Files
PaperClipAI/doc/RELEASE-AUTOMATION-SETUP.md
T
Nicky LeachandClaude Opus 5.5 3a8f95d928 fix(ci): let verified Dependabot lockfiles merge through the reporting-lock gate (#19356)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Only trusted environments may change `pnpm-lock.yaml`: the lockfile
refresh workflow and Dependabot. Contributors never commit it.
> - Paid evaluation jobs also install a lock only when the
reporting-lock proof (`tests/runner-e2e/report-lock.json` and `.patch`)
admits it.
> - #19283 added a CI test that checks the committed lock against that
proof. Only the refresh workflow writes the proof, so every Dependabot
lockfile pull request now fails CI. Examples are #17364, #17172, and
#17911.
> - A merged Dependabot lockfile also breaks the refresh workflow.
`prepare-report-lock.mjs --refresh` refuses to renew the proof for a
lock that the proof does not already admit.
> - This pull request lets a verified Dependabot lockfile pass, and it
keeps both lockfile rules strict. It also closes a gap in the
contributor rule.
> - The benefit is that Dependabot security updates can merge again, and
only trusted environments write lock content.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19283, #17364, #17172, #17911, #19303.

**What happened?**
`server/scripts/reporting-lock-policy.test.mjs` fails on each Dependabot
pull request that changes `pnpm-lock.yaml`. The error is "Reporting lock
changed; review the dependency correction before install". A Dependabot
pull request cannot change the proof files, so it can never pass. After
a merge, the lockfile refresh also stops at "Committed report lock is
not reviewed; refusing to refresh its proof".

**Expected behavior**
- Contributors cannot change `pnpm-lock.yaml` or the reporting-lock
proof.
- Dependabot can change `pnpm-lock.yaml`.
- The lockfile refresh workflow can change `pnpm-lock.yaml` and the
proof.
- After a Dependabot lockfile merges, the refresh workflow admits it and
renews the proof.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Open a Dependabot pull request that changes `pnpm-lock.yaml`, such as
#17364.
2. Let CI run. The `server (9/12)` shard fails on the reporting-lock
policy test.

**Security gap found during this work**
The old rule skipped the lockfile check when `github.head_ref` was
`chore/refresh-lockfile`. A contributor could open a pull request from a
fork branch with that name and commit a lockfile change. The old rule
also exempted any pull request that Dependabot opened, including commits
that other people pushed to its branch.

## What Changed

- Add `.github/scripts/lockfile-trust.mjs`. It decides which writers may
change lock content:
- The refresh workflow: the head is `chore/refresh-lockfile` in this
repository, and `github-actions[bot]` opened the pull request.
- Dependabot: Dependabot opened the pull request from this repository,
and the head `pnpm-lock.yaml` matches a Dependabot commit. That commit
must have `dependabot[bot]` as its author, GitHub (`web-flow`) as its
committer, and a verified signature. The script reads these fields from
the GitHub API.
- The reporting-lock proof files count as lock content. Only the refresh
workflow may change them.
- `pr-trusted.yml` policy job: replace the inline `head_ref` and author
exemption with `lockfile-trust.mjs pr`. The job runs the script copy
from the base commit, so a pull request cannot change the check that
judges it. If the base predates the script, the job uses the earlier
rule.
- `refresh-lockfile.yml`: add `lockfile-trust.mjs merged`. It checks
that the last lockfile change on `master` is a GitHub-signed merge of a
Dependabot pull request, and that the lockfile at the pull request head
matches a verified Dependabot commit. If both checks pass, it gives the
lockfile SHA-256 to `prepare-report-lock.mjs --refresh
--trusted-lock-sha256`.
- `refresh-lockfile.yml` PR step: check `pnpm-lock.yaml` and both proof
files before it exits as unchanged. A refresh that renews only the proof
now opens a pull request.
- `prepare-report-lock.mjs` and its `.d.mts` declaration:
`refreshReportLock` accepts a trusted lock hash. If the trusted lock
already resolves, the proof admits it exactly with an empty patch. If
not, the proof records the resolution as the reviewed correction, as
before.
- `reporting-lock-policy.test.mjs`: skip on Dependabot pull requests.
The policy job verifies those lockfiles. The general test job gets
`PAPERCLIP_CI_PR_AUTHOR` for this purpose. This keeps the test, so it
still merges cleanly with #19303.
- `check-pr-lockfile.mjs` (advisory gate): allow Dependabot lockfile
changes, and flag changes to the proof files.
- `CODEOWNERS`: add the two proof files.
- `doc/RELEASE-AUTOMATION-SETUP.md`: describe the writers, the
`@dependabot recreate` path, and the proof renewal after merge.

## Verification

- `node --test '.github/scripts/tests/*.test.mjs'`: 707 passed. This
includes 17 new tests in `lockfile-trust.test.mjs` and 3 new tests in
`check-pr-lockfile.test.mjs`. The new tests run the `pr` command against
real git histories with a stub `gh`.
- `tests/runner-e2e/prepare-report-lock.test.ts`: 10 passed, including 3
new trusted-lock refresh tests. I ran it with a minimal Vitest config,
because the runner-e2e config builds a provider bundle first.
- `server/scripts/reporting-lock-policy.test.mjs`: passes normally, and
skips with `PAPERCLIP_CI_PR_AUTHOR=dependabot[bot]`.
- Live check of the `pr` mode against #17364 with the real GitHub API:
- With the real author, it reports "pnpm-lock.yaml matches verified
Dependabot commit 83c328c15c…" and `writer=dependabot`.
- With a contributor as the author and `chore/refresh-lockfile` as the
head ref, it fails.
- Live check of the `merged` mode at the real merge commits of #16018,
#16020, and #15361. All three report a trusted lock hash. For #16018 and
#15361, `master` changed after Dependabot's commit, so GitHub's merge
produced different lockfile bytes. An exact-bytes rule would refuse
them. That is why the rule trusts GitHub-signed merges of a verified
Dependabot head.
- Greptile reviewed `513ca2def8` at 4/5 with one P1: a proof-only
refresh was never committed, because the PR step checked only
`pnpm-lock.yaml`. `edbeb1ea0d` fixes it. A new test in
`lockfile-refresh-merge.test.mjs` runs the step's change check on a
proof-only change. The test fails without the fix.
- CI `Typecheck + Release Registry` failed at `edbeb1ea0d`:
`prepare-report-lock.d.mts` did not declare the new options argument
(TS2554 twice in `prepare-report-lock.test.ts`). `9139aaad85` updates
the declaration. A local `tsc -p tests/runner-e2e/tsconfig.json` shows
the 2 errors with the old declaration and none with the new one.
- CI at `9139aaad85` failed in six general test shards. None of them run
code that this pull request changes, and PR CI loads `pr-trusted.yml`
from `master`. The failures:
- `heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts`: "expected 'running' to be
'succeeded'"
  - `status-card-evaluation-work.test.ts`: a deadline comparison
  - `isolated-repository-rehome.test.ts`: timed out after 15 seconds
- `chat-channels.integration.test.ts`: GitHub webhook recovery
scheduling
- `company-import-export-e2e.test.ts`: child server start timeout, which
also fails on unrelated branches
- `workspaces-b`: every test passed, but an `EPIPE` error came after
`acpx-engine/execute.test.ts`
  I started a rerun of the failed jobs.
- Superagent found a P1 at `9139aaad85`: a verified signature proves who
committed, not who authored. A collaborator could sign a commit with
their own key and set Dependabot as the author. `4fe180d6c1` also
requires GitHub (`web-flow`) as the committer. New tests cover the
spoofed-author case. #17364, #16018, #16020 and #15361 still verify
against the GitHub API.
- `git merge-file` merges this test change with #19303 without
conflicts.
- Not run: the full repository test suite and typecheck. These changes
touch only CI scripts, workflows, one helper, and tests. GitHub CI
covers full regression.

## Risks

- `pr-trusted.yml` loads from `master`, so the new policy takes effect
only after merge. This pull request's own CI uses the earlier rule.
- A Dependabot pull request that is behind `master` now fails if someone
merges `master` into it and the lockfile changes. Use `@dependabot
recreate`. The policy job error says this.
- Paid evaluation jobs refuse a merged Dependabot lockfile until the
refresh pull request merges. The refresh merges without review when it
adds no new package versions. If the release-age gate holds it, the wait
lasts until a maintainer merges it or the daily refresh runs. During
that time, the reporting-lock policy test also fails on other pull
requests, which is the current behavior for any unrenewed lock.
- The rule trusts GitHub as the signer of Dependabot commits and of
merge commits (`web-flow`). Superagent uses the same trust root.
- People with write access can still push to `chore/refresh-lockfile`.
This was already true. The bot merges only its own head commit
(`--match-head-commit`), and code-owner review covers anything else.
- A future manual proof renewal, such as #19283, now needs the refresh
workflow or an admin merge. A contributor pull request that changes the
proof files fails.

## Model Used

- Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), with tool use and code
execution, in Claude Code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (focused tests; see
Verification)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-05 16:42:26 -08:00

25 KiB

Release Automation Setup

This document covers the GitHub and npm setup required for the current Paperclip release model:

  • automatic canaries from master
  • manual stable promotion from a chosen source ref
  • npm trusted publishing via GitHub OIDC
  • protected release infrastructure in a public repository

Repo-side files that depend on this setup:

  • .github/workflows/release.yml
  • .github/CODEOWNERS

Note:

  • the release workflows intentionally use pnpm install --no-frozen-lockfile
  • this matches the repo's current policy where pnpm-lock.yaml is refreshed by GitHub automation after manifest changes land on master
  • the publish jobs then restore pnpm-lock.yaml before running scripts/release.sh, so the release script still sees a clean worktree

1. Merge the Repo Changes First

Before touching GitHub or npm settings, merge the release automation code so the referenced workflow filenames already exist on the default branch.

Required files:

  • .github/workflows/release.yml
  • .github/CODEOWNERS

2. Configure npm Trusted Publishing

Do this for every public package that Paperclip publishes.

At minimum that includes:

  • paperclipai
  • @paperclipai/server
  • @paperclipai/ui
  • public packages under packages/

2.1. In npm, open each package settings page

For each package:

  1. open npm as an owner of the package
  2. go to the package settings / publishing access area
  3. add a trusted publisher for the GitHub repository paperclipai/paperclip

2.2. Add one trusted publisher entry per package

npm currently allows one trusted publisher configuration per package.

Configure:

  • workflow: .github/workflows/release.yml

Repository:

  • paperclipai/paperclip

Environment name:

  • leave the npm trusted-publisher environment field blank

Why:

  • the single release.yml workflow handles both canary and stable publishing
  • GitHub environments npm-canary and npm-stable still enforce different approval rules on the GitHub side

2.2.1. Newly added public packages need a bootstrap phase

Trusted publishing is configured on the npm package itself, not at the repo scope. That means a brand-new public package must not be auto-enrolled into CI publishing until its npm package exists and its trusted publisher has been configured.

Repo policy:

  1. add every non-private package to scripts/release-package-manifest.json
  2. set "publishFromCi": true only when CI is expected to publish that package
  3. if the package is not ready for CI publishing yet, keep "publishFromCi": false
  4. complete the package bootstrap before merging any PR that changes a release-enabled new package

Bootstrap sequence for a new package:

  1. publish the package once from a trusted maintainer machine using normal npm auth
  2. open that package on npm and add the paperclipai/paperclip trusted publisher for .github/workflows/release.yml
  3. rerun or dry-run the release flow as needed to confirm CI publishing now works
  4. only then enable "publishFromCi": true

PR CI enforces this by checking changed release-enabled package manifests against npm. That keeps master canary publishing healthy while preserving the no-long-lived-token model for normal CI releases.

2.3. Verify trusted publishing before removing old auth

After the workflows are live:

  1. run a canary publish
  2. confirm npm publish succeeds without any NPM_TOKEN
  3. run a stable dry-run
  4. run one real stable publish

Only after that should you remove old token-based access.

3. Remove Legacy npm Tokens

After trusted publishing works:

  1. revoke any repository or organization NPM_TOKEN secrets used for publish
  2. revoke any personal automation token that used to publish Paperclip
  3. if npm offers a package-level setting to restrict publishing to trusted publishers, enable it

Goal:

  • no long-lived npm publishing token should remain in GitHub Actions

4. Create GitHub Environments

Create three environments in the GitHub repository:

  • npm-canary
  • npm-beta
  • npm-stable

Path:

  1. GitHub repository
  2. Settings
  3. Environments
  4. New environment

5. Configure npm-canary

Recommended settings for npm-canary:

  • environment name: npm-canary
  • required reviewers: none
  • wait timer: none
  • deployment branches and tags:
    • selected branches only
    • allow master

Reasoning:

  • every push to master should be able to publish a canary automatically
  • no human approval should be required for canaries

The scheduled nightly lane also publishes under npm-canary: it is the same trust level (fully automated, no human gate), its runs execute on master so the branch rule is satisfied, and reusing the environment means the nightly lane required no new environments and no npm trusted-publisher changes (publishing still happens from release.yml, see section 2.2).

5.1. Configure npm-beta

Recommended settings for npm-beta:

  • environment name: npm-beta
  • required reviewers: at least one maintainer
  • prevent self-review: enabled when your team size allows it
  • wait timer: none
  • deployment branches and tags:
    • selected branches only
    • allow master

Reasoning:

  • beta promotions are deliberate human decisions; the required reviewer on this environment is the promotion gate
  • create this environment before the first channel: beta dispatch. If the workflow runs first, GitHub auto-creates the environment with no protection rules, and that first beta would publish without approval

Like nightly, beta publishing lives in release.yml, so no npm trusted-publisher changes are needed (see section 2.2).

6. Configure npm-stable

Recommended settings for npm-stable:

  • environment name: npm-stable
  • required reviewers: at least one maintainer other than the person triggering the workflow when possible
  • prevent self-review: enabled
  • admin bypass: disabled if your team can tolerate it
  • wait timer: optional
  • deployment branches and tags:
    • selected branches only
    • allow master

Reasoning:

  • stable publishes should require an explicit human approval gate
  • the workflow is manual, but the environment should still be the real control point

7. Protect master

Open the branch protection settings for master.

Recommended rules:

  1. require pull requests before merging
  2. require status checks to pass before merging
  3. require review from code owners
  4. dismiss stale approvals when new commits are pushed
  5. restrict who can push directly to master

At minimum, make sure workflow and release script changes cannot land without review.

8. Enforce CODEOWNERS Review

This repo now includes .github/CODEOWNERS, but GitHub only enforces it if branch protection requires code owner reviews.

In branch protection for master, enable:

  • Require review from Code Owners

Then verify the owner entries are correct for your actual maintainer set.

Current file:

  • .github/CODEOWNERS

If @cryppadotta is not the right reviewer identity in the public repo, change it before enabling enforcement.

8.1. Let the Lockfile Bot Merge Lockfile Refreshes

.github/workflows/refresh-lockfile.yml regenerates pnpm-lock.yaml from the manifests on master and merges the result without CI or review. Only trusted environments write lock content, and contributors never commit it. Two writers can change pnpm-lock.yaml:

  • this workflow, on its chore/refresh-lockfile branch
  • Dependabot, but only when the lockfile in its pull request matches a verified Dependabot commit

The reporting-lock proof (tests/runner-e2e/report-lock.json and report-lock.patch) controls the lock that paid evaluation jobs install, so it counts as lock content too. Only this workflow writes it.

.github/scripts/lockfile-trust.mjs enforces these rules in the pr-trusted.yml policy job. The job runs the copy of the script from the base commit, so a pull request cannot change the check that judges it. To update a Dependabot pull request that is behind master, comment @dependabot recreate. Do not merge master into its branch, because a merged lockfile no longer matches Dependabot's commit.

After a Dependabot lockfile merges, this workflow renews the proof. It first confirms three things: GitHub signed the merge commit, Dependabot opened the pull request, and the lockfile at the pull request head matches a verified Dependabot commit. It then records the merged lockfile in the proof and merges the refresh like any other. Paid evaluation jobs refuse the new lockfile until that refresh merges.

Resolution keeps locked versions, but it picks the newest matching version for an added or widened dependency. A release-age gate (.github/scripts/check-lockfile-release-age.mjs) therefore checks every package version that the refresh adds. The bot merges only when each one has been on npm for at least 3 days. If any version is newer, or the gate cannot verify it, the bot leaves a comment on the PR and does not merge. A maintainer can review and merge it, or the daily scheduled refresh merges it after the versions are old enough. A held run saves its lockfile, and the hash of the master lockfile it started from, as an artifact. The next run resolves from that lockfile only while master still has the same lockfile. Held versions therefore stay put while their manifests are unchanged, even when newer releases appear, and a lockfile change on master replaces them. The gate also holds any added entry whose resolution is not a plain npm registry tarball. Change the age with --min-age-days in the workflow.

The merge uses a dedicated GitHub App. Do not reuse commitperclip or bypass the built-in github-actions app. Those identities are available to other workflows, including release jobs that run dependency install scripts, so a bypass for them would let any of those workflows land code on master.

  1. Create an organization-owned GitHub App, for example paperclip-lockfile-bot:
    • Disable the webhook.
    • Repository permissions: Contents: Read and write, Pull requests: Read and write. Leave everything else at No access.
    • Allow installation only on this account.
  2. Install the app on paperclipai/paperclip only.
  3. Create a GitHub environment named lockfile-refresh. Under deployment branches and tags, allow only master. Add no required reviewers.
  4. In that environment, add:
    • variable LOCKFILE_BOT_CLIENT_ID: the app's client ID
    • secret LOCKFILE_BOT_PRIVATE_KEY: a private key generated for the app
  5. In the master ruleset, add the app as a bypass actor with bypass mode For pull requests only. The app can then merge PRs past required checks and code owner review, but it cannot push to master directly.

The workflow mints the app token after dependency resolution finishes and merges only the commit it pushed (--match-head-commit). A commit anyone else pushes to chore/refresh-lockfile makes the merge fail.

9. Protect Release Infrastructure Specifically

These files should always trigger code owner review:

  • .github/workflows/release.yml
  • scripts/release.sh
  • scripts/release-lib.sh
  • scripts/release-package-map.mjs
  • scripts/create-github-release.sh
  • scripts/rollback-latest.sh
  • doc/RELEASING.md
  • doc/PUBLISHING.md

If you want stronger controls, add a repository ruleset that explicitly blocks direct pushes to:

  • .github/workflows/**
  • scripts/release*

10. Do Not Store a Claude Token in GitHub Actions

Do not add a personal Claude or Anthropic token for automatic changelog generation.

Recommended policy:

  • stable changelog generation happens locally from a trusted maintainer machine
  • canaries never generate changelogs

This keeps LLM spending intentional and avoids a high-value token sitting in Actions.

11. Verify the Canary Workflow

After setup:

  1. merge a harmless commit to master
  2. open the Release workflow run triggered by that push
  3. confirm it passes verification
  4. confirm publish succeeds under the npm-canary environment
  5. confirm npm now shows a new canary release
  6. confirm a git tag named canary/vYYYY.MDD.P-canary.N was pushed

Install-path check:

npm install --prefix "$(mktemp -d)" paperclipai@canary --no-audit --no-fund

The release script runs this clean-prefix install after publishing every workspace package dependency-first and publishing paperclipai last. A package that is not yet registry-visible stops the train before the channel entrypoint can advance.

12. Verify the Stable Workflow

After at least one good canary exists:

  1. resolve the target stable version with ./scripts/release.sh stable --date YYYY-MM-DD --print-version
  2. prepare releases/vYYYY.MDD.P.md on the source commit you want to promote
  3. open Actions -> Release
  4. run it with:
    • source_ref: the tested commit SHA or canary tag source commit
    • stable_date: leave blank or set the intended UTC date like 2026-03-18 do not enter a version like 2026.318.0; the workflow computes that from the date
    • dry_run: true
  5. confirm the dry-run succeeds
  6. rerun with dry_run: false
  7. approve the npm-stable environment when prompted
  8. confirm npm latest points to the new stable version
  9. confirm git tag vYYYY.MDD.P exists
  10. confirm the GitHub Release was created

Implementation note:

  • the GitHub Actions stable workflow calls create-github-release.sh with PUBLISH_REMOTE=origin
  • local maintainer usage can still pass PUBLISH_REMOTE=public-gh explicitly when needed

13. Suggested Maintainer Policy

Use this policy going forward:

  • canaries are automatic and cheap
  • stables are manual and approved
  • only stables get public notes and announcements
  • release notes are committed before stable publish
  • rollback uses npm dist-tag, not unpublish

14. Troubleshooting

Trusted publishing fails with an auth error

Check:

  1. the workflow filename on GitHub exactly matches the filename configured in npm
  2. the package has the trusted publisher entry for the correct repository
  3. the job has id-token: write
  4. the job is running from the expected repository, not a fork

Stable workflow runs but never asks for approval

Check:

  1. the publish job uses environment npm-stable
  2. the environment actually has required reviewers configured
  3. the workflow is running in the canonical repository, not a fork

CODEOWNERS does not trigger

Check:

  1. .github/CODEOWNERS is on the default branch
  2. branch protection on master requires code owner review
  3. the owner identities in the file are valid reviewers with repository access

Runner verification dependency cache

release-verify.yml runs Verify Paperclip Runner on two independent runners. The protocol lane runs check:eval-kernel and check:protocol. The Rust lane runs check:runner and check:api-authority. Together they retain every check in check:all; both lanes must pass before Cloud source verification or readiness can succeed. A failed lane does not cancel the other lane.

Both lanes restore Cargo dependencies with the pinned Rust Cache action. The compiler comes from the Runner package's rust-toolchain.toml before the action computes its key. Compiler and Cargo metadata changes select a new cache. The release-runner-v2 shared key avoids separate copies for these lanes. Its suffix hashes the virtual workspace's runner/Cargo.toml and ancestor Cargo configuration. Rust Cache discovers member manifests through Cargo metadata, which omits this virtual manifest. Without the suffix, changing [profile.dev] can restore an exact but obsolete dependency cache on every run. GitHub caches are immutable, so the successful rebuild cannot replace that old entry. The profile/configuration hash also partitions fallback restores. Every reader and writer uses the same inputs, including the separate typecheck and cross-target caches. Only the Rust lane saves this cache. After verification it also runs build:rust to warm the debug dependencies used by the protocol lane; its own tests already warm release dependencies. The cache writer is shorter than the protocol lane.

GitHub matches a cache entry on its key and on a version hash of the absolute paths in the entry. The master writer runs on the RunsOn fleet, where the checkout is /home/runner/_work/paperclip/paperclip. The trusted PR workflow restores the same entry read-only on GitHub-hosted runners, where the checkout is /home/runner/work/paperclip/paperclip. A Pin the Runner Rust workspace path step in both workflows links $HOME/paperclip-runner-rust to the Runner crate and passes that path to the cache action, so both layouts hash the same paths and the PR lanes can restore master's entry. The guard tests under .github/scripts/tests/ require this step, with identical text, before every Rust cache step in both workflows.

Workspace crates and installed Cargo binaries are excluded from this entry. Every run runs all assigned checks, including on a cache hit. In release verification, only an own-repository master-push run verifying that push's exact SHA can restore the cache, and only a successful Rust lane saves it. The PR workflow restores master's cache read only. Tag and manual candidate release verification compile without this cache. A miss or eviction costs compilation time but does not change the checks. To discard old dependency caches, increment the shared-key version and let the next successful master verification warm it.

Installed JavaScript dependencies

setup-ci-dependencies can restore exact node_modules trees and separately certified shared/SDK build outputs. scripts/ci-dependency-cache.mjs hashes manifests, resolution, patches, install scripts, and the runtime/checkout layout. The root workspace-link hook and the server/Runner Copilot asset hooks are known postinstall commands. An exact dependency restore replays these hooks before validating workspace links and build outputs. Copilot defers installation in an unbuilt source checkout; its normal build installs and verifies the assets. Provider assets are not included in the dependency cache. Any unrecognized workspace lifecycle hook still disables materialized reuse. Only a frozen install from the canonical master push can publish the shared entries.

For CI cache changes, the profile-ci label runs the paired setup benchmark and exercises restored dependencies with the shared-package tests. The longer server test comparison runs when its measured scripts or fixtures change; cache-only changes do not require unchanged test commands to run faster. It also builds Rust units on one GitHub-hosted runner and restores the dependency and workspace caches on a second runner with a fresh checkout. Both restores must be exact, and Cargo must report every unit as fresh. These qualification caches are scoped to the PR and run; they cannot populate master's caches.

Runner release crate cache

The dependency entry leaves the Runner's own crate out, and a fresh checkout invalidates cargo's mtime fingerprints for workspace crates anyway, so every pull request build compiled paperclip-runner-core in release mode from scratch (28-49s per job on 2026-10-11) although most master commits leave its inputs untouched. A second, content-addressed entry holds only that crate's release artifacts: its fingerprints, the lib's rlib and rmeta, the paperclip-runnerd binary and their dep-info, about 70 MB. The path list and the key inputs live in scripts/runner-release-crate-cache.mjs, which both workflows call, and scripts/__tests__/runner-release-crate-cache.test.mjs holds the readers and the writer to them.

The key is runner-release-crate-v1-<scope>-<hashFiles>. The scope names the platform, the pinned compiler (rustc --version --verbose: release, commit and host) and a hash of the checkout root, because cargo's dep-info records the protocol files the crate includes by relative path as absolute paths. The hashFiles part covers every input the build reads: the toolchain pin, the manifests and lockfile, the crate sources, the protocol schemas and fixtures, and the three fixture trees the test modules include (two under the Runner package and tests/runner-e2e/fixtures at the repository root). Any change to any of them selects a new key. A guard test resolves every include_str! and include_bytes! in the crate, whether its argument is a literal or a concat! of literals, env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR") and macro metavariables, and fails on an include that lands outside these patterns or uses a form it cannot resolve. Readers pass no restore-keys: a prefix match would hand cargo another revision's output.

The writer is the Rust lane of the same master-push verification, after its checks and the debug warm-up. It looks the key up first and, on a miss, runs cargo clean --release -p paperclip-runner-core and then the package's build:binary (the exact command the readers run) before saving, so the entry carries no test-profile variants. In the trusted PR workflow, the Typecheck, Build and Canary Dry Run jobs and the two Verify Paperclip Runner lanes that build the crate (rust and the final vitest shard) restore the entry read-only right after the dependency restore. On a hit, mark-current sets the mtime of every restored artifact to now, so cargo's freshness check sees every source as older than the build and keeps the artifacts. A restore that lacks any file cargo reads or checks for either unit (the fingerprint hash and dep-info of each unit, the lib's rlib and rmeta, the binary under deps; measured with cargo 1.97.1, which recompiles without any one of them and recreates the uplifted binary without any of the rest) is removed instead, the job log names the missing file, and cargo compiles as on a miss. pnpm build then prints Finished release profile in well under a second for that crate. On a miss nothing changes: cargo compiles the crate as before.

The trust boundary is unchanged: only master writes, a pull request can only restore master's entry, and it restores only artifacts built from inputs byte-identical to its own merge tree.

The trust boundary is the protected master branch, not the cache-key text. GitHub does not let master restore caches created by a child branch, sibling branch, tag, or PR merge ref. Both permitted restore scopes (current branch and default branch) are master here. A workflow with authority to execute arbitrary code on master can affect verification directly and is already trusted. The cache contains dependency build artifacts, not credentials or workspace output. See GitHub cache access restrictions.

Chat integration test shards

Release verification runs the large chat integration file on three independent runners. Five other server shards cover every remaining general server file. The ordinary local test command and trusted PR workflow keep their complete general-server group. Each chat case shuts down its services, pauses its own still-active endpoints, and retires its active/waiting conversations after assertions. This keeps workers in later cases from claiming earlier fixtures in the shared test database. Application assertions stay unchanged.

Each chat job collects active tests with Vitest, groups cases by source line, and balances those groups by case count. Parameterized cases and loop-generated cases on one line stay together. The job re-collects with the exact line filters it will execute and fails if the selected case identities differ. Hooks and test execution remain sequential inside each runner with its own temporary home.

Run one shard locally with:

pnpm test:run:general -- --group general-chat --shard-index 0 --shard-count 3

Use indexes 0, 1, and 2 to run the complete chat suite. The CLI validates that each shard has work and that collection includes usable source locations. A Vitest collection or filtering change fails verification instead of dropping tests. Splitting adds three release-verification jobs and repeats collection and fixture setup; it does not make a single test faster.

The file-duration manifest also records the native Codex Runner integration suite's measured import and execution cost, so the existing file balancer accounts for it in both ordinary PR and release verification.

Cloud readiness runner placement

When AWS routing is enabled, Cloud image builds use paperclip-cloud-build-x64 and source verification uses paperclip-post-merge-x64. The artifact wait and the Cloud source verified v1 and Cloud deployable v1 marker jobs run on GitHub-hosted runners. These small jobs must not hold or wait for capacity in the source-verification fleet. During a merge burst, even a completed build must wait for its marker before consumers can recognize readiness.

Runner placement does not change readiness requirements: exact-source artifacts, all source checks, and the image verification must still pass. The versioned markers and their dependency gates are unchanged.