mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-10-28 20:21:50 +01:00
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip gives teams durable tasks, agent execution, budgets, and approvals. > - People also use assistants in Codex, Claude, and other MCP clients. > - Those assistants need a scoped connection that preserves the person’s permissions and attribution. > - Delegating a task must not turn the assistant into the assigned agent. > - This PR adds opt-in user OAuth, ten first-party tools, browser consent, and workflow packages. > - Paid product evals verify the resulting tasks, documents, attribution, retries, and access boundaries. > - The team keeps working after the assistant conversation ends. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Problem or motivation** A person cannot connect an external assistant to an existing team through browser consent and safely delegate durable work as themselves. **Proposed solution** Expose an opt-in `/mcp/paperclip` endpoint with individually described first-party operations. Bind every connection to a person, client, company, resource, and scopes. Reuse domain authorization and scheduling. Package shared team-review, delegation, and follow-up workflows for OpenAI/Codex and Claude. **Alternatives considered** Related PRs #9393 and #12549 cover earlier remote MCP and board-operator approaches. This change uses user OAuth and a bounded public catalog. It does not expose a generic executor, operator administration, static shared board credentials, or external agent execution. Registry listing work in #9851 is a separate distribution step. **Roadmap alignment** This maintainer-requested implementation extends the governed MCP gateway, activity attribution, durable work products, and hosted deployment direction in `ROADMAP.md`. It implements the first release of the saved design plan; external agent participation and granted third-party tools remain later releases. ## What Changed - Add MCP 2.0 discovery and task status/comment/document Events on the same authenticated endpoint. Persist subscriptions and delivery receipts, verify HTTPS callbacks, sign Standard Webhooks, encrypt callback material, recheck permissions/Cloud membership, and bound retries/expiry. Older MCP clients keep their existing tools. - Add discovery, dynamic client registration, S256 PKCE, resource validation, rotating refresh tokens, revocation, and company consent. Store credentials as hashes and recheck membership at execution. - Add tools for connection identity, agents/projects, task search/read/create, human comments, documents/deliverables, and pending-approval links. Preserve current domain permissions and scheduling. - Add durable mutation receipts across reconnects. Matching retries replay results; uncertain outcomes keep the same request ID and require inspection. - Add consent and connection-management pages, OAuth log redaction, shared plugin workflows, and separate OpenAI/Codex and Claude package outputs. - Add eight paid Product E2E cases across three models, independent durable-state grading, usage evidence, cleanup, and report integration. Add task-document guidance and regenerate the runner capability inventories. - Add migrations 0301 and 0302, the dated implementation plan, result notes, and direct-client setup instructions in `doc/public-mcp.md`. ## Verification - Merge integration `e180b1948`: resolved conflicts with current master, preserved both eval registries, regenerated capability catalogs, and regenerated migrations as 0301/0302 while keeping the original replay-safe SQL byte-identical. Local migration safety/snapshot tests (26), MCP/OAuth tests (38), redaction/OpenAPI tests (71), and eval catalog/grading tests (198) pass. Token and capability gates pass. Full recursive typecheck passed. Fresh Greptile review is 5/5 with no unresolved findings. CI is green on this exact head (55 successes, two intentional skips, one neutral result): one unchanged Cursor sandbox test timed out at 10 seconds, then passed locally in 856 ms. A single retry of that failed shard and the aggregate workflow passed. Merge remains blocked on the repository code-owner approval rule. Earlier checks passed at `6aa0962d4fb715f2190bb7bb22efacab2e58495d`: 55 successes, two intentional skips and one neutral result. [The earlier CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/36901592350) includes all test shards, browser tests, typecheck, build and canary dry run. Greptile was 5/5 on that commit with no unresolved review threads. GitHub still requires code-owner review under the repository merge rules; passing checks do not bypass that approval. Paid source fingerprints remain separate below and in the dated result note. - Paid Events qualification passes **3/3**: GPT-5.4 Mini, Claude Haiku 4.5 and Claude Sonnet 4.6. Each uses a real public HTTPS callback, signature verification and report retrieval in a fresh conversation. A final Mini regression passes after the quota/status fixes. All evidence validates. Bounded tunnel startup retries occur before provider calls and remain visible; failed earlier attempts retain their original grades. - The earlier complete seven-case matrix passes **21/21**, with a separate **3/3** delegation regression. Two preceding matrices also passed 21/21 each. A complete 24-cell matrix including Events has not been run. [The dated results](doc/plans/2026-10-01-public-mcp-paid-eval-results.md) retain exact source fingerprints, failures, model IDs and partial costs. - Node 24: repository-wide `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass after merging master. Server typecheck passes after the final quota/status changes. Eval typecheck and all 892 eval-support tests pass. - All 33 real MCP/OAuth tests pass. The preceding combined MCP, redaction, private-address and DNS-rebinding run passed 129 tests; two later MCP regressions cover quota reuse and unchanged-status suppression. All 28 adjacent issue-tree/stale-lock route tests pass. CI then found a null checkout result in the existing concurrent-workspace path; logging now uses optional status access. All 12 closed-workspace tests and all 33 MCP tests pass after that correction. The exact-start event calibration exposed a timestamp gap; scanning now includes the subscription start, with all 33 MCP tests and server typecheck passing. These two narrow corrections follow the paid regression. - A real Core → Cloud → Core authority round trip passes OAuth, MCP 2.0 subscription/delivery, current membership loss, unsubscribe, legacy SDK tools, refresh and revocation. Its callback transport is a fixture with independent HMAC verification. The paid Events campaigns separately prove public HTTPS delivery. - Earlier component qualification passed UI 7,117 tests, CLI 502, shared 832, skills catalog 20, database 160 and OpenAPI 10. Token gates, module boundaries, migration order and plugin regeneration passed. CI covers general/serialized suites, eight browser shards, runner checks, typecheck, build and canary dry run. - **Local full-suite limitation:** the earlier monolithic run was not clean. It encountered overlapping schema rebuilding, Mac database shared-memory limits and isolated CLI/fixture failures. Targeted reruns passed. The existing >32 MiB Git filename stress test still hit its 300-second Mac timeout. The additional serialized sweep stopped after 62 passing suites once CI passed. Original failures and partial logs remain; this PR does not claim a wholly green local monolithic run. - Local Codex CLI and Claude Code OAuth login and MCP SDK interoperability were verified. Public-store installation, actual ChatGPT Work Cloud Events UI, staging HTTPS client behavior and hosted newcomer provisioning remain release gates. Enablement is moving to **Settings → Experimental → Assistant connections (MCP)** in the stacked follow-up [#14933](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/14933). Merge both for the intended setup experience. This foundation branch alone still uses `PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_MCP_ENABLED=true`. After deployment, set `PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL` to the authenticated instance's HTTPS origin, and connect to `/mcp/paperclip`. Select a team and allow writes in browser consent. Configure an available agent and budget, then delegate and retrieve results later. For Events, rescan the deployed plugin catalog in ChatGPT Work Cloud; the host supplies its webhook credentials when the user asks to watch a task. See [the setup runbook](doc/public-mcp.md). ## Risks - Events are at-least-once and may arrive out of order. No replay cursor is advertised. Clients must refresh finite subscriptions, read current state and avoid comment feedback loops. Callback material uses the instance secrets master key; hosted subscriptions require the updated Cloud broker and are bounded to five minutes/the access proof expiry. - ChatGPT Work Cloud/dot event UI, plugin rescan and a hosted staging subscription remain deployment gates. Local signed-webhook and paid model evidence does not claim those surfaces have been exercised. - Disabled by default. Merging adds schema and opt-in code; it does not deploy a public endpoint, publish a store listing, create a team, or start paid agents. - Migrations 0301 and 0302 are additive and idempotent. Their SQL is unchanged from the earlier preview numbers, so hash-aware upgrade reconciliation preserves prior staging applications. Normal instance upgrades must apply it before enabling MCP. - Task creation and comments can schedule paid agent work. Consent and tool descriptions disclose that effect. Revocation blocks future calls but does not undo delegated work. - Public deployments need edge rate limits and credential-safe logging. Internal dispatch is restricted to the closed catalog and carries a request-local verified actor. - Hosted onboarding requires the companion Cloud broker, encryption-key configuration, and tenant rollout. Self-hosted direct connections can use this PR alone. - Store acceptance and agent-mode participation are not claimed. Checked-in plugin endpoints are development defaults; rebuild packages for a real deployment before installation. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 in Codex, with reasoning, tool use, and code execution. A more specific serving version and context-window size were not exposed by the session. Paid eval models: `gpt-5.4-mini-2026-03-17`, `claude-haiku-4-5-20251001`, and `claude-sonnet-4-6`. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (targeted/component checks; full local-run limitations are recorded above) - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
198 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
198 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash, createHmac, randomBytes, randomUUID, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
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import { createRequire } from "node:module";
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import { createServer } from "node:http";
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import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
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import { once } from "node:events";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { expect, type BrowserContext, type Page } from "@playwright/test";
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const require = createRequire(path.resolve(import.meta.dirname, "../../server/package.json"));
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const { Client } = await import(require.resolve("@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js"));
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const { StreamableHTTPClientTransport } = await import(require.resolve("@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/streamableHttp.js"));
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export const origin = `http://127.0.0.1:${process.env.PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_E2E_PORT ?? process.env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_MCP_EVAL_PORT ?? 3298}`;
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export const resource = origin + "/mcp/paperclip";
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export interface Team { id: string; name: string; issuePrefix: string }
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export interface Agent { id: string; name: string; status: string }
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export interface Task { id: string; companyId: string; title: string; status: string; assigneeAgentId: string | null }
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export interface Run { id: string; agentId: string; status: string }
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export interface Document { body: string; createdByAgentId: string | null; latestRevisionId: string }
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export interface Comment { id: string; body: string; authorUserId: string | null; authorAgentId: string | null }
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export interface Tokens { access_token: string; refresh_token: string; expires_in: number; scope: string }
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export interface ToolResult { isError?: boolean; structuredContent?: Record<string, unknown>; content: Array<{ type: string; text?: string }> }
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export async function api<T>(context: BrowserContext, method: string, route: string, data?: unknown): Promise<T> {
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const response = await context.request.fetch(origin + route, { method, data, headers: { Origin: origin } });
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// Never include response bodies, cookies or OAuth codes in diagnostic errors.
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if (!response.ok()) throw new Error(`Public API ${method} ${route.split("?")[0]} returned HTTP ${response.status()}`);
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return response.status() === 204 ? undefined as T : await response.json() as T;
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}
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export async function oauthPost(route: string, body: unknown) {
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return fetch(origin + "/mcp/oauth/" + route, { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify(body) });
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}
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export async function beginConnection(write = true, redirect = origin + "/eval-client-callback") {
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const registration = await oauthPost("register", { client_name: "Paperclip acceptance client", redirect_uris: [redirect] });
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expect(registration.status, "public client registration").toBe(201);
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const { client_id: clientId } = await registration.json() as { client_id: string };
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const verifier = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
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const state = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
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const params = new URLSearchParams({ client_id: clientId, redirect_uri: redirect, response_type: "code", resource, code_challenge: createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest("base64url"), code_challenge_method: "S256", state, scope: `paperclip:read ${write ? "paperclip:write " : ""}offline_access` });
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const response = await fetch(origin + "/mcp/oauth/authorize?" + params, { redirect: "manual" });
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expect(response.status, "authorization request").toBe(303);
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const consentUrl = response.headers.get("location")!;
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return { clientId, verifier, state, redirect, params, consentUrl, requestId: new URL(consentUrl).pathname.split("/").at(-1)! };
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}
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export async function connect(context: BrowserContext, team: Team, write = true, page?: Page, secrets: string[] = []) {
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// A real assistant callback has its own origin. A same-origin fake callback
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// would be intercepted by Paperclip's service worker and render the board.
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const callbackServer = page ? createServer((_req, res) => { res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/html", "Cache-Control": "no-store", "Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer" }); res.end("<h1>Assistant connected</h1>"); }) : undefined;
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if (callbackServer) { callbackServer.listen(0, "127.0.0.1"); await once(callbackServer, "listening"); }
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const address = callbackServer?.address();
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const redirect = address && typeof address !== "string" ? `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}/callback` : undefined;
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try {
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const request = await beginConnection(write, redirect);
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let redirectUrl: string;
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if (page) {
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await page.goto(request.consentUrl);
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await expect(page.getByRole("heading", { name: "Connect your assistant to Paperclip" })).toBeVisible();
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await expect(page.getByRole("button", { name: "Connect team", exact: true })).toBeDisabled();
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await page.getByRole("radio", { name: team.name, exact: true }).check();
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if (write) await page.getByRole("checkbox").check();
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await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Connect team", exact: true }).click();
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await expect(page.getByRole("heading", { name: "Assistant connected" })).toBeVisible();
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redirectUrl = page.url();
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// Leave the secret-bearing callback before any later assertions/evidence.
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await page.goto(origin + "/assistant-connections");
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} else {
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({ redirectUrl } = await api<{ redirectUrl: string }>(context, "POST", `/api/mcp/requests/${request.requestId}/consent`, { decision: "approve", companyId: team.id, allowWrites: write }));
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}
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const callback = new URL(redirectUrl);
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secrets.push(request.verifier, callback.searchParams.get("code") ?? "");
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expect(callback.searchParams.get("state") === request.state, "OAuth state returned intact").toBe(true);
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const exchange = { grant_type: "authorization_code", client_id: request.clientId, redirect_uri: request.redirect, resource, code: callback.searchParams.get("code"), code_verifier: request.verifier };
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const tokenResponse = await oauthPost("token", exchange);
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expect(tokenResponse.status, "code exchange").toBe(200);
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const tokens = await tokenResponse.json() as Tokens;
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secrets.push(tokens.access_token, tokens.refresh_token);
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return { ...request, tokens, exchange };
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} finally {
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if (callbackServer) { callbackServer.closeAllConnections(); await new Promise<void>(resolve => callbackServer.close(() => resolve())); }
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}
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}
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export async function mcp(tokens: Tokens) {
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const client = new Client({ name: "paperclip-product-eval", version: "1.0.0" });
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await client.connect(new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(new URL(resource), { requestInit: { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${tokens.access_token}` } } }));
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return {
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list: async () => await client.listTools() as { tools: Array<{ name: string; description: string; inputSchema: Record<string, unknown>; annotations: { readOnlyHint: boolean } }> },
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call: async (name: string, args: Record<string, unknown> = {}) => await client.callTool({ name, arguments: args }) as ToolResult,
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close: async () => { await client.close(); },
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};
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}
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export function content<T>(result: ToolResult): T {
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expect(result.isError === true, "MCP operation succeeded").toBe(false);
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expect(result.structuredContent, "MCP returned structured outcome").toBeTruthy();
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return result.structuredContent as T;
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}
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/** Host-owned Events transport. Models never see callback signing or OAuth material. */
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export async function mcpEventRpc(tokens: Tokens, method: string, args: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
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const response = await fetch(resource, { method: "POST", headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${tokens.access_token}`, "Content-Type": "application/json", "MCP-Protocol-Version": "2026-07-28", "Mcp-Method": method },
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body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method, params: { ...args, _meta: { "io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion": "2026-07-28", "io.modelcontextprotocol/clientCapabilities": {} } } }) });
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const body = await response.json() as { result?: Record<string, unknown>; error?: { code: number; data?: { reason?: string } } };
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if (!response.ok || body.error || !body.result) throw new Error(`MCP Events ${method} failed: HTTP ${response.status}, code ${body.error?.code ?? "missing_result"}, reason ${body.error?.data?.reason ?? "unavailable"}; details withheld`);
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return body.result;
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}
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export interface ReceivedTaskEvent { eventId: string; name: string; timestamp: string; data: { companyId: string; taskId: string; status?: string }; cursor: null }
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interface EventReceiver {
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url: string; secret: string; events: ReceivedTaskEvent[]; readonly verified: number;
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readonly duplicateCount: number; startupAttempts: number; startupFailures: string[]; close: () => Promise<void>;
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}
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export async function eventReceiver(secrets: string[], startupFailures: string[] = []): Promise<EventReceiver> {
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const key = randomBytes(32);
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const secret = "whsec_" + key.toString("base64");
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const path = "/events/" + randomUUID();
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const readinessNonce = randomUUID();
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const events: ReceivedTaskEvent[] = [];
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const seen = new Set<string>();
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let verified = 0;
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let duplicateCount = 0;
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const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
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try {
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if (req.url === path && req.method === "GET") { res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Cache-Control": "no-store" }); res.end(JSON.stringify({ nonce: readinessNonce })); return; }
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if (req.url !== path || req.method !== "POST") { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return; }
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const chunks: Buffer[] = []; let size = 0;
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for await (const chunk of req) { size += Buffer.byteLength(chunk); if (size > 262144) throw new Error(); chunks.push(Buffer.from(chunk)); }
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const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString();
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const id = req.headers["webhook-id"];
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const timestamp = req.headers["webhook-timestamp"];
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const signature = req.headers["webhook-signature"];
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if (typeof id !== "string" || typeof timestamp !== "string" || typeof signature !== "string" || Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - Number(timestamp)) > 300) throw new Error();
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const expected = createHmac("sha256", key).update(`${id}.${timestamp}.${raw}`).digest();
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const valid = signature.split(" ").some(part => { const [version, encoded] = part.split(","); const actual = Buffer.from(encoded ?? "", "base64"); return version === "v1" && actual.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(actual, expected); });
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if (!valid) throw new Error();
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const body = JSON.parse(raw);
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if (body.type === "verification" && typeof body.challenge === "string") {
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verified++; res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "application/json" }); res.end(JSON.stringify({ challenge: body.challenge })); return;
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}
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if (body.eventId !== id || !body.data || body.type) throw new Error();
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if (seen.has(id)) duplicateCount++; else { seen.add(id); events.push(body); }
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res.writeHead(204); res.end();
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} catch { res.writeHead(400); res.end(); }
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});
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server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1"); await once(server, "listening");
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const address = server.address();
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if (!address || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("Event receiver did not start");
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const tunnel = spawn(process.env.PAPERCLIP_EVAL_CLOUDFLARED ?? "cloudflared", ["tunnel", "--no-autoupdate", "--protocol", "http2", "--url", `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] });
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const close = async () => {
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if (tunnel.pid && tunnel.exitCode === null && tunnel.signalCode === null) {
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const exited = once(tunnel, "exit").catch(() => {});
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tunnel.kill("SIGTERM");
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const timer = setTimeout(() => tunnel.kill("SIGKILL"), 5000);
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try { await exited; } finally { clearTimeout(timer); }
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}
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server.closeAllConnections(); await new Promise<void>(resolve => server.close(() => resolve()));
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};
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secrets.push(secret);
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try {
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const origin = await new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
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let output = "";
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const timer = setTimeout(() => { reject(new Error("HTTPS event tunnel startup timed out")); }, 60_000);
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const finish = (error?: Error, url?: string) => { clearTimeout(timer); if (error) reject(error); else resolve(url!); };
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tunnel.once("error", () => finish(new Error("cloudflared is required for the live HTTPS event receiver")));
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tunnel.once("exit", () => finish(new Error("HTTPS event tunnel exited before startup")));
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const read = (chunk: Buffer) => { output = (output + chunk.toString()).slice(-32768); const url = output.match(/https:\/\/[a-z0-9-]+\.trycloudflare\.com/)?.[0]; if (url && output.includes("Registered tunnel connection")) finish(undefined, url); };
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tunnel.stdout!.on("data", read); tunnel.stderr!.on("data", read);
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});
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secrets.push(origin + path);
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// A registered tunnel connection can precede public DNS/edge readiness.
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// Prove that this exact fixture receiver is reachable before paying for work.
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const readyBy = Date.now() + 60_000;
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let ready = false;
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let lastFailure = "unreachable";
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while (Date.now() < readyBy) {
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try {
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const response = await fetch(origin + path, { redirect: "error", signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000) });
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if (response.ok && (await response.json() as { nonce?: string }).nonce === readinessNonce) { ready = true; break; }
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lastFailure = `http_${response.status}`;
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await response.body?.cancel();
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} catch (error) {
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const cause = (error as { cause?: { code?: string } }).cause?.code;
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lastFailure = cause === "ENOTFOUND" ? "dns_not_found" : "network_unavailable";
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}
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await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1000));
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}
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if (!ready) throw new Error(`HTTPS event receiver did not become publicly reachable (${lastFailure})`);
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return { url: origin + path, secret, events, startupAttempts: startupFailures.length + 1, startupFailures, get verified() { return verified; }, get duplicateCount() { return duplicateCount; }, close };
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} catch (error) {
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await close();
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const reason = error instanceof Error && error.message.includes("dns_not_found") ? "dns_not_found" : "tunnel_startup_unavailable";
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const failures = [...startupFailures, reason];
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if (failures.length < 3) return eventReceiver(secrets, failures);
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throw new Error(`HTTPS event receiver failed after ${failures.length} setup attempts (${reason}); no model call started`);
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}
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}
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