mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
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## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Connections provide governed tools, chat channels, model accounts,
and gateways.
> - Several management routes require a human board actor even when an
agent has the required grant.
> - Default agents must configure these resources within the responsible
user's authority.
> - This pull request adds a shared authorization path to the existing
REST and native API surface.
> - Human authentication, execution approvals, and local host boundaries
remain enforced.
> - The benefit is that a standard agent can complete authorized setup
with a bounded human handoff.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Subsystem affected**
Server authorization, connection services, shared contracts, native API
discovery, database schema.
**Problem or motivation**
Connection administration is available in the web app but often
unavailable to agents. Agent grants, responsible-user authority,
credential ownership, and actor attribution need separate checks.
Opening gateway-token creation also requires preserving the issuing
agent's delegated authority during token use.
**Proposed solution**
Use the existing authorization evaluator for every connection family.
Enforce current responsible-user authority, effective trust, grant
scope, resource visibility, and target-agent access. Keep existing agent
grants unchanged. Expose authorized configuration through default
`search_api` and `call_api`. Save human authentication steps and let
agents continue after completion.
**Roadmap alignment**
This change completes the API access path for the existing Connected
Apps, Personal & Shared AI Accounts, and governed MCP Gateway
capabilities in `ROADMAP.md`. It follows the maintainer's requested
design. Related work: #11899 enforces connection execution access and
creator/manager rules; this PR extends agent management across
connection families. It does not replace that execution-policy work.
## What Changed
- Add shared connection management context and mandatory
responsible-user, trust, scope, and target checks.
- Allow authorized agents to configure tool, chat/email, GitHub/Slack,
AI, profile, and gateway resources through existing routes.
- Preserve human credential ownership and record the actual agent,
responsible user, and run or key in audit data.
- Preserve saved browser authentication handoffs and callback session
checks.
- Bind agent-issued durable gateway tokens to their responsible user and
recheck delegated authority at use.
- Add explicit REST transport and management capability metadata,
built-in guidance, and sensitive-response handling.
- Intersect caller and endpoint-agent Slack test/invitation policies,
including independent and shared rates. Require the addressed human’s
current endpoint identity link before completing identity handoffs.
- Add production-authenticated integration scenarios. Companion #17739
contains the saved setup UI (including the required human
import/rotation step), product and permission documentation,
catalog/Vercel credential and callback ownership, and operation maps to
keep each review below 100 files. Both PRs must ship together; merge
this implementation first, then its companion.
## Verification
- Current implementation head:
`2ecd6451d0d0c8d82121a4e3fa4ce94c5befbbd6`, including master
`ea727dc3c2`, 99 files. The latest follow-up fixes the two valid
findings from the preceding f9 review. Exact-head Greptile has completed
at5/5 with no findings and Superagent passed. Full exact-head Linux CI
workflow40446606056 completed SUCCESS; only the queued external
Paperclip Review remains pending; earlier Linux passes do not qualify
this successor.
- Latest preserved-stack verification passed **2,165 tests** in fresh
PostgreSQL: **70 actual-auth scenarios**, 27 OpenAPI contracts, 2,022
native API tests and 46 saved GitHub wizard cases. **141 existing
gateway/policy acceptance tests** also passed. Workspace
typecheck/build, maps and token gates passed. The first workspace
typecheck was blocked by sandbox tsx IPC permissions; its authorized
rerun passed. This is focused local evidence; the full Linux CI matrix
is still required.
- Issuer/target gateway policy regressions were red before the fix. Both
decisions now intersect, including Block/Ask first/rates, same
credential identity and current token/user/agent authority after
approval. Invocations retain their token and actual requesting agent;
deleted tokens fail closed. Thirteen actual-auth cases cover revocation,
narrowed scope, approvals, shared rates and board compatibility.
Intermediate missing-token attribution, review-context and
implicit-session actor failures remain in the qualification record; all
final cases pass.
- Activity pagination now retains a bounded cursor across private-only
windows. The actual-JWT regression reaches three older readable events
after 27 private ones without exposing private details. A native
device-login regression was red for plaintext receipts; local check and
test-call results now use existing protected-response handling. The
passing actual-auth case proves encrypted persistence, exact replay,
redacted history and no response asset.
- Previous-head `5b55195593` Linux CI initially failed e2e shard 4/8 in
the existing connection-intent continuation test: periodic recovery
queued a repair at 01:21:47, the scripted journey completed the task at
01:21:48, and the extra queued run was cancelled at 01:21:49 because the
task was terminal. The assertion selected that latest cancelled run.
GitHub refused the first attempt while the workflow was nonterminal.
After completion, the single evidence-supported failed-job rerun was
accepted as **attempt 2** on the same head (workflow 40431202466). The
failed shard and final E2E aggregate passed on attempt 2, and the
complete Linux workflow for that head is successful. The original
failure remains part of qualification. No additional unchanged-code
rerun will be used for this failure.
- Companion CI also has an unchanged login-cleanup idleness timeout,
retained in its qualification record. That same 16-case suite passed in
this parent Linux run and a fresh local database. Both preceding
workflows passed after their single failed-job reruns as attempt 2; the
original failures remain recorded. No additional unchanged-code rerun
was used.
- Migration `0380_broken_aqueduct.sql` was regenerated through the
repository workflow after master took 0379 for project Git
authorization. It adds the responsible-user column with `IF NOT EXISTS`,
preserves upstream migrations, and satisfies snapshot retention and
migration safety checks.
- Upstream published Copilot v62 and v63 identities remain byte-for-byte
unchanged. The combined guidance is now v64, digest
`sha256:22e31f95ef972bcead98a4a707c9f33433558fd111e390e027a2bbb4346e112a`.
The normal shared TypeScript/Rust identity check and **61 Copilot
installation tests passed**. The old source-identity assertion first
failed against unchanged published v63; regenerating a new v64 preserves
the published release.
- Workspace `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build`, map validation, and UI
token gates passed on the final combined stack after the upstream merge.
Node 24.22.1 / pnpm 9.15.4 were used.
- **Earlier 82 API/OpenAPI tests passed** in fresh PostgreSQL 18: 55
assembled-server scenarios and 27 contracts. They use real persistent
agent keys, run JWTs, human sessions, production defaults, and
deterministic provider fixtures. No actor injection establishes access.
- The new email regression was red before per-account scope filtering.
The Arcade regression was red before human ownership and inventory-key
fixes; it also verifies actual-agent audit identity and a human-session
inventory read. The activity regression measured **200 authorization
checks before the fix and one afterward** for the same one-item page.
- **82 GitHub UI tests passed**, including all three new
failed-replacement regressions that were red before their fix. The UI
preserves an earlier copy only after confirming its committed
generation. Changed or unreadable results block copying and reconnecting
until reconciled. Human-only secret responses now include their
nonsecret committed generation.
- Private test status now rechecks the originating principal and linked
task, including mandatory agent/responsible-user privacy. Cross-agent
tests require the full caller tool access decision and the same
credential identity, regardless of auth label; caller and target
policies/approvals and rate limits apply before execution and after
human approval. A profile-only precondition was found to reject valid
allow-policy and scoped-grant access and has been removed. Both
permitted-access cases and a no-auth-label identity regression were red
before the correction; caller-specific Block still prevents provider
execution. The private-status regression was also red before its fix.
- The tool-activity regression measured 100 capability decisions and 102
run captures on a 100-event page before the fix. It now uses two task
decisions and at most two captures while retaining the same 50 visible
events, private-event filtering, and 403 after audit-grant revocation.
The regression was red before request-context reuse and task-decision
sharing; final server typecheck/build also pass.
- Generic chat configure/reconnect now hands agent-supplied verification
credentials to the addressed human before provider work or vault
changes. Actual key/JWT regressions were red for Slack signing-key
replacement and generic channel secret-reference rebinding. They now
prove unchanged refs and vaulted signing value, human setup, permitted
agent bot-token repair, and governed test messages. All 82 API/OpenAPI
cases pass in fresh PostgreSQL. Eight native receipt protections and
final server typecheck/build also pass.
- The preceding review found that old healthy state could retire a
credential-entry card before a human changed anything. The actual-JWT
regression was red. Saved field generations now change only with
protected values and commit with refs plus a verification fence; retries
retain the baseline. Old health, bot-token repair and unchanged entry
stay pending. New signing verification and current authority permit
continuation. A separate red race proved that user revocation during
provider authentication could return 403 after refs changed; authority
is now checked before persistence and inside the credential transaction.
The final 82 API/OpenAPI cases, four neighboring real-database
Slack/GitHub lifecycle cases, and final server typecheck/build pass.
- A preceding full run crossed a rate-window boundary. Database rows
prove one consumed slot at 23:35 and another at 23:36 for the same
policy/bucket. Only Date is frozen in the rate test cases; transport and
asynchronous timers remain real. Production rate behavior is unchanged,
and the final full run passes. An intermediate fixture failure that
overwrote hidden generation metadata with an API projection is retained
in the qualification record.
- Linux CI on an earlier head found two rate-admission assertions that
omitted the newly persisted bucket key. The failures were reproduced
locally; both assertions now verify the exact actor/tool bucket and all
49 policy-service tests pass. The companion qualification record retains
the initial and intermediate failures. Catalog creator attribution is
preserved in the companion to keep this implementation review at 99
files.
- The latest review reproduced three regressions before repair: complete
human replacements failed on unavailable old signing secrets, fresh
GitHub links incorrectly selected reconnect, and different
credential-entry requests shared an idempotency key. Each old protected
ref now has a narrow known-unavailable fallback; unexpected resolver
failures and company/scope violations still abort. Fresh imports keep
their credential form, configured endpoints keep reconnect, and
canonical field sets/completion modes distinguish handoffs while
matching retries retain their baseline. All 55 actual-auth scenarios and
27 separately run OpenAPI contracts pass, as do server typecheck/build.
Companion #17739 also passes all 41 wizard tests including actual
fresh-form submission, UI typecheck, maps and token gates. Earlier red
results and a mistyped OpenAPI filename are retained in qualification.
- The configured GitHub handoff regression was red in the
browser-component tests and actual-auth link/persistence tests. Saved
links now name requested fields and all/any completion mode; the
companion form submits those supplied fields through reconnect and
retains other saved credentials. Webhook/client-secret reconnect remains
human-only; first-setup secret restrictions remain. All 46 wizard tests
pass, including combined modes and legacy links. A duplicate review
referenced the older companion bf760912; the current form is already
fixed, linked in the reply, and its thread is resolved.
- Linux CI on bf760912 failed automatic Slack provisioning because vault
persistence cleared an already verified manifest-update challenge. The
same regression was reproduced locally. The provider-owned helper now
preserves proof only for the current signing fingerprint and callback
URL. Eight existing compatibility cases pass, including this case and
initial GitHub secret rejection. The first uncommitted GitHub-field
variant also failed that initial boundary and was narrowed to reconnect;
both failures remain in qualification.
- The upstream merge conflicted only in generated migration metadata.
Upstream 0379 is preserved, normal generation/pruning produced 0380, and
two repeated applications of the idempotent additive SQL passed. The
final combined stack passed **128 tests** (55 actual-auth, 27 OpenAPI
and 46 wizard cases) in fresh PostgreSQL. Eight Google UI cases also
pass; the two protocol cases could not initialize embedded PostgreSQL in
this fresh local attempt. Their earlier passing evidence remains
historical; fresh Linux CI must execute them. Vercel personal credential
attribution is preserved in companion #17739 with its other
ownership/consent follow-ups, keeping this PR at 99 files.
- The suite covers fresh defaults, restricted users/agents, scopes,
personal isolation, token revocation, human handoffs, callback replay,
execution approvals, authorized self-targeted policy changes,
self-approval denial, and current authority before commit. Reproduce API
checks with `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/openapi-routes.test.ts`, using a fresh database
through `PAPERCLIP_CONNECTION_MANAGEMENT_TEST_DATABASE_URL` or the
default embedded test database.
- Companion #17739 also records consent separately from token refresh so
saved Google choices survive refresh. Its eight service-picker and two
local-HTTP OAuth tests pass; both new UI cases were red before the fix.
Normal migration generation confirms no SQL change is needed for the
additive JSON metadata.
- The integration module shares one assembled server, authentication
factory, and provider lifecycle to preserve the
HTTP-to-vault-to-task-continuation proof. A reused external database
caused a Slack fixture identity conflict; the fresh final run passed.
Earlier fixture/transport and contract-update failures remain in the
companion qualification record.
- The broad local `pnpm test:run` attempt remains blocked by macOS
embedded PostgreSQL's host semaphore limit. It is not a clean pass. The
fresh Linux CI matrix must complete. Provider fixtures do not prove live
setup or an empirical LLM success rate.
- A current-head completed Paperclip assessment is not yet recorded. Its
earlier external recovery boundary has not been bypassed, and no
incomplete assessment is reported as passing. The user authorized both
merges when checks pass; merge this implementation first, then replay,
retarget, and requalify companion #17739 against the squash-merged
master.
- After the master refresh, local workspace typecheck/build, **97
actual-auth/OpenAPI cases** and **141 gateway/policy cases** pass. The
original fixed database port was occupied; Docker assigned a free
localhost port. The first neighbor setup command could not resolve root
`tsx`, leaving its schema uninitialized; the built database package
migrated the separate fixture and all unchanged cases passed. Both setup
failures are retained in qualification. Fresh Linux CI remains required;
no full local test-sweep pass is claimed.
- The f9 Greptile review scored **2/5** for two reproduced findings:
Slack test sends skipped the caller’s tool policy, and healthy App
credentials completed an unconfirmed identity handoff. Both are fixed in
this head and have resolved evidence threads
([Slack](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17737#discussion_r4384927765),
[identity](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17737#discussion_r4384927895)).
Actual key/JWT cases cover twelve Slack caller/target/recipient
combinations; the human-session GitHub OAuth callback alone remains
pending until explicit confirmation. All **99 API/OpenAPI tests** (72
actual-auth + 27 contracts), workspace typecheck and build pass. On the
combined companion, all four focused cases (including the twelve Slack
combinations), typecheck/build and maps also pass. The continuation
suite’s 50 embedded-PG cases were skipped because its database could not
start locally; fresh Linux CI must run them. Initial fixture
credential-collision and audit-projection assertion failures are
retained with the red reproductions in the companion qualification
record. No full local sweep or live consent is claimed.
## Risks
- The maintainer explicitly confirmed authorized policy administration,
including self-targeted changes that loosen controls. These writes
require management grants and the responsible user’s current authority.
Agents cannot approve their own governed action requests or edit their
own principal permission grants. The actual-auth regression exercises
both permitted administration and those denials.
- This is a broad authorization change. Incorrect scope or owner
resolution could deny permitted setup or expose another user's
resources. Integration cases cover both permitted and denied requests
with actual authentication.
- The additive nullable gateway-token column does not infer identities
for legacy clients or backfill agent grants. Legacy agent tokens without
a responsible user fail closed.
- Provider fixtures test supported setup and callback contracts. They do
not prove live provider availability.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, repository tools, and code
execution. The runtime does not expose a more specific deployment ID or
context-window size.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass — focused suites above;
full local sweep remains blocked as documented
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green — exact `2ecd6451d0` Linux CI
completed SUCCESS; external Paperclip Review is still queued
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups —
exact `2ecd6451d0` review completed; both f9 findings have resolved
evidence replies
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
1774 lines
73 KiB
TypeScript
1774 lines
73 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
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import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
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import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import {
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activityLog,
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agents,
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companies,
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companySecrets,
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createDb,
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heartbeatRuns,
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issues,
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principalPermissionGrants,
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projects,
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toolAccessAuditEvents,
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toolActionRequests,
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toolApplications,
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toolCatalogEntries,
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toolCallEvents,
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toolConnections,
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toolInvocations,
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toolMcpGateways,
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toolPolicies,
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toolProfileBindings,
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toolProfileEntries,
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toolProfiles,
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toolRateLimitCounters,
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} from "@paperclipai/db";
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import {
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getEmbeddedPostgresTestSupport,
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startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase,
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} from "./helpers/embedded-postgres.js";
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import { toolAccessPolicyService } from "../services/tool-access-policy.js";
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import { toolAccessService } from "../services/tool-access.js";
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import { createToolGatewayService, ToolGatewayHttpError } from "../services/tool-gateway.js";
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import { canonicalToolArguments, signToolArguments } from "../services/tool-content-guards.js";
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const externalTestDatabaseUrl = process.env.PAPERCLIP_TOOL_POLICY_TEST_DATABASE_URL;
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const embeddedPostgresSupport = externalTestDatabaseUrl ? { supported: true } : await getEmbeddedPostgresTestSupport();
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const describeEmbeddedPostgres = embeddedPostgresSupport.supported ? describe : describe.skip;
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function legacySideEffectKey(invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect, argumentsHash: string) {
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const scope = { companyId: invocation.companyId, runId: invocation.runId, issueId: invocation.issueId,
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applicationId: invocation.applicationId, connectionId: invocation.connectionId,
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catalogEntryId: invocation.catalogEntryId, toolName: invocation.toolName, argumentsHash };
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return `side_effect:${createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(Object.fromEntries(
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Object.entries(scope).sort(([left], [right]) => left < right ? -1 : left > right ? 1 : 0),
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))).digest("hex")}`;
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}
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async function createCompany(db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>) {
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return db.insert(companies).values({
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name: `Tool Access ${randomUUID()}`,
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issuePrefix: `TA${randomUUID().slice(0, 6).toUpperCase()}`,
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}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
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}
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async function createAgent(
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db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>,
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companyId: string,
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permissions: Record<string, unknown> = {},
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) {
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return db.insert(agents).values({
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companyId,
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name: `Agent ${randomUUID()}`,
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role: "engineer",
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adapterType: "process",
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adapterConfig: {},
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runtimeConfig: {},
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permissions,
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}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
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}
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async function createRun(
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db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>,
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companyId: string,
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agentId: string,
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contextSnapshot: Record<string, unknown> = {},
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) {
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return db.insert(heartbeatRuns).values({
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companyId,
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agentId,
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invocationSource: "assignment",
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status: "running",
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contextSnapshot,
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}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
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}
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async function createIssue(db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>, companyId: string, title = "Tool issue") {
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return db.insert(issues).values({
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companyId,
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title: `${title} ${randomUUID()}`,
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status: "in_progress",
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}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
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}
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async function createTool(db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>, companyId: string) {
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const application = await db.insert(toolApplications).values({
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companyId,
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applicationKey: `fixture-${randomUUID()}`,
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name: `Fixture ${randomUUID()}`,
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type: "mcp_http",
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status: "active",
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}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
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const connection = await db.insert(toolConnections).values({
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companyId,
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applicationId: application.id,
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name: `Connection ${randomUUID()}`,
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uid: `test/${randomUUID()}`,
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transport: "mcp_remote",
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status: "active",
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enabled: true,
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config: { url: "https://example.invalid/mcp" },
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}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
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const catalogEntry = await db.insert(toolCatalogEntries).values({
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companyId,
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applicationId: application.id,
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connectionId: connection.id,
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name: "send_email",
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toolName: "send_email",
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riskLevel: "write",
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versionHash: randomUUID(),
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schemaHash: randomUUID(),
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}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
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return { application, connection, catalogEntry };
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}
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async function createApprovedToolAction(input: {
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db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>;
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companyId: string;
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agentId: string;
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connectionId: string;
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catalogEntryId: string;
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issueId?: string | null;
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argumentsValue: Record<string, unknown>;
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status?: "approved" | "executed";
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}) {
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const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(input.db);
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const decisionInput = {
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companyId: input.companyId,
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actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: input.agentId, agentId: input.agentId },
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runContext: { issueId: input.issueId ?? null },
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request: {
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connectionId: input.connectionId,
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catalogEntryId: input.catalogEntryId,
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toolName: "send_email",
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arguments: input.argumentsValue,
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},
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};
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const decision = await svc.decide(decisionInput);
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const recorded = await svc.recordInvocation(decisionInput, decision);
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if (!recorded.actionRequest) throw new Error("Expected approval-required action request");
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const [updated] = await input.db
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.update(toolActionRequests)
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.set({
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status: input.status ?? "approved",
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resolvedAt: new Date(),
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updatedAt: new Date(),
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})
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.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, recorded.actionRequest.id))
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.returning();
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return { decisionInput, invocation: recorded.invocation, actionRequest: updated };
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}
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type IdRef = { id: string };
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function sendEmailGrantRow(company: IdRef, agent: IdRef): typeof principalPermissionGrants.$inferInsert {
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return {
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companyId: company.id,
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principalType: "agent",
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principalId: agent.id,
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permissionKey: "tools:use",
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scope: { toolName: "send_email" },
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};
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}
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function agentProfileBindingRow(company: IdRef, profile: IdRef, agent: IdRef): typeof toolProfileBindings.$inferInsert {
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return {
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companyId: company.id,
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profileId: profile.id,
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targetType: "agent",
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targetId: agent.id,
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};
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}
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function sendEmailDecisionInput(company: IdRef, agent: IdRef, connection: IdRef, catalogEntry: IdRef): Parameters<ReturnType<typeof toolAccessPolicyService>["decide"]>[0] {
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return {
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companyId: company.id,
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actor: { actorType: "agent", actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
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request: { connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id, toolName: "send_email" },
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};
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}
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|
|
function reviewSendPolicyRow(company: IdRef, name: string): typeof toolPolicies.$inferInsert {
|
|
return {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: name,
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function executedActionInput(db: ReturnType<typeof createDb>, company: IdRef, agent: IdRef, connection: IdRef, catalogEntry: IdRef, args: Record<string, unknown>): Parameters<typeof createApprovedToolAction>[0] {
|
|
return {
|
|
db,
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: agent.id,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
argumentsValue: args,
|
|
status: "executed",
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
describeEmbeddedPostgres("tool access policy service", () => {
|
|
let db!: ReturnType<typeof createDb>;
|
|
let tempDb: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase>> | null = null;
|
|
|
|
beforeAll(async () => {
|
|
if (!externalTestDatabaseUrl) tempDb = await startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase("paperclip-tool-access-policy-");
|
|
db = createDb(externalTestDatabaseUrl ?? tempDb!.connectionString);
|
|
}, 20_000);
|
|
|
|
afterEach(async () => {
|
|
await db.delete(toolRateLimitCounters);
|
|
await db.delete(toolActionRequests);
|
|
await db.delete(toolInvocations);
|
|
await db.delete(toolCallEvents);
|
|
await db.delete(toolAccessAuditEvents);
|
|
await db.delete(toolPolicies);
|
|
await db.delete(toolProfileEntries);
|
|
await db.delete(toolProfileBindings);
|
|
await db.delete(toolMcpGateways);
|
|
await db.delete(toolProfiles);
|
|
await db.delete(toolCatalogEntries);
|
|
await db.delete(toolConnections);
|
|
await db.delete(toolApplications);
|
|
await db.delete(companySecrets);
|
|
await db.delete(principalPermissionGrants);
|
|
await db.delete(issues);
|
|
await db.delete(projects);
|
|
await db.delete(activityLog);
|
|
await db.delete(heartbeatRuns);
|
|
await db.delete(agents);
|
|
await db.delete(companies);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
afterAll(async () => {
|
|
await db?.$client.end({ timeout: 1 });
|
|
await tempDb?.cleanup();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("denies direct execution without an effective profile or grant", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(sendEmailDecisionInput(company, agent, connection, catalogEntry));
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_default",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("allows calls through an effective agent profile", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const profile = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `profile-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Write tools",
|
|
defaultAction: "deny",
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileBindings).values(agentProfileBindingRow(company, profile, agent));
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileEntries).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: profile.id,
|
|
selectorType: "tool_name",
|
|
effect: "include",
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(sendEmailDecisionInput(company, agent, connection, catalogEntry));
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_profile",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: [profile.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("uses issue-scoped profiles ahead of company defaults", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const issue = await createIssue(db, company.id, "Scoped deny");
|
|
|
|
const [companyProfile, issueProfile] = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values([
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `company-allow-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Company allow",
|
|
defaultAction: "deny",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `issue-deny-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Issue deny",
|
|
defaultAction: "deny",
|
|
},
|
|
]).returning();
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileBindings).values([
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: companyProfile!.id,
|
|
targetType: "company",
|
|
targetId: company.id,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: issueProfile!.id,
|
|
targetType: "issue",
|
|
targetId: issue.id,
|
|
},
|
|
]);
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileEntries).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: companyProfile!.id,
|
|
selectorType: "tool_name",
|
|
effect: "include",
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent", actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
runContext: { issueId: issue.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id, toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_default",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: [issueProfile!.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("uses agent-scoped profiles ahead of project defaults", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const project = await db.insert(projects).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: `Project ${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
|
|
const [projectProfile, agentProfile] = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values([
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `project-allow-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Project allow",
|
|
defaultAction: "deny",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `agent-deny-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Agent deny",
|
|
defaultAction: "deny",
|
|
},
|
|
]).returning();
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileBindings).values([
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: projectProfile!.id,
|
|
targetType: "project",
|
|
targetId: project.id,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: agentProfile!.id,
|
|
targetType: "agent",
|
|
targetId: agent.id,
|
|
},
|
|
]);
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileEntries).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: projectProfile!.id,
|
|
selectorType: "tool_name",
|
|
effect: "include",
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent", actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
runContext: { projectId: project.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id, toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_default",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: [agentProfile!.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("uses issue-scoped allows ahead of broader company denies", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const issue = await createIssue(db, company.id, "Scoped allow");
|
|
|
|
const [companyProfile, issueProfile] = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values([
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `company-deny-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Company deny",
|
|
defaultAction: "deny",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `issue-allow-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Issue allow",
|
|
defaultAction: "deny",
|
|
},
|
|
]).returning();
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileBindings).values([
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: companyProfile!.id,
|
|
targetType: "company",
|
|
targetId: company.id,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: issueProfile!.id,
|
|
targetType: "issue",
|
|
targetId: issue.id,
|
|
},
|
|
]);
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileEntries).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: issueProfile!.id,
|
|
selectorType: "tool_name",
|
|
effect: "include",
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent", actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
runContext: { issueId: issue.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id, toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_profile",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: [issueProfile!.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("denies calls through draft and archived profiles", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const draftAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const archivedAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const [draftProfile, archivedProfile] = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values([
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `draft-profile-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Draft write tools",
|
|
status: "draft",
|
|
defaultAction: "allow",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `archived-profile-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Archived write tools",
|
|
status: "archived",
|
|
defaultAction: "allow",
|
|
},
|
|
]).returning();
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileBindings).values([
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: draftProfile!.id,
|
|
targetType: "agent",
|
|
targetId: draftAgent.id,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: archivedProfile!.id,
|
|
targetType: "agent",
|
|
targetId: archivedAgent.id,
|
|
},
|
|
]);
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileEntries).values([
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: draftProfile!.id,
|
|
selectorType: "tool_name",
|
|
effect: "include",
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileId: archivedProfile!.id,
|
|
selectorType: "tool_name",
|
|
effect: "include",
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
},
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
for (const agent of [draftAgent, archivedAgent]) {
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(sendEmailDecisionInput(company, agent, connection, catalogEntry));
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_default",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: [],
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("denies calls through disabled applications before explicit grants and allows them after reactivation", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { application, connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values(sendEmailGrantRow(company, agent));
|
|
const input = {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id, toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input)).resolves.toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_explicit_grant",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolApplications)
|
|
.set({ status: "disabled", updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(eq(toolApplications.id, application.id));
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input)).resolves.toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_disabled_application",
|
|
explanation: "Application is disabled.",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolApplications)
|
|
.set({ status: "active", updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(eq(toolApplications.id, application.id));
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input)).resolves.toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_explicit_grant",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("manages generic tool policies without exposing trust rules", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const otherCompany = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db);
|
|
const [trustRule] = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Promoted trust rule",
|
|
policyType: "trust_rule",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { trustRule: { hitCount: 0 } },
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
|
|
const created = await svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Block destructive senders",
|
|
description: "Block a dangerous tool family.",
|
|
policyType: "block",
|
|
priority: 10,
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
selectors: { toolNames: ["send_email", "delete_email"] },
|
|
conditions: null,
|
|
config: null,
|
|
}, { userId: "board-user" });
|
|
|
|
expect(created).toMatchObject({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Block destructive senders",
|
|
policyType: "block",
|
|
priority: 10,
|
|
createdByUserId: "board-user",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await expect(svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Generic trust rule",
|
|
description: null,
|
|
policyType: "trust_rule",
|
|
priority: 100,
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
selectors: {},
|
|
conditions: null,
|
|
config: null,
|
|
})).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 422 });
|
|
|
|
await expect(svc.updatePolicy({
|
|
companyId: otherCompany.id,
|
|
policyId: created.id,
|
|
body: { enabled: false },
|
|
})).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 404 });
|
|
|
|
const listed = await svc.listPolicies(company.id);
|
|
expect(listed.map((policy) => policy.id)).toEqual([created.id]);
|
|
|
|
const updated = await svc.updatePolicy({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
policyId: created.id,
|
|
body: {
|
|
name: "Require review for destructive senders",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "delete_email" },
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
expect(updated).toMatchObject({
|
|
id: created.id,
|
|
name: "Require review for destructive senders",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "delete_email" },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const deleted = await svc.deletePolicy({ companyId: company.id, policyId: created.id });
|
|
expect(deleted.id).toBe(created.id);
|
|
await expect(svc.deletePolicy({ companyId: company.id, policyId: trustRule.id }))
|
|
.rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 404 });
|
|
expect(await svc.listPolicies(company.id)).toEqual([]);
|
|
const remainingTrustRules = await svc.listTrustRules(company.id);
|
|
expect(remainingTrustRules.map((policy) => policy.id)).toEqual([trustRule.id]);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("treats glob-looking action-name selectors as exact names", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const profile = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `profile-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Write tools",
|
|
defaultAction: "allow",
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileBindings).values(agentProfileBindingRow(company, profile, agent));
|
|
const wildcardPolicy = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Review wildcard-looking sends",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
priority: 10,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "*send*" },
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
|
|
const input = {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id, toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input)).resolves.toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_profile",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: [profile.id],
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [],
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const exactPolicy = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Review exact sends",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
priority: 5,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input)).resolves.toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: "requires_approval_policy",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: [profile.id],
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [exactPolicy.id],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(wildcardPolicy.selectors).toEqual({ toolName: "*send*" });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("matches tool name selectors against connected MCP upstream tool names", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const policy = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Review upstream todo writes",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
priority: 10,
|
|
selectors: { toolNames: ["todo.add"] },
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent", actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
toolName: "mcp.smoke-fixture:todo-add",
|
|
upstreamToolName: "todo.add",
|
|
},
|
|
})).resolves.toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: "requires_approval_policy",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects agent-supplied run context that belongs to another agent", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const actorAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const otherAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const run = await db.insert(heartbeatRuns).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: otherAgent.id,
|
|
invocationSource: "assignment",
|
|
status: "running",
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent", actorId: actorAgent.id, agentId: actorAgent.id },
|
|
runContext: { heartbeatRunId: run.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_run_context_mismatch",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects agent-supplied issue context that differs from the stored heartbeat context", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const canonicalIssue = await createIssue(db, company.id, "Canonical");
|
|
const escalatedIssue = await createIssue(db, company.id, "Escalated");
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const run = await createRun(db, company.id, agent.id, { issueId: canonicalIssue.id });
|
|
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent", actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
runContext: { heartbeatRunId: run.id, issueId: escalatedIssue.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_run_context_mismatch",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("audits denied calls without storing secret argument values", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const input = {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
arguments: { to: "ops@example.com", apiKey: "sk-test-secret-value-123456" },
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const decision = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input);
|
|
await toolAccessPolicyService(db).writeAudit(input, decision);
|
|
const [legacyAudit] = await db.select().from(toolAccessAuditEvents);
|
|
const [callEvent] = await db.select().from(toolCallEvents);
|
|
const serialized = JSON.stringify({ legacy: legacyAudit.details, dedicated: callEvent });
|
|
|
|
expect(decision.reasonCode).toBe("deny_default");
|
|
expect(callEvent).toMatchObject({
|
|
eventType: "policy_decision",
|
|
outcome: "denied",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_default",
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [],
|
|
requestHash: expect.any(String),
|
|
});
|
|
expect(serialized).not.toContain("sk-test-secret-value");
|
|
expect(serialized).toContain("[REDACTED]");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("records approval-required invocations and action requests with matched policy IDs", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const policy = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Review writes",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
description: "Writes require board review.",
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
const input = {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
arguments: { to: "ops@example.com", body: "ship it" },
|
|
sideEffecting: true,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const decision = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input);
|
|
const recorded = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).recordInvocation(input, decision);
|
|
await toolAccessPolicyService(db).writeAudit(input, decision);
|
|
const [callEvent] = await db.select().from(toolCallEvents);
|
|
|
|
expect(decision).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: "requires_approval_policy",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy.id],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(recorded.actionRequest).toMatchObject({
|
|
invocationId: recorded.invocation.id,
|
|
requestedByAgentId: agent.id,
|
|
status: "pending",
|
|
});
|
|
expect(recorded.invocation).toMatchObject({
|
|
approvalState: "pending",
|
|
status: "awaiting_approval",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy.id],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(callEvent).toMatchObject({
|
|
eventType: "policy_decision",
|
|
outcome: "pending",
|
|
decision: "require_approval",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy.id],
|
|
requestSummary: expect.objectContaining({ summary: expect.any(String) }),
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("replays side-effecting calls with the same idempotency key instead of creating a new invocation", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values(sendEmailGrantRow(company, agent));
|
|
const input = {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
arguments: { to: "ops@example.com" },
|
|
sideEffecting: true,
|
|
idempotencyKey: "send-email-1",
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const decision = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input);
|
|
const first = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).recordInvocation(input, decision);
|
|
const replay = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).recordInvocation(input, decision);
|
|
|
|
expect(first.replayed).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(replay.replayed).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(replay.invocation.id).toBe(first.invocation.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("derives a canonical idempotency key for side-effecting calls without caller-supplied keys", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values(sendEmailGrantRow(company, agent));
|
|
const input = {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
arguments: { to: "ops@example.com", body: "only once" },
|
|
sideEffecting: true,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const decision = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input);
|
|
const first = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).recordInvocation(input, decision);
|
|
const replay = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).recordInvocation(input, decision);
|
|
|
|
expect(first.replayed).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(first.invocation.idempotencyKey).toMatch(/^side_effect:v2:/);
|
|
expect(replay.replayed).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(replay.invocation.id).toBe(first.invocation.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it.each([
|
|
[{ password: "old-value" }, { password: "new-value" }],
|
|
[{ body: `${"x".repeat(500)}old` }, { body: `${"x".repeat(500)}new` }],
|
|
[{ items: [...Array.from({ length: 50 }, (_, index) => index), "old"] }, { items: [...Array.from({ length: 50 }, (_, index) => index), "new"] }],
|
|
])("blocks unverifiable legacy default-key writes until an explicit new operation is requested (%#)", async (original, replacement) => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values(sendEmailGrantRow(company, agent));
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db, { toolActionSigningSecret: "legacy-identity-fixture-key" });
|
|
const input = { companyId: company.id, actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, toolName: "send_email", arguments: original, sideEffecting: true } };
|
|
const decision = await svc.decide(input);
|
|
const first = await svc.recordInvocation(input, decision);
|
|
const oldHash = first.invocation.argumentsSummary!.sha256!;
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ argumentsHash: oldHash,
|
|
idempotencyKey: legacySideEffectKey(first.invocation, oldHash), status: "succeeded" })
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, first.invocation.id));
|
|
// A complete new request can equal the old shortened preview verbatim.
|
|
// That must not bypass the legacy verifier through the current-key lookup.
|
|
const previewArguments = JSON.parse(first.invocation.argumentsSummary!.summary);
|
|
for (const args of [original, replacement, previewArguments]) {
|
|
await expect(svc.recordInvocation({ ...input, request: { ...input.request, arguments: args } }, decision))
|
|
.rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 409, details: {
|
|
reasonCode: "legacy_tool_idempotency_unverifiable", invocationId: first.invocation.id,
|
|
} });
|
|
}
|
|
expect(await db.select().from(toolInvocations)).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
const explicit = await svc.recordInvocation({ ...input, request: { ...input.request, arguments: replacement,
|
|
idempotencyKey: "intentional-new-operation" } }, decision);
|
|
expect(explicit.replayed).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(explicit.invocation.id).not.toBe(first.invocation.id);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it.each(["preview", "complete"])("replays a legacy default-key result when its %s identity proves an exact match", async (identityKind) => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values(sendEmailGrantRow(company, agent));
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db, { toolActionSigningSecret: "legacy-identity-fixture-key" });
|
|
// Historical sorting was ordinal; the new canonical serializer uses locale order.
|
|
const input = { companyId: company.id, actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, toolName: "send_email", arguments: identityKind === "preview"
|
|
? { Z: "last", a: "first" } : { password: "saved-secret" }, sideEffecting: true } };
|
|
const decision = await svc.decide(input);
|
|
const first = await svc.recordInvocation(input, decision);
|
|
expect(first.invocation.argumentsHash).not.toBe(first.invocation.argumentsSummary!.sha256);
|
|
const oldHash = identityKind === "preview" ? first.invocation.argumentsSummary!.sha256! : first.invocation.argumentsHash!;
|
|
const resultSummary = { summary: "saved result" };
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ argumentsHash: oldHash, resultSummary,
|
|
idempotencyKey: legacySideEffectKey(first.invocation, oldHash), status: "succeeded" })
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, first.invocation.id));
|
|
expect(await svc.recordInvocation(input, decision)).toMatchObject({ replayed: true,
|
|
invocation: { id: first.invocation.id, resultSummary } });
|
|
expect(await db.select().from(toolInvocations)).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("uses authenticated legacy arguments to distinguish an exact retry from a new secret operation", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values(sendEmailGrantRow(company, agent));
|
|
const signingSecret = "legacy-identity-fixture-key";
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db, { toolActionSigningSecret: signingSecret });
|
|
const input = { companyId: company.id, actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, toolName: "send_email", arguments: { password: "old-value" }, sideEffecting: true } };
|
|
const decision = await svc.decide(input);
|
|
const first = await svc.recordInvocation(input, decision);
|
|
const oldHash = first.invocation.argumentsSummary!.sha256!;
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ argumentsHash: oldHash,
|
|
idempotencyKey: legacySideEffectKey(first.invocation, oldHash), status: "succeeded" })
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, first.invocation.id));
|
|
await db.insert(toolActionRequests).values({ companyId: company.id, invocationId: first.invocation.id,
|
|
status: "executed", canonicalArgumentsHash: oldHash, canonicalArgumentsSummary: first.invocation.argumentsSummary!, signedArguments: signToolArguments({
|
|
invocationId: first.invocation.id, toolName: "send_email", canonicalArguments: canonicalToolArguments(input.request.arguments), signingSecret,
|
|
}) });
|
|
expect(await svc.recordInvocation(input, decision)).toMatchObject({ replayed: true, invocation: { id: first.invocation.id } });
|
|
const replacement = await svc.recordInvocation({ ...input, request: { ...input.request, arguments: { password: "new-value" } } }, decision);
|
|
expect(replacement.replayed).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(await db.select().from(toolInvocations)).toHaveLength(2);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("separates no-run default keys by actor and never exposes another actor's legacy result", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const firstAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const secondAgent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values([sendEmailGrantRow(company, firstAgent), sendEmailGrantRow(company, secondAgent)]);
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db);
|
|
const input = { companyId: company.id, actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: firstAgent.id, agentId: firstAgent.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, toolName: "send_email", arguments: { body: "same request" }, sideEffecting: true } };
|
|
const secondInput = { ...input, actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: secondAgent.id, agentId: secondAgent.id } };
|
|
const first = await svc.recordInvocation(input, await svc.decide(input));
|
|
const second = await svc.recordInvocation(secondInput, await svc.decide(secondInput));
|
|
expect(second.replayed).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(second.invocation.idempotencyKey).not.toBe(first.invocation.idempotencyKey);
|
|
const oldHash = first.invocation.argumentsSummary!.sha256!;
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ argumentsHash: oldHash, resultSummary: { summary: "first actor's result" },
|
|
idempotencyKey: legacySideEffectKey(first.invocation, oldHash), status: "succeeded" })
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, first.invocation.id));
|
|
await db.delete(toolInvocations).where(eq(toolInvocations.id, second.invocation.id));
|
|
const error = await svc.recordInvocation(secondInput, await svc.decide(secondInput)).then(() => null, failure => failure);
|
|
expect(error).toMatchObject({ status: 409 });
|
|
expect(error.details).toEqual({ reasonCode: "legacy_tool_idempotency_unverifiable" });
|
|
expect(JSON.stringify(error)).not.toContain(first.invocation.id);
|
|
expect(await db.select().from(toolInvocations)).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("enforces rate-limit policies before explicit grants", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values(sendEmailGrantRow(company, agent));
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "One send per minute",
|
|
policyType: "rate_limit",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { limit: 1, windowSeconds: 60, keyBy: ["agent", "tool"] },
|
|
});
|
|
const input = {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
consumeRateLimit: true,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const first = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input);
|
|
const second = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input);
|
|
|
|
expect(first.allowed).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(second).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "rate_limited",
|
|
reasonCode: "rate_limited",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("atomically consumes the final rate-limit slot", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values(sendEmailGrantRow(company, agent));
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "One concurrent send per minute",
|
|
policyType: "rate_limit",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { limit: 1, windowSeconds: 60, keyBy: ["agent", "tool"] },
|
|
});
|
|
const input = {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent" as const, actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
consumeRateLimit: true,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const decisions = await Promise.all([
|
|
toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input),
|
|
toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(input),
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
expect(decisions.filter((decision) => decision.allowed)).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
expect(decisions.filter((decision) => decision.reasonCode === "rate_limited")).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
async function admittedRateLimitedInvocation(limit = 1) {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const issue = await createIssue(db, company.id);
|
|
const run = await createRun(db, company.id, agent.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const [profile] = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values({ companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: "admitted-gateway", name: "Admitted gateway", defaultAction: "deny" }).returning();
|
|
const [gateway] = await db.insert(toolMcpGateways).values({ companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Admitted gateway", slug: "admitted-gateway", profileId: profile.id }).returning();
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values(sendEmailGrantRow(company, agent));
|
|
const [ratePolicy] = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({ companyId: company.id, name: "One admitted send",
|
|
policyType: "rate_limit", selectors: { toolName: "send_email" }, priority: 1,
|
|
config: { limit, windowSeconds: 3600, keyBy: ["agent", "tool"] } }).returning();
|
|
const input = { ...sendEmailDecisionInput(company, agent, connection, catalogEntry),
|
|
runContext: { heartbeatRunId: run.id, issueId: issue.id, gatewayId: gateway.id }, consumeRateLimit: true,
|
|
request: { connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id, toolName: "send_email", arguments: { to: "recipient@example.test" } } };
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db);
|
|
const initial = await svc.decide(input);
|
|
expect(initial.allowed).toBe(true);
|
|
const { invocation } = await svc.recordInvocation(input, initial);
|
|
expect(invocation.gatewayId).toBe(gateway.id);
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ status: "executing" }).where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocation.id));
|
|
return { company, agent, input: { ...input, consumeRateLimit: false }, invocation, ratePolicy, svc };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it.each(["allow", "approved"] as const)("retains the consumed final rate-limit slot for the same executing %s invocation", async authorization => {
|
|
const { input, invocation, ratePolicy, svc } = await admittedRateLimitedInvocation();
|
|
if (authorization === "approved") await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ policyDecision: "require_approval", approvalState: "approved" })
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocation.id));
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input)).toMatchObject({ decision: "rate_limited" });
|
|
expect(invocation.policyExplanation?.consumedRateAdmissions).toEqual([
|
|
{ policyId: ratePolicy.id, versionHash: expect.stringMatching(/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/),
|
|
bucketKey: `${ratePolicy.id}:agent:${input.actor.agentId}|tool:send_email` },
|
|
]);
|
|
const counters = await db.select().from(toolRateLimitCounters);
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, { admittedInvocationId: invocation.id })).toMatchObject({ allowed: true });
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, { admittedInvocationId: invocation.id })).toMatchObject({ allowed: true });
|
|
expect(await db.select().from(toolRateLimitCounters)).toEqual(counters);
|
|
expect((await db.select().from(toolRateLimitCounters))[0].remaining).toBe(0);
|
|
// Neither a new invocation nor an accidental consuming recheck can borrow
|
|
// another invocation's already-spent slot.
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, { admittedInvocationId: randomUUID() })).toMatchObject({ decision: "rate_limited" });
|
|
expect(await svc.decide({ ...input, consumeRateLimit: true }, { admittedInvocationId: invocation.id }))
|
|
.toMatchObject({ decision: "rate_limited" });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rechecks a newly added rate policy rather than borrowing an older policy's consumed slot", async () => {
|
|
const { company, input, invocation, svc } = await admittedRateLimitedInvocation();
|
|
await svc.createPolicy(company.id, { name: "New send limit", policyType: "rate_limit", priority: 0,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" }, config: { limit: 1, windowSeconds: 3600, keyBy: ["agent", "tool"] } });
|
|
// Consume the new rule through normal admission; the exhausted original
|
|
// rule then denies this separate request before any provider dispatch.
|
|
expect(await svc.decide({ ...input, consumeRateLimit: true })).toMatchObject({ decision: "rate_limited" });
|
|
const counters = await db.select().from(toolRateLimitCounters);
|
|
expect(counters).toHaveLength(2);
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, { admittedInvocationId: invocation.id })).toMatchObject({ decision: "rate_limited" });
|
|
expect(await db.select().from(toolRateLimitCounters)).toEqual(counters);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rechecks an edited rate-policy generation without consuming another slot", async () => {
|
|
const { company, input, invocation, ratePolicy, svc } = await admittedRateLimitedInvocation(2);
|
|
expect(await svc.decide({ ...input, consumeRateLimit: true })).toMatchObject({ allowed: true });
|
|
await svc.updatePolicy({ companyId: company.id, policyId: ratePolicy.id,
|
|
body: { config: { limit: 1, windowSeconds: 3600, keyBy: ["agent", "tool"] } } });
|
|
const counters = await db.select().from(toolRateLimitCounters);
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, { admittedInvocationId: invocation.id })).toMatchObject({ decision: "rate_limited" });
|
|
expect(await db.select().from(toolRateLimitCounters)).toEqual(counters);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rechecks rate limits for historical executing invocations without durable consumption proof", async () => {
|
|
const { input, invocation, svc } = await admittedRateLimitedInvocation();
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ policyExplanation: null }).where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocation.id));
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, { admittedInvocationId: invocation.id })).toMatchObject({ decision: "rate_limited" });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("reevaluates current blocks, grants, and approval policies for admitted work", async () => {
|
|
const { company, input, invocation, svc } = await admittedRateLimitedInvocation();
|
|
const options = { admittedInvocationId: invocation.id };
|
|
const [block] = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({ companyId: company.id, name: "Block admitted sends",
|
|
policyType: "block", priority: 0, selectors: { toolName: "send_email" } }).returning();
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, options)).toMatchObject({ decision: "deny", reasonCode: "deny_policy_block" });
|
|
await db.delete(toolPolicies).where(eq(toolPolicies.id, block.id));
|
|
await db.delete(principalPermissionGrants).where(eq(principalPermissionGrants.companyId, company.id));
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, options)).toMatchObject({ decision: "deny", reasonCode: "deny_default" });
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({ companyId: company.id, name: "Require new review",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval", priority: 2, selectors: { toolName: "send_email" } });
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, options)).toMatchObject({ decision: "require_approval" });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("does not retain rate admission for a mismatched or no-longer-authorized invocation", async () => {
|
|
const { input, invocation, svc } = await admittedRateLimitedInvocation();
|
|
const options = { admittedInvocationId: invocation.id };
|
|
const mutations: Partial<typeof toolInvocations.$inferInsert>[] = [
|
|
{ actorType: "system" }, { actorId: randomUUID() }, { agentId: null }, { runId: null }, { issueId: null }, { gatewayId: null },
|
|
{ applicationId: null }, { connectionId: null }, { catalogEntryId: null }, { toolName: "different_tool" },
|
|
{ providerType: null }, { applicationKey: null }, { upstreamToolName: null }, { argumentsHash: "different" },
|
|
{ status: "authorized" }, { policyDecision: "deny" }, { policyDecision: "require_approval", approvalState: "pending" },
|
|
];
|
|
for (const mutation of mutations) {
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set(mutation).where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocation.id));
|
|
expect(await svc.decide(input, options), JSON.stringify(mutation)).toMatchObject({ decision: "rate_limited" });
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ ...invocation, status: "executing" }).where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocation.id));
|
|
}
|
|
expect(await svc.decide({ ...input, request: { ...input.request, arguments: { to: "another@example.test" } } }, options))
|
|
.toMatchObject({ decision: "rate_limited" });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects unsupported policy semantics at create and update time", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db);
|
|
const policy = await svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Require review",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await expect(svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Dead redact policy",
|
|
policyType: "redact" as never,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { redact: { fields: ["to", "body"] } },
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow("Tool policy type 'redact' is not supported at runtime");
|
|
await expect(svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Dead custom check",
|
|
policyType: "validate" as never,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { schema: { required: ["body"] } },
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow("Tool policy type 'validate' is not supported at runtime");
|
|
await expect(svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Malformed conditional policy",
|
|
policyType: "allow",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
conditions: { args: { body: "safe" } } as never,
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow("Tool policy conditions include unsupported runtime semantics");
|
|
await expect(svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Ignored approval config",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { validate: { required: ["body"] } },
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow("Tool policy type 'require_approval' does not support config");
|
|
await expect(svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Invalid rate limit",
|
|
policyType: "rate_limit",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { rateLimit: { limit: 0, windowSeconds: 60 } },
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow("Rate-limit policy config requires positive numeric limit and windowSeconds");
|
|
await expect(svc.updatePolicy({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
body: { conditions: { args: { body: "safe" } } as never },
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow("Tool policy conditions include unsupported runtime semantics");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects fieldMatches patterns with nested quantifiers", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db);
|
|
|
|
await expect(svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Unsafe regex",
|
|
policyType: "allow",
|
|
priority: 10,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
conditions: {
|
|
arguments: { fieldMatches: { body: "^(a+)+$" } },
|
|
},
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow("unsafe regular expression");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects fieldMatches patterns with ambiguous alternation", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db);
|
|
|
|
await expect(svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Unsafe alternation",
|
|
policyType: "allow",
|
|
conditions: {
|
|
arguments: { fieldMatches: { body: "^(a|aa)*b$" } },
|
|
},
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow("unsafe regular expression");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("allows a write policy only for a safe argument subset and blocks unsafe arguments", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const svc = toolAccessPolicyService(db);
|
|
const allowPolicy = await svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Allow safe destination",
|
|
policyType: "allow",
|
|
priority: 10,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
conditions: {
|
|
arguments: {
|
|
fieldEquals: { to: "ops@example.com" },
|
|
fieldMatches: { body: "^[\\s\\S]{1,200}$" },
|
|
},
|
|
risk: { isWrite: true },
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
const blockPolicy = await svc.createPolicy(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Block external destination",
|
|
policyType: "block",
|
|
priority: 5,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
conditions: {
|
|
arguments: {
|
|
fieldNotEquals: { to: "ops@example.com" },
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await expect(svc.decide({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent", actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
arguments: { to: "ops@example.com", body: "safe update" },
|
|
},
|
|
})).resolves.toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_policy",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [allowPolicy.id],
|
|
policyExplanation: {
|
|
conditionsMatched: ["arguments", "risk"],
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await expect(svc.decide({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actor: { actorType: "agent", actorId: agent.id, agentId: agent.id },
|
|
request: {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
arguments: { to: "outside@example.com", body: "exfiltrate" },
|
|
},
|
|
})).resolves.toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_policy_block",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [blockPolicy.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("fails closed for legacy unsupported redact and validate policies", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const profile = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `profile-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Fallback allow",
|
|
defaultAction: "allow",
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileBindings).values(agentProfileBindingRow(company, profile, agent));
|
|
const [redactPolicy] = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Legacy redact",
|
|
policyType: "redact" as never,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { redact: { fields: ["to", "body"] } },
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
const [validatePolicy] = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Legacy validate",
|
|
policyType: "validate" as never,
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { schema: { required: ["body"] } },
|
|
priority: 2,
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
|
|
const redactDecision = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(sendEmailDecisionInput(company, agent, connection, catalogEntry));
|
|
await db.update(toolPolicies).set({ enabled: false }).where(eq(toolPolicies.id, redactPolicy!.id));
|
|
const validateDecision = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(sendEmailDecisionInput(company, agent, connection, catalogEntry));
|
|
|
|
expect(redactDecision).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_policy_block",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [redactPolicy!.id],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(validateDecision).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_policy_block",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [validatePolicy!.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("fails closed for legacy condition-bearing policies", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const profile = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `profile-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Fallback allow",
|
|
defaultAction: "allow",
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileBindings).values(agentProfileBindingRow(company, profile, agent));
|
|
const [policy] = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Legacy conditional allow",
|
|
policyType: "allow",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
conditions: { args: { body: "safe" } },
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(sendEmailDecisionInput(company, agent, connection, catalogEntry));
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_policy_block",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy!.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("fails closed for legacy rate-limit policies with invalid config", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
const profile = await db.insert(toolProfiles).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
profileKey: `profile-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: "Fallback allow",
|
|
defaultAction: "allow",
|
|
}).returning().then((rows) => rows[0]!);
|
|
await db.insert(toolProfileBindings).values(agentProfileBindingRow(company, profile, agent));
|
|
const [policy] = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Broken rate limit",
|
|
policyType: "rate_limit",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
config: { rateLimit: { limit: 0, windowSeconds: 60 } },
|
|
priority: 1,
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
|
|
const result = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(sendEmailDecisionInput(company, agent, connection, catalogEntry));
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_policy_block",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy!.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("promotes repeated approved actions into a scoped trust rule with audited hits", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const issue = await createIssue(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
name: "Review send_email",
|
|
policyType: "require_approval",
|
|
selectors: { toolName: "send_email" },
|
|
description: "Writes require review until promoted.",
|
|
});
|
|
const args = { to: "ops@example.com", body: "ship it" };
|
|
const first = await createApprovedToolAction({
|
|
db,
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: agent.id,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
issueId: issue.id,
|
|
argumentsValue: args,
|
|
status: "executed",
|
|
});
|
|
await createApprovedToolAction({
|
|
db,
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: agent.id,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
issueId: issue.id,
|
|
argumentsValue: args,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const trustRule = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).createTrustRuleFromActionRequest({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: first.actionRequest.id,
|
|
body: {
|
|
approvalThreshold: 2,
|
|
scope: { includeIssue: true, includeCatalogEntry: true },
|
|
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000),
|
|
batchApproval: { enabled: true, maxBatchSize: 5, windowSeconds: 3600 },
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
const decision = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide({
|
|
...first.decisionInput,
|
|
consumeRateLimit: true,
|
|
});
|
|
const [updatedRule] = await db.select().from(toolPolicies).where(eq(toolPolicies.id, trustRule.id));
|
|
const trustConfig = updatedRule.config as { trustRule?: { hitCount?: number; lastHitAt?: string | null } };
|
|
const trustEvents = await db.select().from(toolCallEvents);
|
|
|
|
expect(trustRule).toMatchObject({
|
|
policyType: "trust_rule",
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
selectors: expect.objectContaining({
|
|
agentId: agent.id,
|
|
issueId: issue.id,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
toolName: "send_email",
|
|
}),
|
|
});
|
|
expect(decision).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: true,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_trust_rule",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [trustRule.id],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(trustConfig.trustRule?.hitCount).toBe(1);
|
|
expect(trustConfig.trustRule?.lastHitAt).toEqual(expect.any(String));
|
|
expect(trustEvents.some((event) => event.eventType === "trust_rule_created")).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(trustEvents.some((event) => event.eventType === "trust_rule_used")).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("does not count approved actions outside the final trust-rule agent scope", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agentA = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const agentB = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values(reviewSendPolicyRow(company, "Review scoped sends"));
|
|
const args = { to: "ops@example.com", body: "same reviewed payload" };
|
|
await createApprovedToolAction({
|
|
db,
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: agentA.id,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
argumentsValue: args,
|
|
status: "executed",
|
|
});
|
|
const agentBAction = await createApprovedToolAction({
|
|
db,
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: agentB.id,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
argumentsValue: args,
|
|
status: "executed",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).createTrustRuleFromActionRequest({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: agentBAction.actionRequest.id,
|
|
body: { approvalThreshold: 2 },
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow(/final rule scope; found 1/);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("does not count approvals from stale catalog versions toward trust-rule promotion", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values(reviewSendPolicyRow(company, "Review versioned sends"));
|
|
const args = { to: "ops@example.com", body: "same payload after tool change" };
|
|
await createApprovedToolAction(executedActionInput(db, company, agent, connection, catalogEntry, args));
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolCatalogEntries)
|
|
.set({ versionHash: randomUUID(), schemaHash: randomUUID(), updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(eq(toolCatalogEntries.id, catalogEntry.id));
|
|
const currentVersionAction = await createApprovedToolAction(executedActionInput(db, company, agent, connection, catalogEntry, args));
|
|
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).createTrustRuleFromActionRequest({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: currentVersionAction.actionRequest.id,
|
|
body: { approvalThreshold: 2, scope: { includeCatalogEntry: true } },
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow(/final rule scope; found 1/);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects company-wide trust-rule promotion bodies that drop the reviewed scope", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values(reviewSendPolicyRow(company, "Review scoped sends"));
|
|
const args = { to: "ops@example.com", body: "same reviewed payload" };
|
|
const first = await createApprovedToolAction(executedActionInput(db, company, agent, connection, catalogEntry, args));
|
|
await createApprovedToolAction(executedActionInput(db, company, agent, connection, catalogEntry, args));
|
|
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).createTrustRuleFromActionRequest({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: first.actionRequest.id,
|
|
body: {
|
|
approvalThreshold: 2,
|
|
scope: {
|
|
includeAgent: false,
|
|
includeProject: false,
|
|
includeApplication: false,
|
|
includeConnection: false,
|
|
includeTool: false,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow(/reviewed actor\/tool scope/);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects argument-broadening trust-rule promotion bodies", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values(reviewSendPolicyRow(company, "Review exact payload sends"));
|
|
const args = { to: "ops@example.com", body: "same reviewed payload" };
|
|
const first = await createApprovedToolAction(executedActionInput(db, company, agent, connection, catalogEntry, args));
|
|
await createApprovedToolAction(executedActionInput(db, company, agent, connection, catalogEntry, args));
|
|
|
|
await expect(toolAccessPolicyService(db).createTrustRuleFromActionRequest({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: first.actionRequest.id,
|
|
body: {
|
|
approvalThreshold: 2,
|
|
argumentFilters: { allowAny: true },
|
|
},
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow(/exact reviewed argument hash/);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("falls back to review when a trusted catalog tool changes", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values(reviewSendPolicyRow(company, "Review changed sends"));
|
|
const args = { to: "ops@example.com", body: "repeatable" };
|
|
const first = await createApprovedToolAction(executedActionInput(db, company, agent, connection, catalogEntry, args));
|
|
await createApprovedToolAction({
|
|
db,
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: agent.id,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
argumentsValue: args,
|
|
});
|
|
const trustRule = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).createTrustRuleFromActionRequest({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: first.actionRequest.id,
|
|
body: { approvalThreshold: 2, scope: { includeCatalogEntry: true } },
|
|
});
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolCatalogEntries)
|
|
.set({ status: "quarantined", versionHash: randomUUID(), updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(eq(toolCatalogEntries.id, catalogEntry.id));
|
|
|
|
const decision = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(first.decisionInput);
|
|
|
|
expect(decision).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: "requires_review_changed_tool",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [trustRule.id],
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("revokes trust rules so matching actions return to per-call approval", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const { connection, catalogEntry } = await createTool(db, company.id);
|
|
await db.insert(toolPolicies).values(reviewSendPolicyRow(company, "Review revocable sends"));
|
|
const args = { to: "ops@example.com", body: "revocable" };
|
|
const first = await createApprovedToolAction(executedActionInput(db, company, agent, connection, catalogEntry, args));
|
|
await createApprovedToolAction({
|
|
db,
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: agent.id,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
argumentsValue: args,
|
|
});
|
|
const trustRule = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).createTrustRuleFromActionRequest({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: first.actionRequest.id,
|
|
body: { approvalThreshold: 2 },
|
|
});
|
|
const revoked = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).revokeTrustRule({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
policyId: trustRule.id,
|
|
body: { reason: "Tool scope changed" },
|
|
});
|
|
const decision = await toolAccessPolicyService(db).decide(first.decisionInput);
|
|
const config = revoked.config as { trustRule?: { revokedAt?: string | null; revocationReason?: string | null } };
|
|
|
|
expect(revoked.enabled).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(config.trustRule?.revokedAt).toEqual(expect.any(String));
|
|
expect(config.trustRule?.revocationReason).toBe("Tool scope changed");
|
|
expect(decision).toMatchObject({
|
|
allowed: false,
|
|
decision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: "requires_approval_policy",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("routes gateway execution through policy decisions instead of legacy gateway permissions", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id, { toolGateway: { allowAll: true } });
|
|
const run = await createRun(db, company.id, agent.id);
|
|
const gateway = createToolGatewayService(db);
|
|
const session = await gateway.createSession({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: agent.id,
|
|
runId: run.id,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await expect(gateway.executeTool({
|
|
sessionToken: session.token,
|
|
tool: "mcp-remote-fixture:echo",
|
|
parameters: { message: "hello" },
|
|
})).rejects.toMatchObject({
|
|
status: 403,
|
|
reasonCode: "deny_default",
|
|
} satisfies Partial<ToolGatewayHttpError>);
|
|
|
|
const [invocation] = await db.select().from(toolInvocations);
|
|
expect(invocation).toMatchObject({
|
|
toolName: "mcp-remote-fixture:echo",
|
|
policyDecision: "deny",
|
|
status: "denied",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("replays idempotent side-effecting gateway calls without creating a second invocation", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const agent = await createAgent(db, company.id);
|
|
const run = await createRun(db, company.id, agent.id);
|
|
await db.insert(principalPermissionGrants).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
principalType: "agent",
|
|
principalId: agent.id,
|
|
permissionKey: "tools:use",
|
|
scope: { toolName: "mcp-remote-fixture:update_note" },
|
|
});
|
|
const gateway = createToolGatewayService(db);
|
|
const session = await gateway.createSession({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: agent.id,
|
|
runId: run.id,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const first = await gateway.executeTool({
|
|
sessionToken: session.token,
|
|
tool: "mcp-remote-fixture:update_note",
|
|
parameters: { noteId: "n1", body: "ship" },
|
|
idempotencyKey: "note-update-1",
|
|
});
|
|
const replay = await gateway.executeTool({
|
|
sessionToken: session.token,
|
|
tool: "mcp-remote-fixture:update_note",
|
|
parameters: { noteId: "n1", body: "ship" },
|
|
idempotencyKey: "note-update-1",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expect(first).toMatchObject({ status: "completed", tool: "mcp-remote-fixture:update_note" });
|
|
expect(replay).toMatchObject({ status: "replayed", invocationId: first.invocationId });
|
|
const invocations = await db.select().from(toolInvocations);
|
|
expect(invocations).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
expect(invocations[0]).toMatchObject({
|
|
idempotencyKey: "note-update-1",
|
|
status: "succeeded",
|
|
resultSummary: expect.objectContaining({ summary: expect.any(String) }),
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects cross-company owner agents and credential secret refs before persisting tool access records", async () => {
|
|
const company = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const otherCompany = await createCompany(db);
|
|
const otherAgent = await createAgent(db, otherCompany.id);
|
|
const [otherSecret] = await db.insert(companySecrets).values({
|
|
companyId: otherCompany.id,
|
|
key: `secret-${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
name: `Secret ${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
const svc = toolAccessService(db);
|
|
|
|
await expect(svc.createApplication(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Wrong owner",
|
|
type: "mcp_http",
|
|
ownerAgentId: otherAgent.id,
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow(/same company/);
|
|
|
|
await expect(svc.createConnection(company.id, {
|
|
name: "Wrong secret",
|
|
transport: "mcp_remote",
|
|
transportConfig: { url: "https://8.8.8.8/mcp" },
|
|
credentialSecretRefs: [{
|
|
secretId: otherSecret.id,
|
|
configPath: "headers.Authorization",
|
|
}],
|
|
})).rejects.toThrow(/same company/);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|