mirror of
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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages AI agents and their work under company access rules. > - Muse readiness uses a saved connection, receiver contact and an authenticated challenge reply. > - A failed challenge write could leave a saved contact with no later recovery trigger. > - A server restart or restored access must recover that contact under current authority. > - This pull request uses the existing delivery coordinator and saved Muse state for recovery. > - It keeps the normal receiver schedule, authorization checks and real deadlines. > - It lets eligible verification recover and lets idle verification stop work. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** The first Muse receiver contact could persist while readiness challenge creation failed. The contact then had no durable retry or startup recovery path. Later membership, lifecycle or feature restoration could also leave pending verification without a notice. **Expected behavior** Retry a temporary failure through the existing worker. Recover pending contact after restart. Recheck the current company, agent, operator, credential and binding generation before issuing a challenge. Stop verification work while it is ineligible or complete. Do not revive revoked credentials. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Use the normal invitation and OAuth registration, PKCE and token flow. 2. Send one receiver contact and let its normal persistence schedule run. 3. Fail the first readiness challenge operation before it commits. 4. Observe whether the existing worker retries without another contact or a manual Verify action. 5. Restart the App with a new database owner. Check that it creates one usable challenge from the saved contact. **Paperclip version or commit** The causal baseline test used the unchanged production implementation at `90148317b2a447794ff29a4acae5648ad11a9770` plus its normal fixture. The accepted positive test used `9d383041028776ad8469ac4af3fe14ba6c369425`. The initial published head was `fe518c9b72504daf6374225987f24d45bc7bcf75`. The lease/auth correction was locally qualified at `cfd515a207416097fe8b586277d70c4fd4a679fa`. The current candidate is `6efe722e7eb1e22acd466125c7b4a627611d0273`; its added Cloud actor fixture correction passed the full normal owning program and all 35 tests. Its current normal build, lifecycle owner controls, healthy-wait and restoration measurements are described below. Earlier results below are bound to their stated revisions. Related public changes: Refs #19819 for original-principal authentication. Refs #19750 for the transaction-owned external feature read. These are related foundations, not duplicate fixes. The current Muse title and head-branch searches found no duplicate contact-verification recovery PR. Related maintenance work is #17000 and terminal assignment settlement is #17793. ## What Changed - Add a typed, exact-binding verification notice through the existing Muse delivery queue. - Register the first-contact notice before its durable write in the same transaction. - Recover pending contact from saved state at startup. Retry temporary failures through the existing scheduler. - Recheck current feature, lifecycle, credential and access state after commit. Park unavailable authority without recurring verification scans. - Add narrowly scoped notices to the existing access, lifecycle, configuration, company, budget and settings write owners. - Save a healthy lifecycle verification wait in the existing operation JSONB. Keep generic unresolved-work and error retries unchanged. - Commit authenticated confirmation and its lifecycle recheck in one transaction. Retain a raced recheck under the active lease, and recover saved waits once at startup. - Retain a committed lifecycle recheck while an expired attempt still owns the row, so its late wait cannot park accepted confirmation. Replacement claims keep their existing owner fence and fresh fact read. - Keep the receiver gap, persistence and per-segment contact limits unchanged. - Add real App OAuth, failure, retry, restart, challenge and quiet evidence. Add two normal-route restoration tests. - Document recovery, reconnect requirements and the existing connected-receiver sleep restriction. ## Verification - Causal baseline: the real invitation and OAuth flow saved one contact. The first challenge operation failed. The normal test failed because it observed one verification attempt instead of a retry. No setup or cleanup failure was counted as this regression. - At `9d383041`: normal own Shared/SDK, DB with migration 0441 assets, Runner TypeScript core and surfaces, module boundaries, and all seven normal App programs passed. One new redundant role comparison first failed typecheck; that diagnostic remains recorded and the corrected full App gate passed. - At `9d383041`: all 17 maintenance component tests passed with zero skips. All original deadline, rollback, drain, terminal settlement and startup controls remain. - At `9d383041`: the one normal App case passed. Real OAuth authorized one receiver signal. A retry occurred about 5.01 seconds after the first failure. A new Db/App owner created one challenge, advanced revision 2 to 3, and accepted authenticated confirmation and mailbox ACK. Query instrumentation had an active positive control. All measured query, callback, session and verifier counters stayed equal across the unchanged scheduled 15-second quiet window. Token revocation and old-token/signal rejection passed. - Known App, worker, HTTP and database owners closed without cleanup errors. The tests used bounded local PostgreSQL and HTTP fixtures. They did not call a live Muse model. - Current integrated semantics: the full normal App driver completed all programs. Only a new test callback had two undefined-value diagnostics. An explicit defined-value guard corrected that test. The full 416-root owning program then passed with empty diagnostics. A separate collector incorrectly required an explicit child `noEmit` field; the normal inherited setting was verified without repeating the compiler. The original failures remain recorded. - The first restoration run failed both cases. Permission parking recorded 120 main-pool queries without more verifier calls. The lifecycle counter recorded two denials without their exact scope. These observations remain unexplained at the individual-query/call level. Source separately shows a lifecycle readiness retry every two seconds while the real external reply is absent. - At `fe518c9b`: normal Shared/SDK and DB producers, module policy, all seven full App programs, and all 33 pure diagnostic controls passed. The lifecycle owner file passed all 19 cases, including both confirmation/park orders, rollback, duplicate notices, startup recovery and authority controls. - At `fe518c9b`: the normal OAuth failure/retry/new-Db reconstruction case passed. Its new healthy-wait window measured 15,002 ms with unchanged total activity before genuine confirmation; the existing ready quiet and revocation checks also passed. - At `fe518c9b`: both normal restoration tests passed in Vitest. Ordinary viewer-to-operator restoration and Pause/Resume recovered the same binding, grant and single contact; each committed one challenge and advanced revision 2 to 3. All six parked, restored and revoked/disabled quiet windows measured at least 15 seconds with active positive read controls and unchanged total queries, callbacks, sessions and verifier calls. Both cleanups passed. - The restoration wrapper still recorded failure: it required lifetime lifecycle denial count zero, whereas the measured count was one before the parked quiet window. The reviewed fixture explicitly permits a current-authority denial from an earlier observation and requires no committed challenge before restoration. Precise denial timing relative to Pause was not serialized. The original wrapper failure is retained; no rerun or retrospective explanation of the earlier failures is claimed. - Review exposed an expired-lease race. The added real-store baseline test failed after the late defer restored `waitingForSignal`; no setup or timeout was counted as the regression. On `cfd515a`, the whole lifecycle owner file passed all 20 tests, including that case. The full normal production declaration program (1067 roots), verification program (662), and auth owning program (405) passed; all 1942 declarations remained byte-identical. - The original remote auth-session shard failed three tests because their partial query adapters lacked the new binding query's join/order/limit chain. A fixture-only correction preserved the real notifier and existing authorization assertions. All 12 auth-session tests passed locally. - Complete remote inspection also found 33 failures in the 35-test Cloud actor fixture with the same missing `innerJoin` method and downstream incomplete-auth assertions. Its original full log and exact synthetic Source comparison are retained. At `6efe722e`, the three-line fixture adapter repair passed the complete normal 662-root test program and the whole 35-test file with zero failures or skips. All existing lock, authorization, settings, debounce and unfinished-auth assertions remain. - The earlier healthy/restoration quiet measurements remain bound to `fe518c9b`. Those steady 15-second windows did not exercise a still-owned attempt passing its 120-second lease. The targeted expired-owner regression qualifies that new boundary; it is not a fresh measurement of the earlier windows. - The initial `fe518c9b` remote gates failed the auth fixtures and reported a Greptile 4/5 P1. The aggregate failure reported the underlying shard. Those actual causes were fixed and qualified above. - Current `6efe722e` remote gates completed with **57 successful checks and three explicit skips**. The full latest edited Greptile summary is **5/5**, explicitly reviews this exact head, and has no new finding. The original P1 thread is resolved. All general, inline and nested review pages were read. - One current-head CI attempt timed out after 30 seconds in the Runner evidence/privacy file, with 6,864 passes and one failure. That file and its transitive inputs are byte-identical to the CI base. A separate local diagnostic preserved every assertion and the original timeout, ran the full normal Runner test project and the entire 41-case file, and passed all 41 with zero skips. Its private bounded timing records measured the target body at 74 ms. The diagnostic was then removed, restoring the exact original test. This is local recovery evidence; the original CI stalled await was not recorded and its cause remains **unproven**. - One retry of only the failed jobs on the unchanged head passed the Runner support suite and dependent aggregate verification. The complete second attempt and original failure logs are preserved. No test, timeout, privacy guard or product code was weakened. This result does not turn the original timeout into an explained failure or a diagnosed flake. - Full recursive typecheck, full `test:run` and a full release build were not repeated locally. The normal full App programs, focused producers and tests above passed, and the required current-head remote gates passed. Final review is against the exact unchanged head; local quiet remains separate from deployed suspension. Reviewer commands use the normal project entry points: `node server/scripts/typecheck-layers.mjs`, the whole `server/src/services/muse-maintenance.test.ts` file, and both normal App PostgreSQL files. PostgreSQL fixtures require explicit owned fixture/admin URLs and normal migrations before imports. Run the files serially with one worker. The private controller retains exact Source, output, worker and owner-closure receipts. ## Risks - Missing or early producer notices could lose a restoration trigger. Notices stay in the transaction that commits the write. The worker checks current authority after commit. - A stale notice must not grant access. Binding generation, current membership, company, agent and credential checks remain authoritative. Revoked credentials require reconnecting. - The change adds no table, migration, alternate task queue or periodic verification scan. It adds two optional fields to existing lifecycle operation JSONB. Generic pending/error deadlines, setup holds and manual repair remain obligations. - Confirmation can race with an active verification attempt. The park compare-and-set must retain the durable recheck. Startup recovery uses a fixed cutoff and keyset pages; it must not become another recurring scan. Wrong company, stale version, pause and revoked credentials must stay fenced. - The connected receiver still has its documented tenant-sleep restriction. Worker quiet is not proof of deployed suspension or external wake. - The normal challenge reply is sent by an authenticated protocol fixture. Live Muse background replies, cost/usage, full Muse lifecycle and full hosted Dot behavior remain unqualified. Partial Dot profile ACK and unsigned-device cutover stay withheld. - Restoration coverage for the additional company, budget, configuration and feature producers remains a separate qualification obligation. This pull request does not mark the whole hosted area complete. ## Model Used OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` authored the implementation and tests with local code and tool use. A GPT-6-based Codex coordinator reviewed the changes and owns integration. Its exact underlying model ID is not exposed. Context window sizes are unavailable. No context size is inferred. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge
1015 lines
37 KiB
TypeScript
1015 lines
37 KiB
TypeScript
import { notifyMuseContactVerification } from "../modules/external-agents/index.js";
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import { idleApiActivity } from "../services/idle-api-activity.js";
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import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
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import type { Request, RequestHandler } from "express";
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import { and, eq, isNull, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
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import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import {
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activityLog,
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agentApiKeys,
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agents,
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authUsers,
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companies,
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companyMemberships,
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heartbeatRuns,
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instanceUserRoles,
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} from "@paperclipai/db";
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import {
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MAX_ISSUE_PREFIX_ATTEMPTS,
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deriveIssuePrefixBase,
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isIssuePrefixConflict,
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issuePrefixSuffixForAttempt,
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pickAvailableIssuePrefix,
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rekeyCompanyIssueIdentifiers,
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} from "../services/issue-prefix.js";
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import { verifyLocalAgentJwt } from "../agent-auth-jwt.js";
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import { agentRunWritesRevoked } from "../agent-run-cancellation.js";
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import { loadAgentRunAuthentication } from "./agent-run-authentication.js";
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import { isUuidLike, normalizeAgentApiKeyScope, type DeploymentMode } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import type { BetterAuthSessionResult } from "../auth/better-auth.js";
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import { logger } from "./logger.js";
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import { captureRunIdentity } from "../services/run-identity.js";
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import { boardAuthService } from "../services/board-auth.js";
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import { retryIdempotentDatabaseOperation } from "../database-retry.js";
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import { beginIdleTrackedWork } from "../services/task-admission.js";
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import { notifyChatCompanyAuthorityChange } from "../services/chat-run-milestone-notifications.js";
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export {
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isTransientDbConnectionError,
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retryIdempotentDatabaseOperation as retryOnTransientDbConnectionError,
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} from "../database-retry.js";
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import { syncCloudTenantWrites } from "./cloud-tenant-sync.js";
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import { resolveOwnerInstanceAdmin } from "../services/cloud-tenant-authority.js";
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import { ensureHumanRoleDefaultGrants } from "../services/principal-access-compatibility.js";
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import { forbidden, unauthorized, unprocessable } from "../errors.js";
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export { isCloudManagedInstance } from "../services/cloud-instance.js";
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import { cloudTenantPrimaryCompanyId, isCloudManagedInstance } from "../services/cloud-instance.js";
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function hashToken(token: string) {
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return createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex");
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}
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function normalizeOptionalString(value: string | null | undefined) {
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return value?.trim() || null;
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}
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function invalidAgentTokenMessage(token: string) {
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try {
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const payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(token.split(".")[1] ?? "", "base64url").toString("utf8")) as {
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exp?: unknown;
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};
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if (typeof payload.exp === "number" && payload.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) {
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return "Expired agent token; obtain fresh credentials and retry";
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}
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} catch {
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// Malformed and incorrectly signed tokens share the generic failure below.
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}
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return "Agent token did not verify; obtain fresh credentials and retry";
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}
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async function resolveLegacyRunResponsibleUserId(
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db: Db,
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input: { companyId: string; agentId: string; runId: string },
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) {
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if (!isUuidLike(input.runId)) return null;
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const run = await db
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.select({ responsibleUserId: heartbeatRuns.responsibleUserId })
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.from(heartbeatRuns)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(heartbeatRuns.id, input.runId),
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eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, input.companyId),
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eq(heartbeatRuns.agentId, input.agentId),
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),
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)
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.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
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return normalizeOptionalString(run?.responsibleUserId);
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}
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async function loadResponsibleUserMemberships(
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db: Db,
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input: { companyId: string; userId: string | null },
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) {
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if (!input.userId) return [];
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const [user, memberships] = await Promise.all([
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db
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.select({ id: authUsers.id })
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.from(authUsers)
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.where(eq(authUsers.id, input.userId))
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.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null),
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db
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.select({
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companyId: companyMemberships.companyId,
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membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole,
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status: companyMemberships.status,
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})
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.from(companyMemberships)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(companyMemberships.companyId, input.companyId),
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eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
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eq(companyMemberships.principalId, input.userId),
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eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
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),
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),
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]);
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return user ? memberships : [];
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}
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/**
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* The user's own active company memberships — the exact company scope a
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* locally authenticated session actor carries. Shared by the session path
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* and the Cloud trusted-header path so both resolve the same access set.
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*/
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async function loadActiveUserCompanyMemberships(db: Db, userId: string) {
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return db
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.select({
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companyId: companyMemberships.companyId,
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membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole,
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status: companyMemberships.status,
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})
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.from(companyMemberships)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
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eq(companyMemberships.principalId, userId),
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eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
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),
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);
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}
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async function auditAgentJwtRunHeaderMismatch(
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db: Db,
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input: { companyId: string; agentId: string; claimRunId: string; headerRunId: string; method: string; url: string },
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) {
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try {
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// The claimed run id is untrusted input from a rejected token. activity_log
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// .run_id is a real FK to heartbeat_runs, so writing it unconditionally
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// makes the insert fail — and the catch swallows it — exactly when the
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// claim is bogus. Keep the claim in entityId/details and populate the FK
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// column only when the row actually exists.
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const claimedRunExists = isUuidLike(input.claimRunId)
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? await db
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.select({ id: heartbeatRuns.id })
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.from(heartbeatRuns)
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.where(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, input.claimRunId))
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.then((rows) => rows.length > 0)
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: false;
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await db.insert(activityLog).values({
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companyId: input.companyId,
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actorType: "agent",
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actorId: input.agentId,
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action: "auth.agent_jwt_run_header_mismatch",
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entityType: "heartbeat_run",
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entityId: input.claimRunId,
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...(isUuidLike(input.agentId) ? { agentId: input.agentId } : {}),
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...(claimedRunExists ? { runId: input.claimRunId } : {}),
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details: {
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claimRunId: input.claimRunId,
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headerRunId: input.headerRunId,
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method: input.method,
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url: input.url,
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},
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});
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} catch (err) {
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logger.warn(
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{ err, companyId: input.companyId, agentId: input.agentId, claimRunId: input.claimRunId },
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"Failed to audit rejected agent JWT run header mismatch",
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);
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}
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}
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async function auditAgentKeyMissingResponsibleUser(
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db: Db,
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input: { companyId: string; agentId: string; keyId: string; method: string; url: string },
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) {
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try {
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await db.insert(activityLog).values({
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companyId: input.companyId,
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actorType: "agent",
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actorId: input.agentId,
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action: "auth.agent_key_missing_responsible_user",
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entityType: "agent_api_key",
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entityId: input.keyId,
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...(isUuidLike(input.agentId) ? { agentId: input.agentId } : {}),
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details: {
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method: input.method,
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url: input.url,
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},
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});
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} catch (err) {
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logger.warn(
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{ err, companyId: input.companyId, agentId: input.agentId, keyId: input.keyId },
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"Failed to audit rejected agent key without responsible user binding",
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);
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}
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}
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interface ActorMiddlewareOptions {
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deploymentMode: DeploymentMode;
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resolveSession?: (req: Request) => Promise<BetterAuthSessionResult | null>;
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}
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const publicRoutineWebhookPath = /^\/api\/routine-triggers\/public\/[a-f0-9]{24}\/fire\/?$/i;
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const publicMcpGatewayProtocolPath = /^\/mcp\/gateways\/gw_[a-f0-9]{32}\/?$/i;
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export function actorMiddleware(db: Db, opts: ActorMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler {
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const boardAuth = boardAuthService(db);
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const authenticate: RequestHandler = async (req, _res, next) => {
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req.actor =
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opts.deploymentMode === "local_trusted"
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? {
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type: "board",
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userId: "local-board",
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userName: "Local Board",
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userEmail: null,
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isInstanceAdmin: true,
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source: "local_implicit",
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}
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: { type: "none", source: "none" };
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// Routine ingress authenticates its own bearer/signature. Never interpret
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// webhook credentials as agent keys or attach an ambient browser session.
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if (req.method === "POST" && publicRoutineWebhookPath.test(req.path)) {
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req.actor = { type: "none", source: "none" };
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next();
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return;
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}
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const runIdHeader = req.header("x-paperclip-run-id");
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const authHeader = req.header("authorization");
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const hasBearerCredentials = /^bearer(?:\s|$)/i.test(authHeader ?? "");
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// Public MCP gateway protocol requests carry a pcgw_* bearer that is
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// validated by the gateway service itself. Do not interpret that bearer as
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// a board key or agent JWT here: doing so rejects the MCP handshake before
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// the protocol route can verify its run-scoped credential. Keep this bypass
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// restricted to the unguessable public gateway path; all /api routes retain
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// the normal actor authentication path below.
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if (hasBearerCredentials && publicMcpGatewayProtocolPath.test(req.path)) {
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if (runIdHeader) req.actor.runId = runIdHeader;
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next();
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return;
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}
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if (!hasBearerCredentials) {
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if (opts.deploymentMode === "authenticated" && opts.resolveSession) {
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const cloudTenantActor = await resolveCloudTenantActor(db, req);
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if (cloudTenantActor) {
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req.actor = {
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...cloudTenantActor,
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runId: runIdHeader ?? undefined,
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};
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next();
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return;
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}
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let session: BetterAuthSessionResult | null = null;
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try {
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session = await opts.resolveSession(req);
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} catch (err) {
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logger.warn(
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{ err, method: req.method, url: req.originalUrl },
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"Failed to resolve auth session from request headers",
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);
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}
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if (session?.user?.id && session.session?.id) {
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const userId = session.user.id;
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const [roleRow, memberships] = await Promise.all([
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db
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.select({ id: instanceUserRoles.id })
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.from(instanceUserRoles)
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.where(and(eq(instanceUserRoles.userId, userId), eq(instanceUserRoles.role, "instance_admin")))
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.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null),
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loadActiveUserCompanyMemberships(db, userId),
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]);
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req.actor = {
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type: "board",
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userId,
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sessionId: session.session.id,
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userName: session.user.name ?? null,
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userEmail: session.user.email ?? null,
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companyIds: memberships.map((row) => row.companyId),
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memberships,
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isInstanceAdmin: Boolean(roleRow),
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runId: runIdHeader ?? undefined,
|
|
source: "session",
|
|
};
|
|
next();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (runIdHeader) req.actor.runId = runIdHeader;
|
|
next();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const token = authHeader!.slice("bearer".length).trim();
|
|
if (!token) {
|
|
next(unauthorized("Empty bearer token; provide valid agent credentials and retry"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const boardKey = await boardAuth.findBoardApiKeyByToken(token);
|
|
if (boardKey) {
|
|
const access = await boardAuth.resolveBoardAccess(boardKey.userId);
|
|
if (access.user) {
|
|
await boardAuth.touchBoardApiKey(boardKey.id);
|
|
req.actor = {
|
|
type: "board",
|
|
userId: boardKey.userId,
|
|
userName: access.user?.name ?? null,
|
|
userEmail: access.user?.email ?? null,
|
|
companyIds: access.companyIds,
|
|
memberships: access.memberships,
|
|
isInstanceAdmin: access.isInstanceAdmin,
|
|
keyId: boardKey.id,
|
|
runId: runIdHeader || undefined,
|
|
source: "board_key",
|
|
};
|
|
if (isCloudManagedInstance() && (access.isInstanceAdmin || access.companyIds.length)) {
|
|
_res.once("finish", () => { if (_res.statusCode >= 200 && _res.statusCode < 400) idleApiActivity.record(); });
|
|
}
|
|
next();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const tokenHash = hashToken(token);
|
|
const key = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(agentApiKeys)
|
|
.where(and(eq(agentApiKeys.keyHash, tokenHash), isNull(agentApiKeys.revokedAt)))
|
|
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
|
|
|
|
if (!key) {
|
|
const claims = verifyLocalAgentJwt(token);
|
|
if (!claims) {
|
|
next(unauthorized(invalidAgentTokenMessage(token)));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const agentRecord = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(agents)
|
|
.where(eq(agents.id, claims.sub))
|
|
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
|
|
|
|
if (!agentRecord || agentRecord.companyId !== claims.company_id) {
|
|
next(unauthorized("Agent record is missing or belongs to another company; obtain fresh credentials and retry"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (agentRecord.lifecycleHolds?.includes("setup")) {
|
|
next(unauthorized("Agent setup is incomplete and cannot authenticate"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (agentRecord.status === "terminated") {
|
|
next(unauthorized("Agent is terminated and cannot authenticate"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (agentRecord.status === "pending_approval") {
|
|
next(unauthorized("Agent is pending approval and cannot authenticate"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const normalizedRunIdHeader = normalizeOptionalString(runIdHeader);
|
|
if (normalizedRunIdHeader && normalizedRunIdHeader !== claims.run_id) {
|
|
await auditAgentJwtRunHeaderMismatch(db, {
|
|
companyId: claims.company_id,
|
|
agentId: claims.sub,
|
|
claimRunId: claims.run_id,
|
|
headerRunId: normalizedRunIdHeader,
|
|
method: req.method,
|
|
url: req.originalUrl,
|
|
});
|
|
next(
|
|
unprocessable("X-Paperclip-Run-Id does not match signed agent JWT run_id", {
|
|
code: "agent_jwt_run_id_mismatch",
|
|
claimRunId: claims.run_id,
|
|
headerRunId: normalizedRunIdHeader,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const [identityRun] = await loadAgentRunAuthentication(db, {
|
|
runId: claims.run_id,
|
|
companyId: claims.company_id,
|
|
agentId: claims.sub,
|
|
});
|
|
if (agentRunWritesRevoked(identityRun)
|
|
&& !["GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"].includes(req.method)) {
|
|
const conversation = identityRun?.contextSnapshot?.conversationMode === true;
|
|
_res.status(403).json({ error: conversation ? "This conversation turn was cancelled" : "This run was cancelled",
|
|
code: conversation ? "conversation_turn_cancelled" : "agent_run_cancelled" });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (identityRun?.activeIdentityContextId && identityRun.status === "running") {
|
|
const captured = await captureRunIdentity(db, { companyId: claims.company_id, agentId: claims.sub, runId: claims.run_id },
|
|
{ readScope: "request_authentication" });
|
|
identityRun.activeIdentityContextId = captured.context?.id ?? null;
|
|
identityRun.responsibleUserId = captured.context?.responsibleUserId ?? null;
|
|
}
|
|
if (claims.authorizing_user_id) {
|
|
// This signed projection exists only for internal native tools. Recheck
|
|
// the admitted run and current immutable binding on every API call.
|
|
try {
|
|
const { parseNativeExecutionInput } = await import("../vendor/paperclip-runner/index.js");
|
|
const { museRunnerBroker } = await import("../services/muse-runner-broker.js");
|
|
const [nativeRun] = await db.select({ status: heartbeatRuns.status, runtimeMode: heartbeatRuns.runtimeMode,
|
|
nativeExecutionInput: sql<unknown>`${heartbeatRuns.runnerProfileJson}->'nativeExecutionInput'`,
|
|
}).from(heartbeatRuns).where(and(
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.id, claims.run_id), eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, claims.company_id), eq(heartbeatRuns.agentId, claims.sub),
|
|
));
|
|
const execution = parseNativeExecutionInput(nativeRun?.nativeExecutionInput);
|
|
if (nativeRun?.status !== "running" || nativeRun.runtimeMode !== "native" || execution.schema !== "paperclip.native-execution-input.v8"
|
|
|| execution.binding.runId !== claims.run_id || execution.binding.agentId !== claims.sub || execution.binding.companyId !== claims.company_id
|
|
|| await museRunnerBroker(db).authorizingUserIdForBinding(execution.provider.binding) !== claims.authorizing_user_id) {
|
|
throw new Error("Muse internal tool authority mismatch");
|
|
}
|
|
await museRunnerBroker(db).assertRunAuthority(execution);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
_res.status(403).json({ error: "Muse native tool authority is unavailable" });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const onBehalfOfUserId = identityRun?.activeIdentityContextId
|
|
? identityRun.responsibleUserId
|
|
: claims.responsible_user_id !== undefined
|
|
? normalizeOptionalString(claims.responsible_user_id)
|
|
: await resolveLegacyRunResponsibleUserId(db, {
|
|
companyId: claims.company_id,
|
|
agentId: claims.sub,
|
|
runId: claims.run_id,
|
|
});
|
|
const onBehalfOfMemberships = await loadResponsibleUserMemberships(db, {
|
|
companyId: claims.company_id,
|
|
userId: onBehalfOfUserId,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
req.actor = {
|
|
type: "agent",
|
|
agentId: claims.sub,
|
|
companyId: claims.company_id,
|
|
keyId: undefined,
|
|
keyScope: normalizeAgentApiKeyScope(claims.key_scope),
|
|
runId: claims.run_id,
|
|
onBehalfOfUserId,
|
|
...(claims.authorizing_user_id ? { authorizingUserId: claims.authorizing_user_id } : {}),
|
|
identityContextId: identityRun?.activeIdentityContextId ?? null,
|
|
onBehalfOfMemberships,
|
|
source: "agent_jwt",
|
|
};
|
|
next();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(agentApiKeys)
|
|
.set({ lastUsedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(eq(agentApiKeys.id, key.id));
|
|
|
|
const agentRecord = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(agents)
|
|
.where(eq(agents.id, key.agentId))
|
|
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
|
|
|
|
if (!agentRecord || agentRecord.companyId !== key.companyId) {
|
|
next(unauthorized("Agent record is missing or belongs to another company; obtain fresh credentials and retry"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (agentRecord.lifecycleHolds?.includes("setup")) {
|
|
next(unauthorized("Agent setup is incomplete and cannot authenticate"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (agentRecord.status === "terminated") {
|
|
next(unauthorized("Agent is terminated and cannot authenticate"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (agentRecord.status === "pending_approval") {
|
|
next(unauthorized("Agent is pending approval and cannot authenticate"));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const responsibleUserId = normalizeOptionalString(key.responsibleUserId);
|
|
if (!responsibleUserId) {
|
|
await auditAgentKeyMissingResponsibleUser(db, {
|
|
companyId: key.companyId,
|
|
agentId: key.agentId,
|
|
keyId: key.id,
|
|
method: req.method,
|
|
url: req.originalUrl,
|
|
});
|
|
next(forbidden("Responsible user is unavailable for this agent key", {
|
|
code: "RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAVAILABLE",
|
|
}));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
req.actor = {
|
|
type: "agent",
|
|
agentId: key.agentId,
|
|
companyId: key.companyId,
|
|
keyId: key.id,
|
|
keyScope: normalizeAgentApiKeyScope(key.scopeConfig),
|
|
onBehalfOfUserId: responsibleUserId,
|
|
onBehalfOfMemberships: await loadResponsibleUserMemberships(db, {
|
|
companyId: key.companyId,
|
|
userId: responsibleUserId,
|
|
}),
|
|
runId: runIdHeader || undefined,
|
|
source: "agent_key",
|
|
};
|
|
if (isCloudManagedInstance() && req.actor.onBehalfOfMemberships?.length) {
|
|
_res.once("finish", () => { if (_res.statusCode >= 200 && _res.statusCode < 400) idleApiActivity.record(); });
|
|
}
|
|
next();
|
|
};
|
|
return async (req, res, next) => {
|
|
// Health and task-drain requests bypass tenant admission, but resolving
|
|
// their actor can still write users, companies, memberships and key usage.
|
|
// Finish all authentication before entering the next handler: the report
|
|
// must count concurrent authentication, without counting its own auth.
|
|
const finish = beginIdleTrackedWork();
|
|
let continueRequest: (() => void) | undefined;
|
|
try {
|
|
await authenticate(req, res, (error?: unknown) => {
|
|
continueRequest = () => next(error);
|
|
});
|
|
} finally {
|
|
finish();
|
|
}
|
|
continueRequest?.();
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Minimal header accessor `resolveCloudTenantActor` needs. Express `Request`
|
|
* satisfies it directly; websocket upgrade paths adapt a raw
|
|
* `IncomingMessage` with {@link cloudActorHeaderSourceFromHeaders} since
|
|
* trusted-header authentication must work identically for upgrades — a
|
|
* cloud-proxied browser has no local Better Auth session to fall back on.
|
|
*/
|
|
export interface CloudActorHeaderSource {
|
|
header(name: string): string | undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Adapts a raw header map (e.g. `IncomingMessage.headers`) to {@link CloudActorHeaderSource}. */
|
|
export function cloudActorHeaderSourceFromHeaders(
|
|
headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,
|
|
): CloudActorHeaderSource {
|
|
return {
|
|
header(name: string) {
|
|
const value = headers[name.toLowerCase()];
|
|
return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Trusted-header actor resolution with bounded transient-connection retries.
|
|
* The tenant sync inside is idempotent end to end — every write is an
|
|
* upsert/on-conflict/delete and the write debounce records only after the
|
|
* whole sync succeeds — so replaying it after a dropped connection is safe,
|
|
* and turns a golden-path authentication 500 into a served request.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function resolveCloudTenantActor(
|
|
db: Db,
|
|
req: CloudActorHeaderSource,
|
|
): Promise<Express.Request["actor"] | null> {
|
|
return retryIdempotentDatabaseOperation(() => resolveCloudTenantActorOnce(db, req));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveCloudTenantActorOnce(
|
|
db: Db,
|
|
req: CloudActorHeaderSource,
|
|
): Promise<Express.Request["actor"] | null> {
|
|
const expectedToken = process.env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN?.trim();
|
|
if (!expectedToken) return null;
|
|
|
|
const token = req.header("x-paperclip-cloud-tenant-token")?.trim();
|
|
if (!token || !constantTimeStringEqual(token, expectedToken)) return null;
|
|
|
|
const userId = requiredCloudHeader(req, "x-paperclip-cloud-user-id");
|
|
const userEmail = requiredCloudHeader(req, "x-paperclip-cloud-user-email").toLowerCase();
|
|
const stackId = requiredCloudHeader(req, "x-paperclip-cloud-stack-id");
|
|
const stackRole = stackMembershipRole(req.header("x-paperclip-cloud-stack-role"));
|
|
const userName = req.header("x-paperclip-cloud-user-name")?.trim() || userEmail;
|
|
const paperclipCompanyId = req.header("x-paperclip-cloud-paperclip-company-id")?.trim();
|
|
const paperclipCompanyName = req
|
|
.header("x-paperclip-cloud-paperclip-company-name")
|
|
?.trim();
|
|
const companyId = cloudTenantCompanyId(stackId);
|
|
const companyName = paperclipCompanyName || humanizeCloudStackSlug(stackId);
|
|
const membershipRole = stackRole === "owner" || stackRole === "admin" ? "owner" : stackRole;
|
|
const syncFingerprint = JSON.stringify([
|
|
userEmail, userName, stackId, stackRole, paperclipCompanyId ?? "", paperclipCompanyName ?? "",
|
|
]);
|
|
let effectiveMembership: { companyId: string; membershipRole: string | null; status: string } = {
|
|
companyId,
|
|
membershipRole,
|
|
status: "active",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Earlier cloud_tenant builds granted every tenant user `instance_admin`.
|
|
// Stale rows from those deployments would still elevate this user through
|
|
// the BetterAuth session path, board API keys, and the authorization
|
|
// service's own instanceUserRoles lookup — so actively purge them on every
|
|
// trusted-header authentication instead of merely no longer inserting them.
|
|
await db
|
|
.delete(instanceUserRoles)
|
|
.where(and(eq(instanceUserRoles.userId, userId), eq(instanceUserRoles.role, "instance_admin")));
|
|
|
|
await syncCloudTenantWrites(db, userId, syncFingerprint, async () => {
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
await db
|
|
.insert(authUsers)
|
|
.values({
|
|
id: userId,
|
|
name: userName,
|
|
email: userEmail,
|
|
emailVerified: true,
|
|
image: null,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.onConflictDoUpdate({
|
|
target: authUsers.id,
|
|
set: { name: userName, email: userEmail, emailVerified: true, updatedAt: now },
|
|
setWhere: sql`${authUsers.name} is distinct from ${userName}
|
|
or ${authUsers.email} is distinct from ${userEmail}
|
|
or ${authUsers.emailVerified} is distinct from true`,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await insertCloudTenantCompany(db, { companyId, companyName, now });
|
|
if (paperclipCompanyName) {
|
|
await repairCloudTenantCompanyName(db, {
|
|
companyId,
|
|
paperclipCompanyId,
|
|
paperclipCompanyName,
|
|
now,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
// Derive any legacy prefix from the repaired name, preserving the helper's
|
|
// exact legacy-marker guards and the operator's own edits.
|
|
await repairCloudTenantCompanyProvisionDefaults(db, { companyId, stackId, now });
|
|
|
|
effectiveMembership = await db.transaction(async tx => {
|
|
const [existing] = await tx.select({
|
|
status: companyMemberships.status,
|
|
membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole,
|
|
}).from(companyMemberships).where(and(
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, companyId),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, userId),
|
|
)).for("update");
|
|
// Serialize authority restoration and its notice while retaining the
|
|
// guarded upsert that leaves unchanged memberships untouched.
|
|
if (!existing || existing.status !== "active" || existing.membershipRole === "viewer") {
|
|
await notifyChatCompanyAuthorityChange(tx, { companyId });
|
|
await notifyMuseContactVerification(tx, { companyId, operatorId: userId });
|
|
}
|
|
return tx
|
|
.insert(companyMemberships)
|
|
.values({ companyId, principalType: "user", principalId: userId, status: "active", membershipRole, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.onConflictDoUpdate({
|
|
target: [companyMemberships.companyId, companyMemberships.principalType, companyMemberships.principalId],
|
|
set: { status: "active", membershipRole, updatedAt: now },
|
|
setWhere: sql`${companyMemberships.status} is distinct from 'active'
|
|
or ${companyMemberships.membershipRole} is distinct from ${membershipRole}`,
|
|
})
|
|
.returning({ companyId: companyMemberships.companyId, membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole, status: companyMemberships.status })
|
|
// PostgreSQL returns no row for an unchanged ON CONFLICT ... WHERE.
|
|
// That condition itself proves the existing role/status match the input.
|
|
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? { companyId, membershipRole, status: "active" });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// An unchanged membership can still lack default grants after a partial
|
|
// sync or an older deployment; keep this repair inside every actual sync.
|
|
await ensureHumanRoleDefaultGrants(db, {
|
|
companyId,
|
|
principalId: userId,
|
|
membershipRole: effectiveMembership.membershipRole ?? membershipRole,
|
|
grantedByUserId: null,
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// The stack's seeded company is only where Cloud provisioned this user.
|
|
// Companies created afterwards on the instance (imports, in-app company
|
|
// creation) attach real membership rows for the user, so union those with
|
|
// the pinned primary — the same active-membership scope a locally
|
|
// authenticated session actor carries. Strictly this user's own rows; the
|
|
// membership-creating flows seed their own permission grants, so nothing
|
|
// needs seeding per request here. A read failure degrades to the pinned
|
|
// primary instead of blocking authentication, mirroring the fail-closed
|
|
// owner-elevation resolution below.
|
|
let additionalMemberships: { companyId: string; membershipRole: string | null; status: string }[] =
|
|
[];
|
|
try {
|
|
additionalMemberships = (await loadActiveUserCompanyMemberships(db, userId)).filter(
|
|
(row) => row.companyId !== companyId,
|
|
);
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
logger.warn(
|
|
{ err, userId, stackId },
|
|
"Failed to load cloud tenant user's company memberships; scoping actor to the stack's primary company",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
type: "board",
|
|
userId,
|
|
userName,
|
|
userEmail,
|
|
companyIds: [companyId, ...additionalMemberships.map((row) => row.companyId)],
|
|
memberships: [
|
|
{
|
|
companyId,
|
|
membershipRole: effectiveMembership.membershipRole ?? membershipRole,
|
|
status: effectiveMembership.status,
|
|
},
|
|
...additionalMemberships,
|
|
],
|
|
// Computed per request, never persisted: the stack owner is elevated to
|
|
// instance admin of their own dedicated instance only while the
|
|
// `enableOwnerInstanceAdmin` flag is on. Non-owner stack roles stay
|
|
// company-scoped. Turning the flag off de-elevates on the next request —
|
|
// there is no role row to clean up.
|
|
isInstanceAdmin: await resolveOwnerInstanceAdmin(db, stackRole),
|
|
canManageExperimentalSettings: stackRole === "admin",
|
|
source: "cloud_tenant",
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function requiredCloudHeader(req: CloudActorHeaderSource, name: string): string {
|
|
const value = req.header(name)?.trim();
|
|
if (!value) {
|
|
throw new Error(`Missing trusted Cloud tenant header ${name}`);
|
|
}
|
|
return value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function stackMembershipRole(value: string | undefined): "owner" | "admin" | "member" | "support" {
|
|
if (value === "owner" || value === "admin" || value === "member" || value === "support") {
|
|
return value;
|
|
}
|
|
throw new Error("Invalid trusted Cloud tenant stack role");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function constantTimeStringEqual(left: string, right: string): boolean {
|
|
const leftBuffer = Buffer.from(left);
|
|
const rightBuffer = Buffer.from(right);
|
|
return leftBuffer.length === rightBuffer.length && timingSafeEqual(leftBuffer, rightBuffer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function cloudTenantCompanyId(stackId: string): string {
|
|
return cloudTenantPrimaryCompanyId(stackId);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function humanizeCloudStackSlug(stackId: string): string {
|
|
const slug = stackId
|
|
.trim()
|
|
.replace(/^paperclip-stack-/i, "")
|
|
.replace(/^stack-/i, "");
|
|
const displayName = slug
|
|
.split(/[-_]+/)
|
|
.filter(Boolean)
|
|
.map((part) => `${part[0]?.toUpperCase() ?? ""}${part.slice(1)}`)
|
|
.join(" ");
|
|
return displayName || "Workspace";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function isKnownBadCloudCompanyName(
|
|
name: string,
|
|
ids: { companyId: string; paperclipCompanyId?: string },
|
|
): boolean {
|
|
const normalized = name.trim();
|
|
return (
|
|
/^paperclip-stack-.+/i.test(normalized) ||
|
|
/^stack-.+\s+paperclip$/i.test(normalized) ||
|
|
normalized === ids.companyId ||
|
|
(ids.paperclipCompanyId !== undefined &&
|
|
normalized === ids.paperclipCompanyId)
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function repairCloudTenantCompanyName(
|
|
db: Db,
|
|
input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
paperclipCompanyId?: string;
|
|
paperclipCompanyName: string;
|
|
now: Date;
|
|
},
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
try {
|
|
const existing = await db
|
|
.select({ name: companies.name })
|
|
.from(companies)
|
|
.where(eq(companies.id, input.companyId))
|
|
.then((rows) => rows[0]);
|
|
if (
|
|
!existing ||
|
|
!isKnownBadCloudCompanyName(existing.name, {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
paperclipCompanyId: input.paperclipCompanyId,
|
|
})
|
|
) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
const [updated] = await tx
|
|
.update(companies)
|
|
.set({ name: input.paperclipCompanyName, updatedAt: input.now })
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(companies.id, input.companyId),
|
|
// A user may rename the company between the read above and this
|
|
// repair. Match the exact observed machine name so that concurrent
|
|
// genuine renames always win.
|
|
eq(companies.name, existing.name),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning({ id: companies.id });
|
|
if (!updated) return;
|
|
|
|
await tx.insert(activityLog).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: "system",
|
|
actorId: "cloud-tenant-auth",
|
|
action: "company.updated",
|
|
entityType: "company",
|
|
entityId: input.companyId,
|
|
details: {
|
|
source: "cloud_tenant_auth",
|
|
reason: "legacy_machine_name_repair",
|
|
previousName: existing.name,
|
|
name: input.paperclipCompanyName,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
logger.warn(
|
|
{ err, companyId: input.companyId },
|
|
"Failed to repair legacy Cloud tenant company name",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Claims the tenant company row for this stack.
|
|
*
|
|
* The prefix derives from the company name, exactly as it does for a
|
|
* self-hosted company. Each attempt is a standalone INSERT, so a failed
|
|
* attempt is its own implicit transaction and cannot poison a surrounding
|
|
* one. `onConflictDoNothing` only absorbs the `companies.id` conflict — a
|
|
* prefix that another company already holds still raises `23505`, so the loop
|
|
* moves on to the next suffix.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function insertCloudTenantCompany(
|
|
db: Db,
|
|
input: { companyId: string; companyName: string; now: Date },
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
const base = deriveIssuePrefixBase(input.companyName);
|
|
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= MAX_ISSUE_PREFIX_ATTEMPTS; attempt += 1) {
|
|
try {
|
|
await db
|
|
.insert(companies)
|
|
.values({
|
|
id: input.companyId,
|
|
name: input.companyName,
|
|
description: null,
|
|
status: "active",
|
|
issuePrefix: `${base}${issuePrefixSuffixForAttempt(attempt)}`,
|
|
updatedAt: input.now,
|
|
})
|
|
.onConflictDoNothing({
|
|
target: companies.id,
|
|
});
|
|
return;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (!isIssuePrefixConflict(error)) throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
throw new Error("Unable to allocate a unique issue prefix for the tenant company");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* The issue prefix that pre-name-derivation builds gave a tenant company.
|
|
*
|
|
* This derivation survives only as the detector for the one-time repair
|
|
* below. Nothing mints a prefix this way any more.
|
|
*/
|
|
function legacyProvisionedIssuePrefix(stackId: string): string {
|
|
const hash = createHash("sha256").update(stackId).digest("hex").slice(0, 4).toUpperCase();
|
|
return `PC${hash}`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The placeholder description that pre-name-derivation builds wrote. */
|
|
const LEGACY_PROVISIONED_DESCRIPTION_PREFIX = "Provisioned by Paperclip Cloud for stack ";
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* One-time repair for companies claimed by a pre-name-derivation build.
|
|
*
|
|
* Those companies carry an opaque hash prefix and a placeholder description
|
|
* that the operator never chose. Re-derive the prefix from the company's
|
|
* current name, re-key the stored issue and case identifiers onto it, and drop
|
|
* the placeholder. Both guards stop matching once the repair lands, so a later
|
|
* pass is a no-op.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function repairCloudTenantCompanyProvisionDefaults(
|
|
db: Db,
|
|
input: { companyId: string; stackId: string; now: Date },
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
try {
|
|
const existing = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
name: companies.name,
|
|
issuePrefix: companies.issuePrefix,
|
|
description: companies.description,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(companies)
|
|
.where(eq(companies.id, input.companyId))
|
|
.then((rows) => rows[0]);
|
|
if (!existing) return;
|
|
|
|
const legacyPrefix = legacyProvisionedIssuePrefix(input.stackId);
|
|
const legacyDescription = existing.description?.startsWith(LEGACY_PROVISIONED_DESCRIPTION_PREFIX)
|
|
? existing.description
|
|
: null;
|
|
if (existing.issuePrefix !== legacyPrefix) {
|
|
if (!legacyDescription) return;
|
|
// The prefix was already re-derived, so only the placeholder is left.
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(companies)
|
|
.set({ description: null, updatedAt: input.now })
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(companies.id, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(companies.description, legacyDescription),
|
|
));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
const candidate = await pickAvailableIssuePrefix(tx, deriveIssuePrefixBase(existing.name));
|
|
if (!candidate || candidate === legacyPrefix) return;
|
|
|
|
const [updated] = await tx
|
|
.update(companies)
|
|
.set({
|
|
issuePrefix: candidate,
|
|
...(legacyDescription ? { description: null } : {}),
|
|
updatedAt: input.now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(companies.id, input.companyId),
|
|
// A user may rename the company between the read above and this
|
|
// repair. Match the exact observed legacy prefix so that concurrent
|
|
// genuine renames always win.
|
|
eq(companies.issuePrefix, legacyPrefix),
|
|
))
|
|
.returning({ id: companies.id });
|
|
if (!updated) return;
|
|
|
|
const rekeyed = await rekeyCompanyIssueIdentifiers(tx, {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
fromPrefix: legacyPrefix,
|
|
toPrefix: candidate,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await tx.insert(activityLog).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: "system",
|
|
actorId: "cloud-tenant-auth",
|
|
action: "company.updated",
|
|
entityType: "company",
|
|
entityId: input.companyId,
|
|
details: {
|
|
source: "cloud_tenant_auth",
|
|
reason: "legacy_provision_defaults_repair",
|
|
previousIssuePrefix: legacyPrefix,
|
|
issuePrefix: candidate,
|
|
descriptionCleared: legacyDescription !== null,
|
|
issuesRekeyed: rekeyed.issues,
|
|
casesRekeyed: rekeyed.cases,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
logger.warn(
|
|
{ err, companyId: input.companyId },
|
|
"Failed to repair legacy tenant company provisioning defaults",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function requireBoard(req: Express.Request) {
|
|
return req.actor.type === "board";
|
|
}
|