Files
PaperClipAI/tests/runner-e2e/private-reporter-artifacts.test.ts
T
f4337bb5fb test(evals): land the chat catalog eval harness on master (#19614)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The chat-feature evals measure whether agents complete real chat
requests through the product
> - The chat catalog eval harness and its repairs live on the
`chat-eval/master-candidate` branch, not on master
> - Today's work made 139 of 242 chat evals pass in verified single-case
live runs. Each product fix landed on master as its own pull request
> - The eval-side changes (setups, graders, fault seams, evidence
capture) still exist only on the candidate
> - This pull request lands the harness on master. Master stays the
source of truth for product behavior
> - The benefit is one tree: evals run against master commits, and
product fixes reach the evals as soon as they merge

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19441, Refs #19599, Refs #20270, Refs #20334, Refs #20342, Refs
#20344, Refs #20354, Refs #20360, Refs #20373, Refs #20382, Refs #20409

**What existing behavior does this improve?**
The chat catalog eval harness and the product it evaluates live on a
long-running branch outside master. Eval fixes do not reach master, so
master-based eval runs use old setups and graders.

**Subsystem affected**
`tests/runner-e2e` chat catalog harness, plus a small set of product
changes that exist only on the candidate.

**Proposed change**
Land the harness on master. Every product fix from this eval work
already merged to master as its own pull request. Conflicts keep
master's product behavior.

## What Changed

- Most of the diff (808 of 851 files) is under `tests/runner-e2e/`:
chat-catalog domains, scenarios, descriptors, the TestOps manifest,
private evidence tooling, and their tests.
- Graders now check saved state, setup literals and rendered or clicked
links. Many keyword and regex checks on free-form replies are removed.
Each changed grader has a bumped `oracleVersion` and calibration tests
(a valid reply, a reworded valid reply, and broken variants that must
fail).
- The shared link helper `hasLink` no longer treats a list link (for
example `/COM/issues?view=mine`) as a link to every task without a URL
key.
- Setup fixes build real state through supported product routes: routine
history, agent grants through the board grant route, budget holds with a
real cap, and a storage-layer archive fault for
`inbox-search.archive-partial-failure`.
- Browser boundary journeys (sign-in, chat-disabled, onboarding) now
write the standard pass evidence files.
- Retargeted cases, approved by the maintainer:
`agent-chat.chat-disabled` (Conference Room gate),
`agents.restore-instructions` (no saved instruction history),
`access.manage-membership` (member permission edits stay board-only).
- The private evidence trusted files (`manual-private-handoff.ts`,
`manual-private-retention.ts`, `manual-private-report-assets.ts`) are
byte-identical to master.
- Product files outside `tests/` (43 files, +1,328 −49) carry
candidate-only changes that master does not yet have. Most are tests.
The main code changes are in `request-human-input.ts`,
`heartbeat-run-summary.ts`, `native-completion-feedback.ts`,
`native-run-finalizer.ts`, `openapi.ts`, `secrets.ts` and
`IssueChatLongThreadPerf.tsx`.

## Verification

- `pnpm vitest run chat-catalog-domains chat-catalog-contract.test.ts
chat-catalog-consistency.test.ts unit-launcher.test.mjs
--testTimeout=180000` in `tests/runner-e2e`: 269 files pass, 3,550 tests
pass.
- `node --test chat-full-catalog-testops-manifest.test.mjs`: 10 pass.
- `node tests/runner-e2e/source-sdk-public-inputs.mjs <HEAD> --check`:
no change.
- `tsc` for `server` and `tests/runner-e2e`: clean.
- Live single-case verification: 139 of 242 cases passed on paid runs,
and a person read the saved evidence for each. These are single-case
runs, not one full-cohort run.

## Risks

- Large diff. Most of it is test-only, but the 43 non-test files change
product code paths. Review those files first.
- Some graders are now less strict on reply wording. A person must read
replies for meaning on those cases.
- 42 cases need disposable outside accounts (Notion, Slack, GitHub,
Daytona and others) and stay blocked. `access.invite-teammate` stays
failing until local agent isolation lands, because the runner's durable
state keeps a live invite token.
- The paid workflow compares the trusted private-evidence files with
master. They are unchanged, so this risk is low.

## Model Used

Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), with tool use and code
execution, in Claude Code. Subagents used the same model.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-10 08:02:11 -06:00

43 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript

import { afterEach, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
import { mkdtemp, mkdir, readFile, readdir, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { sanitizePrivateReporterArtifacts } from "./private-reporter-artifacts.js";
import { inspectEmbeddedReport, packageEvidence } from "./evidence.js";
const roots: string[] = []; afterEach(async () => { for (const root of roots.splice(0)) await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
it("redacts actual reporter sinks, rejects compressed HTML/blob secrets, and leaves independently observed product bytes unchanged", async () => {
const root = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "report-privacy-control-")); roots.push(root);
const canary = "synthetic-private-cookie-723958234";
for (const directory of ["snapshots", "playwright-output", "html-report", "blob-report"]) await mkdir(path.join(root, directory));
for (const relative of ["playwright.log", "junit.xml", "playwright-output/error-context.md"]) await writeFile(path.join(root, relative), `HTTP429: provider unavailable; failed fill ${canary}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
// This is independent oracle input, deliberately not a diagnostic sink.
await writeFile(path.join(root, "snapshots", "api-state.json"), JSON.stringify({ actualProductResponse: canary }));
const raw = path.join(root, "report.json"); await writeFile(raw, JSON.stringify({ error: `failed fill ${canary}` }), { mode: 0o600 });
const zip = path.join(root, "blob-report", "report.zip"); execFileSync("zip", ["-q", zip, "report.json"], { cwd: root });
const html = `<html><script>window.playwrightReportBase64 = "data:application/zip;base64,${(await readFile(zip)).toString("base64")}"</script></html>`;
await writeFile(path.join(root, "html-report", "index.html"), html);
expect(await inspectEmbeddedReport(html, [canary])).toContain("exact secret");
const issues = await sanitizePrivateReporterArtifacts(root, [canary]);
expect(issues.filter(issue => issue.disposition === "redacted")).toHaveLength(3);
expect(issues.filter(issue => issue.disposition === "omitted")).toHaveLength(2);
expect(JSON.stringify(issues)).not.toContain(canary);
for (const relative of ["playwright.log", "junit.xml", "playwright-output/error-context.md"]) { const safe = await readFile(path.join(root, relative), "utf8"); expect(safe).not.toContain(canary); expect(safe).toContain("HTTP429: provider unavailable"); }
expect(await readdir(path.join(root, "blob-report"))).toEqual([]); expect(await readdir(path.join(root, "html-report"))).toEqual([]);
expect(await readFile(path.join(root, "snapshots/api-state.json"), "utf8")).toContain(canary);
const packaged = await packageEvidence({ privateDir: root, uploadDir: path.join(root, "uploaded"), secrets: [canary], expectPassScreenshot: false });
// Product leakage still fails independently, despite sanitized diagnostics.
expect(packaged.leaks).toContainEqual({ file: "snapshots/api-state.json", reason: "exact secret value" });
});
it("keeps clean inspectable reports, but refuses unknown embedded report encoding", async () => {
const root = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "report-clean-control-")); roots.push(root);
await mkdir(path.join(root, "html-report")); await writeFile(path.join(root, "html-report/index.html"), "<html>ordinary clean report</html>");
expect(await sanitizePrivateReporterArtifacts(root, ["private-canary-6234"])).toEqual([]);
expect(await readFile(path.join(root, "html-report/index.html"), "utf8")).toContain("ordinary clean report");
await writeFile(path.join(root, "clean.json"), JSON.stringify({ error: "HTTP503 provider unavailable" }));
const zip = path.join(root, "clean.zip"); execFileSync("zip", ["-q", zip, "clean.json"], { cwd: root });
const embedded = `window.playwrightReportBase64="data:application/zip;base64,${(await readFile(zip)).toString("base64")}";`;
expect(await inspectEmbeddedReport(embedded, ["private-canary-6234"])).toBeNull();
expect(await inspectEmbeddedReport('<script>window.playwrightReportBase64="opaque";</script>', [])).toContain("could not be inspected");
});