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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The chat-feature evals measure whether agents complete real chat requests through the product > - The chat catalog eval harness and its repairs live on the `chat-eval/master-candidate` branch, not on master > - Today's work made 139 of 242 chat evals pass in verified single-case live runs. Each product fix landed on master as its own pull request > - The eval-side changes (setups, graders, fault seams, evidence capture) still exist only on the candidate > - This pull request lands the harness on master. Master stays the source of truth for product behavior > - The benefit is one tree: evals run against master commits, and product fixes reach the evals as soon as they merge ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #19441, Refs #19599, Refs #20270, Refs #20334, Refs #20342, Refs #20344, Refs #20354, Refs #20360, Refs #20373, Refs #20382, Refs #20409 **What existing behavior does this improve?** The chat catalog eval harness and the product it evaluates live on a long-running branch outside master. Eval fixes do not reach master, so master-based eval runs use old setups and graders. **Subsystem affected** `tests/runner-e2e` chat catalog harness, plus a small set of product changes that exist only on the candidate. **Proposed change** Land the harness on master. Every product fix from this eval work already merged to master as its own pull request. Conflicts keep master's product behavior. ## What Changed - Most of the diff (808 of 851 files) is under `tests/runner-e2e/`: chat-catalog domains, scenarios, descriptors, the TestOps manifest, private evidence tooling, and their tests. - Graders now check saved state, setup literals and rendered or clicked links. Many keyword and regex checks on free-form replies are removed. Each changed grader has a bumped `oracleVersion` and calibration tests (a valid reply, a reworded valid reply, and broken variants that must fail). - The shared link helper `hasLink` no longer treats a list link (for example `/COM/issues?view=mine`) as a link to every task without a URL key. - Setup fixes build real state through supported product routes: routine history, agent grants through the board grant route, budget holds with a real cap, and a storage-layer archive fault for `inbox-search.archive-partial-failure`. - Browser boundary journeys (sign-in, chat-disabled, onboarding) now write the standard pass evidence files. - Retargeted cases, approved by the maintainer: `agent-chat.chat-disabled` (Conference Room gate), `agents.restore-instructions` (no saved instruction history), `access.manage-membership` (member permission edits stay board-only). - The private evidence trusted files (`manual-private-handoff.ts`, `manual-private-retention.ts`, `manual-private-report-assets.ts`) are byte-identical to master. - Product files outside `tests/` (43 files, +1,328 −49) carry candidate-only changes that master does not yet have. Most are tests. The main code changes are in `request-human-input.ts`, `heartbeat-run-summary.ts`, `native-completion-feedback.ts`, `native-run-finalizer.ts`, `openapi.ts`, `secrets.ts` and `IssueChatLongThreadPerf.tsx`. ## Verification - `pnpm vitest run chat-catalog-domains chat-catalog-contract.test.ts chat-catalog-consistency.test.ts unit-launcher.test.mjs --testTimeout=180000` in `tests/runner-e2e`: 269 files pass, 3,550 tests pass. - `node --test chat-full-catalog-testops-manifest.test.mjs`: 10 pass. - `node tests/runner-e2e/source-sdk-public-inputs.mjs <HEAD> --check`: no change. - `tsc` for `server` and `tests/runner-e2e`: clean. - Live single-case verification: 139 of 242 cases passed on paid runs, and a person read the saved evidence for each. These are single-case runs, not one full-cohort run. ## Risks - Large diff. Most of it is test-only, but the 43 non-test files change product code paths. Review those files first. - Some graders are now less strict on reply wording. A person must read replies for meaning on those cases. - 42 cases need disposable outside accounts (Notion, Slack, GitHub, Daytona and others) and stay blocked. `access.invite-teammate` stays failing until local agent isolation lands, because the runner's durable state keeps a live invite token. - The paid workflow compares the trusted private-evidence files with master. They are unchanged, so this risk is low. ## Model Used Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), with tool use and code execution, in Claude Code. Subagents used the same model. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
43 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript
43 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { createHmac } from "node:crypto";
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import { chromium, test, type Cookie } from "@playwright/test";
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interface Request { baseURL: string; route: string; routineId: string; triggerId: string; setupPending: boolean; signingMode: string; nonce: string; cookies: Cookie[]; executablePath?: string; channel?: string }
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async function main() {
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let attached = false; try { test.info(); attached = true; } catch { /* no Test worker */ } if (attached) throw new Error("Private webhook driver must be outside Test");
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const request = process.argv[2]!; const input = JSON.parse(await readFile(request, "utf8")) as Request; const base = new URL(input.baseURL);
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if (base.protocol !== "http:" || base.hostname !== "127.0.0.1" || !/^[a-f0-9-]{36}$/i.test(input.triggerId) || !/^[a-f0-9-]{36}$/i.test(input.routineId) || !input.route.endsWith(`/routines/${input.routineId}`)) throw new Error("Private webhook target is outside its exact disposable scope");
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const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true, ...(input.executablePath ? { executablePath: input.executablePath } : {}), ...(input.channel ? { channel: input.channel } : {}) });
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try {
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const context = await browser.newContext({ baseURL: base.origin }); await context.addCookies(input.cookies); const page = await context.newPage(); page.setDefaultTimeout(30_000);
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const url = new URL(input.route, base); if (input.setupPending) url.searchParams.set("triggerSetup", input.triggerId);
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await page.goto(url.href, { waitUntil: "domcontentloaded" });
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const rotated = page.waitForResponse(response => new URL(response.url()).pathname === `/api/routine-triggers/${input.triggerId}/rotate-secret` && response.request().method() === "POST" && response.ok());
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if (input.setupPending) await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Generate new key", exact: true }).click();
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else { const card = page.getByRole("region", { name: "Webhook trigger", exact: true }); await card.getByRole("button", { name: "Edit webhook", exact: true }).click(); await card.getByRole("button", { name: "Replace key", exact: true }).click(); await page.getByRole("dialog").getByRole("button", { name: "Replace key", exact: true }).click(); }
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const material = await (await rotated).json() as { secretMaterial: { webhookSecret: string; webhookUrl: string } };
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const secret = material.secretMaterial.webhookSecret; const endpoint = new URL(material.secretMaterial.webhookUrl);
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if (!/^[a-f0-9]{48}$/i.test(secret) || endpoint.origin !== base.origin || !/^\/api\/routine-triggers\/public\/[^/]+\/fire$/.test(endpoint.pathname)) throw new Error("Unexpected one-time scoped webhook credential");
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await page.locator("code").filter({ hasText: secret }).first().waitFor({ state: "visible" });
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if (input.setupPending) { await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Check connection", exact: true }).click();
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const finished = page.waitForResponse(response => new URL(response.url()).pathname === `/api/routine-triggers/${input.triggerId}` && response.request().method() === "PATCH" && response.ok());
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await page.getByRole("button", { name: /^Finish (?:setup|without checking)$/ }).click(); await finished; }
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const cookie = input.cookies.map(value => `${value.name}=${value.value}`).join("; ");
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const readRuns = async () => { const response = await fetch(new URL(`/api/routines/${input.routineId}/runs`, base), { redirect: "error", headers: cookie ? { cookie } : {}, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(15_000) }); if (!response.ok) throw new Error("Invocation proof unavailable"); return await response.json() as Array<{ id: string }>; };
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const before = await readRuns(); const payload = JSON.stringify({ event: "synthetic.test-service", delivery: input.nonce });
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const bad = await fetch(endpoint, { method: "POST", redirect: "error", headers: { "content-type": "application/json", authorization: "Bearer deliberately-invalid-eval-key", "idempotency-key": `${input.nonce}-bad` }, body: payload, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(15_000) }); const invalidStatus = bad.status; await bad.body?.cancel();
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const afterInvalid = await readRuns();
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const headers: Record<string, string> = { "content-type": "application/json", "idempotency-key": `${input.nonce}-valid` };
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if (["bearer", "app_webhook"].includes(input.signingMode)) headers.authorization = `Bearer ${secret}`;
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else if (["github_hmac", "fireflies_hmac"].includes(input.signingMode)) headers[input.signingMode === "github_hmac" ? "x-hub-signature-256" : "x-hub-signature"] = `sha256=${createHmac("sha256", secret).update(payload).digest("hex")}`;
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else if (input.signingMode === "hmac_sha256") { const timestamp = String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)); headers["x-paperclip-timestamp"] = timestamp; headers["x-paperclip-signature"] = `sha256=${createHmac("sha256", secret).update(`${timestamp}.${payload}`).digest("hex")}`; }
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else throw new Error("Webhook did not require authenticated delivery");
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const accepted = await fetch(endpoint, { method: "POST", redirect: "error", headers, body: payload, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(15_000) });
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const validStatus = accepted.status; if (validStatus !== 202) throw new Error("Authenticated synthetic delivery was not accepted");
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const result = await accepted.json() as { id?: string; linkedIssueId?: string };
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await writeFile(path.join(path.dirname(request), "secret.txt"), secret, { mode: 0o600 });
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return { processIsolation: true, testRunnerAttached: false, credentialVisibleInHumanUI: true, setupFinished: true, invalidStatus, validStatus, invalidCreatedInvocation: afterInvalid.length !== before.length, invocationId: result.id, linkedIssueId: result.linkedIssueId, triggerId: input.triggerId };
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} finally { await browser.close(); }
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}
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main().then(receipt => process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(receipt))).catch(() => { process.stderr.write("Private webhook operation failed; diagnostics withheld"); process.exitCode = 1; });
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