0 Fork 0

mirror of https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git synced 2026-10-20 15:09:57 +02:00

Files

T

DottaandPaperclip 98d9360658 feat(adapters): confine local coding processes (#9504 )

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI
agents for work.
> - Local coding adapters currently spawn their CLI processes directly
on the Paperclip host.
> - CLI-native approval and sandbox flags do not provide a reliable host
filesystem or network boundary.
> - An agent can therefore inspect unrelated host files or fetch
external material when an operator needs stronger isolation.
> - The confinement must stay opt-in so existing local adapter behavior
does not change unexpectedly.
> - This pull request adds a shared Linux Bubblewrap spawn layer for
workspace filesystem and deny/allowlist network scopes.
> - The benefit is enforceable defense in depth around Codex and Claude
local runs while preserving explicit provider connectivity.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

### What happened?

`codex_local` and `claude_local` processes could read arbitrary host
paths and make unrestricted outbound network requests because Paperclip
did not impose a spawn-level boundary.

### Expected behavior

Operators can opt into a workspace-only filesystem view and either deny
network egress or allow exact provider/API hosts, independently of CLI
approval flags.

### Steps to reproduce

1. Run current `master` on Linux and configure a Codex or Claude local
adapter.
2. Ask the agent to read a canary file outside its active workspace.
3. Ask the agent to `curl` a public host.
4. Observe that both operations succeed without a Paperclip-level
confinement option.

### Environment

- Paperclip commit: `c36f1a4af` / current `master` base.
- Deployment mode: Linux local dev or self-hosted server.
- Installation: built from source.
- Adapters: Codex and Claude Code.
- Database: not related.

## What Changed

- Added a shared Bubblewrap process wrapper with opt-in
`filesystemScope: "workspace"`, managed/extra path mounts, private
`/tmp`, and Linux-only validation.
- Added `networkScope: "deny" | "allowlist"`; both use a private network
namespace, while allowlist mode exposes an exact-host HTTP(S) proxy over
a Unix-socket bridge.
- Wired Codex and Claude local CLI execution through the wrapper and
forced scoped auto runs onto the CLI lane because ACP processes are not
covered.
- Added unit and gated Bubblewrap canaries for outside-file denial,
workspace writes, direct network denial, allowlisted forwarding, and
rejected destinations.
- Documented both scopes, provider allowlist examples, Bubblewrap
requirements, and default-off behavior.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/adapter-utils/src/local-process-sandbox.test.ts
packages/adapters/codex-local/src/server/acp.test.ts
packages/adapters/claude-local/src/server/acp.test.ts` — 34 passed, 4
gated Bubblewrap tests skipped by default.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-codex-local typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils build`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-codex-local build`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local build`
- Attempted the gated tests with a vendored Bubblewrap binary; this
container blocks unprivileged namespace setup (`setting up uid map:
Permission denied` / loopback `RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted`),
so kernel-level execution remains for CI or a namespace-enabled Linux
host.

## Risks

- Bubblewrap must be installed and unprivileged user/mount/network
namespaces must be enabled on the host; scoped runs fail clearly if the
prerequisite is missing.
- Allowlist mode depends on the coding CLI honoring standard
`HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` variables; custom providers must list every
required exact hostname and port.
- Exact-host allowlists intentionally reject wildcards, which is safer
but may require operators to enumerate multi-host provider setups.
- No behavior changes unless an operator enables `filesystemScope` or
`networkScope`.

> This aligns with the ROADMAP direction toward safer remote and
sandboxed agent environments and does not duplicate an open PR or issue
found in the repository search.

## Model Used

- OpenAI GPT-5.5 (`gpt-5.5`) via Codex CLI, with reasoning, repository
tool use, shell execution, code editing, and test execution. The serving
context-window size is not exposed to the agent.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

2026-07-14 11:01:19 -05:00

src

feat(adapters): confine local coding processes (#9504 )

2026-07-14 11:01:19 -05:00

CHANGELOG.md

…

package.json

Make ACP the default engine for local adapters (#9238 )

2026-07-08 19:05:03 -07:00

README.md

PAPA-430: workspace finalize gates + no-remote-git enforcement (#6969 )

2026-05-29 08:25:29 -07:00

tsconfig.json

…

README.md

@paperclipai/adapter-utils

Shared utilities for Paperclip adapters: process spawning, environment injection, sandbox/SSH transport, workspace sync, and the round-trip helpers that move code between the local execution-workspace cwd and wherever the agent actually runs.

For the adapter-author guide see docs/adapters/creating-an-adapter.md and the in-repo notes at packages/adapters/AUTHORING.md.

No-remote-git contract

The local execution-workspace cwd is the only persistence boundary across runs. No adapter may depend on a git remote for cross-run state.

Adapters that run the agent on a different host should use the SSH round-trip helpers in src/ssh.ts:

prepareWorkspaceForSshExecution({ spec, localDir, remoteDir }) — bundles the local cwd (tracked files, dirty edits, untracked additions, and the git history needed to reconstruct it) to remoteDir before the run starts. Runs with no git remote configured.
restoreWorkspaceFromSshExecution({ spec, localDir, remoteDir, ... }) — syncs the remote cwd back into localDir after the run, including any new commits the agent created. Also runs with no git remote configured.

prepareRemoteManagedRuntime in src/remote-managed-runtime.ts wraps both calls for adapters that want a per-run remote workspace and an automatic restoreWorkspace() finally hook.

The invariant is pinned by the no-remote-git contract case in src/ssh-fixture.test.ts, which asserts that a remote-only commit propagates to the local worktree through the prepare → restore round-trip with no git remote configured at any point. Do not regress that test.