## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Runtime preparation depends on access and credential state as well as tool definitions. > - Grant, membership, secret, and endpoint changes need committed invalidation. > - Their writers must acquire locks before journal fanout can lock agent rows. > - This pull request adds access hooks with the corresponding transaction guards. > - Plugins can refresh preparation immediately while task-time authorization remains authoritative. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** Grant changes, credential rotation and revocation, company access changes, and connector endpoint configuration do not request runtime synchronization. Journal fanout exposes lock inversions between credential persistence, access cleanup, and connection assignment writers. **Expected behavior** Committed access changes request runtime preparation without polling or credential values in the journal. Agent-specific secret bindings and new personal delegations affect their target agent. Company access changes remain conservative. Provider bookkeeping does not create preparation work. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Change an audience, delegation, membership permission, referenced credential, vault configuration, or endpoint instruction. 2. Expect a committed runtime event in the correct company and scope. 3. Run reconnect, credential refresh, SSH setup, or membership cleanup concurrently with related writes. 4. Expect both operations to preserve access checks and finish without a lock-order cycle. **Additional context** Final feature extraction from #16503. The earlier slices, #16604, and the separate delivery-test correction #16871 are merged. This PR is now the active change against master. The rebase preserves the merged assignment and definition recipient rules, Unicode selector semantics, and profile/reference transaction guards. ## What Changed - Add migration 0356 for grants, audiences, delegation, membership/permissions, secret bindings, referenced credentials and vaults, and chat/email endpoint configuration. - Keep events content-free. Ignore health, delivery, publication, Vercel verification, and GitHub webhook bookkeeping while retaining credential and repository-access changes. - Target agent secret bindings and all personal delegation changes to their old and new target agents. Coalesce delegation changes per transaction. - Lock existing grants before connections and credential persistence in OAuth and cleanup writers. - Reject superseded refresh leases before rotating stored credentials. Ignore lease acquisition and release when access metadata is unchanged. - Serialize audience replacement, validate membership, and preserve unchanged audiences. - Lock membership before permission-only saves and grant before Railway SSH setup. Individual delegation revocation locks its grant and target. Whole-grant and membership cleanup lock company recipients before deleting scoped delegations. - Lock grants and connection inputs before static-key reconnect writes. Lock company agents before cascading secret deletion; use a nonblocking secret lock and bounded retries to avoid a new cycle with credential writers. - Add PostgreSQL concurrency coverage for access writers and endpoint publication/configuration behavior. - Preserve the owner lock for plugin instance-secret removal; these secrets cannot use ordinary bindings. - Align Slack search refresh, callbacks, and disconnect with grant-before-connection locking. Recheck newly discovered grants without waiting before provider work. - Retry complete membership transactions when a credential deletion candidate is busy. Cover all four cleanup entry points and process company access in ID order. - Document final invalidation coverage and task-time authorization boundaries. ## Verification - Current head: `78aace55bef7f52bc5742b131e0b3961eb5c0f11`. All 1,061 tests across 23 affected suites pass. The named Slack authorization integration scenario also passes; it exercises authorization, refresh, disconnect, and rejection of a late callback. Server/database typechecks, migration safety and numbering, five-snapshot retention, feature maps, and diff checks pass. The complete PR diff was reviewed for secrets and personal data before push. Final acceptance: [CI run 39308303837, attempt 2](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39308303837) is green, with 55 successful checks and two optional Storybook skips. The current-head Greptile reassessment returned **Apex 5/5** at 19:16 UTC on 2026-10-19. Its full summary reports no actionable issues. Security passed, all threads are resolved, and GitHub reports no merge conflicts. The reassessment was requested as a standard review after the fixes; Greptile retained the Apex tier. - On this head, [CI run 39308303837](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39308303837) failed the unchanged adapter-utils HTTP/2 fixture with `EADDRINUSE` before READY. Its closed probe left a port handoff race. That test and its gateway are byte-identical on master. No upstream fix was found. The deterministic fixture correction is isolated in #16888; no adapter test changes are included here. The failed jobs recovered on retry without a feature source change. The original failure remains documented here, and #16888 carries the fixture correction separately. That retry demonstrates recovery; the held-probe negative control establishes the port handoff race. - Rebased onto master `194fc11406`, including merged #16604 and #16871. Replayed only the access-hook commit. Resolved OAuth, test, and documentation conflicts while retaining both sets of tests. Migration 0356 preserves the merged assignment/definition recipient rules, Unicode selector semantics, and profile/reference guards. - Apex returned 3/5 on `0fb65bc27`. Negative controls reproduce its Slack delegation and member-cleanup deadlocks (`40P01`) and unwanted Vercel/GitHub bookkeeping events. Slack grant writers now take their locks before the connection. A separate late-grant control reproduces `40P01` without the post-lock recheck; the complete guard passes. All four membership cleanup commands retry from a fresh transaction when the credential is busy. Tests verify successful cleanup and no journal rows from failed attempts. Credential IDs and repository-access changes still notify runtimes. - Earlier review corrections remain covered: static-key reconnect and cascading secret removal each reproduce `40P01` without their guards. Grant lease acquisition/release is ignored. Secret removal releases agent locks when a credential writer is busy. Instance-secret removal retains the owner lock and passes its public plugin API contention regression. Delegation updates and revocations target old/new agents; unrelated-peer, coalescing, unchanged-update, and rollback cases pass. Three negative controls verify the required whole-grant and membership cleanup guards after narrowing delegation scope. - Preserve prior acceptance failures: the first rebased 20-suite run passed 1,025/1,026; its only failure was a draft uninstall fixture blocking a random peer. Blocking the assigned agent corrected that assumption, and all 44 access/assignment tests passed. Later, all 1,044 tests across 21 suites, [CI run 39302185527](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39302185527), standard Greptile 5/5, and security passed on `0fb65bc27`. That did not clear the later Apex findings described above. Draft run 38975428081 failed a server shard; its cause was not re-investigated. A later green run does not establish that earlier cause. - Local fixture corrections are recorded separately from product failures: an assignment filename filter initially matched no file; the actual suite was included in full runs. A delegation fixture omitted its required creator, and a guard run omitted a query import. The new global-access cleanup fixture now uses its own user to avoid earlier fixtures' memberships. All were corrected before publishing their final iterations. - Local checks target affected services and real PostgreSQL boundaries. A full local build and repository-wide test run were not performed. Hosted CI supplies broader verification. Provider responses in tests are controlled; live provider behavior was not qualified. ## Risks Migration 0356 adds triggers without changing table schema. Apply it through the normal migration flow. Most access changes retain synchronous company-wide invalidation. Company fanout takes O(eligible company agents) locks and journal rows, without a fanout ceiling or mutation quota. Agent secret bindings and individual delegation changes retain narrower recipients. Events contain no credentials. Physical removal of non-instance secrets takes ordered locks on all company agents before cascading into bindings. This costs O(company agents) locks even for an otherwise unreferenced secret. Instance secrets cannot use ordinary bindings and retain their owner lock. A busy secret lock releases the transaction guards and retries up to three times. Continued contention returns a retryable conflict. Provider deletion stays outside that transaction; a retry resumes removal of an already disabled secret. Membership cleanup uses nonblocking credential guards and retries the full membership transaction. Slack search adds two grant queries, scoped to the subject and connection. Its retries occur before provider work or credential persistence. Each retry loop is limited to three attempts. Invalidation requests preparation; task-time authorization and provider session activation remain authoritative. Provider calls use fixtures; no live provider qualification is claimed. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with reasoning, repository inspection, code execution, and testing. The exact deployment model ID and context window are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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Agent runtime synchronization
Plugins can opt into committed agent runtime changes with
resourceLifecycle: ["agent_runtime"] and events.subscribe.
Implement onResourceLifecycle and handle update and delete.
Existing agent and project subscriptions do not receive this new resource type.
Manual inbox reads retain both legacy streams regardless of automatic subscriptions.
They include runtime events only when the manifest opts into agent_runtime.
An event contains company identity, agent identity in resourceId, a numeric
sequence serialized as id, and its action. It contains no file contents,
configuration, or credentials. Treat id as an opaque decimal revision, not a
JavaScript floating-point value. Delivery is at least once and ordered per agent.
Return acknowledged only after external effects finish. Return retry after an
unfinished operation, or deferred when configuration is missing. Startup,
plugin startup, and configuration changes recover unacknowledged work.
The host records configuration changes at the database mutation boundary. This covers API saves, rollback, plugin writes, and background writers. No-op updates and heartbeat accounting do not create runtime work. Instruction edits, file deletions, restores, and run writeback use the file audit boundary. Pending hires produce no update until approval. Returning to the ready lifecycle phase requests synchronization after preparation or resume. Existing agents receive a one-time baseline when the migration runs. Agent deletion leaves a durable delete event.
PostgreSQL notifications wake the existing durable dispatcher only after commit,
including writes through independent clients. Notifications carry no identifiers
or contents. The journal remains authoritative. The listener scans on connection
and reconnection so a dropped notification does not lose committed work. There
is no recurring empty-inbox poll. Existing retry deadlines still retry failed work.
A process opens one listener connection only after a ready plugin opts into
agent_runtime. The database connection must support session-level LISTEN;
transaction-mode poolers are not supported for this opt-in feature. Startup waits
for listener registration. It releases the listener after the last runtime
subscriber is disabled or removed. Legacy subscriptions keep process-local work signals.
A plugin that also has agents.lifecycle.manage can call
ctx.agents.getRuntime(agentId, companyId) from a company-scoped invocation.
Only the enabled, ready plugin selected in that agent's required lifecycle set
can read these inputs. The result supplies the latest runtime revision, the
normalized agent configuration, instruction root and entry filename, and that
plugin's own instance secrets. Instruction paths use the same managed-folder
recovery as the instruction reader. A missing or cross-company agent returns null.
The instruction root identifies host files that the trusted worker can package
through its existing filesystem access. This API grants no arbitrary path reads.
Never expose instance secrets through UI data, logs, plugin state, or agent files.
Re-read current state before external effects. A queued event can be older than the returned revision. Fence stale revisions at the destination and use its conditional writes. Current configuration is desired state, not a frozen run snapshot or permission to change an active provider session. Execution admission and provider activation keep their existing checks. The private transport consumer is a separate integration.
Filesystem changes outside Paperclip's managed write APIs do not emit these hooks. Filesystem publication and the database journal are not one filesystem transaction. A failed managed write must be repaired through the same API before claiming synchronization. Upstream repository detection remains owned by the source integration.
Successful file saves record the current desired state. Identical retries and
already-applied deletions repair a missing journal event if a prior save published
bytes before its database transaction failed. Audit rows carry their runtime
revision, so repeated identical saves against that revision create no audit rows
or events. Later runtime changes invalidate that deduplication. The file API still
returns changed: false for identical content and keeps conditional-write checks.
Consumers can skip rewriting content whose hash already matches.
Skills
Migration 0348 invalidates referencing agents when installed skill content, companion files, versions, source bindings, or identities change. Rename checks both old and new keys. String selections, structured selections, and supported legacy aliases are recognized. Unrelated agents and other companies receive no content invalidation. Private-source bindings, membership, and privacy changes invalidate only agents assigned skills from the affected sources. Project workspace authorization-policy changes use the same boundary. Company policy changes conservatively invalidate the company. Source retry/lease bookkeeping and skill popularity counters do not emit changes. Multi-skill source publication defers its skill invalidation until transaction commit, after it acquires all skill rows. This avoids an agent-lock/skill-lock cycle with concurrent version saves. Individual file edits retain immediate journaling and their existing filesystem rollback behavior.
Assignment edits already use the configuration boundary. The runtime reader returns selected skill entries with host source paths and immutable version IDs. It uses the execution resolver, current agent access, the instance pin flag, and legacy operational-skill rules. It performs no upstream refresh. The resolver can rebuild an expired version cache from saved bytes. Slow materialization happens outside the agent row lock. The reader rechecks ownership and revision afterward; it retries concurrent changes three times and then returns a conflict.
Pinned assignments receive conservative content invalidations too. Their resolved version and bytes stay pinned when pin support is enabled. Consumers can compare versions or destination hashes and avoid rewriting unchanged trees. Task-only skill mentions and a running task's saved version selection remain task-owned.
Standing connection assignments
getRuntime also returns connectionAssignments: effective publicMcp and
chatConnectors feature switches, installed connections with id, name,
transport, enabled, and status, and active profile IDs. It includes both
company assignments and assignments for the requested agent. It excludes other
agents' assignments and has no credential values, grant details, or tool schemas.
The owning-plugin checks for the runtime reader apply to this field too.
Migration 0354 records committed changes to every stored field used by this snapshot. Agent-targeted installation and profile binding edits invalidate only their old and new target agents. Company-targeted assignments invalidate company agent runtimes. Project, routine, issue, and gateway bindings are outside this snapshot and do not invalidate it. Connection metadata, profile activation or removal, and connector feature switches still use conservative company-wide invalidation. Empty writes and changes to health bookkeeping do not. Multiple assignment statements in one transaction coalesce to one update per agent. Journal writes and their triggering changes commit or roll back together. Company-wide invalidation remains synchronous: it locks eligible company agents in order and journals one update per agent. Its work grows with company size; there is no fanout ceiling or cross-transaction mutation quota.
The reader orders and deduplicates assignments. It rejects more than 512 connections or 128 active profiles with status 422 instead of returning a partial snapshot. It rechecks the revision after reading assignments and skills, with the same three-attempt conflict behavior described above.
Each delivery-service startup records one company baseline when an enabled runtime subscriber becomes active. This covers feature overlays supplied at process startup. It does not add a recurring scan. Plugins must compare desired state and destination hashes before rewriting external files.
Standing assignments express desired state; they do not prove task-specific authorization. Existing agent and skill invalidations still apply independently.
Tool definitions and configuration
Migration 0355 extends runtime invalidation to application and connection
configuration, catalog contents, profile entries, policies, and MCP gateways.
These changes use the same content-free journal, atomic commit behavior, and
transaction coalescing. Bulk discovery invalidates once per company per committed
chunk instead of once per tool. Unchanged rediscovery, health bookkeeping, and
trust-rule usage counters do not request preparation. Binding and installation
notifications retain the scoped recipients described above. Profile-entry changes
notify agents from the old and new profiles' standing bindings. Policies use
their old and new agentId and agentIds selectors, including their intersection
when both are set. Unscoped policies and company-bound profiles retain atomic
company fanout. Other definition changes still use conservative company-wide
fanout with the same documented company-size cost.
Profile entry mutations lock referenced applications, connections, and catalog rows before the parent profile. They then change the entries and parent in one transaction, using the reserved connection for validation and profile reads. Profile replacement locks both old and new references before the parent. It rechecks the reference set under the parent lock and retries up to three times if a concurrent entry edit changes it. Continued churn returns a conflict. Setup finalization and catalog publication can run concurrently without acquiring these locks in the opposite order. Policy reorder locks all affected policies in ID order and changes their priorities in one statement so scoped agent locks are ordered across the set. Connection removal locks the managed profile before deleting its entries in the same transaction.
The bounded assignment snapshot remains the API described above. An invalidation can advance its revision without changing its assignment fields. Consumers must use their existing authorized readers for tool definitions and configuration.
Access, credentials, and endpoints
Migration 0356 adds connection grants, grant audiences and delegations, company membership and permissions, secret bindings, chat/email endpoint configuration, and referenced credential rotation or revocation. Vault configuration and status changes invalidate companies whose connector credentials reference that vault. Vault health checks, OAuth grant refresh leases, Vercel verification timestamps, GitHub webhook health, and endpoint publication timestamps do not request work. Credential identifiers, expiry, and repository access changes remain covered. Events contain no credential values, phone numbers, or provider payloads.
Access changes conservatively invalidate eligible company agents because responsible-user and task-time access can vary across runs. Agent secret bindings instead invalidate their owning agent. Personal delegation creation, reassignment, and revocation invalidate only their old and new target agents. Whole-grant revocation and membership cleanup retain company invalidation. Unchanged grant audiences preserve their rows after membership validation.
OAuth persistence and membership cleanup lock affected grants before connection inputs and credential mutations. Each affected set is locked in ID order. Task completion locks existing grants before assignment inputs. Permission-only saves lock membership before replacing permissions, as role and status saves do. Slack search refresh, callbacks, and disconnect lock only the subject's grants before their connection. After locking the connection, they recheck the grants without waiting. A newly discovered busy grant rolls back and retries before provider work or credential persistence. Three failed attempts return a retryable conflict. Each operation adds two grant queries, bounded to the subject and connection. The existing connection lock still serializes provider refresh work.
Membership cleanup locks credential deletion candidates without waiting before company agent locks. A busy credential rolls back the complete membership transaction, including its membership and grant locks. All four cleanup entry points re-read their state on retry, with at most three attempts. Company-access changes process companies in ID order.
Personal delegation creation locks its grant, connection reference, and target agent before insertion. Delegation revocation locks its grant and target before deletion. Whole-grant and membership cleanup lock eligible company agents in ID order before deleting scoped delegations. Static-key reconnect locks grants and connection inputs before credential writes. Secret removal locks company agents in ID order before cascading into bindings. Plugin instance secrets cannot use ordinary bindings, so their removal retains its owner lock without a company sweep. It tries the secret lock without waiting, releases its transaction locks if that lock is busy, and retries up to three times. Continued contention returns a retryable conflict. Provider deletion stays outside that transaction; retrying resumes removal of the already disabled secret. These guards accompany the hooks that require them.
The runtime snapshot still excludes credentials and arbitrary configuration. Task-scoped profile bindings, responsible-user consent, gateway sessions, automatic connector skill overlays, and connection instructions remain in the existing run preparation path. Invalidation does not create a run identity or activate a provider session. Transport consumers must preserve those boundaries.