Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/__tests__/redaction.test.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip f91a6e27c0 feat(issues): contain cross-issue agent side effects (#10837)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the control plane that coordinates autonomous agent
work.
> - Agents need to collaborate on issues beyond their current
assignment.
> - Cross-issue comments and updates are useful, but an unbounded run
can create cascading side effects.
> - The control plane must preserve company-wide collaboration while
containing each run's influence.
> - Comment attribution must also show the responsible user and the
acting agent in audits.
> - This pull request adds run-bound cross-issue containment,
attribution, and agent-class wake rules.
> - The benefit is safer collaboration without restoring issue-assignee
ownership restrictions.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Agent-authenticated issue comments, updates, reopen behavior, and
assignee wake routing.

**Subsystem affected**

Cross-cutting: server routes and services, shared contracts, database
schema and migration, and implementation documentation.

**Current behavior**

An authenticated agent can collaborate across company issues, but one
heartbeat run has no per-run side-effect boundary. Comment records also
do not persist the responsible user separately from the acting agent.

**Proposed behavior**

Require a valid heartbeat run for agent cross-issue comments and
updates. Audit each attempt and cap a run at 20 cross-issue effects.
Keep the cap in log-only mode until it automatically changes to
enforcement at 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC. Preserve same-issue writes. Use
agent-class wakes for agent comments. Keep same-run completion comments
from reopening completed work. Record the responsible user on
agent-authored comments and activity.

**Reason and benefit**

Agents can collaborate on other issues without an assignment gate, while
each run has an atomic and inspectable side-effect limit. Operators can
identify both the acting agent and the responsible user.

**Breaking changes**

After 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC, the twenty-first cross-issue comment or
update from one heartbeat run returns a containment error. Agent
cross-issue writes without valid run context are rejected. The migration
is additive and backfills existing agent-authored comment attribution
where the source data is available.

## What Changed

- Added an atomic per-run counter for cross-issue agent comments and
updates.
- Added audit events for allowed and rejected cross-issue effects.
- Added the automatic log-only to enforcement flip at 2026-08-11 00:00
UTC.
- Added responsible-user attribution to agent-authored comments,
activity records, shared types, and validators.
- Added an additive migration and migration coverage for existing
comments.
- Updated reopen, resume, and wake behavior so agent comments create
agent-class wakes and same-run completion comments remain inert.
- Updated the implementation specification and regression coverage.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/cross-issue-influence-limit.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/issue-comment-attribution-audit-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/issue-comment-reopen-routes.test.ts
packages/db/src/issue-comment-on-behalf-migration.test.ts` — 97 tests
passed.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` — passed, including migration safety checks.
- `pnpm test:run` — server batch: 3,364 passed and 2 skipped; UI batch:
3,504 passed. One unrelated CLI doctor test warned because this agent
runtime injects static AWS credentials.
- `env -u AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID -u AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY pnpm exec vitest
run cli/src/__tests__/secrets.test.ts` — 8 tests passed and confirmed
the CLI failure was ambient-environment sensitive.
- `pnpm build` — passed.

## Risks

- The fixed enforcement timestamp changes production behavior
automatically on 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC. Audit logs before that time
provide rollout visibility.
- The per-run counter serializes on the heartbeat-run row. This prevents
concurrent attempts from racing past the cap but adds a small lock scope
for cross-issue writes.
- Existing comments can only be backfilled when their acting run or
agent attribution is recoverable.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-5 in the Codex agent runtime. The runtime did not expose a
context-window size. Reasoning, shell tools, code editing, and test
execution were enabled.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-04 13:17:49 -05:00

151 lines
5.0 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE, redactEventPayload, redactSensitiveText, sanitizeRecord } from "../redaction.js";
describe("redaction", () => {
it("redacts sensitive keys and nested secret values", () => {
const input = {
apiKey: "abc123",
nested: {
AUTH_TOKEN: "token-value",
safe: "ok",
},
env: {
OPENAI_API_KEY: "sk-openai",
OPENAI_API_KEY_REF: {
type: "secret_ref",
secretId: "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111",
},
OPENAI_API_KEY_PLAIN: {
type: "plain",
value: "sk-plain",
},
PAPERCLIP_API_URL: "http://localhost:3100",
},
};
const result = sanitizeRecord(input);
expect(result.apiKey).toBe(REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE);
expect(result.nested).toEqual({
AUTH_TOKEN: REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE,
safe: "ok",
});
expect(result.env).toEqual({
OPENAI_API_KEY: REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE,
OPENAI_API_KEY_REF: {
type: "secret_ref",
secretId: "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111",
},
OPENAI_API_KEY_PLAIN: {
type: "plain",
value: REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE,
},
PAPERCLIP_API_URL: "http://localhost:3100",
});
});
it("redacts jwt-looking values even when key name is not sensitive", () => {
const input = {
session: "aaa.bbb.ccc",
normal: "plain",
};
const result = sanitizeRecord(input);
expect(result.session).toBe(REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE);
expect(result.normal).toBe("plain");
});
it("redacts payload objects while preserving null", () => {
expect(redactEventPayload(null)).toBeNull();
expect(redactEventPayload({ password: "hunter2", safe: "value" })).toEqual({
password: REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE,
safe: "value",
});
});
it("preserves authorization decision reasons in audit payloads", () => {
expect(redactEventPayload({
authorizationReason: "allow_scoped_agent_write",
authorization: "Bearer secret",
surface: "issue.comment.create",
})).toEqual({
authorizationReason: "allow_scoped_agent_write",
authorization: REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE,
surface: "issue.comment.create",
});
});
it("redacts common secret shapes from unstructured text", () => {
const jwt = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c";
const githubToken = "ghp_1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
const input = [
"Authorization: Bearer live-bearer-token-value",
`payload {"apiKey":"json-secret-value"}`,
`paperclip {"PAPERCLIP_API_KEY":"paperclip-json-secret"}`,
`escaped {\\"apiKey\\":\\"escaped-json-secret\\"}`,
`export PAPERCLIP_API_KEY='paperclip-shell-secret'`,
`GITHUB_TOKEN=${githubToken}`,
`session=${jwt}`,
].join("\n");
const result = redactSensitiveText(input);
expect(result).toContain(REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE);
expect(result).not.toContain("live-bearer-token-value");
expect(result).not.toContain("json-secret-value");
expect(result).not.toContain("paperclip-json-secret");
expect(result).not.toContain("escaped-json-secret");
expect(result).not.toContain("paperclip-shell-secret");
expect(result).not.toContain(githubToken);
expect(result).not.toContain(jwt);
});
it("redacts inline secrets from command metadata without hiding safe command text", () => {
const input = {
command: "custom-acp --token ghp_example_secret env OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-live-example custom-acp",
commandArgs: ["--safe", "ok", "--token", "ghp_arg_secret", "--api-key=sk-inline-example"],
env: {
PAPERCLIP_RESOLVED_COMMAND: "env OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-live-example custom-acp --token ghp_example_secret",
SAFE_VALUE: "visible",
},
};
const result = redactEventPayload(input);
expect(result?.command).toBe(
`custom-acp --token ${REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE} env OPENAI_API_KEY=${REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE} custom-acp`,
);
expect(result?.commandArgs).toEqual([
"--safe",
"ok",
"--token",
REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE,
`--api-key=${REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE}`,
]);
expect(result?.env).toEqual({
PAPERCLIP_RESOLVED_COMMAND:
`env OPENAI_API_KEY=${REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE} custom-acp --token ${REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE}`,
SAFE_VALUE: "visible",
});
});
it("redacts non-string command args after secret flags", () => {
const result = redactEventPayload({
commandArgs: ["--api-key", { nested: "secret-value" }, "safe-next"],
});
expect(result?.commandArgs).toEqual(["--api-key", REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE, "safe-next"]);
});
it("does not treat bare args payloads as command args", () => {
const result = redactEventPayload({
args: ["--api-key", "not-a-command-secret"],
argv: ["--api-key", "command-secret"],
});
expect(result?.args).toEqual(["--api-key", "not-a-command-secret"]);
expect(result?.argv).toEqual(["--api-key", REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE]);
});
});