts`, and `retained-google-credential-cleanup.test.ts`. They use real PostgreSQL, encrypted fixture credentials and controlled provider callbacks. - `pnpm -r typecheck` passed. - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` and `git diff --check` passed. - `pnpm build` passed on the rebased branch. The server typecheck and production server build both passed again on final commit `03bd3973bdf85108bbd82355abdb217f0e1c83bd` after the runtime-home ownership changes. - Caller coverage: all 166 cases pass across native credential handoff, managed Google subscription writeback, model discovery, heartbeat configuration and hired-agent execution. The full hiring file passed all 79 cases after its admission assertion was corrected. Together with the affected suites, 352 targeted cases pass. - The final home-binding check passed all 188 cases across the account, managed Google writeback, model discovery and retained-cleanup suites. - Review follow-up: two real-PostgreSQL cases pass for quota refresh and concurrent Google account tests. The quota case observes a credential row update in progress, verifies that the runtime takes no account file mutex, and confirms that the private home receives the committed replacement token. The Google case completes a second provider callback while the first callback remains open in a separate private home. - Greptile rated the runtime change 4/5 and found only misplaced map patch notes. Those additions were removed. The implementation documentation remains in `doc/connections/AI-CONNECTIONS.md` and the implementation contract. - `pnpm test:run` was attempted. Chat partition 1 passed 351 expanded cases. Partition 2 passed 324 cases and failed one Teams file-receipt API case at its 15-second deadline: `refuses generic resolution with stale version transfer preconditions without changing receipts`. That case exercises publication resolution, not AI account execution. Its isolated rerun passed. The remaining local partitions did not run after that failure. This is not a claim that the full local suite passed. - Wider caller checks initially identified old serialization expectations and two cleanup retry cases. Updated assertions now require concurrent account use. The partial-removal correction lets a retained home finish removal after a durable credential handoff. All affected caller cases pass, including the full hiring file. - Live provider concurrency and deployment recovery have not been qualified. This PR does not claim that the reported Cloud deployment contains the fix. ## Risks - A new invocation can use the currently saved credential while another runtime still owns a refreshed copy. The existing writeback checks decide which credential can replace the saved value. - Actual credential updates and durable replacement recovery retain atomic storage transactions. This change removes execution serialization, not the integrity checks on stored credentials. - Unfinished cleanup retains its private home and its existing idle hold. This change does not certify a previous provider process as stopped. - There is no database migration, credential format change, permission expansion or ambient-account fallback. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex desktop, with source editing, shell execution, PostgreSQL fixture tests and read-only browser diagnosis. The session does not expose the exact deployment ID or context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Apps, Connections, and Integrations
Audience: internal engineers and product contributors working on integrations.
Start here when adding a provider: Connection authoring runbook. It is the canonical agent tutorial from provider research and protocol classification through manifest generation, branding, secrets, deterministic tests, real-account proof, and PR submission.
Chat and email channels: conversation-channel contract, question inventory and quality bar, and per-provider question coverage index.
Runtime authentication: AI Connections.
Long-term memory: Experimental memory connectors.
Provider notes: Google Workspace, Gmail, Asana, Sentry, PostHog, Braintrust, Neon, Superagent, Gauge, Ditto, 1Password, Unikraft, AgentMail, Telem.AI, iMessage Photon, Enterpret, Supabase, and Vercel. Optional credential custody: Vercel Connect.
Post-read action: classify a new integration request, pick the right Paperclip layer to change, and avoid creating a parallel connection framework.
Decision Record
Board decisions from PAP-13211 make the Apps v2 substrate on the PAP-10341 branch canonical:
- D1: Apps v2 is the substrate. The active model is
tool_applications,tool_connections, catalog entries, profiles, policy rules, action requests, gateway sessions, audit events, and runtime slots. Connections v1 is retired as an implementation path. - D2: one credential authority per connection, brokered projections. The
default is the Paperclip instance vault: durable third-party credentials live
in
company_secretsas secret refs. A reviewed remote MCP method may instead opt in to Vercel Connect, in which case Vercel is the durable credential authority and Paperclip stores only the connector reference and redacted grant metadata. A connection must never mix those two sources. Adapter config, plugin config, harness credential files, and run environments may receive only brokered or projected credentials. - D3: the vocabulary and three-door IA are product law. The default product doors are Apps, Connections, and Review. Protocol and operator-depth concepts live behind Developer or Advanced surfaces.
- D4: unification lands on PAP-10341. Pages, CircleBack-style harness MCP OAuth, provider gallery work, and plugin-provided integrations converge on this branch instead of spawning new integration substrates.
- D5: inbound stays thin. External clients that call Paperclip use scoped Paperclip tokens and existing profiles/rules. They do not get a separate permission model.
Canonical Object Model
Use connection as the unifying noun. A connection is four things:
- A stored credential reference.
- A capability catalog.
- A governance layer.
- An audit trail.
Everything else is an axis on that object:
| Axis | Values | It answers |
|---|---|---|
| Direction | outbound, inbound | Who is the client? |
| Transport | MCP, native REST/OpenAPI, OAuth app install, webhook | How do bytes move? |
| Auth mode | OAuth, API key/PAT, app installation, none | What does the secret represent? |
| Credential owner | company, user, run | Whose identity acts? |
| Packaging | catalog entry, plugin, skill | How does it ship? |
MCP is a transport, not a product category. "Install the Discord app", "connect Google Drive", and "add an MCP endpoint" all produce governed connections with different transport/auth values.
Layer Stack
When you are unsure where a change belongs, place it on the narrowest layer that solves the problem:
| Layer | Owns | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Surface | user-facing Apps, Connections, Review, Developer/Advanced screens | gallery cards, setup wizard, review queue |
| Governance | profiles, bindings, allow/ask-first/block rules, quarantine, audit | read-only profile, ask-first write policy |
| Capability | action catalogs, schemas, risk classes, changed-tool review | search_issues, create_comment, schema hash |
| Credential | company_secrets, OAuth broker, credential resolver, token broker |
Slack bot token ref, Google OAuth refresh token ref |
| Identity | actor attribution and token exchange | board user, agent run, first-party service identity |
| Transport | how the external system is reached | remote HTTP MCP, local stdio, REST/OpenAPI, webhook |
The agent should not hold a durable provider credential. It should hold a Paperclip run/session token; the server or broker resolves the connection, checks governance, invokes the provider, and writes audit.
Identity vs. connections
Signing a user in and connecting a resource are different planes with different owners, different token profiles, and different homes. Do not merge them. This section is the public, connections-side statement of the identity model so connector implementers inherit the rule without depending on private identity-service documentation or re-deriving it.
| Plane | Question | Lives where | Token profile |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1. Sign-in methods | Who are you? | paperclip-id (id.paperclip.ing → Account) |
Minimal-scope provider tokens (openid email profile), used once to authenticate, encrypted at rest, never exported |
| P2. Connections (Apps) | What may your agents touch? | Paperclip App instances (tool_connections), acquired via the connect broker for hosted + self-hosted |
Rich-scope, long-lived resource tokens in the instance's encrypted vault; per-agent grants; risk-tier policy defaults |
| P3. Login with Paperclip | Who may authenticate against us? | paperclip-id OIDC provider + DB-backed client registry |
Our ES256 ID/access tokens issued by us to registered RPs (instances, the broker, future third parties) |
Everything in doc/connections/ — the First-30 matrix,
the connection authoring runbook, and the connect-broker work —
lives on plane P2. It never acquires, stores, or brokers a P1 sign-in token.
The standing rule (D7)
Adopted as a standing rule (decision D7) with the identity-model plan. State it verbatim in any P2 design so the app-store work cannot drift into merging the planes:
Sign-in tokens are never reused as resource tokens; id.paperclip.ing never stores resource tokens; no connections hub on the ID service.
P2 tokens flow broker → instance vault as pass-through only; the id.paperclip.ing Account page therefore must not grow a "Connections" hub. The reasons to hold the planes apart (from the plan §3):
- Scope discipline. Sign-in wants the narrowest grant; connections want deliberately broad ones. One button that does both is how you grant repo access just to log in.
- Blast radius. id.paperclip.ing holding every customer's Vercel/Slack/GitHub resource tokens would make it the single juiciest target in the fleet; the broker is intentionally pass-through.
- Self-hosted symmetry. Instances own their vaults, so self-hosters don't depend on our uptime to use their own connections.
- Legibility. Sign-in and connections answer different user questions, and every product we benchmarked (Vercel, Railway, GitHub, Google) keeps them on separate pages with separate names.
The explicit Vercel Connect exception does not change D7 or merge P1 and P2.
The operator chooses Vercel as the P2 credential authority for an individual
connection. id.paperclip.ing is not involved, and neither sign-in tokens nor
provider tokens pass through it. The deployment's Vercel access token or
workload OIDC identity is bootstrap authority for that external vault, not a
provider resource credential.
Naming alignment
Use the surface-correct name for each plane; they intentionally differ:
| Surface | Plane | Name to use |
|---|---|---|
| Paperclip App instances | P2 | "Connections" |
| id.paperclip.ing Account | P1 | "Ways to sign in" |
| id.paperclip.ing admin | P3 | "OIDC clients" (until the app store productizes it) |
Packaging Rule
Default to a catalog entry when an integration can be described as metadata: manifest, auth config, action catalog, resource filters, and policy defaults.
Use a plugin only when the integration needs product code such as custom UI pages, its own tables, workers, migrations, routines, or specialized ingestion. A plugin may bundle catalog entries, but it must not bypass the connection, profile, policy, credential, and audit model.
Use a skill for agent instructions. Skills may use connections; they must not own durable tokens.
Canonical Docs
- Glossary defines product and internal terms.
- Identity vs. connections is the public statement of the P1/P2/P3 boundary and the D7 standing rule for connections work.
- Security threat model harvests the keeper from PAP-2359 and maps it onto Apps v2.
- First-30 matrix harvests the keeper from PAP-2432 and is the source matrix for connector playbook work.
- Connecting any remote MCP server is the baseline: how an operator connects a standards-compliant remote MCP endpoint with no Paperclip code change, and how sign-in resolves a client.
- Connection authoring runbook is the one end-to-end, agent-executable guide for adding a vendor as a catalog entry on Apps v2: research, connection-type selection, OAuth/API-key/generated-URL setup, encrypted credential handling, branding, implementation, browser and live-provider testing, verification, and PR submission.
- Vercel Connect operator guide documents the optional external credential source, deployment flags, runtime resolution, recovery, and smoke requirements.
- MCP access governance remains the operator runbook for the current gateway, profile, policy, approval, runtime, and audit APIs.
Migration Notes
Connections v1 contributed useful policy, UX, and rollout thinking, but its
implementation branch is no longer the target. When you see old tickets or code
using connections, connection_grants, or a provider-directory mental model,
translate the intent into Apps v2:
| Connections v1 intent | Apps v2 home |
|---|---|
| Provider directory | Apps gallery / tool_applications |
| Configured provider instance | Connection / tool_connections |
| Grant allowlist | Profiles, profile bindings, policies |
| Resource filters | Policy/profile conditions plus provider config |
| Tool broker | Tool gateway and runtime supervisor |
| Connection UX tail | Apps, Connections, Review, Developer/Advanced IA |
Do not add new work to the retired v1 branch. If an old ticket still describes a valid product gap, retarget it to an active Apps v2 issue or close it as superseded with a link to the replacement.
For Slack chat bot creation, installation, recovery, and live qualification, see Automatic Slack app setup.