Files
PaperClipAI/maps
DottaandPaperclip 9966f31bee fix(chat): keep permission failures scoped to the rejected operation (#16847)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - External channels deliver agent replies through a durable
publication queue.
> - A provider can reject one operation while other operations remain
allowed.
> - The shared error classifier treated generic 403 and permission
errors as failures of the whole connection.
> - Failure handlers then changed the user's enabled setting and removed
all assigned channel tools.
> - This pull request limits permission failures to the rejected
operation and preserves connection intent during authentication
failures.
> - Unrelated work can continue, while confirmed authentication failures
still stop endpoint traffic.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #16137. Follows #16138, which distinguishes local authorization
errors from provider errors. This change also narrows provider
permission failures. Related #16806 handles a separate task-continuation
tool-binding defect.

A provider 403 or missing-scope response currently disables a connection
that may still support other operations. The expected behavior is a
visible operation failure with unrelated work preserved. Confirmed
authentication failures must stop sends without changing the user's
enabled setting.

## What Changed

- Classify generic 403, adapter permission errors, and Slack
missing-scope/no-permission responses as failed operations.
- Preserve rate-limit retries, known destination quarantine, and
confirmed authentication failures.
- Preserve connection status and enabled intent when publication,
provider-reply, or form-open authentication fails. The endpoint still
enters attention and its runtime stops.
- Add GitHub regressions for retained discovery and successful later
publication after 403, and no further sends after 401.
- Mark authentication health failed and fence persistent receiver
startup, background reconciliation, and receiver callbacks. Keep signed
GitHub lifecycle events available during an authentication stop. Verify
Discord reconciliation and Photon restart preserve the stop, while
transient Discord disconnects still recover.
- Update provider, publication, and modal regression expectations and
the execution contract and verification maps.

## Verification

- Red: five new classifier cases returned endpoint attention before the
repair. The signed-installation-removal regression also reproduced a
blocked lifecycle event after a 401 before narrowing the receiver guard.
- Green: all 35 classifier tests pass.
- Green: 19 PostgreSQL-backed cases pass through the production channel
services, including GitHub discovery/publication, Slack provider replies
and question modals, Telegram credential/destination failures, rate
limiting, and Discord/Photon authentication-stop persistence.
- Map structural checks and `git diff --check` pass.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass. All CI gates are green on
`7e379bcd98aa8363e42efe7f8a4b2589b7111ae6`; Greptile is 5/5 on that
exact commit with no unresolved findings.
- The monolithic local `pnpm test:run` was started, then stopped after
its revision passed the full CI matrix and was superseded by the
authentication-stop repair. Final full-suite verification passed in CI
shards; all 19 final local provider regressions pass.
- The tests run from this source checkout on macOS arm64 with isolated
PostgreSQL and controlled provider failures. They do not prove live
GitHub recovery or deployment. No live connection settings were changed.

## Risks

- Permission failures now leave unrelated work available. The rejected
operation remains failed and is not automatically replayed. Provider
authorization still applies to every request.
- Keeping a connection enabled must not bypass an authentication stop.
GitHub verifies blocked tool discovery and later sends; Discord and
Photon verify background reconciliation and restart cannot clear the
stop. Failed connection health is an execution gate while the endpoint
requires attention.
- Explicit disable, disconnect, signed installation revocation, and
existing destination-specific denial handling remain unchanged. No
migration or API schema change is required.
- Previously disabled connections are not automatically re-enabled
because an upgrade cannot safely infer the user's intent.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family. The runtime does not expose the exact
deployment model ID or context-window size. Used reasoning, shell tools,
repository edits, and test execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-19 09:54:22 -05:00
..

Paperclip maps

The maps describe the same capabilities from two perspectives:

  • Feature map: what a person can do, where to reach it, and how to verify the user journey. Preserve its Poteto format.
  • Agent access map: the APIs and agent entry points for those capabilities, their permission boundaries, and access verification.

These are sibling directories under maps/. Each feature file has a same-named agent access companion. Reuse the product map's sub-feature IDs, so tasks/create identifies the same capability in both maps. Product behavior remains governed by the implementation spec; a map cannot grant authority or redefine a permission denial as success.

Access contract

Every business operation needs both an API and a usable agent entry point for an actor authorized to perform it. A dedicated tool is optional when REST, the CLI, an assigned MCP client, or native search_api / call_api already provides the operation. Record which agent surfaces actually have that path; an installed CLI or optional MCP package cannot be assumed available to every native/remote run.

Track these independently:

Dimension Values and meaning
API present, missing, not-applicable, or unreviewed. Use exact methods/paths; distinguish protocols from REST.
Agent access available, partial, missing, restricted, operator-only, not-applicable, or unreviewed. Name the supported surface and actual entry point.
Policy Actor, action/grant, company/resource/ownership scope, responsible-user intersection, run requirements, work modes, and gates relevant to the operation.
Evidence source-only, verified, failed, blocked, or not-run. Source presence and successful board calls are not agent verification.
Review depth baseline records representative operations and known gaps; operation-reviewed enumerates the capability's meaningful operations and their individual access contracts.

Broad capabilities such as task properties must be split into operations before they count as operation-reviewed: renaming, metadata edits, assignment, dependencies, and lifecycle changes can use different tools and permission rules. An available read path cannot certify a write path. List/get/create/update/delete, execution/control, credential handling, and resolution are separate where their authority or transport differs. Do not duplicate request schemas from OpenAPI.

Exceptions and restrictions

Presentation-only state, static developer fixtures, and pre-start/local operator work may use not-applicable for a domain API, with a concrete reason and the existing local path. When a capability combines shared data with presentation, split the operations: browser recents do not exempt resource lookup from API coverage. Promoting local state to a shared feature requires revisiting the entry.

A board-only endpoint is restricted for agent identity, not an automatic exception or a missing API. Cite the enforced policy and record whether the agent can request the authorized human's action and observe its result. An unresolved delegation question remains in Gaps. Company access, a job title, a personal assistant's OAuth grant, or an accepted interaction does not grant board identity. Keep budget, approval, secret and execution authority intact.

Check actual route/service authorization and production tool admission. OpenAPI actor labels and scenario/evaluation tool declarations are supporting metadata; record disagreements rather than using them as proof of access. Native API fallback restrictions, tool field/scope limits, and rollout settings are part of the agent path, even when a legacy agent can call the REST endpoint directly.

Companion file format

Each agent-access-map/<area>.md has an H1, a relative link to its product file, followed by one H2 backticked ID per product sub-feature. Each capability contains these fields:

  • Review: baseline or operation-reviewed.
  • API: presence state and exact operation IDs, or a reasoned exception.
  • Agent access: availability state and concrete entry points by surface.
  • Policy: relevant permission and runtime boundaries, with source references.
  • Evidence: evidence state, reviewed commit and sources or executed proof.
  • Verification: allowed/denied assertions and observable result; record what has actually run separately from the proposed recipe.
  • Gaps: missing APIs/paths, discovery drift, unreviewed operations or policy decisions; use none only for the enumerated scope that was reviewed.

For an operation-reviewed capability, use H3 backticked operation IDs and repeat API, Agent access, Policy, Evidence, Verification and Gaps for each operation. Use small operation names such as create, update, read, or run-now. The enclosing capability has Review: operation-reviewed only after its meaningful operations have been enumerated. The following excerpt shows one operation; include the others before using that review label:

## `definition`

Review: `operation-reviewed`.

### `create`

API: `present` — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/routines.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST, CLI routine create and native call_api
under the enabled rollout and active-run/mode gates.
Policy: same company; assigneeAgentId must be the calling agent; cite the
routine authorization and native API policy sources.
Evidence: `source-only` — reviewed commit and source links; no live proof.
Verification: `not-run` — create an owned routine; reject assignment to another
agent; inspect saved configuration, attribution and retry behavior.
Gaps: verify ownership and responsible-user resolution with a permitted agent
context; source presence alone does not qualify this operation.

Keeping the maps synchronized

When a change adds/removes a capability or changes its behavior, API, permission, tool binding, CLI support, or work mode, update the affected companion and product recipe as appropriate in the same change. Preserve IDs across renames where the capability is unchanged; update the affected cross-links together. Indexes discover recipes automatically. An API-only change may update the companion without rewriting unchanged user instructions.

maintain-verification-skill owns reconciliation of both maps. It follows changed source and authorization, checks real agent reachability, and records product gaps without implementing them during a maintenance pass. The creation skill uses this structure. verify-paperclip consumes the relevant recipes and reports evidence/drift; map editing belongs to maintenance.

Run the structural check after map changes:

node scripts/check-maps.mjs

It checks paired areas/IDs, navigation metadata, required fields, and local references. It does not certify endpoint authorization, production bindings, operation completeness, or live behavior. Source audits must check those against the existing API and tool contracts; avoid a second schema catalog or runtime.

For live access proof, use Paperclip's existing API/runner/MCP fixtures or an owned isolated instance. Use the actual agent identity, target and work mode. Assert the allowed result and relevant denial (another company/private resource, wrong owner, missing grant, invalid run, restricted mode or resolver). Mutations also need persisted state/attribution and retry behavior. Capture evidence using the existing artifact workflow; keep executed run results separate from generated maps/generated/coverage.json, which lists page references.

Local authorship and generated indexes

Change only the recipes, access contracts and stories whose behavior or intent changed. Feature recipes own navigation metadata; stories own small parameters.paperclip annotations. Do not register entries or refresh counts in shared READMEs, inventories, fingerprints or review journals.

node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs validates and generates aggregate navigation, Storybook data, verification routes and the page inventory. All outputs live in ignored maps/generated/, ui/storybook/generated/, and the ignored Storybook preview.tsx wrapper. Start/build and UI typechecking generate their own inputs. A clean merged checkout therefore assembles both branches' changes automatically.

Git provides history and diffs. PRs, issues and CI artifacts retain review/run evidence for the named revision. Capability associations do not create whole-file review dependencies. Keep durable scenario limits in the affected recipe or story.