## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - People use experimental settings to opt into product features. > - Cloud stack Admins can manage their company, but cannot save an experiment. > - Requiring an Owner role adds unrelated privileges to this workflow. > - This pull request gives trusted Cloud stack Admins permission to update experiments. > - Other instance administration and platform settings keep their existing checks. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A person with the Cloud stack Admin role receives “Instance admin access required” when they enable an experimental setting, such as Fast responses. **Expected behavior** Cloud stack Admins can save editable experimental settings. This permission does not grant general instance-admin authority. Members, Support users, and agents cannot change experiments. Cloud-managed and operator-hidden settings remain protected. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Sign into a Cloud staging workspace as a stack Admin. 2. Open Settings → Experimental. 3. Enable Experimental fast responses. 4. Observe the permission error instead of a saved setting. **Additional context** Related: #10343 introduced computed Owner elevation. #15748 added Fast responses and the company Connections settings page. The roadmap and existing PRs were checked. This is a small authorization fix for the existing settings path. ## What Changed - Derive experiment-management authority from the current trusted Cloud stack Admin role on each request. - Apply that authority only to the experimental settings PATCH route. Keep general settings, environment defaults, and task drain restricted to instance admins. - Preserve existing hidden-setting checks, managed feature restrictions, and activity records. - Add role and role-downgrade regressions, allowed and denied route cases, staging coverage, and updated OpenAPI and access documentation. ## Verification - Before the fix, the Admin fast-response request returned 403 and the new role assertions failed. The first sandboxed HTTP run could not bind local sockets; the regression run outside that sandbox reached the expected authorization failures. - Focused Cloud actor, settings route, managed-overlay, and health tests: 149 passed. - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` and `git diff --check` pass. - `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass. - Greptile reviewed commit `7c33b90066121f03183579d2fae2650755e025e4` at 5/5. Its one style finding is fixed and resolved. - The full local `pnpm test:run` did not pass. It reported two early collection failures before workspace build outputs were ready and a 15-second timeout in the unchanged AgentMail recovery test. The run was stopped after those failures while the full CI suite continued. No full local-suite pass is claimed. - The first current-head CI attempt failed the unchanged Runner test “preserves a real listening process and its marker when a health RPC times out” with `runner_remote_process_identity_unavailable` / `process_identity_changed`. The test passes in a local isolated run. This recovery does not establish the CI failure's cause. [Failed job](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39332989655/job/118336142261). The failed shard passed on its single rerun. The failure cause remains unconfirmed. All CI checks on commit `7c33b90066121f03183579d2fae2650755e025e4` are now green. [Final CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39332989655). - No deployed staging behavior is claimed. Manual acceptance after deployment: as a stack Admin, enable Fast responses, reload, and confirm Connections appears. Confirm Members and Support users still cannot save experiments. ## Risks - This intentionally extends experimental settings write access to Cloud stack Admins. It does not persist an instance-admin role or expand other instance controls. - Production retains its existing managed feature policy. Staging retains its editable experiment allowlist and protected execution and owner-elevation settings. - No database migration or UI change is required. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, repository tools, code execution, and browser inspection. The runtime does not expose an exact model snapshot or context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api requires operator rollout admission, a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.