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Preserve bounded, redacted and screened upstream JSON-RPC error messages for remote MCP tools and context reads. Audit blocked instructions, retain received error semantics, and redact URL/session and decoded credential echoes. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
56 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
56 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
import { redactEventPayload, redactSensitiveText } from "../redaction.js";
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import { redactSensitiveValueOccurrences } from "../middleware/redact-sensitive.js";
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import { isRemoteUrlSecretParameter } from "./remote-url-credentials.js";
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import { ToolContentValidationError, validateToolContent } from "./tool-content-guards.js";
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/** Reuse the URL-vault policy for query keys and the event redactor for headers. */
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export function mcpErrorRequestSecrets(values: Record<string, string> | URLSearchParams): string[] {
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const query = values instanceof URLSearchParams;
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const entries = query ? [...values] : Object.entries(values);
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return entries
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.filter(([key, value]) => (query && isRemoteUrlSecretParameter(key))
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|| (redactEventPayload({ [key]: value }) as Record<string, unknown>)[key] !== value
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|| /^(key|session|mcp-session-id)$/i.test(key))
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.map(([, value]) => value);
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}
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/** Only the protocol's message is diagnostic text. Never reflect arbitrary data,
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* stacks, or the raw response. Redact before truncating so a boundary cannot
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* turn a credential into an unrecognizable, partially exposed value. */
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export async function mcpErrorMessage(
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fallback: string,
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error: unknown,
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headers: Record<string, string>,
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sensitiveValues: readonly string[] = [],
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classifier?: Parameters<typeof validateToolContent>[0]["classifier"],
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onBlocked?: (finding: Pick<ToolContentValidationError, "reasonCode" | "findings" | "detectorMetadata">) => Promise<void>,
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): Promise<string> {
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if (!error || typeof error !== "object" || Array.isArray(error)) return fallback;
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const { message } = error as Record<string, unknown>;
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if (typeof message !== "string" || !message.trim()) return fallback;
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// Remove bare authorization credentials as well as the full header.
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const values = [...sensitiveValues, ...mcpErrorRequestSecrets(headers),
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...Object.entries(headers).filter(([key]) => /^(proxy-)?authorization$/i.test(key))
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.map(([, value]) => value.replace(/^\S+\s+/, ""))];
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const redacted = redactSensitiveValueOccurrences(message, values) as string;
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const detail = redactSensitiveText(redacted)
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.replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f\u202a-\u202e\u2066-\u2069]/g, " ")
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.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
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if (!detail) return fallback;
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const bounded = detail.length > 1000 ? `${detail.slice(0, 997)}...` : detail;
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// Screen exactly the normalized text that will reach the caller. Never
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// return or persist provider instructions through the error channel.
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try {
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await validateToolContent({ value: bounded, direction: "result",
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sensitiveMode: "redact", promptInjectionMode: "block", classifier });
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} catch (error) {
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if (error instanceof ToolContentValidationError) {
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// Report only structured guard metadata, never the provider text.
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await onBlocked?.({ reasonCode: error.reasonCode, findings: error.findings, detectorMetadata: error.detectorMetadata });
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return fallback;
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}
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throw error;
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}
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return `${fallback}. Upstream message (untrusted): ${bounded}`;
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}
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