## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Cloud sets managed feature values for each tenant stack. > - Staging lets admins change experimental features. > - The staging exception also let old tenant false values override Cloud true values. > - This could disable required features such as isolated workspaces. > - This pull request keeps every Cloud-enabled feature on and rejects attempts to disable it. > - The same rule applies to staging, production, and managed stacks without a hostname. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs: #16876 **What happened?** The staging override added in #16876 treats managed true values as editable defaults. A stored tenant false value can disable a feature that Cloud enables. Settings writes also accept attempts to disable Cloud-enabled features. **Expected behavior** If Cloud sets a feature to true, the tenant reads true and cannot turn it off. This applies to every managed stack. Staging can still change allowed experiments that Cloud has not enabled. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Set a managed staging primary hostname and enable isolated workspaces in `PAPERCLIP_MANAGED_CONFIG`. 2. Start with `enableIsolatedWorkspaces: false` in the tenant settings row. 3. Read `/api/instance/settings/experimental`. Before this fix, staging returns false. 4. Try to PATCH that flag to false. After this fix, the API returns 403 without saving, and reads return true with managed control metadata. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced against master at `cde944ed75648adfb569e86133adc8b118b55dd6`. ## What Changed - Keep managed true values in the staging read overlay. They override old tenant values and lock the existing UI controls. - Reject attempts to set any Cloud-enabled feature to false before writing settings. - Cover every managed feature in service tests across staging, production, and an absent hostname. Add real-service HTTP tests for isolation on staging and production. - Update operator documentation and the feature and access maps. ## Verification - Confirmed the new service regression fails before the fix: staging returns stored false, and writes can attempt to disable enabled flags. - Passed all six focused settings suites: 168 tests. Passed the final route and overlay suites after adding the HTTP regression: 109 tests. - Passed existing experimental settings UI tests: 54 tests. These cover the existing managed-control behavior. - Passed `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` and `git diff --check`. - Passed `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build`. The first typecheck used an install that did not honor locked versions and hit an unrelated `@pierre/diffs` API mismatch. Reinstalling from the lockfile resolved it; no lockfile changes are included. - Full CI passed on `f43136812a92ec838a24f0c423270e4fbd997c28`: 55 successful checks, one neutral review check, and two expected skips. This includes typecheck, build, general and serialized tests, runner checks, and E2E shards. [CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39411907756). - The duplicate local `pnpm test:run` was stopped after the complete CI matrix passed. It is not counted as a completed local full-suite pass. - Greptile reviewed `f43136812a92ec838a24f0c423270e4fbd997c28`: 5/5 with no outstanding findings. The only finding on the first review was the repository rule against new code comments; those comments were removed. ## Risks - Staging users can no longer disable a feature that Cloud enables. This is the intended behavior. - Clients that send a stale full settings form containing false for a Cloud-enabled feature receive 403 and must reload. - No database migration is needed. Stored false values remain in the database, but cannot override an active Cloud true value. - Cloud-disabled staging experiments remain editable. Production restrictions and self-hosted settings remain unchanged. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, `gpt-6.1-sol`, with reasoning, repository tools, and test execution. The context window size is not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
6.6 KiB
Installation, configuration, updates, and backups — agent access
Product map: Installation, configuration, updates, and backups.
Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: f981fa3cc10cb8663a87dec60345fbff46d54d0a.
This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps. Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the map contract for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.
install-update
Review: baseline.
API: not-applicable — No uniform company REST updater API. Treat pre-start
installation as an operator exception or design an explicit delegated operator API.
Agent access: operator-only — Existing CLI install/update/rollback commands.
Policy: Local machine operator and instance-administrator authority; distinct from company-scoped agent keys.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise the listed local workflow in an authorized, owned
operator environment. Verify its isolation and result; do not count local machine
authority as company-agent API access.
Gaps: No uniform company REST updater API. Treat pre-start installation as an operator exception or design an explicit delegated operator API.
server-service
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
GET /api/health.
Agent access: operator-only — Existing CLI service/dev controls; health REST; owned
workspace services have separate agent APIs.
Policy: Local machine operator and instance-administrator authority; distinct from company-scoped agent keys.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise the listed local workflow in an authorized, owned
operator environment. Verify its isolation and result; do not count local machine
authority as company-agent API access.
Gaps: Instance start/stop and task workspace start/stop are different capabilities. Local service control is not agent company authority.
configuration
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
GET /api/instance/settings.PATCH /api/instance/settings.GET /api/instance/settings/experimental.PATCH /api/instance/settings/experimental.
Agent access: restricted — Board/admin instance settings; CLI configure/env; local
configuration files.
Policy: Local machine operator and instance-administrator authority; distinct from company-scoped agent keys.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: Settings APIs cover parts of configuration; pre-start database/binding/storage configuration is local operator tooling.
Cloud stack Admins may update experimental settings through the trusted Cloud
actor without receiving other instance-admin powers. This uses the current
stack role on each request; company membership alone does not grant it.
Members, Support users, agents, and ordinary self-hosted sessions remain denied.
Cloud staging exposes experimental controls to instance admins and stack Admins.
It permits saved overrides of Cloud-disabled experimental defaults. Cloud-enabled
features remain true on every managed stack, including staging, and the settings
service rejects attempts to disable them with 403 before saving.
This exception requires a managed instance
and a provisioner-supplied *.staging.paperclip.app primary hostname; request
headers do not establish staging. Ordinary board members and agents still cannot
mutate instance settings. Only an explicit feature allowlist is editable on staging. Cloud
owner-admin elevation and managed-sandbox execution policy remain managed, and
production policy and other Cloud floors remain.
Local route tests
cover stack Admin experiment access and auditing, denial for other instance
controls and actor sources, hidden-setting restrictions, and a spoofed request hostname;
the Cloud actor tests
cover role changes and preserved instance-admin isolation;
no live Cloud or agent-credential verification is claimed.
diagnostics
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
GET /api/health.GET /api/livenessandHEAD /api/liveness— public process startup status and build commit only; no database readiness or workspace identity.
Liveness is anonymous and runs before actor/session resolution. Hostname and signed-bootstrap endpoint validation still apply. It grants no instance control authority. Liveness tests cover idle drain, invalid ambient credentials, unavailable SQL, and startup recovery with local Express fixtures; no live provider or agent access is claimed.
Agent access: partial — REST health plus local CLI doctor.
Policy: Local machine operator and instance-administrator authority; distinct from company-scoped agent keys.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Health is an API; full local doctor/repair inspects host configuration and is not equivalent to that response.
backup
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/instance/database-backups.
Agent access: restricted — Board/admin backup API; local CLI db:backup; restore into
an authorized separate target.
Policy: Local machine operator and instance-administrator authority; distinct from company-scoped agent keys.
Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: API creation exists. Restore/lifecycle are operator workflows rather than ordinary company agent capabilities.