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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract. > - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads. > - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context, which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer assigned to hostile content. > - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging, route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context. > - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations. > - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection, preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion, documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks, enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic. > - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot surfaces. Fixes #7531. ## What Changed - Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work products. - Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context. - Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime containment, and quarantine redaction. - Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views. - Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated `doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review contract plan under `doc/plans/`. - Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered migration are not broken by the renumbered migration. ## Verification - Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`. - Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or `.github/workflows` changes. - Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata. - Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not broken. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx` - `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps` - `git diff --check` - GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify, policy/review, Socket, and Snyk. - Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved Greptile review threads. - No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work. ## Risks - Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata, and UI preset controls. - Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions. - Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover the current known routes but future integrations must route through the same containment layer. - The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is 5/5. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI workflow. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically required - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
223 lines
6.5 KiB
TypeScript
223 lines
6.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import {
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agentPermissionsSchema,
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type LowTrustBoundary,
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LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_RAW_OUTPUT_DISPOSITION,
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LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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} from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import { normalizeIssueExecutionPolicy } from "../services/issue-execution-policy.js";
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import {
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isIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary,
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resolveCoreTrustPreset,
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} from "../services/trust-preset-resolver.js";
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const companyId = "11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111";
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const otherCompanyId = "22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222";
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const projectA = "33333333-3333-4333-8333-333333333333";
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const projectB = "44444444-4444-4444-8444-444444444444";
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const projectC = "55555555-5555-4555-8555-555555555555";
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const rootIssueId = "66666666-6666-4666-8666-666666666666";
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const issueA = "77777777-7777-4777-8777-777777777777";
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const issueB = "88888888-8888-4888-8888-888888888888";
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const issueC = "99999999-9999-4999-8999-999999999999";
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const agentA = "aaaaaaaa-aaaa-4aaa-8aaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa";
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const agentB = "bbbbbbbb-bbbb-4bbb-8bbb-bbbbbbbbbbbb";
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function lowTrustBoundary(input: Partial<Omit<LowTrustBoundary, "mode">>): LowTrustBoundary {
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return {
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mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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companyId,
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...input,
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};
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}
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function boundaryPolicy(boundary: ReturnType<typeof lowTrustBoundary>) {
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return {
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: boundary,
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},
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};
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}
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describe("resolveCoreTrustPreset", () => {
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it("defaults to standard with no boundary", () => {
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const result = resolveCoreTrustPreset({
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companyId,
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agent: { companyId, permissions: { canCreateAgents: false } },
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});
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expect(result).toMatchObject({
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kind: "standard",
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preset: "standard",
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boundary: null,
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});
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});
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it("intersects low-trust agent, project, and issue policy boundaries", () => {
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const result = resolveCoreTrustPreset({
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companyId,
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agent: {
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companyId,
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permissions: {
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trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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authorizationPolicy: {
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managedBy: "core-trust-preset",
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trustBoundary: lowTrustBoundary({
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projectIds: [projectA, projectB],
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rootIssueId,
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issueIds: [issueA, issueB],
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allowedAgentIds: [agentA, agentB],
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allowedToolClasses: ["git.read", "tests.local"],
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}),
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},
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},
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},
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project: {
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companyId,
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executionWorkspacePolicy: boundaryPolicy(lowTrustBoundary({
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projectIds: [projectB, projectC],
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issueIds: [issueB, issueC],
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allowedAgentIds: [agentB],
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allowedToolClasses: ["git.read"],
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})),
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},
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issue: {
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companyId,
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executionPolicy: {
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: lowTrustBoundary({
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issueIds: [issueB],
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allowedToolClasses: ["git.read", "github.pr.read"],
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}),
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},
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},
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},
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});
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expect(result.kind).toBe("low_trust_review");
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if (result.kind !== "low_trust_review") throw new Error("expected low-trust result");
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expect(result.boundary).toMatchObject({
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companyId,
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mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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rootIssueId,
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projectIds: [projectB],
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issueIds: [issueB],
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allowedAgentIds: [agentB],
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allowedToolClasses: ["git.read"],
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});
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expect(isIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary(result.boundary, { companyId, id: issueB, projectId: projectB })).toBe(true);
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expect(isIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary(result.boundary, { companyId, id: issueC, projectId: projectC })).toBe(false);
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});
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it("fails closed for unknown presets", () => {
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const result = resolveCoreTrustPreset({
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companyId,
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agent: {
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companyId,
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permissions: {
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trustPreset: "trusted_but_weird",
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},
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},
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});
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expect(result).toMatchObject({
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kind: "denied",
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reason: "unsupported_trust_preset",
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source: "agent",
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});
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});
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it("fails closed when low-trust has no concrete project or issue scope", () => {
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const result = resolveCoreTrustPreset({
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companyId,
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agent: {
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companyId,
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permissions: {
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trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: lowTrustBoundary({ allowedToolClasses: ["git.read"] }),
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},
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},
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},
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});
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expect(result).toMatchObject({
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kind: "denied",
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reason: "missing_low_trust_boundary_scope",
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});
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});
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it("denies cross-company policy sources and boundaries", () => {
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const sourceMismatch = resolveCoreTrustPreset({
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companyId,
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project: {
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companyId: otherCompanyId,
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executionWorkspacePolicy: boundaryPolicy(lowTrustBoundary({ projectIds: [projectA] })),
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},
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});
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expect(sourceMismatch).toMatchObject({
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kind: "denied",
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reason: "cross_company_boundary",
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source: "project",
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});
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const boundaryMismatch = resolveCoreTrustPreset({
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companyId,
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issue: {
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companyId,
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executionPolicy: {
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: {
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mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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companyId: otherCompanyId,
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rootIssueId,
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},
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},
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},
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},
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});
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expect(boundaryMismatch).toMatchObject({
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kind: "denied",
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reason: "cross_company_boundary",
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source: "issue",
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});
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});
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it("normalizes and preserves trust policy JSON alongside existing policy data", () => {
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const permissions = agentPermissionsSchema.parse({
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canCreateAgents: false,
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trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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authorizationPolicy: {
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managedBy: "ee-permissions",
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customEeField: { mode: "visualized" },
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trustBoundary: lowTrustBoundary({ rootIssueId }),
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},
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});
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expect(permissions.authorizationPolicy?.customEeField).toEqual({ mode: "visualized" });
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const executionPolicy = normalizeIssueExecutionPolicy({
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reviewPreset: {
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id: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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version: 1,
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rawOutputDisposition: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_RAW_OUTPUT_DISPOSITION,
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},
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authorizationPolicy: {
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managedBy: "core-trust-preset",
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trustBoundary: lowTrustBoundary({ rootIssueId }),
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},
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});
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expect(executionPolicy).toMatchObject({
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stages: [],
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reviewPreset: {
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id: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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rawOutputDisposition: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_RAW_OUTPUT_DISPOSITION,
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},
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authorizationPolicy: {
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managedBy: "core-trust-preset",
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trustBoundary: { rootIssueId },
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},
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});
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});
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});
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