mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-10-23 17:33:51 +02:00
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - A provider must work through normal installed packages on local and Daytona environments. > - Candidate-only success does not prove that the shipped package contains the manifest and native runtime needed for Daytona. > - The release must preserve saved-token access and task lifecycle guarantees. > - This pull request will qualify Copilot and include the exact-source remote manifest in normal release archives. > - The benefit is a reviewable part of the Copilot production release. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #15701, #15703 and #15705. Supersedes qualification work in #15563 and the original candidate in #14434. Base: #15705. ## What Changed - Keep Copilot discovery passive during reconnect reconciliation; refresh on explicit opening, account/environment changes and reconnect. - Retain the selected Product cases, permission/continuity evidence and cleanup checks. - Build the Linux provider manifest from the existing pinned Docker stage in the cloud. - Join all four native daemon receipts with that manifest before server packing. - Reject missing or incompatible remote authority during normal release assembly; retain historical workflow compatibility. - Promote the completed profile47 qualification marker, publish the current qualification record and preserve every failed attempt. - Keep one current release checklist and the shipped-canary gates explicit. ## Verification Runtime #15701 is merged at `d855e550ad8d2a267312983f26457aabf5393c3a`. History #15703 is merged at `df80616d98119cbf5abd40549794d9980a5fabf6`. Remaining source [`42bcbd61299655f7e37aabe6bb5f19bba770ad1d`](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/commit/42bcbd61299655f7e37aabe6bb5f19bba770ad1d) contains the four-file authorization repair. The remaining PR trees preserve six nonoverlapping files from the newer public mainline managed-settings fix and the CI-owned lockfile. No unrelated provider is enabled. The security finding is repaired: existing-agent discovery requires `agent_config:update` before connection selection or token resolution. The saved environment is the default. Authorized editors can select a prospective environment. Both denied board-viewer and agent-reader regressions fail on the original source. All49 route tests and server typecheck pass with the fix. Denied requests perform no connection selection, credential resolution or probe. Current-head security scans pass on both remaining PRs; the repaired thread is resolved. Copilot CLI1.0.88 and profile47 retain digest `sha256:55044aa235e88b3fe36ec8a556ee1e3382590870aab907e4462ef7d64af49cea`. The [qualification record](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/42bcbd61299655f7e37aabe6bb5f19bba770ad1d/doc/plans/2026-10-20-copilot-qualification-v47.json) reports20/20 Product cells,154 assertions and7/7 protocol cases,46 assertions against frozen normal installed source `c2616370800f5f6df45246b0890ba35a7cd2faab`. The exact qualification model is `gpt-5.6-luna`. Every passing Product case confirms cleanup. Original failures remain recorded; automatic behavior retries are disabled. The route-only authorization repair changes no bound runtime/profile bytes and does not relabel the frozen campaign. The ordinary installed remote journey passed saved-token selection, model discovery, normal UI save/reopen, metadata-only Test, completed task, accepted receipt and exact19-byte browser download. An open model catalog caused no additional discovery requests during117seconds. Actual installed runtime smokes passed on macOS ARM64, macOS x64 under Rosetta and native Linux x64 on Daytona. Raw token browser entry was not exercised; encrypted connection creation used the normal API. The first Daytona file attempt timed out during delayed semantic dispatch; its precise stalled layer remains unresolved. Independent ordinary remote delivery and the other19 Product cells passed before one instrumented recheck passed8/8 with unchanged source,prompt,assertions and deadlines. No causal latency repair is claimed. Before the authorization repair, all four final PR heads passed required verify/E2E and fresh Greptile5/5 reviews with zero unresolved threads. Current-head CI/review is running for the two repaired heads. Local focused checks retain129 connection,59 runner,72 shared-eval and88 recovery/workspace passes, plus migration safety and token gates. The additive Copilot migration is361; released master history is preserved. [Cloud normal-package run39414239704](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39414239704) builds the pre-security source4f3f. All four native producers and Linux package assembly pass; the final clean installed consumers are finishing. All18 retained archives match their hashes;37,863 regular files contain zero selected credentials. That package does not contain the later route repair. The actual final published package must include it and pass the local/Daytona live canaries. The frozen Daytona image remains published and independently verified. No separate full-image scan is claimed. Docker builds run in the cloud. **Remaining:** current-head CI/review, setup and qualification merges, final publication, and ordinary local/Daytona canaries against the actual shipped package. The user explicitly authorizes the maintainer review override; CI remains a merge gate. No production deployment is claimed. Provider USD remains unknown and GitHub-attributed. ## Risks An omitted or mismatched image manifest prevents ordinary Daytona startup. Final normal archives must contain the matching image authority and platform daemons. The completed runtime campaign remains bound to its original source; the final UI-only repair needs its own normal-install setup proof. Credit notices are not measured USD receipts. Native steering, native plan mode and detached work remain outside this release. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6. The exact serving model ID and context window are not exposed in this task. Used for code changes, review and tool-assisted verification. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
235 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
235 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import { mkdtemp, readFile, rm, unlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import { join } from "node:path";
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import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { observeCopilotFixtureCommand, findCopilotFixtureCommand, matchCopilotFixtureCommand, countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget, countCopilotToolOrigins, readCopilotMarkerAfterCleanup } from "./copilot-protection-evidence.js";
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import type { CopilotToolNotice } from "./copilot-evidence.js";
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const notice: CopilotToolNotice = { runId: "run", sessionId: "session", turnId: "turn", toolCallId: "edit", stage: "tool", operation: "edit", observedAtMs: 1, seq: 1 };
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describe("Copilot protection independent evidence", () => {
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it.each(["in_progress", "completed", "failed"] as const)("counts an alternate origin first seen as %s", status => {
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const rows = [{ ...notice, status: "pending" as const }, { ...notice, status }, { ...notice, toolCallId: "alternate", status }];
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expect(countCopilotToolOrigins(rows)).toBe(2);
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expect(countCopilotToolOrigins([{ ...notice, status }, { ...notice, sessionId: "other", status }])).toBe(2);
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});
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it.each(["unchanged", "changed", "deleted"])("independently reads the marker after %s cleanup", async mode => {
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const root = await mkdtemp("/tmp/pc-copilot-marker-"); const path = join(root, "marker");
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try {
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await writeFile(path, "expected"); expect(await readFile(path, "utf8")).toBe("expected");
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const matches = await readCopilotMarkerAfterCleanup(async () => {
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if (mode === "changed") await writeFile(path, "changed");
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if (mode === "deleted") await unlink(path);
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}, path, "expected");
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expect(matches).toBe(mode === "unchanged");
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} finally { await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
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});
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});
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import { assertCopilotRemoteRetirement, assertCopilotRemoteAttached, copilotActionNotices, copilotRemoteDeniedSample, prepareCopilotRemoteAction, type CopilotRemoteSnapshot, type CopilotRemoteFixture } from "./copilot-protection-evidence.js";
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const target = "copilot-denied-nonce.txt";
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describe("Copilot denied-target origin correlation", () => {
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// Captured native shape: updates omit the target; permission events bind it.
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const deniedTarget = "pc-denied-fixture/copilot-denied-nonce.txt";
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const captured = (): CopilotToolNotice[] => [
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{ ...notice, seq: 39, status: "pending" },
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{ ...notice, seq: 42, stage: "permission_requested", requestId: "request", target: deniedTarget, declineOffered: true },
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{ ...notice, seq: 44, stage: "permission_delivered", requestId: "request", target: deniedTarget, outcome: "reject_once" },
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{ ...notice, seq: 45, status: "failed" },
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];
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it("counts the captured denied edit across exact permission and tool origins", () => {
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expect(countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget(captured(), deniedTarget)).toBe(1);
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expect(countCopilotToolOrigins(copilotActionNotices(captured(), captured()[0]!))).toBe(1);
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});
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it.each(["runId", "sessionId", "turnId", "toolCallId"] as const)("cannot borrow a target across %s", field => {
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const rows = captured().map(n => n.stage === "tool" ? { ...n, [field]: "foreign" } : n);
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expect(countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget(rows, deniedTarget)).toBe(0);
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});
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it.each(["in_progress", "completed", "failed"] as const)("counts a retry first seen as %s", status => {
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const rows = [...captured(), { ...notice, toolCallId: "retry", seq: 46, target: deniedTarget, status }];
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expect(countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget(rows, deniedTarget)).toBe(2);
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expect(countCopilotToolOrigins(copilotActionNotices(rows, rows[0]!))).toBe(2);
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});
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it("does not hide an alternate operation with no target", () => {
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const rows = [...captured(), { ...notice, toolCallId: "alternate", seq: 46, operation: "execute" as const }];
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expect(countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget(rows, deniedTarget)).toBe(1);
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expect(countCopilotToolOrigins(copilotActionNotices(rows, rows[0]!))).toBe(2);
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});
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it("does not count permission-only or entirely unbound evidence", () => {
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expect(countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget(captured().filter(n => n.stage !== "tool"), deniedTarget)).toBe(0);
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expect(countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget(captured().filter(n => n.stage === "tool"), deniedTarget)).toBe(0);
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});
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it.each([
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{ target: "other.txt" }, { operation: "execute" as const },
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])("rejects conflicting tool evidence %j", conflict => {
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const rows = captured(); rows[3] = { ...rows[3]!, ...conflict };
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expect(() => countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget(rows, deniedTarget)).toThrow(/Conflicting/);
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});
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it("rejects another permission request on the same tool origin", () => {
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const rows = captured(); rows[2] = { ...rows[2]!, requestId: "other" };
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expect(() => countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget(rows, deniedTarget)).toThrow(/permission/);
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expect(() => countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget([...captured(), { ...captured()[1]!, seq: 46 }], deniedTarget)).toThrow(/permission/);
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});
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it("rejects a restarted or repeated native lifecycle under a reused origin", () => {
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for (const status of ["pending", "in_progress", "completed", "failed"] as const) {
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expect(() => countCopilotEditOriginsForTarget([...captured(), { ...notice, status, seq: 46 }], deniedTarget)).toThrow(/lifecycle/);
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}
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});
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});
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function receipt(): CopilotRemoteSnapshot {
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const root = { pid: 50, ppid: 1, startTicks: "200", bootId: "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789abc" };
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return { binding: { companyId: "company", environmentId: "env", runId: "run", leaseId: "lease", sandboxId: "sandbox", image: `image@sha256:${"a".repeat(64)}`, remoteCwd: "/home/daytona/workspace" },
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observedAtMs: 60, receivedAtMs: 61, observedMonotonicNs: "600", complete: true, workspace: {},
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targets: { [target]: { absent: true, sha256: null, complete: true, mutationCount: 0, parent: { dev: "1", ino: "2" } } },
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watcher: { complete: true, targetMutationCount: 0, workspaceMutationCount: 0 }, processes: { captured: true, root, journal: [root], live: [] },
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setup: { path: ".action.txt", sha256: `sha256:${"b".repeat(64)}`, published: true },
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attached: { connections: 1, failure: null, commandExit: { code: 0, observedAtMs: 20, observedMonotonicNs: "200" }, markerWrittenAtMs: 25, markerWrittenMonotonicNs: "250", clientExitedAtMs: 30, clientExitedMonotonicNs: "300" } };
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}
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function baseline() { const s = receipt(); s.observedAtMs = 1; s.observedMonotonicNs = "1"; s.processes.live = [50]; s.setup = { ...s.setup, published: false, sha256: null }; return s; }
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describe("Copilot sealed remote proof", () => {
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it("requires exact lease and original process identity in the retained final receipt", () => {
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expect(() => assertCopilotRemoteRetirement(receipt(), baseline())).not.toThrow();
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for (const mutate of [
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.binding.leaseId = "foreign"; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.processes.live = [50]; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.processes.root!.startTicks = "999"; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.processes.captured = false; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.processes.journal = []; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.setup.published = false; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.watcher.complete = false; },
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]) { const s = receipt(); mutate(s); expect(() => assertCopilotRemoteRetirement(s, baseline())).toThrow(); }
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});
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it("rejects transient remote writes, parent replacement and unrelated workspace changes", () => {
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expect(copilotRemoteDeniedSample(receipt(), baseline(), target, "after-cleanup").exists).toBe(false);
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for (const mutate of [
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.targets[target]!.mutationCount = 2; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.targets[target]!.parent.ino = "new"; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.targets[target]!.complete = false; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.watcher.workspaceMutationCount = 1; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.workspace.other = `sha256:${"a".repeat(64)}`; },
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]) { const s = receipt(); mutate(s); expect(() => copilotRemoteDeniedSample(s, baseline(), target, "after-cleanup")).toThrow(); }
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});
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it("requires independent attached child/client ordering and rejects early terminal", () => {
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expect(assertCopilotRemoteAttached(receipt(), baseline(), 50).connections).toBe(1);
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for (const mutate of [
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.attached!.connections = 2; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.attached!.commandExit!.code = 1; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.attached!.clientExitedMonotonicNs = "240"; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.attached!.markerWrittenMonotonicNs = null; },
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(s: CopilotRemoteSnapshot) => { s.attached!.clientExitedAtMs = 51; },
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]) { const s = receipt(); mutate(s); expect(() => assertCopilotRemoteAttached(s, baseline(), 50)).toThrow(); }
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expect(() => assertCopilotRemoteAttached(receipt(), baseline(), 20)).toThrow();
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});
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it("exempts only exact completed action-file reads before the tested operation", () => {
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const call = { ...notice, seq: 10, status: "in_progress" as const };
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const read = { ...notice, toolCallId: "bootstrap", operation: "read", status: "completed", seq: 1 } as CopilotToolNotice;
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const actionFile = `.paperclip-eval-action-${"a".repeat(36)}.txt`;
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const event = { runId: "run", seq: 2, protocolSchemaVersion: 1, eventType: "tool.execution.completed", payload: { prpEvent: {
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schema: "paperclip.prp.event.v1", schemaVersion: 1, sourceKind: "runner", runId: "run", turnId: "turn", eventType: "tool.execution.completed", emittedAt: new Date(2).toISOString(),
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payload: { schema: "paperclip.tool.execution.v1", executionId: "bootstrap", transport: "builtin", operation: "read", target: actionFile, status: "completed" },
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} } };
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read.readTargetSha256 = `sha256:${createHash("sha256").update(actionFile).digest("hex")}`;
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const proof = { actionFile, events: [event] };
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expect(countCopilotToolOrigins(copilotActionNotices([read, call], call, proof))).toBe(1);
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const wrong = structuredClone(event); wrong.payload.prpEvent.payload.target = "unrelated.txt";
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expect(() => copilotActionNotices([read, call], call, { actionFile, events: [wrong] })).toThrow();
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expect(() => copilotActionNotices([read, { ...read, toolCallId: "unrelated", seq: 3 }, call], call, proof)).toThrow();
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expect(() => copilotActionNotices([{ ...read, turnId: "other" }, call], call, proof)).toThrow();
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for (const bad of [{ ...read, seq: 11 }, { ...read, operation: undefined }, { ...read, operation: "edit" as const }]) {
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expect(countCopilotToolOrigins(copilotActionNotices([bad, call], call, { actionFile, events: [] }))).toBe(2);
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}
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expect(countCopilotToolOrigins(copilotActionNotices([read, call], call))).toBe(2);
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});
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it("awaits the remote fixture and baseline before disclosing the actual command", async () => {
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const s = baseline(), order: string[] = [];
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const fixture: CopilotRemoteFixture = { binding: s.binding, remoteCwd: s.binding.remoteCwd, actionFile: s.setup.path,
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killOwnedCopilot: async () => { throw new Error("Unexpected provider-death dispatch"); },
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snapshot: async () => { await Promise.resolve(); order.push("baseline"); return s; },
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releaseAttachedCommand: async () => { throw new Error("Unexpected fixture release during setup"); },
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setupAttachedCommand: async input => { expect(input.waitForFinishAttempt).toBe(true); expect(input.markerText).toBe("private-marker"); order.push("setup"); return { command: "exact-remote-command", commandSha256: `sha256:${"c".repeat(64)}` }; },
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finish: async () => { throw new Error("must not finish during setup"); }, readFile: async () => { throw new Error("must not read host file"); }, close: async () => {} };
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const prepared = await prepareCopilotRemoteAction({ fixture, companyId: "company", environmentId: "env", runId: "run", target, prompt: "test", markerText: "private-marker" });
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order.push("publish"); expect(order).toEqual(["setup", "baseline", "publish"]);
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expect(prepared.prompt).toContain("exact-remote-command"); expect(prepared.prompt).not.toContain("private-marker");
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await expect(prepareCopilotRemoteAction({ fixture, companyId: "company", environmentId: "env", runId: "other", target, prompt: "test" })).rejects.toThrow(/Foreign/);
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s.targets[target]!.absent = false;
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await expect(prepareCopilotRemoteAction({ fixture, companyId: "company", environmentId: "env", runId: "run", target, prompt: "test" })).rejects.toThrow(/present/);
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});
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});
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it("uses sealed retained bytes after lease deletion, rejects changed/deleted markers, and never snapshots again", async () => {
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const { readCopilotRemoteMarkerAfterRetirement } = await import("./copilot-protection-evidence.js");
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const { createHash } = await import("node:crypto");
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const end = receipt(); end.targets[target] = { ...end.targets[target]!, absent: false, sha256: `sha256:${createHash("sha256").update("marker").digest("hex")}` };
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let finished = false, bytes: Buffer | undefined = Buffer.from("marker");
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const fixture = {
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finish: async () => { finished = true; return end; },
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snapshot: async () => { throw new Error("lease destroyed: RPC forbidden"); },
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readFile: async () => { if (!finished) throw new Error("not retained yet"); if (!bytes) throw new Error("terminal_file_missing"); return Buffer.from(bytes); },
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} as unknown as CopilotRemoteFixture;
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expect(await readCopilotRemoteMarkerAfterRetirement(fixture, baseline(), target, "marker")).toBe(true);
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bytes = Buffer.from("changed"); expect(await readCopilotRemoteMarkerAfterRetirement(fixture, baseline(), target, "marker")).toBe(false);
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bytes = undefined; await expect(readCopilotRemoteMarkerAfterRetirement(fixture, baseline(), target, "marker")).rejects.toThrow(/missing/);
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});
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describe("Copilot fixture command equivalence", () => {
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const command = "'/pinned/node' '/fixture/client.cjs' '/fixture/private/socket' 'nonce'";
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const digest = (value: string) => `sha256:${createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex")}`;
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const captured = (prefix = " "): CopilotToolNotice[] => [
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{ ...notice, operation: "execute", mode: "async", detach: false, commandSha256: digest(prefix + command), status: "pending", seq: 38 },
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{ ...notice, operation: "execute", mode: "async", detach: false, commandSha256: digest(prefix + command), status: "completed", shellId: "0", shellState: "started", commandToolCallId: notice.toolCallId, seq: 54 },
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{ ...notice, operation: "read", toolCallId: "shell-read", status: "completed", shellId: "0", shellState: "completed", commandToolCallId: notice.toolCallId, exitCode: 0, seq: 105 },
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];
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it.each(["", " ", "\t", " \t \t \t \t"])("preserves the raw digest for bounded prefix %j", prefix => {
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const rows = captured(prefix), before = structuredClone(rows), result = findCopilotFixtureCommand(rows, command);
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expect(result?.match).toEqual({ algorithm: "leading-ascii-horizontal-v1", canonicalCommandSha256: digest(command), nativeCommandSha256: digest(prefix + command), leadingWhitespace: prefix });
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expect(result?.call).toBe(rows[0]); expect(rows).toEqual(before);
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});
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it.each(["\n", "\r", "\r\n", "\v", "\f", "\u00a0", "\u2003", " ", "\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t"])("rejects non-admitted prefix %j", prefix => {
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expect(matchCopilotFixtureCommand(command, digest(prefix + command))).toBeNull();
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});
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it.each([
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command + " ", command + "\t", command.replace("node' '", "node' '"), command.replaceAll("'", '"'),
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command.replace("client.cjs", "other.cjs"), command.replace("nonce", "other"),
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command + "; true", command + " && true", command + " | cat", command + " $(echo x)", "ENV=x " + command,
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])("rejects command-content change %j", actual => {
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expect(matchCopilotFixtureCommand(command, digest(actual))).toBeNull();
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});
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it("rejects an absent or malformed digest and a noncanonical fixture command", () => {
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expect(matchCopilotFixtureCommand(command, "")).toBeNull();
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expect(matchCopilotFixtureCommand(" " + command, digest(" " + command))).toBeNull();
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expect(findCopilotFixtureCommand([], command)).toBeNull();
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expect(findCopilotFixtureCommand(captured().map(n => ({ ...n, commandSha256: undefined })), command)).toBeNull();
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});
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it.each(["runId", "sessionId", "turnId", "toolCallId"] as const)("never combines execution states from different %s", field => {
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const rows = captured(); rows[1] = { ...rows[1]!, [field]: "foreign" };
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expect(findCopilotFixtureCommand(rows, command)).toBeNull();
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});
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it("retains independent observations when command matching fails, including cleanup mutation", async () => {
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const root = await mkdtemp("/tmp/pc-command-observation-"); const markerPath = join(root, "marker");
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const order: string[] = []; const receipt = { observedAtMs: 40, markerWrittenAtMs: 20, clientExitedAtMs: 30, childGone: true };
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try {
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await writeFile(markerPath, "private-marker");
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const result = await observeCopilotFixtureCommand(captured(), command + " invalid", { markerPath, fixture: {
|
|
marker: "private-marker", snapshot: () => { order.push("snapshot"); return receipt; },
|
|
close: async () => { order.push("close"); await writeFile(markerPath, "changed-during-cleanup"); },
|
|
} });
|
|
expect(result).toEqual({ external: receipt, markerMatches: true, afterCleanupMarkerMatches: false, matched: null });
|
|
expect(order).toEqual(["snapshot", "close"]);
|
|
expect(result.external?.observedAtMs).toBe(40); // Original observation time, never cleanup time.
|
|
} finally { await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
|
|
});
|
|
it("rejects retries, another command, conflicting input and reused lifecycle", () => {
|
|
for (const extra of [
|
|
{ ...captured()[0]!, toolCallId: "retry" },
|
|
{ ...captured()[1]!, toolCallId: "retry" },
|
|
{ ...captured()[0]!, toolCallId: "other", commandSha256: digest(command + " other") },
|
|
{ ...captured()[0]!, seq: 39 }, { ...captured()[1]!, seq: 55 },
|
|
{ ...captured()[0]!, status: "in_progress" as const, seq: 55 },
|
|
]) expect(findCopilotFixtureCommand([...captured(), extra], command)).toBeNull();
|
|
for (const conflict of [{ commandSha256: digest(command) }, { mode: "sync" as const }, { detach: true }, { operation: "edit" as const }, { status: "failed" as const }]) {
|
|
const rows = captured(); rows[1] = { ...rows[1]!, ...conflict };
|
|
expect(findCopilotFixtureCommand(rows, command)).toBeNull();
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
});
|