mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-10-23 17:33:51 +02:00
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages AI agents and their paid work. > - Budgets must prevent new work and stop reported overruns. > - Cost settlement also ran serial lifecycle reconciliation for every eligible company agent. > - That made request latency grow with unrelated idle agents and delayed results on stop delivery. > - This change separates atomic admission and accounting from durable asynchronous enforcement. > - Scoped live usage detects overruns without writing provisional ledger charges. > - The result is constant query scope for ordinary settlement and recoverable stop delivery. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** Settlement and budget checks entered company-wide lifecycle reconciliation. A company with 1,000 unrelated idle agents performed 1,001 accounting transactions for one ordinary cost evaluation. User requests could also wait for provider termination. Running usage checkpoints did not enforce reported monetary exposure. **Expected behavior** Keep the final reservation gate authoritative. Commit charges, scope blocks, and enforcement intent before returning. Deliver stop requests after commit. Read only applicable policies and execution scopes for ordinary charges. Stop long-running work when supported reported or priced usage establishes an overrun. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Create a disposable company with one company budget and idle agents. 2. Evaluate a charge below the budget with 0, 17, and 1,000 unrelated idle agents. 3. Compare query counts, company accounting transactions, and duration. 4. Use the controlled partial-usage and delayed-stop fixtures to check enforcement and request responsiveness. **Paperclip version or commit** The measured baseline is `6c9b87d0922f1ebfc43e8b0c36889ac5ba7b9837` from `master`. Related public work: Refs #16976, #2006, #3539, #13763, #14296, #16853, #13075. These cover the affected service charge, cancellation, and accounting paths. This change removes their shared reconciliation overhead. ## What Changed - Batch applicable policy exposure under the existing company accounting lock. Preserve exact fractional money and zero-reservation dispatch fences. - Commit a durable final budget dispatch claim before provider I/O. Retain a separate final issue/run ownership transaction through synchronous handoff, without holding the company accounting lock or awaiting provider work. Preserve native recovery lease checks and duplicate handoff fencing. Browser handoff rechecks current policy; it reuses a consumed rate slot only for the identical policy generation. - Separate ledger spend, live observed spend, and effective held capacity. Use the maximum of reservation and live observation for each unfinished operation. - Deliver budget cancellation through the existing coordinator. Revalidate generations and persist queued/running stop fences before external termination. Bound stop concurrency to four. - Apply agent holds only to the affected agent. Project budgets leave other projects running. Project real company transitions in bounded lifecycle batches. - Replace periodic broad reconciliation with durable pending work, startup repair, receipt replay, and concrete retry/window deadlines. Retain drain and idle-safety checks. - Enforce accepted cumulative usage checkpoints without provisional charges. Final accounting atomically replaces live exposure and settles reservations. - Add operator-gated budget spans, regression coverage, map updates, and a real-PostgreSQL comparison harness. No schema or first-party telemetry change. ## Verification - Full workspace `pnpm -r typecheck` passes on the final ownership fix, rebased onto `bbcf5dfe98`. Production `pnpm build` passes on final head `4c5f4de8b1`. Map, module-boundary, token, and Storybook catalog checks pass. - Focused real-PostgreSQL coverage includes the 292-case rebased accounting/dispatch run, 63 browser cases, 52 run-control/cancellation cases, 42 policy-generation cases, 77 lifecycle/commentary cases, and the exact Muse confirmation regression. Native executor unit coverage passes all 768 cases. Final ownership coverage passes: 74 adapter/use-case cases, nine public regression cases, and the additional deleted-project race. These exercise competing ownership, budget changes and charges between phases, zero/nonzero duplicate claims, rollback, recovery contention, read-only capacity rechecks, and controlled HTTP startup after commit. Another 74 pure/startup/tracing cases pass. The complete CI matrix and both 5/5 reviews passed on `1ac9b58`; its external security scan identified a stale-owner handoff race. The final fix restores synchronous issue/run ownership fencing after the accounting transaction commits. Final head `8e84f55ce8` has fresh Greptile 5/5 with zero new comments, Paperclip review 5/5, and a passing security scan. The complete latest-head [CI matrix](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39535189808) passes, including budget, browser, Runner, build, and canary jobs. The unchanged Runner close fixture passed on its sole same-head job retry. - Broad local `pnpm test:run` invocations were stopped before required source updates (rebase and review fixes). They are not claimed as full passes. Final full-suite coverage comes from the complete latest-head CI matrix; local focused coverage and the incomplete broad invocations are reported separately. - Reproduce performance with `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec tsx ../scripts/benchmark-budget-enforcement.ts --baseline-ref=6c9b87d0922f1ebfc43e8b0c36889ac5ba7b9837`; repeat with `--reverse`. The harness uses disposable real PostgreSQL, 20 warm samples per variant/count, and records raw timings, SQL/lock counts, agent reads, unchanged agent state, and query plans. Final production-source measurement revision: `eff713a4f72c7f4b7a4002a701cb481d4bfccd95`; the extended harness is committed in `4c5f4de8b1`. | Unrelated idle agents | Baseline median / p95 | New median / p95 | Baseline SQL / locks | New SQL / locks | New agent reads | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 0 | 1.80 / 2.33 ms | 2.99 / 3.88 ms | 5 / 1 | 7 / 1 | 0 | | 17 | 15.53 / 19.55 ms | 2.24 / 2.60 ms | 90 / 18 | 7 / 1 | 0 | | 1,000 | 978.35 / 1,790.43 ms | 2.16 / 2.52 ms | 5,005 / 1,001 | 7 / 1 | 0 | - These measurements use local PostgreSQL 18.1 and Node 26.4.0 arm64. They isolate the cost-evaluation core and complete admission path, without hosted-region or provider latency. Prior-revision reversed-order controls also preserved the constant query counts; the final measurements above use the final production source. - Complete reserve → final ownership gate → immediate offline provider result is measured separately, with one responsible agent and one active operation at each unrelated-agent count. Admission p95 baseline/new: 0 agents **11.54 / 29.77 ms**; 17 agents **9.31 / 27.62 ms**; 1,000 agents **24.51 / 74.05 ms**. Baseline admission was already scoped; the stronger final fence adds bounded overhead. New counts stay constant at 53 Drizzle statements, three transactions, two company-accounting locks, and five agent-reading statements bound to the responsible agent. Zero unrelated-agent reads, exactly one provider callback per sample, and no leftover runs or holds. All admission scenarios stay below 250 ms. No external provider calls are included. - The partial-usage/delayed-termination fixture passed 20/20: receipt persistence p95 13 ms, receipt return to observed durable Stop fence p95 28 ms, complete receipt-start-to-fence p95 50 ms, unrelated database request p95 1 ms while termination was blocked. After releasing the controlled termination fixture, acknowledgement p95 was 14 ms. These are separately measured phases; fixture acknowledgement is not live-provider termination latency. - Models and provider deadlines are unchanged. No deployment, live inference, or staging acceptance is claimed. A quiet 30-minute follow-up waits for the merged revision on staging, then repeats classifier and controlled budget-stop acceptance in staging, recording hosted bookkeeping, queue delay, and actual provider acknowledgement separately. - Development failures retained: finalizer notification regressions (fixed; 27/27 affected cases passed), invalid browser admission fixture assumptions (fixed; browser coverage now passes 63/63), and first-head lifecycle/dispatch CI regressions (reproduced and repaired). A prior-head Cases E2E test hit its unchanged announcement-dismiss handler race while opening a filter; the same journey passed on `1ac9b58`. The external security review then found a stale-owner race between accounting commit and provider entry; final verification covers a competing run in that gap while retaining provider I/O outside the accounting lock. Early PostgreSQL startup attempts hit local semaphore pressure; serial reruns succeeded. The final-head Runner lane had one failure among 1,823 tests: the unchanged `timeout-attachment` fixture failed at its first process close after 6.28 seconds. The sole same-head job retry passed all 1,819 active tests (four skipped), including that fixture in 1.85 seconds. Three isolated local probes could not run correctly because the Rust fake-provider fixture binary was absent; cleanup masked the original startup failure. CI builds that fixture through its normal lane. These probes are inconclusive and are not counted as passes. ## Risks - This changes accounting, lifecycle, and cancellation ordering. Durable generations, source/sequence checks, ownership leases, and company locking remain required for correctness. - Provider stop acknowledgement can be slow or fail. Stop intent remains pending until existing termination proof succeeds; cancelled row status alone does not acknowledge delivery. - Mid-run limits depend on provider usage reports or supported price calculations. Providers that report only at completion cannot provide exact mid-call detection. - Signals are process-local wake hints for the supported single-active-writer model. Durable state and startup recovery remain authoritative. - There are no migrations, new queue tables, or cached balances. Repeat the classifier and controlled budget-stop acceptance after normal rollout. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, tool use, code execution, and parallel coding agents. The host does not expose the exact backend model revision or context-window size, so those values are not asserted. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2105 lines
91 KiB
TypeScript
2105 lines
91 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import { boundRunIssueIdSql } from "./run-task-binding.js";
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import { and, asc, desc, eq, gt, inArray, isNull, ne, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
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import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import {
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agents,
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heartbeatRuns,
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issues,
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principalPermissionGrants,
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projects,
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routines,
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toolAccessAuditEvents,
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toolActionRequests,
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toolApplications,
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toolCatalogEntries,
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toolConnections,
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toolCallEvents,
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toolInvocations,
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toolMcpGateways,
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toolPolicies,
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toolProfileBindings,
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toolProfileEntries,
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toolProfiles,
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toolRateLimitCounters,
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} from "@paperclipai/db";
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import type {
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ToolAccessDecision,
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ToolAccessDecisionInput,
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ToolAccessReasonCode,
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ToolAccessSelector,
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ToolAuditEventType,
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CreateToolPolicy,
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DuplicateToolPolicy,
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CreateToolTrustRuleFromActionRequest,
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ReorderToolPolicies,
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RevokeToolTrustRule,
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ToolPolicyDecision,
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ToolPolicyConditions,
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UpdateToolPolicy,
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ToolRateLimitRule,
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ToolRedactedValueSummary,
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ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters,
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ToolRiskLevel,
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} from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import { toolPolicyConditionsSchema } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import { badRequest, conflict, notFound, unprocessable } from "../errors.js";
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import {
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effectiveToolProfileBindings,
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profileIdsInBindingOrder,
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} from "./tool-profile-binding-precedence.js";
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import { recordToolRuntimeAuditWriteFailure } from "./tool-runtime-metrics.js";
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type ToolAccessContext = {
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companyId: string;
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actorType: "agent" | "user" | "system" | "plugin";
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actorId: string;
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agentId: string | null;
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heartbeatRunId: string | null;
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issueId: string | null;
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projectId: string | null;
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routineId: string | null;
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gatewayId: string | null;
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applicationId: string | null;
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connectionId: string | null;
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catalogEntryId: string | null;
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catalogStatus: string | null;
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catalogVersionHash: string | null;
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catalogSchemaHash: string | null;
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providerType: string | null;
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applicationKey: string | null;
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upstreamToolName: string | null;
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toolName: string;
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riskLevel: ToolRiskLevel | null;
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argumentsHash: string;
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arguments: unknown;
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};
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type RedactionResult = {
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summary: ToolRedactedValueSummary;
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redactionPlan: { redactedFieldCount: number; redactedFields: string[] };
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};
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type PolicyConditionEvaluation = {
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matched: boolean;
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matchedGroups: string[];
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failedGroup?: string;
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reason?: string;
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};
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type TrustRuleConfig = {
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trustRule?: {
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sourceActionRequestId?: string | null;
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sourceInvocationId?: string | null;
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sourceApprovalCount?: number;
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approvalThreshold?: number;
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argumentFilters?: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters | null;
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expiresAt?: string | null;
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revokedAt?: string | null;
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revokedByAgentId?: string | null;
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revokedByUserId?: string | null;
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revocationReason?: string | null;
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hitCount?: number;
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lastHitAt?: string | null;
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catalogVersionHash?: string | null;
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schemaHash?: string | null;
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batchApproval?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
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};
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} & Record<string, unknown>;
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const SENSITIVE_KEY_RE =
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/(^|[_-])(api[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|client[_-]?secret|cookie|credential|jwt|password|private[_-]?key|refresh[_-]?token|secret|session[_-]?token|token)($|[_-])/i;
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const SECRET_VALUE_RE = /\b(sk-[a-z0-9_-]{12,}|ghp_[a-z0-9_]{12,}|xox[baprs]-[a-z0-9-]{12,}|bearer\s+[a-z0-9._-]{12,})\b/i;
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function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
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return Boolean(value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value));
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}
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function nonBlankString(value: string | null | undefined): string | null {
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return typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0 ? value : null;
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}
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/**
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* Reads one string field of a run's context snapshot in SQL. The snapshot can
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* hold hundreds of KB of task text, so a policy check never loads the whole
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* document. A non-string value reads as null. Runs store the snapshot as a
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* JSON object, which the run indexes on `context_snapshot ->> 'issueId'` also
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* expect.
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*/
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export function runContextSnapshotString(key: "issueId" | "projectId" | "routineId" | "wakeCommentId") {
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const field = sql.raw(`'${key}'`);
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return sql<string | null>`case when jsonb_typeof(${heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot} -> ${field}) = 'string'
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then ${heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot} ->> ${field} end`;
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}
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/**
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* Memo for one batch of `decide` calls that share a company, actor and run
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* context, such as one tools/list response. A listing decides every tool
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* against the same agent, run, profiles and policies, so the batch reads each
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* of those rows once instead of once per tool. The cache is a point-in-time
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* view: create one per batch and drop it with the request. Rate-limit counters
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* are never cached.
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*/
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export type ToolAccessDecisionCache = Map<string, Promise<unknown>>;
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export function createToolAccessDecisionCache(): ToolAccessDecisionCache {
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return new Map();
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}
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function cachedRead<T>(
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cache: ToolAccessDecisionCache | undefined,
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key: string,
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read: () => Promise<T>,
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): Promise<T> {
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if (!cache) return read();
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const cached = cache.get(key);
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if (cached) return cached as Promise<T>;
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const pending = read();
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cache.set(key, pending);
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// Do not keep a failed read, so a later call in the batch tries again.
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pending.catch(() => {
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if (cache.get(key) === pending) cache.delete(key);
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});
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return pending;
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}
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// The database returns ids in this canonical form.
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const CANONICAL_UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
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const catalogEntryContextColumns = {
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id: toolCatalogEntries.id,
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companyId: toolCatalogEntries.companyId,
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connectionId: toolCatalogEntries.connectionId,
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applicationId: toolCatalogEntries.applicationId,
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riskLevel: toolCatalogEntries.riskLevel,
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toolName: toolCatalogEntries.toolName,
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status: toolCatalogEntries.status,
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versionHash: toolCatalogEntries.versionHash,
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schemaHash: toolCatalogEntries.schemaHash,
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};
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function stableStringify(value: unknown): string {
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if (!isRecord(value) && !Array.isArray(value)) return JSON.stringify(value);
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if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(stableStringify).join(",")}]`;
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return `{${Object.keys(value).sort().map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${stableStringify(value[key])}`).join(",")}}`;
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}
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function sha256(value: unknown): string {
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return createHash("sha256").update(stableStringify(value)).digest("hex");
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}
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type ConsumedRateAdmission = { policyId: string; versionHash: string };
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function ratePolicyVersionHash(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect): string {
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return sha256({ ...policy, createdAt: policy.createdAt.toISOString(), updatedAt: policy.updatedAt.toISOString() });
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}
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function isoDateOrNull(value: unknown): string | null {
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if (!value) return null;
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if (value instanceof Date) return Number.isNaN(value.getTime()) ? null : value.toISOString();
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if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
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const date = new Date(value);
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return Number.isNaN(date.getTime()) ? null : date.toISOString();
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}
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function policyConfig(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect): TrustRuleConfig {
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return isRecord(policy.config) ? policy.config as TrustRuleConfig : {};
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}
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function trustRuleConfig(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect) {
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const config = policyConfig(policy).trustRule;
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return isRecord(config) ? config : null;
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}
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function readPath(value: unknown, path: string): unknown {
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if (!path) return undefined;
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return path.split(".").reduce<unknown>((current, segment) => {
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if (!isRecord(current) && !Array.isArray(current)) return undefined;
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if (Array.isArray(current)) {
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const index = Number(segment);
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return Number.isInteger(index) ? current[index] : undefined;
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}
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return current[segment];
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}, value);
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}
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function argumentFiltersMatch(filters: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters | null | undefined, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
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if (!filters || filters.allowAny === true) return true;
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if (filters.exactHash && filters.exactHash !== ctx.argumentsHash) return false;
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if (filters.allowedHashes?.length && !filters.allowedHashes.includes(ctx.argumentsHash)) return false;
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if (filters.fieldEquals) {
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for (const [path, expected] of Object.entries(filters.fieldEquals)) {
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if (stableStringify(readPath(ctx.arguments, path)) !== stableStringify(expected)) return false;
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}
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}
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if (filters.fieldNotEquals) {
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for (const [path, expected] of Object.entries(filters.fieldNotEquals)) {
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if (stableStringify(readPath(ctx.arguments, path)) === stableStringify(expected)) return false;
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}
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}
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if (filters.fieldIn) {
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for (const [path, allowedValues] of Object.entries(filters.fieldIn)) {
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const actual = stableStringify(readPath(ctx.arguments, path));
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if (!allowedValues.some((expected) => stableStringify(expected) === actual)) return false;
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}
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}
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if (filters.fieldMatches) {
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for (const [path, pattern] of Object.entries(filters.fieldMatches)) {
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const actual = readPath(ctx.arguments, path);
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if (typeof actual !== "string") return false;
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let re: RegExp;
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try {
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re = new RegExp(pattern);
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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if (!re.test(actual)) return false;
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}
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}
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if (filters.fieldExists?.some((path) => readPath(ctx.arguments, path) === undefined)) return false;
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if (filters.fieldAbsent?.some((path) => readPath(ctx.arguments, path) !== undefined)) return false;
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return Boolean(
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filters.exactHash
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|| filters.allowedHashes?.length
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|| filters.fieldEquals
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|| filters.fieldNotEquals
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|| filters.fieldIn
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|| filters.fieldMatches
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|| filters.fieldExists?.length
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|| filters.fieldAbsent?.length,
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);
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}
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function trustRuleNeedsReview(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
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const rule = trustRuleConfig(policy);
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if (!rule || !ctx.catalogEntryId) return false;
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const catalogVersionHash = typeof rule.catalogVersionHash === "string" ? rule.catalogVersionHash : null;
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const schemaHash = typeof rule.schemaHash === "string" ? rule.schemaHash : null;
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return Boolean(
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ctx.catalogStatus === "quarantined"
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|| ctx.catalogStatus === "removed"
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|| (catalogVersionHash && ctx.catalogVersionHash && catalogVersionHash !== ctx.catalogVersionHash)
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|| (schemaHash && ctx.catalogSchemaHash && schemaHash !== ctx.catalogSchemaHash),
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);
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}
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function trustRuleIsActive(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect, now = new Date()): boolean {
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const rule = trustRuleConfig(policy);
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if (!rule) return false;
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if (rule.revokedAt) return false;
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if (rule.expiresAt) {
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const expiresAt = new Date(rule.expiresAt);
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if (!Number.isNaN(expiresAt.getTime()) && expiresAt.getTime() <= now.getTime()) return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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function sideEffectIdempotencyKey(ctx: ToolAccessContext, argumentsHash: string): string {
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return `side_effect:${sha256({
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companyId: ctx.companyId,
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runId: ctx.heartbeatRunId,
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issueId: ctx.issueId,
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applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
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connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
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catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
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toolName: ctx.toolName,
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argumentsHash,
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})}`;
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}
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function auditOutcome(accessDecision: ToolAccessDecision): "pending" | "success" | "denied" | "timeout" {
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if (accessDecision.decision === "allow") return "success";
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if (accessDecision.decision === "require_approval") return "pending";
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if (accessDecision.decision === "defer_runtime") return "timeout";
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return "denied";
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}
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function summarizeAndRedact(value: unknown): RedactionResult {
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const redactedFields: string[] = [];
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|
const visit = (current: unknown, path: string): unknown => {
|
|
if (typeof current === "string") {
|
|
if (SECRET_VALUE_RE.test(current)) {
|
|
redactedFields.push(path || "$");
|
|
return "[REDACTED]";
|
|
}
|
|
return current.length > 500 ? `${current.slice(0, 500)}...[truncated]` : current;
|
|
}
|
|
if (Array.isArray(current)) return current.slice(0, 50).map((entry, index) => visit(entry, `${path}[${index}]`));
|
|
if (!isRecord(current)) return current;
|
|
const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
|
|
for (const [key, nested] of Object.entries(current)) {
|
|
const nestedPath = path ? `${path}.${key}` : key;
|
|
if (SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.test(key)) {
|
|
redactedFields.push(nestedPath);
|
|
out[key] = "[REDACTED]";
|
|
} else {
|
|
out[key] = visit(nested, nestedPath);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out;
|
|
};
|
|
const redacted = visit(value ?? {}, "");
|
|
const text = stableStringify(redacted);
|
|
return {
|
|
summary: {
|
|
summary: text.length > 4000 ? `${text.slice(0, 4000)}...[truncated]` : text,
|
|
sizeBytes: Buffer.byteLength(text),
|
|
sha256: sha256(redacted),
|
|
redactedFields,
|
|
},
|
|
redactionPlan: {
|
|
redactedFieldCount: redactedFields.length,
|
|
redactedFields,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function decision(
|
|
kind: ToolPolicyDecision,
|
|
reasonCode: ToolAccessReasonCode,
|
|
explanation: string,
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: string[],
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: string[],
|
|
extra: Partial<ToolAccessDecision> = {},
|
|
): ToolAccessDecision {
|
|
return {
|
|
decision: kind,
|
|
allowed: kind === "allow",
|
|
reasonCode,
|
|
explanation,
|
|
effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
...extra,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function listValues(value: unknown): string[] {
|
|
if (typeof value === "string" && value.trim()) return [value.trim()];
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [];
|
|
return value.filter((item): item is string => typeof item === "string" && item.trim().length > 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function asToolRiskLevel(value: unknown): ToolRiskLevel | null {
|
|
if (
|
|
value === "low"
|
|
|| value === "medium"
|
|
|| value === "high"
|
|
|| value === "critical"
|
|
|| value === "read"
|
|
|| value === "write"
|
|
|| value === "destructive"
|
|
) {
|
|
return value;
|
|
}
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function selectorMatches(selector: ToolAccessSelector | Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
|
|
if (!selector || Object.keys(selector).length === 0) return true;
|
|
const s = selector as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
// Tool/action names are exact selectors. Glob-looking values are treated as literal names.
|
|
const match = (singleKey: string, pluralKey: string, actual: string | null) => {
|
|
const single = typeof s[singleKey] === "string" ? String(s[singleKey]) : null;
|
|
const many = listValues(s[pluralKey]);
|
|
return (!single || actual === single) && (many.length === 0 || Boolean(actual && many.includes(actual)));
|
|
};
|
|
const matchAny = (singleKey: string, pluralKey: string, actuals: Array<string | null>) => {
|
|
const values = actuals.filter((value): value is string => Boolean(value));
|
|
const single = typeof s[singleKey] === "string" ? String(s[singleKey]) : null;
|
|
const many = listValues(s[pluralKey]);
|
|
return (!single || values.includes(single)) && (many.length === 0 || many.some((value) => values.includes(value)));
|
|
};
|
|
return (
|
|
match("actorType", "actorTypes", ctx.actorType) &&
|
|
match("agentId", "agentIds", ctx.agentId) &&
|
|
match("projectId", "projectIds", ctx.projectId) &&
|
|
match("routineId", "routineIds", ctx.routineId) &&
|
|
match("issueId", "issueIds", ctx.issueId) &&
|
|
match("gatewayId", "gatewayIds", ctx.gatewayId) &&
|
|
match("applicationId", "applicationIds", ctx.applicationId) &&
|
|
match("connectionId", "connectionIds", ctx.connectionId) &&
|
|
match("catalogEntryId", "catalogEntryIds", ctx.catalogEntryId) &&
|
|
match("applicationKey", "applicationKeys", ctx.applicationKey) &&
|
|
match("providerType", "providerTypes", ctx.providerType) &&
|
|
matchAny("toolName", "toolNames", [ctx.toolName, ctx.upstreamToolName]) &&
|
|
match("riskLevel", "riskLevels", ctx.riskLevel)
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function conditionRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | null {
|
|
return isRecord(value) && Object.keys(value).length > 0 ? value : null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function argumentConditionMatches(condition: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
|
|
const filters: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters = {
|
|
fieldEquals: conditionRecord(condition.fieldEquals) ?? undefined,
|
|
fieldNotEquals: conditionRecord(condition.fieldNotEquals) ?? undefined,
|
|
fieldIn: conditionRecord(condition.fieldIn) as Record<string, unknown[]> | undefined,
|
|
fieldMatches: conditionRecord(condition.fieldMatches) as Record<string, string> | undefined,
|
|
fieldExists: listValues(condition.fieldExists),
|
|
fieldAbsent: listValues(condition.fieldAbsent),
|
|
};
|
|
return argumentFiltersMatch(filters, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function riskRank(value: ToolRiskLevel | null): number {
|
|
if (value === "read" || value === "low") return 1;
|
|
if (value === "write" || value === "medium") return 2;
|
|
if (value === "destructive" || value === "high") return 3;
|
|
if (value === "critical") return 4;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function boolCondition(value: unknown): boolean | null {
|
|
return typeof value === "boolean" ? value : null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function timeWindowMatches(condition: Record<string, unknown>, now: Date): boolean {
|
|
const startAt = isoDateOrNull(condition.startAt);
|
|
const endAt = isoDateOrNull(condition.endAt);
|
|
if (startAt && now.getTime() < new Date(startAt).getTime()) return false;
|
|
if (endAt && now.getTime() > new Date(endAt).getTime()) return false;
|
|
|
|
const days = Array.isArray(condition.daysOfWeekUtc)
|
|
? condition.daysOfWeekUtc.filter((day): day is number => Number.isInteger(day) && day >= 0 && day <= 6)
|
|
: [];
|
|
if (days.length > 0 && !days.includes(now.getUTCDay())) return false;
|
|
|
|
const startHour = typeof condition.startHourUtc === "number" ? condition.startHourUtc : null;
|
|
const endHour = typeof condition.endHourUtc === "number" ? condition.endHourUtc : null;
|
|
if (startHour !== null || endHour !== null) {
|
|
const hour = now.getUTCHours();
|
|
const start = startHour ?? 0;
|
|
const end = endHour ?? 24;
|
|
if (start === end) return false;
|
|
if (start < end) {
|
|
if (hour < start || hour >= end) return false;
|
|
} else if (hour < start && hour >= end) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function policyConditions(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect): ToolPolicyConditions | null {
|
|
return isRecord(policy.conditions) && Object.keys(policy.conditions).length > 0
|
|
? policy.conditions as ToolPolicyConditions
|
|
: null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function conditionGroupFail(group: string, reason: string): PolicyConditionEvaluation {
|
|
return { matched: false, matchedGroups: [], failedGroup: group, reason };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function evaluatePolicyConditions(
|
|
conditions: ToolPolicyConditions | null | undefined,
|
|
ctx: ToolAccessContext,
|
|
now = new Date(),
|
|
): PolicyConditionEvaluation {
|
|
if (!conditions || Object.keys(conditions).length === 0) return { matched: true, matchedGroups: [] };
|
|
const matchedGroups: string[] = [];
|
|
|
|
const argumentCondition = conditionRecord(conditions.arguments ?? conditions.args);
|
|
if (argumentCondition) {
|
|
if (!argumentConditionMatches(argumentCondition, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("arguments", "Tool arguments did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("arguments");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.actor) {
|
|
if (!selectorMatches(conditions.actor, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("actor", "Actor did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("actor");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.context) {
|
|
const context = conditions.context as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
if (boolCondition(context.requireIssue) === true && !ctx.issueId) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("context", "Policy condition requires issue context.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (boolCondition(context.requireProject) === true && !ctx.projectId) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("context", "Policy condition requires project context.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (boolCondition(context.requireRoutine) === true && !ctx.routineId) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("context", "Policy condition requires routine context.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!selectorMatches(context, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("context", "Issue, project, or routine context did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("context");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.risk) {
|
|
const risk = conditions.risk as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
const levels = listValues(risk.levels).map(asToolRiskLevel).filter((level): level is ToolRiskLevel => Boolean(level));
|
|
const max = asToolRiskLevel(risk.max);
|
|
const isWrite = boolCondition(risk.isWrite);
|
|
const isDestructive = boolCondition(risk.isDestructive);
|
|
if (levels.length > 0 && (!ctx.riskLevel || !levels.includes(ctx.riskLevel))) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("risk", "Tool risk level did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (max && riskRank(ctx.riskLevel) > riskRank(max)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("risk", "Tool risk level is above the policy condition limit.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (isWrite !== null && ((ctx.riskLevel === "write" || ctx.riskLevel === "destructive" || ctx.riskLevel === "medium" || ctx.riskLevel === "high" || ctx.riskLevel === "critical") !== isWrite)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("risk", "Tool write capability did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (isDestructive !== null && ((ctx.riskLevel === "destructive" || ctx.riskLevel === "high" || ctx.riskLevel === "critical") !== isDestructive)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("risk", "Tool destructive capability did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("risk");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.credentialScope) {
|
|
const scope = conditions.credentialScope as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
if (!selectorMatches(scope, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("credentialScope", "Credential scope did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!selectorMatches({
|
|
applicationKey: scope.applicationKey,
|
|
applicationKeys: scope.applicationKeys,
|
|
providerType: scope.providerType,
|
|
providerTypes: scope.providerTypes,
|
|
}, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("credentialScope", "Credential provider did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("credentialScope");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.trustBoundary) {
|
|
const boundary = conditions.trustBoundary as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
if (!selectorMatches({
|
|
applicationKey: boundary.applicationKey,
|
|
applicationKeys: boundary.applicationKeys,
|
|
providerType: boundary.providerType,
|
|
providerTypes: boundary.providerTypes,
|
|
}, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("trustBoundary", "Trust boundary did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (boolCondition(boundary.remoteHttpOnly) === true && ctx.providerType !== "mcp_remote_http") {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("trustBoundary", "Policy condition requires a remote HTTP MCP tool.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (boolCondition(boundary.paperclipSelfOnly) === true && ctx.providerType !== "paperclip_self") {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("trustBoundary", "Policy condition requires a Paperclip self tool.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("trustBoundary");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.timeWindow) {
|
|
if (!timeWindowMatches(conditions.timeWindow as Record<string, unknown>, now)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("timeWindow", "Current UTC time is outside the policy condition window.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("timeWindow");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { matched: true, matchedGroups };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function profileEntryMatches(entry: typeof toolProfileEntries.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
|
|
const selected = entry.selectorType === "application" ? entry.applicationId === ctx.applicationId
|
|
: entry.selectorType === "connection" ? entry.connectionId === ctx.connectionId
|
|
: entry.selectorType === "catalog_entry" ? entry.catalogEntryId === ctx.catalogEntryId
|
|
: entry.selectorType === "tool_name" ? entry.toolName === ctx.toolName
|
|
: entry.selectorType === "risk_level" ? entry.riskLevel === ctx.riskLevel : false;
|
|
if (!selected) return false;
|
|
const conditions = isRecord(entry.conditions) ? entry.conditions as ToolPolicyConditions : null;
|
|
return evaluatePolicyConditions(conditions, ctx).matched;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function targetMatches(binding: typeof toolProfileBindings.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "company") return binding.targetId === ctx.companyId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "agent") return binding.targetId === ctx.agentId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "project") return binding.targetId === ctx.projectId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "routine") return binding.targetId === ctx.routineId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "issue") return binding.targetId === ctx.issueId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "gateway") return binding.targetId === ctx.gatewayId;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function rateLimitRule(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect): ToolRateLimitRule | null {
|
|
const config = isRecord(policy.config) ? policy.config : {};
|
|
const raw = isRecord(config.rateLimit) ? config.rateLimit : config;
|
|
const limit = typeof raw.limit === "number" ? raw.limit : null;
|
|
const windowSeconds = typeof raw.windowSeconds === "number" ? raw.windowSeconds : null;
|
|
if (!limit || !windowSeconds || limit <= 0 || windowSeconds <= 0) return null;
|
|
return {
|
|
limit: Math.floor(limit),
|
|
windowSeconds: Math.floor(windowSeconds),
|
|
keyBy: Array.isArray(raw.keyBy)
|
|
? raw.keyBy.filter((item): item is NonNullable<ToolRateLimitRule["keyBy"]>[number] => typeof item === "string")
|
|
: undefined,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertGenericPolicyType(policyType: string) {
|
|
if (policyType === "trust_rule") {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rules are managed through the trust-rule promotion and revoke endpoints");
|
|
}
|
|
if (policyType === "redact" || policyType === "validate") {
|
|
throw unprocessable(`Tool policy type '${policyType}' is not supported at runtime`);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function isSafePolicyRegex(pattern: string): boolean {
|
|
if (pattern.length > 256) return false;
|
|
if (/\\[1-9]/.test(pattern)) return false;
|
|
if (/(^|[^\\])\|/.test(pattern)) return false;
|
|
if (/\((?:[^()\\]|\\.)*[+*](?:[^()\\]|\\.)*\)[+*{]/.test(pattern)) return false;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertSupportedPolicyConditions(conditions: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined) {
|
|
if (!conditions || Object.keys(conditions).length === 0) return;
|
|
const parsed = toolPolicyConditionsSchema.safeParse(conditions);
|
|
if (!parsed.success) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Tool policy conditions include unsupported runtime semantics", {
|
|
issues: parsed.error.issues.map((issue) => ({
|
|
path: issue.path.join("."),
|
|
message: issue.message,
|
|
})),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const fieldMatches = parsed.data.arguments?.fieldMatches;
|
|
if (fieldMatches) {
|
|
for (const pattern of Object.values(fieldMatches)) {
|
|
if (!isSafePolicyRegex(pattern)) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Tool policy fieldMatches includes an unsafe regular expression");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function unsupportedRuntimePolicyType(policyType: string) {
|
|
return policyType === "redact" || policyType === "validate";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function hasConfig(config: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined) {
|
|
return Boolean(config && Object.keys(config).length > 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertSupportedGenericPolicyShape(
|
|
policyType: string,
|
|
conditions: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined,
|
|
config: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined,
|
|
) {
|
|
assertGenericPolicyType(policyType);
|
|
assertSupportedPolicyConditions(conditions);
|
|
if (policyType !== "rate_limit" && hasConfig(config)) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(`Tool policy type '${policyType}' does not support config`);
|
|
}
|
|
if (policyType === "rate_limit") {
|
|
const raw = isRecord(config?.rateLimit) ? config.rateLimit : config;
|
|
const limit = isRecord(raw) && typeof raw.limit === "number" ? raw.limit : null;
|
|
const windowSeconds = isRecord(raw) && typeof raw.windowSeconds === "number" ? raw.windowSeconds : null;
|
|
if (!limit || !windowSeconds || limit <= 0 || windowSeconds <= 0) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Rate-limit policy config requires positive numeric limit and windowSeconds");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function getGenericPolicyRow(db: Db, companyId: string, policyId: string) {
|
|
const [policy] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolPolicies.id, policyId),
|
|
eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId),
|
|
ne(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule"),
|
|
))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!policy) throw notFound("Tool policy not found");
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function windowKind(windowSeconds: number): "minute" | "hour" | "day" | "month" {
|
|
if (windowSeconds <= 60) return "minute";
|
|
if (windowSeconds <= 3600) return "hour";
|
|
if (windowSeconds <= 86400) return "day";
|
|
return "month";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function windowStart(now: Date, windowSeconds: number): Date {
|
|
return new Date(Math.floor(now.getTime() / (windowSeconds * 1000)) * windowSeconds * 1000);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function rateBucket(rule: ToolRateLimitRule, ctx: ToolAccessContext): string {
|
|
const parts = rule.keyBy?.length ? rule.keyBy : ["company", "agent", "connection", "tool"] as const;
|
|
return parts.map((part) => {
|
|
if (part === "company") return `company:${ctx.companyId}`;
|
|
if (part === "agent") return `agent:${ctx.agentId ?? "none"}`;
|
|
if (part === "application") return `application:${ctx.applicationId ?? "none"}`;
|
|
if (part === "connection") return `connection:${ctx.connectionId ?? "none"}`;
|
|
return `tool:${ctx.toolName}`;
|
|
}).join("|");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function scopeAllowsTool(scope: Record<string, unknown> | null, ctx: ToolAccessContext) {
|
|
if (scope === null || scope === undefined) return true;
|
|
if (!isRecord(scope)) return false;
|
|
if (Object.keys(scope).length === 0) return true;
|
|
const { allow, ...selectors } = scope;
|
|
if (Object.hasOwn(scope, "allow")) {
|
|
const values = typeof allow === "string" ? [allow] : allow;
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(values) || values.length === 0 ||
|
|
!values.every((value) => typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0)) return false;
|
|
if (!values.includes(`tool:${ctx.toolName}`) &&
|
|
!(ctx.upstreamToolName && values.includes(`tool:${ctx.upstreamToolName}`)) &&
|
|
!(ctx.connectionId && values.includes(`connection:${ctx.connectionId}`)) &&
|
|
!(ctx.applicationId && values.includes(`application:${ctx.applicationId}`))) return false;
|
|
}
|
|
// Grant restrictions must all be understood and match. The permissive policy
|
|
// selector matcher cannot validate untrusted or historical grant JSON itself.
|
|
const keys = new Set([
|
|
"actorType", "agentId", "projectId", "routineId", "issueId", "gatewayId",
|
|
"applicationId", "connectionId", "catalogEntryId", "applicationKey",
|
|
"providerType", "toolName", "riskLevel",
|
|
]);
|
|
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(selectors)) {
|
|
if (keys.has(key)) {
|
|
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.trim().length === 0) return false;
|
|
} else if (key.endsWith("s") && keys.has(key.slice(0, -1))) {
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length === 0 ||
|
|
!value.every((entry) => typeof entry === "string" && entry.trim().length > 0)) return false;
|
|
} else return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return selectorMatches(selectors, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function toolAccessPolicyService(db: Db) {
|
|
async function listPolicies(companyId: string) {
|
|
return db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId), ne(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule")))
|
|
.orderBy(asc(toolPolicies.priority), desc(toolPolicies.updatedAt));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function reorderPolicies(companyId: string, body: ReorderToolPolicies) {
|
|
const uniquePolicyIds = [...new Set(body.policyIds)];
|
|
if (uniquePolicyIds.length !== body.policyIds.length) {
|
|
throw badRequest("policyIds must not contain duplicates");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
const rows = await tx
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId),
|
|
ne(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule"),
|
|
))
|
|
.orderBy(toolPolicies.id)
|
|
.for("no key update");
|
|
const byId = new Map(rows.map((row) => [row.id, row]));
|
|
const missingIds = uniquePolicyIds.filter((id) => !byId.has(id));
|
|
if (missingIds.length > 0) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("All reordered policies must belong to the company", { missingPolicyIds: missingIds });
|
|
}
|
|
if (uniquePolicyIds.length !== rows.length) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Reorder must include every non-trust policy for the company", {
|
|
expectedPolicyCount: rows.length,
|
|
receivedPolicyCount: uniquePolicyIds.length,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
await tx.execute(sql`UPDATE tool_policies
|
|
SET priority = (requested.ordinality * 100)::integer, updated_at = ${now.toISOString()}
|
|
FROM jsonb_array_elements_text(${JSON.stringify(uniquePolicyIds)}::jsonb)
|
|
WITH ORDINALITY AS requested(id, ordinality)
|
|
WHERE tool_policies.company_id = ${companyId} AND tool_policies.id = requested.id::uuid`);
|
|
return tx
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId), ne(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule")))
|
|
.orderBy(asc(toolPolicies.priority), desc(toolPolicies.updatedAt));
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function duplicatePolicy(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
policyId: string;
|
|
body: DuplicateToolPolicy;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
}) {
|
|
const existing = await getGenericPolicyRow(db, input.companyId, input.policyId);
|
|
assertSupportedGenericPolicyShape(existing.policyType, existing.conditions ?? null, existing.config ?? null);
|
|
const rows = await db
|
|
.select({ name: toolPolicies.name })
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, input.companyId));
|
|
const names = new Set(rows.map((row) => row.name));
|
|
let name = input.body.name?.trim() || `${existing.name} copy`;
|
|
if (names.has(name)) {
|
|
const baseName = name;
|
|
let suffix = 2;
|
|
while (names.has(`${baseName} ${suffix}`)) suffix += 1;
|
|
name = `${baseName} ${suffix}`;
|
|
}
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const [policy] = await db
|
|
.insert(toolPolicies)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: existing.companyId,
|
|
name,
|
|
description: existing.description,
|
|
policyType: existing.policyType,
|
|
priority: existing.priority + 1,
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
selectors: existing.selectors ?? {},
|
|
conditions: existing.conditions ?? null,
|
|
config: existing.config ?? null,
|
|
createdByAgentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
createdByUserId: input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.returning();
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function createPolicy(
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
body: CreateToolPolicy,
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null },
|
|
) {
|
|
assertSupportedGenericPolicyShape(body.policyType, body.conditions ?? null, body.config ?? null);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const [policy] = await db
|
|
.insert(toolPolicies)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId,
|
|
name: body.name,
|
|
description: body.description ?? null,
|
|
policyType: body.policyType,
|
|
priority: body.priority ?? 100,
|
|
enabled: body.enabled ?? true,
|
|
selectors: body.selectors ?? {},
|
|
conditions: body.conditions ?? null,
|
|
config: body.config ?? null,
|
|
createdByAgentId: actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
createdByUserId: actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.returning();
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function updatePolicy(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
policyId: string;
|
|
body: UpdateToolPolicy;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const existing = await getGenericPolicyRow(db, input.companyId, input.policyId);
|
|
const nextPolicyType = input.body.policyType ?? existing.policyType;
|
|
const nextConditions = input.body.conditions !== undefined ? input.body.conditions ?? null : existing.conditions ?? null;
|
|
const nextConfig = input.body.config !== undefined ? input.body.config ?? null : existing.config ?? null;
|
|
assertSupportedGenericPolicyShape(nextPolicyType, nextConditions, nextConfig);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const [policy] = await db
|
|
.update(toolPolicies)
|
|
.set({
|
|
...(input.body.name !== undefined ? { name: input.body.name } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.description !== undefined ? { description: input.body.description ?? null } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.policyType !== undefined ? { policyType: input.body.policyType } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.priority !== undefined ? { priority: input.body.priority } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.enabled !== undefined ? { enabled: input.body.enabled } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.selectors !== undefined ? { selectors: input.body.selectors ?? {} } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.conditions !== undefined ? { conditions: input.body.conditions ?? null } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.config !== undefined ? { config: input.body.config ?? null } : {}),
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.id, existing.id))
|
|
.returning();
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function deletePolicy(input: { companyId: string; policyId: string }) {
|
|
const existing = await getGenericPolicyRow(db, input.companyId, input.policyId);
|
|
const [deleted] = await db
|
|
.delete(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.id, existing.id))
|
|
.returning();
|
|
return deleted;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function loadCatalogEntry(companyId: string, catalogEntryId: string, cache?: ToolAccessDecisionCache) {
|
|
const readEntry = async () => {
|
|
const [entry] = await db.select(catalogEntryContextColumns).from(toolCatalogEntries).where(eq(toolCatalogEntries.id, catalogEntryId));
|
|
return entry && entry.companyId === companyId ? entry : null;
|
|
};
|
|
// Only a canonical id can use the in-memory lookup. Any other spelling
|
|
// takes the direct query, so a cached and an uncached decision agree.
|
|
if (!cache || !CANONICAL_UUID_RE.test(catalogEntryId)) return readEntry();
|
|
// A listing decides the active catalog tools of the company, so a batch
|
|
// reads those entries once and looks each one up in memory. Any other
|
|
// entry takes the direct query.
|
|
const entriesById = await cachedRead(cache, `active-catalog-tools:${companyId}`, async () => {
|
|
const entries = await db
|
|
.select(catalogEntryContextColumns)
|
|
.from(toolCatalogEntries)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.companyId, companyId),
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.entryKind, "tool"),
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.status, "active"),
|
|
isNull(toolCatalogEntries.quarantinedAt),
|
|
));
|
|
return new Map(entries.map((entry) => [entry.id, entry]));
|
|
});
|
|
const entry = entriesById.get(catalogEntryId);
|
|
if (!entry) return readEntry();
|
|
return entry.companyId === companyId ? entry : null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function loadContext(input: ToolAccessDecisionInput, cache?: ToolAccessDecisionCache): Promise<
|
|
| { ok: true; ctx: ToolAccessContext; redaction: RedactionResult }
|
|
| { ok: false; decision: ToolAccessDecision; redaction: RedactionResult }
|
|
> {
|
|
const redaction = summarizeAndRedact(input.request.arguments ?? {});
|
|
let agentId = input.actor.agentId ?? (input.actor.actorType === "agent" ? input.actor.actorId : null);
|
|
let heartbeatRunId = input.runContext?.heartbeatRunId ?? null;
|
|
let issueId = input.runContext?.issueId ?? null;
|
|
let projectId = input.runContext?.projectId ?? null;
|
|
let routineId = input.runContext?.routineId ?? null;
|
|
const gatewayId = input.runContext?.gatewayId ?? null;
|
|
|
|
if (input.actor.actorType === "agent") {
|
|
const lookupAgentId = agentId ?? "";
|
|
const [agent] = await cachedRead(cache, `agent:${input.companyId}:${lookupAgentId}`, async () =>
|
|
db.select({ id: agents.id }).from(agents).where(and(eq(agents.id, lookupAgentId), eq(agents.companyId, input.companyId))));
|
|
if (!agent) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_missing_agent", "Authenticated agent was not found in the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
agentId = agent.id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (heartbeatRunId) {
|
|
const runId = heartbeatRunId;
|
|
const [run] = await cachedRead(cache, `run:${runId}`, async () =>
|
|
db
|
|
.select({
|
|
companyId: heartbeatRuns.companyId,
|
|
agentId: heartbeatRuns.agentId,
|
|
issueId: boundRunIssueIdSql(),
|
|
projectId: runContextSnapshotString("projectId"),
|
|
routineId: runContextSnapshotString("routineId"),
|
|
})
|
|
.from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, runId)));
|
|
if (!run || run.companyId !== input.companyId || (input.actor.actorType === "agent" && run.agentId !== agentId)) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_run_context_mismatch", "Supplied run context does not match the authenticated actor.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
agentId = run.agentId;
|
|
const runIssueId = nonBlankString(run.issueId);
|
|
const runProjectId = nonBlankString(run.projectId);
|
|
const runRoutineId = nonBlankString(run.routineId);
|
|
if ((issueId && runIssueId && issueId !== runIssueId)
|
|
|| (projectId && runProjectId && projectId !== runProjectId)
|
|
|| (routineId && runRoutineId && routineId !== runRoutineId)) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_run_context_mismatch", "Supplied run context does not match the stored heartbeat context.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
issueId = runIssueId ?? issueId;
|
|
projectId = runProjectId ?? projectId;
|
|
routineId = runRoutineId ?? routineId;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (issueId) {
|
|
const contextIssueId = issueId;
|
|
const [issue] = await cachedRead(cache, `issue:${contextIssueId}`, async () =>
|
|
db.select({ companyId: issues.companyId, projectId: issues.projectId }).from(issues).where(eq(issues.id, contextIssueId)));
|
|
if (!issue || issue.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Issue context is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
if (projectId && projectId !== issue.projectId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_run_context_mismatch", "Project context does not match the issue context.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
projectId = projectId ?? issue.projectId;
|
|
}
|
|
if (projectId) {
|
|
const contextProjectId = projectId;
|
|
const [project] = await cachedRead(cache, `project:${contextProjectId}`, async () =>
|
|
db.select({ companyId: projects.companyId }).from(projects).where(eq(projects.id, contextProjectId)));
|
|
if (!project || project.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Project context is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (routineId) {
|
|
const contextRoutineId = routineId;
|
|
const [routine] = await cachedRead(cache, `routine:${contextRoutineId}`, async () =>
|
|
db.select({ companyId: routines.companyId }).from(routines).where(eq(routines.id, contextRoutineId)));
|
|
if (!routine || routine.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Routine context is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let applicationId = input.request.applicationId ?? null;
|
|
let connectionId = input.request.connectionId ?? null;
|
|
let catalogEntryId = input.request.catalogEntryId ?? null;
|
|
let catalogStatus: string | null = null;
|
|
let catalogVersionHash: string | null = null;
|
|
let catalogSchemaHash: string | null = null;
|
|
let providerType = typeof input.request.providerType === "string" ? input.request.providerType : null;
|
|
let applicationKey = typeof input.request.applicationKey === "string" ? input.request.applicationKey : null;
|
|
let upstreamToolName = typeof input.request.upstreamToolName === "string" ? input.request.upstreamToolName : null;
|
|
let riskLevel = asToolRiskLevel(input.request.riskLevel);
|
|
let connectionTransport: string | null = null;
|
|
let applicationType: string | null = null;
|
|
|
|
if (catalogEntryId) {
|
|
const entry = await loadCatalogEntry(input.companyId, catalogEntryId, cache);
|
|
if (!entry) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_missing_tool", "Requested tool is not in the company catalog.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
connectionId = entry.connectionId;
|
|
applicationId = entry.applicationId ?? applicationId;
|
|
riskLevel = entry.riskLevel;
|
|
upstreamToolName = upstreamToolName ?? entry.toolName;
|
|
catalogStatus = entry.status;
|
|
catalogVersionHash = entry.versionHash;
|
|
catalogSchemaHash = entry.schemaHash;
|
|
} else if (connectionId) {
|
|
const entryConnectionId = connectionId;
|
|
const [entry] = await cachedRead(cache, `catalog-entry-name:${input.companyId}:${entryConnectionId}:${input.request.toolName}`, async () =>
|
|
db
|
|
.select(catalogEntryContextColumns)
|
|
.from(toolCatalogEntries)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolCatalogEntries.companyId, input.companyId), eq(toolCatalogEntries.connectionId, entryConnectionId), eq(toolCatalogEntries.name, input.request.toolName))));
|
|
if (entry) {
|
|
catalogEntryId = entry.id;
|
|
applicationId = entry.applicationId ?? applicationId;
|
|
riskLevel = entry.riskLevel;
|
|
upstreamToolName = upstreamToolName ?? entry.toolName;
|
|
catalogStatus = entry.status;
|
|
catalogVersionHash = entry.versionHash;
|
|
catalogSchemaHash = entry.schemaHash;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (connectionId) {
|
|
const contextConnectionId = connectionId;
|
|
const [connection] = await cachedRead(cache, `connection:${contextConnectionId}`, async () =>
|
|
db
|
|
.select({
|
|
companyId: toolConnections.companyId,
|
|
applicationId: toolConnections.applicationId,
|
|
enabled: toolConnections.enabled,
|
|
status: toolConnections.status,
|
|
transport: toolConnections.transport,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolConnections)
|
|
.where(eq(toolConnections.id, contextConnectionId)));
|
|
if (!connection || connection.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Connection is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
if (!connection.enabled || connection.status === "disabled" || connection.status === "archived") {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_disabled_connection", "Connection is disabled.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
applicationId = connection.applicationId;
|
|
connectionTransport = connection.transport;
|
|
}
|
|
if (applicationId) {
|
|
const contextApplicationId = applicationId;
|
|
const [application] = await cachedRead(cache, `application:${contextApplicationId}`, async () =>
|
|
db
|
|
.select({
|
|
companyId: toolApplications.companyId,
|
|
applicationKey: toolApplications.applicationKey,
|
|
status: toolApplications.status,
|
|
type: toolApplications.type,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolApplications)
|
|
.where(eq(toolApplications.id, contextApplicationId)));
|
|
if (!application || application.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Application is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
if (application.status === "disabled") {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_disabled_application", "Application is disabled.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
if (application.status === "archived") {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_archived_application", "Application is archived.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
applicationKey = applicationKey ?? application.applicationKey;
|
|
applicationType = application.type;
|
|
}
|
|
providerType = providerType
|
|
?? (applicationType === "mcp_http" && connectionTransport === "mcp_remote"
|
|
? "mcp_remote_http"
|
|
: applicationType === "mcp_stdio" && connectionTransport === "local_stdio"
|
|
? "mcp_local_stdio"
|
|
: null);
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
ok: true,
|
|
redaction,
|
|
ctx: {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor.actorType,
|
|
actorId: input.actor.actorId,
|
|
agentId,
|
|
heartbeatRunId,
|
|
issueId,
|
|
projectId,
|
|
routineId,
|
|
gatewayId,
|
|
applicationId,
|
|
connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId,
|
|
catalogStatus,
|
|
catalogVersionHash,
|
|
catalogSchemaHash,
|
|
providerType,
|
|
applicationKey,
|
|
upstreamToolName,
|
|
toolName: input.request.toolName,
|
|
riskLevel,
|
|
argumentsHash: redaction.summary.sha256 ?? sha256(input.request.arguments ?? {}),
|
|
arguments: input.request.arguments ?? {},
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function effectiveProfiles(ctx: ToolAccessContext, cache?: ToolAccessDecisionCache) {
|
|
const bindings = await cachedRead(cache, `profile-bindings:${ctx.companyId}`, async () =>
|
|
db.select().from(toolProfileBindings).where(eq(toolProfileBindings.companyId, ctx.companyId)));
|
|
const matchingBindings = bindings.filter((binding) => targetMatches(binding, ctx));
|
|
if (matchingBindings.length === 0) return { profiles: [], entries: [] as Array<typeof toolProfileEntries.$inferSelect> };
|
|
const candidateProfileIds = profileIdsInBindingOrder(matchingBindings);
|
|
const candidateProfiles = await cachedRead(cache, `profiles:${ctx.companyId}:${[...candidateProfileIds].sort().join(",")}`, async () =>
|
|
db.select().from(toolProfiles).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolProfiles.companyId, ctx.companyId),
|
|
inArray(toolProfiles.id, candidateProfileIds),
|
|
)));
|
|
const gatewayId = ctx.gatewayId;
|
|
const [gateway] = gatewayId
|
|
? await cachedRead(cache, `gateway-profile-mode:${ctx.companyId}:${gatewayId}`, async () =>
|
|
db
|
|
.select({ defaultProfileMode: toolMcpGateways.defaultProfileMode })
|
|
.from(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.companyId, ctx.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.id, gatewayId),
|
|
))
|
|
.limit(1))
|
|
: [];
|
|
const activeBindings = effectiveToolProfileBindings(
|
|
matchingBindings,
|
|
candidateProfiles,
|
|
ctx.connectionId,
|
|
{ includeAdditiveAppProfiles: gateway?.defaultProfileMode !== "gateway_only" },
|
|
);
|
|
const profileIds = profileIdsInBindingOrder(activeBindings);
|
|
const profilesById = new Map(candidateProfiles.map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));
|
|
const activeProfiles = profileIds
|
|
.map((profileId) => profilesById.get(profileId) ?? null)
|
|
.filter((profile): profile is typeof toolProfiles.$inferSelect => Boolean(profile && profile.status === "active"));
|
|
const activeProfileIds = activeProfiles.map((profile) => profile.id);
|
|
// The active profile set depends on the connection (additive app profiles),
|
|
// so a batch reads the entries once per distinct set.
|
|
const entries = activeProfileIds.length > 0
|
|
? await cachedRead(cache, `profile-entries:${ctx.companyId}:${[...activeProfileIds].sort().join(",")}`, async () =>
|
|
db.select().from(toolProfileEntries).where(and(eq(toolProfileEntries.companyId, ctx.companyId), inArray(toolProfileEntries.profileId, activeProfileIds))))
|
|
: [];
|
|
return { profiles: activeProfiles, entries };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function explicitGrant(ctx: ToolAccessContext, cache?: ToolAccessDecisionCache): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
const principalType = ctx.actorType === "agent" ? "agent" : ctx.actorType === "user" ? "user" : null;
|
|
const principalId = ctx.actorType === "agent" ? ctx.agentId : ctx.actorId;
|
|
if (!principalType || !principalId) return false;
|
|
const grants = await cachedRead(cache, `tool-grants:${ctx.companyId}:${principalType}:${principalId}`, async () =>
|
|
db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(principalPermissionGrants)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(principalPermissionGrants.companyId, ctx.companyId),
|
|
eq(principalPermissionGrants.principalType, principalType),
|
|
eq(principalPermissionGrants.principalId, principalId),
|
|
eq(principalPermissionGrants.permissionKey, "tools:use"),
|
|
)));
|
|
return grants.some((grant) => scopeAllowsTool(grant.scope, ctx));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function enforceRateLimit(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext, consume: boolean) {
|
|
const rule = rateLimitRule(policy);
|
|
if (!rule) return null;
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const start = windowStart(now, rule.windowSeconds);
|
|
const kind = windowKind(rule.windowSeconds);
|
|
const resetAt = new Date(start.getTime() + rule.windowSeconds * 1000);
|
|
const bucketKey = `${policy.id}:${rateBucket(rule, ctx)}`;
|
|
const counterWhere = and(
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.companyId, ctx.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.policyId, policy.id),
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.counterKey, bucketKey),
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.windowKind, kind),
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.windowStartAt, start),
|
|
);
|
|
if (!consume) {
|
|
const [existing] = await db.select().from(toolRateLimitCounters).where(counterWhere);
|
|
const count = existing ? Math.max(0, existing.limit - existing.remaining) : 0;
|
|
return { limited: count >= rule.limit, count, limit: rule.limit, windowSeconds: rule.windowSeconds, bucketKey };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const [counter] = await db
|
|
.insert(toolRateLimitCounters)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
counterKey: bucketKey,
|
|
scopeType: "policy",
|
|
scopeId: policy.id,
|
|
windowKind: kind,
|
|
windowStartAt: start,
|
|
limit: rule.limit,
|
|
remaining: Math.max(0, rule.limit - 1),
|
|
resetAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.onConflictDoUpdate({
|
|
target: [
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.companyId,
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.policyId,
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.counterKey,
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.windowKind,
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.windowStartAt,
|
|
],
|
|
set: {
|
|
limit: rule.limit,
|
|
remaining: sql`greatest(0, least(${toolRateLimitCounters.remaining}, ${rule.limit}) - 1)`,
|
|
resetAt,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
},
|
|
setWhere: gt(toolRateLimitCounters.remaining, 0),
|
|
})
|
|
.returning({ remaining: toolRateLimitCounters.remaining });
|
|
if (!counter) {
|
|
return { limited: true, count: rule.limit, limit: rule.limit, windowSeconds: rule.windowSeconds, bucketKey };
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
limited: false,
|
|
count: Math.max(0, rule.limit - counter.remaining),
|
|
limit: rule.limit,
|
|
windowSeconds: rule.windowSeconds,
|
|
bucketKey,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function recordTrustRuleHit(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext, redaction: RedactionResult) {
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const config = policyConfig(policy);
|
|
const rule = trustRuleConfig(policy) ?? {};
|
|
const nextRule = {
|
|
...rule,
|
|
hitCount: Math.max(0, Number(rule.hitCount ?? 0)) + 1,
|
|
lastHitAt: now.toISOString(),
|
|
};
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolPolicies)
|
|
.set({ config: { ...config, trustRule: nextRule }, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.id, policy.id));
|
|
await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
action: "tool_access.trust_rule_used",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_trust_rule",
|
|
details: {
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
runId: ctx.heartbeatRunId,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
hitCount: nextRule.hitCount,
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
await db.insert(toolCallEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
eventType: "trust_rule_used",
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
runId: ctx.heartbeatRunId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy.id],
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_trust_rule",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
requestHash: redaction.summary.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
requestSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan,
|
|
metadata: { hitCount: nextRule.hitCount },
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function admittedRateLimitAdmissions(ctx: ToolAccessContext, invocationId: string): Promise<ConsumedRateAdmission[]> {
|
|
const [invocation] = await db.select({
|
|
actorType: toolInvocations.actorType, actorId: toolInvocations.actorId, agentId: toolInvocations.agentId,
|
|
runId: toolInvocations.runId, issueId: toolInvocations.issueId, gatewayId: toolInvocations.gatewayId,
|
|
applicationId: toolInvocations.applicationId, connectionId: toolInvocations.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: toolInvocations.catalogEntryId, toolName: toolInvocations.toolName,
|
|
providerType: toolInvocations.providerType, applicationKey: toolInvocations.applicationKey,
|
|
upstreamToolName: toolInvocations.upstreamToolName, argumentsHash: toolInvocations.argumentsHash,
|
|
status: toolInvocations.status, policyDecision: toolInvocations.policyDecision, approvalState: toolInvocations.approvalState,
|
|
policyExplanation: toolInvocations.policyExplanation,
|
|
}).from(toolInvocations).where(and(eq(toolInvocations.companyId, ctx.companyId), eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId)));
|
|
const authorized = invocation && invocation.status === "executing"
|
|
&& (invocation.policyDecision === "allow" || (invocation.policyDecision === "require_approval" && invocation.approvalState === "approved"))
|
|
&& invocation.actorType === ctx.actorType && invocation.actorId === ctx.actorId && invocation.agentId === ctx.agentId
|
|
&& invocation.runId === ctx.heartbeatRunId && invocation.issueId === ctx.issueId && invocation.gatewayId === ctx.gatewayId
|
|
&& invocation.applicationId === ctx.applicationId && invocation.connectionId === ctx.connectionId
|
|
&& invocation.catalogEntryId === ctx.catalogEntryId && invocation.toolName === ctx.toolName
|
|
&& invocation.providerType === ctx.providerType && invocation.applicationKey === ctx.applicationKey
|
|
&& invocation.upstreamToolName === ctx.upstreamToolName
|
|
&& invocation.argumentsHash === ctx.argumentsHash;
|
|
const stored = authorized ? invocation.policyExplanation?.consumedRateAdmissions : null;
|
|
return Array.isArray(stored) ? stored.filter((item): item is ConsumedRateAdmission => isRecord(item)
|
|
&& typeof item.policyId === "string" && CANONICAL_UUID_RE.test(item.policyId)
|
|
&& typeof item.versionHash === "string" && /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(item.versionHash)) : [];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Decides one tool access request. Pass the same `cache` to every call of a
|
|
* batch that shares one actor and run context (for example, one tools/list
|
|
* response) so the batch reads the shared policy inputs once.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function decide(
|
|
input: ToolAccessDecisionInput,
|
|
options: { cache?: ToolAccessDecisionCache; admittedInvocationId?: string } = {},
|
|
): Promise<ToolAccessDecision> {
|
|
const consumedRateAdmissions: ConsumedRateAdmission[] = [];
|
|
const result = await decideInternal(input, options, consumedRateAdmissions);
|
|
return consumedRateAdmissions.length ? { ...result,
|
|
policyExplanation: { ...result.policyExplanation, consumedRateAdmissions },
|
|
} : result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function decideInternal(
|
|
input: ToolAccessDecisionInput,
|
|
options: { cache?: ToolAccessDecisionCache; admittedInvocationId?: string },
|
|
consumedRateAdmissions: ConsumedRateAdmission[],
|
|
): Promise<ToolAccessDecision> {
|
|
// A decision that consumes a rate limit can also record a trust-rule hit
|
|
// from the policy row, so it always reads fresh rows.
|
|
const cache = input.consumeRateLimit === true || options.admittedInvocationId ? undefined : options.cache;
|
|
const loaded = await loadContext(input, cache);
|
|
if (!loaded.ok) return loaded.decision;
|
|
const { ctx, redaction } = loaded;
|
|
// A final handoff rechecks current permissions for work already admitted by
|
|
// the gateway. Its own last consumed slot cannot reject that same work.
|
|
// Only durable consumption of an unchanged rule retains that slot; new or
|
|
// edited rules still apply. This option never approves or consumes a call.
|
|
const admittedRates = input.consumeRateLimit === false && options.admittedInvocationId
|
|
? await admittedRateLimitAdmissions(ctx, options.admittedInvocationId) : [];
|
|
const profileState = await effectiveProfiles(ctx, cache);
|
|
const effectiveProfileIds = profileState.profiles.map((profile) => profile.id);
|
|
const permittedByProfile = profileState.profiles.some((profile) => {
|
|
const matchingEntries = profileState.entries.filter((entry) => entry.profileId === profile.id && profileEntryMatches(entry, ctx));
|
|
return !matchingEntries.some((entry) => entry.effect === "exclude")
|
|
&& (profile.defaultAction === "allow" || matchingEntries.some((entry) => entry.effect === "include"));
|
|
});
|
|
const policies = await cachedRead(cache, `enabled-policies:${ctx.companyId}`, async () =>
|
|
db.select().from(toolPolicies).where(and(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, ctx.companyId), eq(toolPolicies.enabled, true))).orderBy(asc(toolPolicies.priority), asc(toolPolicies.createdAt)));
|
|
for (const policy of policies) {
|
|
const conditions = policyConditions(policy);
|
|
if (conditions && selectorMatches(policy.selectors, ctx)) {
|
|
const parsed = toolPolicyConditionsSchema.safeParse(conditions);
|
|
if (!parsed.success) {
|
|
return decision(
|
|
"deny",
|
|
"deny_policy_block",
|
|
"Tool access denied because a matching policy uses unsupported runtime conditions.",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
[policy.id],
|
|
{
|
|
redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan,
|
|
policyExplanation: {
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
policyType: policy.policyType,
|
|
selectorMatched: true,
|
|
conditionsError: parsed.error.issues.map((issue) => ({
|
|
path: issue.path.join("."),
|
|
message: issue.message,
|
|
})),
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const matchingPolicies = policies
|
|
.map((policy) => ({ policy, conditionEvaluation: evaluatePolicyConditions(policyConditions(policy), ctx) }))
|
|
.filter(({ policy, conditionEvaluation }) => selectorMatches(policy.selectors, ctx) && conditionEvaluation.matched);
|
|
const explicitBlock = matchingPolicies.find(({ policy }) => policy.policyType === "block");
|
|
for (const { policy, conditionEvaluation } of matchingPolicies) {
|
|
const policyExplanation = {
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
policyType: policy.policyType,
|
|
selectorMatched: true,
|
|
conditionsMatched: conditionEvaluation.matchedGroups,
|
|
};
|
|
if (unsupportedRuntimePolicyType(policy.policyType)) {
|
|
return decision(
|
|
"deny",
|
|
"deny_policy_block",
|
|
"Tool access denied because a matching policy uses unsupported runtime semantics.",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
[policy.id],
|
|
{ redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "block") {
|
|
return decision("deny", "deny_policy_block", policy.description ?? "Tool access is blocked by policy.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "rate_limit") {
|
|
if (!rateLimitRule(policy)) {
|
|
return decision(
|
|
"deny",
|
|
"deny_policy_block",
|
|
"Tool access denied because a matching rate-limit policy has invalid runtime config.",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
[policy.id],
|
|
{ redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const versionHash = ratePolicyVersionHash(policy);
|
|
if (admittedRates.some(admission => admission.policyId === policy.id && admission.versionHash === versionHash)) continue;
|
|
const state = await enforceRateLimit(policy, ctx, input.consumeRateLimit === true);
|
|
if (state?.limited) {
|
|
return decision("rate_limited", "rate_limited", "Tool access rate limit exceeded.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { rateLimitState: state, redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
if (state && input.consumeRateLimit === true) consumedRateAdmissions.push({ policyId: policy.id, versionHash });
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "trust_rule") {
|
|
const rule = trustRuleConfig(policy);
|
|
if (!rule || !trustRuleIsActive(policy)) continue;
|
|
if (!argumentFiltersMatch(rule.argumentFilters, ctx)) continue;
|
|
// Remembered permissions cannot override an explicit block. Preserve
|
|
// priority semantics for ordinary allow/require-approval policies.
|
|
if (explicitBlock) return decision("deny", "deny_policy_block", explicitBlock.policy.description ?? "Tool access is blocked by policy.", effectiveProfileIds, [explicitBlock.policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan });
|
|
|
|
if (trustRuleNeedsReview(policy, ctx)) {
|
|
return decision(
|
|
"require_approval",
|
|
"requires_review_changed_tool",
|
|
"Tool definition changed or was quarantined after this trust rule was created; review is required.",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
[policy.id],
|
|
{ redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.consumeRateLimit === true) {
|
|
await recordTrustRuleHit(policy, ctx, redaction);
|
|
}
|
|
return decision("allow", "allow_trust_rule", policy.description ?? "Tool access allowed by trust rule.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "require_approval") {
|
|
// The connection's Ask first control restricts an existing action grant;
|
|
// it must never grant access to agents outside that connection's profile.
|
|
if (["app_gallery_finish", "connection_intent"].includes(String(policy.config?.source)) && !permittedByProfile) continue;
|
|
if (policy.config?.source === "connection_intent" && explicitBlock) {
|
|
return decision("deny", "deny_policy_block", explicitBlock.policy.description ?? "Tool access is blocked by policy.", effectiveProfileIds, [explicitBlock.policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan });
|
|
}
|
|
return decision("require_approval", "requires_approval_policy", policy.description ?? "Tool access requires approval.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "allow") {
|
|
return decision("allow", "allow_policy", "Tool access allowed by policy.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (await explicitGrant(ctx, cache)) {
|
|
return decision("allow", "allow_explicit_grant", "Tool access allowed by explicit grant.", effectiveProfileIds, [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const entriesByProfile = new Map<string, Array<typeof toolProfileEntries.$inferSelect>>();
|
|
for (const entry of profileState.entries) {
|
|
const list = entriesByProfile.get(entry.profileId) ?? [];
|
|
list.push(entry);
|
|
entriesByProfile.set(entry.profileId, list);
|
|
}
|
|
for (const profile of profileState.profiles) {
|
|
const entries = entriesByProfile.get(profile.id) ?? [];
|
|
const matchingEntries = entries.filter((entry) => profileEntryMatches(entry, ctx));
|
|
if (matchingEntries.some((entry) => entry.effect === "exclude")) continue;
|
|
if (profile.defaultAction === "allow" || matchingEntries.some((entry) => entry.effect === "include")) {
|
|
return decision("allow", "allow_profile", "Tool access allowed by effective profile.", effectiveProfileIds, [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return decision("deny", "deny_default", "No effective tool profile, grant, or allow policy permits this call.", effectiveProfileIds, [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function writeAudit(
|
|
input: ToolAccessDecisionInput,
|
|
accessDecision: ToolAccessDecision,
|
|
eventType: ToolAuditEventType = "policy_decision",
|
|
) {
|
|
const loaded = await loadContext(input);
|
|
const redaction = loaded.redaction;
|
|
const ctx = loaded.ok ? loaded.ctx : {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor.actorType,
|
|
actorId: input.actor.actorId,
|
|
agentId: input.actor.agentId ?? null,
|
|
issueId: input.runContext?.issueId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayId: input.runContext?.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
runId: input.runContext?.heartbeatRunId ?? null,
|
|
connectionId: input.request.connectionId ?? null,
|
|
catalogEntryId: input.request.catalogEntryId ?? null,
|
|
applicationId: input.request.applicationId ?? null,
|
|
providerType: input.request.providerType ?? null,
|
|
applicationKey: input.request.applicationKey ?? null,
|
|
upstreamToolName: input.request.upstreamToolName ?? null,
|
|
toolName: input.request.toolName,
|
|
riskLevel: input.request.riskLevel ?? null,
|
|
};
|
|
const runId = "runId" in ctx ? ctx.runId : ctx.heartbeatRunId;
|
|
try {
|
|
const [legacyAuditEvent] = await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
action: `tool_access.${eventType}`,
|
|
outcome: accessDecision.allowed ? "success" : "denied",
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: accessDecision.effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
|
|
applicationKey: ctx.applicationKey,
|
|
providerType: ctx.providerType,
|
|
upstreamToolName: ctx.upstreamToolName,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
runId,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
riskLevel: ctx.riskLevel,
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan,
|
|
policyExplanation: accessDecision.policyExplanation ?? null,
|
|
rateLimitState: accessDecision.rateLimitState ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
const [toolCallEvent] = await db.insert(toolCallEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
eventType: eventType as typeof toolCallEvents.$inferInsert["eventType"],
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
runId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
decision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
outcome: auditOutcome(accessDecision),
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
requestHash: redaction.summary.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
requestSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan,
|
|
rateLimitState: accessDecision.rateLimitState ?? null,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
legacyAuditEventId: legacyAuditEvent.id,
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: accessDecision.effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
explanation: accessDecision.explanation,
|
|
policyExplanation: accessDecision.policyExplanation ?? null,
|
|
providerType: ctx.providerType,
|
|
applicationKey: ctx.applicationKey,
|
|
upstreamToolName: ctx.upstreamToolName,
|
|
riskLevel: ctx.riskLevel,
|
|
},
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
return { legacyAuditEvent, toolCallEvent };
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
await recordToolRuntimeAuditWriteFailure(db, input.companyId);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function recordInvocation(input: ToolAccessDecisionInput, accessDecision: ToolAccessDecision) {
|
|
const loaded = await loadContext(input);
|
|
if (!loaded.ok) throw new Error("Cannot record invocation for invalid tool access context");
|
|
const { ctx, redaction } = loaded;
|
|
const argumentsHash = redaction.summary.sha256 ?? sha256(input.request.arguments ?? {});
|
|
const idempotencyKey = input.request.idempotencyKey
|
|
?? (input.request.sideEffecting ? sideEffectIdempotencyKey(ctx, argumentsHash) : null);
|
|
if (idempotencyKey) {
|
|
const [existing] = await db.select().from(toolInvocations).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.idempotencyKey, idempotencyKey),
|
|
));
|
|
if (existing) return { invocation: existing, replayed: true, actionRequest: null };
|
|
}
|
|
const status = accessDecision.decision === "allow"
|
|
? "authorized"
|
|
: accessDecision.decision === "require_approval"
|
|
? "awaiting_approval"
|
|
: accessDecision.decision === "rate_limited"
|
|
? "rate_limited"
|
|
: "denied";
|
|
const [invocation] = await db.insert(toolInvocations).values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
idempotencyKey,
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
runId: ctx.heartbeatRunId,
|
|
gatewayId: ctx.gatewayId,
|
|
applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
catalogVersionHash: ctx.catalogVersionHash,
|
|
catalogSchemaHash: ctx.catalogSchemaHash,
|
|
providerType: ctx.providerType,
|
|
applicationKey: ctx.applicationKey,
|
|
upstreamToolName: ctx.upstreamToolName,
|
|
riskLevel: ctx.riskLevel,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
argumentsHash,
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
policyDecision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
policyExplanation: accessDecision.policyExplanation ?? null,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
approvalState: accessDecision.decision === "require_approval" ? "pending" : "not_required",
|
|
status,
|
|
errorCode: accessDecision.allowed || accessDecision.decision === "require_approval" ? null : accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
errorMessage: accessDecision.allowed || accessDecision.decision === "require_approval" ? null : accessDecision.explanation,
|
|
completedAt: accessDecision.allowed || accessDecision.decision === "require_approval" ? null : new Date(),
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
let actionRequest = null;
|
|
if (accessDecision.decision === "require_approval") {
|
|
[actionRequest] = await db.insert(toolActionRequests).values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
status: "pending",
|
|
canonicalArgumentsHash: invocation.argumentsHash ?? argumentsHash,
|
|
canonicalArgumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
requestedByAgentId: ctx.actorType === "agent" ? ctx.agentId : null,
|
|
requestedByUserId: ctx.actorType === "user" ? ctx.actorId : null,
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
}
|
|
return { invocation, replayed: false, actionRequest };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function matchingApprovedActionRequestCount(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect;
|
|
filters: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters;
|
|
selectors: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const rows = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolActionRequests.companyId, input.companyId), inArray(toolActionRequests.status, ["approved", "executed"])));
|
|
if (rows.length === 0) return 0;
|
|
const invocationIds = rows.map((row) => row.invocationId);
|
|
const invocations = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolInvocations.companyId, input.companyId), inArray(toolInvocations.id, invocationIds)));
|
|
const byId = new Map(invocations.map((row) => [row.id, row]));
|
|
const issueIds = [...new Set(invocations.map((row) => row.issueId).filter((id): id is string => Boolean(id)))];
|
|
const issueRows = issueIds.length > 0
|
|
? await db
|
|
.select({ id: issues.id, projectId: issues.projectId })
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(and(eq(issues.companyId, input.companyId), inArray(issues.id, issueIds)))
|
|
: [];
|
|
const issueProjectById = new Map(issueRows.map((row) => [row.id, row.projectId]));
|
|
const allowedHashes = new Set([
|
|
...(input.filters.allowedHashes ?? []),
|
|
...(input.filters.exactHash ? [input.filters.exactHash] : []),
|
|
...(input.invocation.argumentsHash ? [input.invocation.argumentsHash] : []),
|
|
]);
|
|
return rows.filter((row) => {
|
|
const invocation = byId.get(row.invocationId);
|
|
if (!invocation) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.toolName !== input.invocation.toolName) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.applicationId !== input.invocation.applicationId) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.connectionId !== input.invocation.connectionId) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.catalogEntryId !== input.invocation.catalogEntryId) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.catalogVersionHash !== input.invocation.catalogVersionHash) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.catalogSchemaHash !== input.invocation.catalogSchemaHash) return false;
|
|
if (!selectorMatches(input.selectors, {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: invocation.actorType as ToolAccessContext["actorType"],
|
|
actorId: invocation.actorId ?? invocation.agentId ?? "system",
|
|
agentId: invocation.agentId,
|
|
heartbeatRunId: invocation.runId,
|
|
issueId: invocation.issueId,
|
|
projectId: invocation.issueId ? issueProjectById.get(invocation.issueId) ?? null : null,
|
|
routineId: null,
|
|
gatewayId: null,
|
|
applicationId: invocation.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: invocation.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: invocation.catalogEntryId,
|
|
catalogStatus: null,
|
|
catalogVersionHash: invocation.catalogVersionHash,
|
|
catalogSchemaHash: invocation.catalogSchemaHash,
|
|
providerType: invocation.providerType,
|
|
applicationKey: invocation.applicationKey,
|
|
upstreamToolName: invocation.upstreamToolName,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
riskLevel: invocation.riskLevel,
|
|
argumentsHash: invocation.argumentsHash ?? "",
|
|
arguments: {},
|
|
})) return false;
|
|
if (input.filters.allowAny === true) return true;
|
|
return Boolean(invocation.argumentsHash && allowedHashes.has(invocation.argumentsHash));
|
|
}).length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function trustRuleSelectors(input: {
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect;
|
|
issueProjectId: string | null;
|
|
selectors?: ToolAccessSelector;
|
|
scope?: CreateToolTrustRuleFromActionRequest["scope"];
|
|
}): Record<string, unknown> {
|
|
const selectors: Record<string, unknown> = { ...(input.selectors ?? {}) };
|
|
const scope = input.scope ?? {};
|
|
const apply = (key: string, value: string | null | undefined, enabled: boolean) => {
|
|
if (!enabled || !value || selectors[key] || selectors[`${key}s`]) return;
|
|
selectors[key] = value;
|
|
};
|
|
apply("agentId", input.invocation.agentId, scope.includeAgent ?? true);
|
|
apply("projectId", input.issueProjectId, scope.includeProject ?? true);
|
|
apply("issueId", input.invocation.issueId, scope.includeIssue === true);
|
|
apply("applicationId", input.invocation.applicationId, scope.includeApplication ?? true);
|
|
apply("connectionId", input.invocation.connectionId, scope.includeConnection ?? true);
|
|
apply("catalogEntryId", input.invocation.catalogEntryId, scope.includeCatalogEntry === true);
|
|
apply("toolName", input.invocation.toolName, scope.includeTool ?? true);
|
|
return selectors;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const REQUIRED_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS = [
|
|
"agentId",
|
|
"projectId",
|
|
"applicationId",
|
|
"connectionId",
|
|
"toolName",
|
|
] as const;
|
|
|
|
const OPTIONAL_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS = ["issueId", "catalogEntryId"] as const;
|
|
|
|
function reviewedTrustRuleSelectorValues(input: {
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect;
|
|
issueProjectId: string | null;
|
|
}): Record<string, string> {
|
|
const reviewed: Record<string, string> = {};
|
|
if (input.invocation.agentId) reviewed.agentId = input.invocation.agentId;
|
|
if (input.issueProjectId) reviewed.projectId = input.issueProjectId;
|
|
if (input.invocation.applicationId) reviewed.applicationId = input.invocation.applicationId;
|
|
if (input.invocation.connectionId) reviewed.connectionId = input.invocation.connectionId;
|
|
if (input.invocation.toolName) reviewed.toolName = input.invocation.toolName;
|
|
if (input.invocation.issueId) reviewed.issueId = input.invocation.issueId;
|
|
if (input.invocation.catalogEntryId) reviewed.catalogEntryId = input.invocation.catalogEntryId;
|
|
return reviewed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function exactReviewedTrustRuleFilters(invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect): ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters {
|
|
if (!invocation.argumentsHash) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rule promotion requires an exact reviewed argument hash on the source action request");
|
|
}
|
|
return { exactHash: invocation.argumentsHash };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertReviewedTrustRuleSelectors(selectors: Record<string, unknown>, reviewed: Record<string, string>) {
|
|
const allowedKeys = new Set<string>([
|
|
...REQUIRED_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS,
|
|
...OPTIONAL_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS,
|
|
]);
|
|
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(selectors)) {
|
|
if (!allowedKeys.has(key)) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(
|
|
`Trust rule promotion only supports the reviewed actor/tool scope. Unsupported selector '${key}'.`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const expected = reviewed[key];
|
|
if (!expected || value !== expected) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(
|
|
`Trust rule promotion selector '${key}' must exactly match the reviewed scope.`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (const key of REQUIRED_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS) {
|
|
const expected = reviewed[key];
|
|
if (!expected) continue;
|
|
if (selectors[key] !== expected) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(
|
|
`Trust rule promotion must keep the reviewed actor/tool scope. Missing exact selector '${key}'.`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertReviewedTrustRuleArgumentFilters(
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect,
|
|
filters: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters | null | undefined,
|
|
): ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters {
|
|
const exact = exactReviewedTrustRuleFilters(invocation);
|
|
if (!filters) return exact;
|
|
if (
|
|
filters.allowAny === true
|
|
|| filters.allowedHashes?.length
|
|
|| filters.fieldEquals
|
|
|| filters.fieldNotEquals
|
|
|| filters.fieldIn
|
|
|| filters.fieldMatches
|
|
|| filters.fieldExists?.length
|
|
|| filters.fieldAbsent?.length
|
|
) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rule promotion only supports the exact reviewed argument hash.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (filters.exactHash !== exact.exactHash) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rule promotion exactHash must match the reviewed argument hash.");
|
|
}
|
|
return exact;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function createTrustRuleFromActionRequest(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
actionRequestId: string;
|
|
body: CreateToolTrustRuleFromActionRequest;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
}) {
|
|
const [actionRequest] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId), eq(toolActionRequests.companyId, input.companyId)))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!actionRequest) throw notFound("Tool action request not found");
|
|
if (actionRequest.status !== "approved" && actionRequest.status !== "executed") {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rules can only be created from approved or executed action requests");
|
|
}
|
|
const [invocation] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolInvocations.id, actionRequest.invocationId), eq(toolInvocations.companyId, input.companyId)))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!invocation) throw notFound("Tool invocation not found");
|
|
if (invocation.policyDecision !== "require_approval") {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rules must be promoted from approval-required tool actions");
|
|
}
|
|
if (invocation.catalogEntryId && !invocation.catalogVersionHash) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rule promotion requires a reviewed tool catalog version on the source action request");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const [issue] = invocation.issueId
|
|
? await db
|
|
.select({ projectId: issues.projectId })
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(and(eq(issues.id, invocation.issueId), eq(issues.companyId, input.companyId)))
|
|
.limit(1)
|
|
: [null];
|
|
const reviewedSelectors = reviewedTrustRuleSelectorValues({
|
|
invocation,
|
|
issueProjectId: issue?.projectId ?? null,
|
|
});
|
|
const selectors = trustRuleSelectors({
|
|
invocation,
|
|
issueProjectId: issue?.projectId ?? null,
|
|
selectors: input.body.selectors,
|
|
scope: input.body.scope,
|
|
});
|
|
assertReviewedTrustRuleSelectors(selectors, reviewedSelectors);
|
|
if (input.body.argumentMode === "action" && (input.actor?.agentId || !invocation.agentId || !invocation.connectionId || actionRequest.approvalId)) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Action-wide permission requires a human-approved agent connection action without a formal approval gate");
|
|
}
|
|
const filters = input.body.argumentMode === "action"
|
|
? { allowAny: true }
|
|
: assertReviewedTrustRuleArgumentFilters(invocation, input.body.argumentFilters);
|
|
const approvalThreshold = input.body.approvalThreshold ?? 2;
|
|
const approvedCount = await matchingApprovedActionRequestCount({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
invocation,
|
|
filters,
|
|
selectors,
|
|
});
|
|
if (approvedCount < approvalThreshold) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(`Trust rule requires ${approvalThreshold} matching approved actions in the final rule scope; found ${approvedCount}`);
|
|
}
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const expiresAt = isoDateOrNull(input.body.expiresAt);
|
|
const name = input.body.name ?? `Trust ${invocation.toolName} ${actionRequest.id.slice(0, 8)}`;
|
|
const description = input.body.description
|
|
?? `Progressive-autonomy trust rule promoted from action request ${actionRequest.id}.`;
|
|
const [policy] = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
name,
|
|
description,
|
|
policyType: "trust_rule",
|
|
priority: input.body.priority ?? 40,
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
selectors,
|
|
config: {
|
|
trustRule: {
|
|
sourceActionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
sourceInvocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
sourceApprovalCount: approvedCount,
|
|
approvalThreshold,
|
|
argumentFilters: filters,
|
|
expiresAt,
|
|
revokedAt: null,
|
|
hitCount: 0,
|
|
lastHitAt: null,
|
|
catalogVersionHash: invocation.catalogVersionHash ?? null,
|
|
schemaHash: invocation.catalogSchemaHash ?? null,
|
|
batchApproval: input.body.batchApproval ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
createdByAgentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
createdByUserId: input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
|
|
await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
connectionId: invocation.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: invocation.catalogEntryId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId ? "agent" : input.actor?.userId ? "user" : "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
action: "tool_access.trust_rule_created",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
reasonCode: "trust_rule_promoted_from_approval",
|
|
details: {
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
approvalThreshold,
|
|
approvedCount,
|
|
selectors,
|
|
argumentFilters: filters,
|
|
expiresAt,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
await db.insert(toolCallEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
eventType: "trust_rule_created",
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId ? "agent" : input.actor?.userId ? "user" : "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
agentId: invocation.agentId,
|
|
runId: invocation.runId,
|
|
issueId: invocation.issueId,
|
|
applicationId: invocation.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: invocation.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: invocation.catalogEntryId,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy.id],
|
|
reasonCode: "trust_rule_promoted_from_approval",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
argumentsSummary: invocation.argumentsSummary,
|
|
requestHash: invocation.argumentsHash,
|
|
requestSummary: invocation.argumentsSummary,
|
|
metadata: { approvalThreshold, approvedCount, selectors, expiresAt },
|
|
});
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function listTrustRules(companyId: string) {
|
|
return db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId), eq(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule")))
|
|
.orderBy(desc(toolPolicies.updatedAt));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function revokeTrustRule(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
policyId: string;
|
|
body: RevokeToolTrustRule;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
}) {
|
|
const [existing] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolPolicies.id, input.policyId), eq(toolPolicies.companyId, input.companyId)))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!existing || existing.policyType !== "trust_rule") throw notFound("Tool trust rule not found");
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const config = policyConfig(existing);
|
|
const rule = trustRuleConfig(existing) ?? {};
|
|
const [updated] = await db
|
|
.update(toolPolicies)
|
|
.set({
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
config: {
|
|
...config,
|
|
trustRule: {
|
|
...rule,
|
|
revokedAt: rule.revokedAt ?? now.toISOString(),
|
|
revokedByAgentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
revokedByUserId: input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
revocationReason: input.body.reason ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.id, existing.id))
|
|
.returning();
|
|
await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId ? "agent" : input.actor?.userId ? "user" : "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
action: "tool_access.trust_rule_revoked",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
reasonCode: "trust_rule_revoked",
|
|
details: { policyId: existing.id, reason: input.body.reason ?? null },
|
|
});
|
|
await db.insert(toolCallEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
eventType: "trust_rule_revoked",
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId ? "agent" : input.actor?.userId ? "user" : "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [existing.id],
|
|
reasonCode: "trust_rule_revoked",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
metadata: { reason: input.body.reason ?? null },
|
|
});
|
|
return updated;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
decide,
|
|
writeAudit,
|
|
recordInvocation,
|
|
summarizeAndRedact,
|
|
listPolicies,
|
|
reorderPolicies,
|
|
createPolicy,
|
|
duplicatePolicy,
|
|
updatePolicy,
|
|
deletePolicy,
|
|
createTrustRuleFromActionRequest,
|
|
listTrustRules,
|
|
revokeTrustRule,
|
|
ensureNoDuplicatePolicyNameError: (error: unknown) => {
|
|
if (error instanceof Error && /duplicate key value/.test(error.message)) {
|
|
throw conflict("A tool policy with that name already exists");
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|