Devin FoleyandPaperclip
fd98075a22
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Operators inspect agent configuration to understand which credentials an agent can use. > - Agent environment bindings can contain inline values, company secret references, and user secret references. > - The Secrets page did not mount the environment editor. Inline credentials were absent, and its empty message said no secrets were bound. > - The existing environment editor already handles these binding types and redacted values. > - This PR mounts that editor on the Secrets page in both UI layouts and clarifies the empty reference message. > - Operators can inspect and edit the configured bindings. Values remain masked, and the Runtime editor remains available. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** An agent can receive an inline credential through its environment while its Secrets page shows no matching entry. That page only rendered the secret-reference overview and API access controls. **Expected behavior** The agent Secrets page shows existing environment bindings as well as secret references. Saved inline values stay redacted. Saving another binding preserves existing credentials. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Save an agent with an inline environment credential. 2. Open the agent Secrets page. 3. The credential row is missing, although the runtime configuration contains it. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced on master `27270e9bf8b7a294cf03f8b84f4857f1b1ff05c7` before the fix. Related: [#12517](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/12517) proposes changes to secret assignment controls. This PR covers display of existing inline environment bindings through the current editor. ## What Changed - Show the environment editor on agent Secrets pages in both UI layouts. Keep the Runtime editor available. - Change the empty overview message to describe missing company secret references. Personal references remain visible in the environment editor. - Add native and legacy agent regressions through the actual page components. - Add a browser check for masked values, secret references, save/reload, and exact credential preservation through an opaque configuration revision. - Update the feature and agent access maps for the existing UI entry point. ## Verification - Red before the fix: the native and legacy page regressions could not find the saved environment credential row. - The focused UI suites pass: 207 tests, including all four layout/adapter page cases. - The server redaction and configuration revision suites pass: 42 tests. Native Runner environment assembly suites pass: 40 tests. - An isolated Chromium flow passes against the real local API and database. It checks a masked inline value, a company secret reference, and save/reload of an added variable. It then removes the new variable and checks that the opaque server revision matches its original value. This proves that the hidden credentials survive both saves without reading them. The initial browser attempt exposed a fixture ordering assumption; the test now compares variable-name sets because PostgreSQL JSONB does not retain insertion order. - `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, `pnpm check:token-gates`, and `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` pass. - The full local `pnpm test:run` attempt found three failures in unchanged server fixtures. The chat-recovery case passes in isolation and in its 22-test group. The two workspace cases inherit `init.defaultBranch=main`; all 179 workspace tests pass when the child process uses `init.defaultBranch=master`, as the fixtures expect. The long local invocation was then stopped. Later local groups were not reached. All corresponding CI test shards pass. - [CI passes on the final commit](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/40809064907). The first canary dry run found an npm version collision. Its single retry passed without a source change. - Apex passes at 5/5 on the current commit with no unresolved findings. ## Risks Low risk. The change reuses the existing editor and save path. No API, secret delivery, permission, or database contract changes. The tests cover masked values and existing references during save/reload. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with tool use and code execution. The session does not expose a more specific model ID or context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass — scoped checks pass; the full local command limits are recorded above - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.
Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file:
onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps.
The feature index lists feature and
capability IDs; IDs and references
explains entry-point references and stable naming.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server,
company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require
Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer
connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource
and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the
rollout policy
and connection authorization.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.