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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Agents use outside services through connections, and the control plane holds each connection's credentials > - Companies want agents to "do things on AWS" with exactly the permissions they choose, without Paperclip storing long-lived AWS keys or rebuilding the AWS API > - AWS hosts an MCP server that runs any AWS API call in its own sandbox, and it accepts a one-hour bearer token that can be minted from IAM credentials > - This pull request adds an AWS connection that mints that token for each connection at call time. The role method proves the connection with the company's workload identity issuer (#22083), so no AWS key is stored > - The benefit is that each AWS connection carries its own role and permissions, AWS enforces them, and agents never see any AWS credential ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #22083 (workload identity issuer) and #22191 (spike findings). **Subsystem affected** Connections (tool access), tool gateway, shared app definitions, instance settings. **Problem or motivation** Paperclip has no way to connect AWS. AWS's hosted MCP server needs a bearer token from AWS Sign-in, minted from IAM credentials. No existing credential path mints a header at call time from a role or key. **Proposed solution** Methods can declare `credentialMinter: "aws_mcp"`. The gateway and connection health checks mint the `Authorization` header at call time, and they share one in-memory cache per connection and grant (about 55 minutes). There are two methods: - Role (`AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` with a Paperclip-signed connection token). - Access key (the key directly, `GetFederationToken`, or `AssumeRole`). Read-only connections add `ReadOnlyAccess` and `AWSMCPSignInOAuthAccessPolicy` as session policies, so AWS refuses changes. The feature is behind the `enableAwsConnector` experimental setting. **Alternatives considered** - Run AWS's `mcp-proxy-for-aws` process on the control plane. Rejected: it adds a Python runtime and processes, and gives nothing the token exchange does not. - Put credentials in the agent sandbox and use the AWS CLI. Deferred: there is no per-call governance, and every sandbox would need the CLI. - Add a new `credentialSource`. Rejected: it needs a migration, and the `vercel_connect` database rules do not fit stored access keys. ## What Changed - `packages/shared`: - `credentialMinter` on connection methods. The validator requires `mcp_remote` and `api_key`, and does not allow `keyPlacement` or another credential source. - The `aws` app definition (two methods, reviewed tools, `mcpSessionRequired`, experimental key). - The `enableAwsConnector` setting in the catalog, types and validators. - `aws` added to the connectable apps. - `server/src/services/connectors/aws/mcp-credentials.ts`: - Settings parsing and checks. The URL must be AWS's endpoint for the saved region, and the role ARN must be valid. - The minter: role or key session, read-only session policies, Sign-in exchange, cache keyed on settings, key references and status, in-flight de-duplication, eviction. - A plain-language error mapping that never shows AWS's own text, because that text can contain account IDs and ARNs. - Gateway (`resolveCredentialHeadersUnrecorded`), credential access (`resolveCredentialHeaders`), catalog discovery and health-failure mapping: - The AWS branch. - After a 401, the gateway evicts the token and mints again, then requires an explicit retry (no replay). Discovery lists again. - Setup: - Minted methods may save a draft without contacting the provider. The role must trust a connection that already exists. - Saving an AWS role draft publishes the company's issuer, so AWS can validate it when the customer registers it. - `workload-identity.ts`: a draft connection can get a token, so setup can test it. Disabled, archived or switched-off connections still get none. - `server/package.json`: `@aws-sdk/client-sts` and `@aws-sdk/client-signin`. The lockfile is left to the refresh workflow. - Artwork: AWS light and dark marks from LobeHub's MIT icon set (already licensed in the repo). The manifest entry passes the brand checks. - `scripts/ingest-app-definitions.mjs`: minted methods are exempt from the `keyPlacement` requirement. The override source is `scripts/app-definition-overrides/aws.json`. Permission reviews are added. - UI: the experimental settings toggle, in alphabetical position. - Docs: `doc/connections/AWS.md`, the connections index, the issuer API doc (draft rule), and the plan's phase table. ## Verification - `server/src/services/connectors/aws/mcp-credentials.test.ts` (7 tests) covers these items: - Both methods and the read-only policies. - Caching, revision, forced refresh, expiry and eviction. - Concurrent de-duplication. - The error mapping, with no AWS text leaking. - Settings validation, including the URL and region check and the rule that an unknown access level means read only. - `server/src/__tests__/aws-mcp-connector.test.ts` (3 tests, real setup, catalog and gateway code with a fake AWS and a session-requiring fake MCP server) covers these items: - The setting gates setup. - The access key is never sent as a header or stored in config. - A cached token is reused. - After a 401, a fresh token is minted and the call is not replayed. - Role draft-then-resume publishes the issuer. - The signed token has the right `iss`, `sub` and `aud`. - An AWS refusal shows a plain health message without the account ID. - Red/green: - Removing the gateway hook fails the access-key test. - Turning off `mcpSessionRequired` fails both integration tests. - Removing draft support for minted methods fails both integration tests. - Restoring each change passes again. - Nearby suites: `tool-gateway-service`, `tool-access-service`, `remote-mcp-connectors`, `instance-settings-service`, `workload-identity`, plus the new files. 775 of 775 pass. - Shared `app-definitions.test.ts` passes (42), including new `credentialMinter` schema tests. UI `InstanceExperimentalSettings` (63) and the brand asset tests pass. `check-app-brand-assets` validates 112 identities. - Typecheck is clean for `packages/shared`, `server` and `ui`. The only UI errors are in Storybook's generated catalog files, which this worktree has not built. - **Real AWS** (Paperclip dev account, integrated code path, issuer behind a temporary public tunnel): - Access key, read only: 8 tools listed. `run_script` `ListBuckets` succeeded in 8.9 s on a cold sandbox. AWS refused `CreateBucket` ("no session policy allows"). - Role: the draft was saved without contacting AWS, and the issuer was published. After an IAM provider and a role trusting only that connection were created, resuming setup listed 8 tools. `ListBuckets` succeeded in 12.8 s. The role's own permissions refused `CreateBucket`. - This run found two bugs the fakes did not: AWS needs MCP sessions for calls, and the role method needs draft-first setup with the issuer published. Both are fixed and both now have tests. - All IAM users, keys, roles, providers and buckets were deleted, and a listing confirmed it. - Not run: Paperclip Cloud staging (the setting is off by default), and `AssumeRole` from an access key with a role ARN against real AWS (unit tests only). ## Risks - The feature is off by default, behind `enableAwsConnector`. No migration. - New dependencies `@aws-sdk/client-sts` and `@aws-sdk/client-signin` are in the existing `@aws-sdk` family (the server already uses `client-s3`). - Minted tokens are held only in process memory. A restart mints again. A cached token can outlive a deactivated key by up to an hour, unless AWS returns 401, which evicts it. - `aws___run_script` is classified as a write, so the normal approval and ask-first policy applies. Read-only connections rely on AWS session policies. - The guided setup screen and the CloudFormation template are not in this PR. Setup uses the generic form and the documented draft and resume steps. ## Model Used - Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with tool use (shell, file edits, AWS SDK for JavaScript against the Paperclip dev AWS account, a Cloudflare quick tunnel, an exploration subagent). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
387 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
387 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
import { createPrivateKey, createPublicKey, randomUUID, sign, type KeyObject } from "node:crypto";
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import { and, eq, gt, inArray, lte, or } from "drizzle-orm";
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import {
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companies,
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companyWorkloadIdentityKeys,
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toolAccessAuditEvents,
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toolConnections,
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type Db,
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} from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { conflict, notFound, unprocessable } from "../errors.js";
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import { persistActivity, publishActivity, type LogActivityInput } from "./activity-log.js";
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import { localEncryptedProvider } from "../secrets/local-encrypted-provider.js";
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import { runtimePublicOrigin } from "./cloud-runtime-identity.js";
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import { generateClientKeyPair, jwkThumbprint } from "./tool-access/oauth/client-credentials.js";
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/**
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* Workload identity issuer: each company signs short-lived OIDC tokens that
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* name one of its connections, and publishes the public keys so an outside
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* cloud (AWS, GCP, Azure) can verify them without Paperclip storing that
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* cloud's keys. Only the control plane can sign; agents never see these tokens.
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*/
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export const WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ALGORITHM = "ES256";
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export const WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_TOKEN_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 300;
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/** A `next` key is published this long before it may sign, so cached key sets pick it up. */
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export const WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_PUBLISH_BEFORE_USE_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
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/** A replaced key stays published this long, so tokens it signed still verify. */
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export const WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_RETIRING_GRACE_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
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type KeyRow = typeof companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.$inferSelect;
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export type WorkloadIdentityIssuerOrigin =
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| { available: true; origin: string }
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| { available: false; reason: "no_public_url" | "not_https" | "has_port" | "loopback" };
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let configuredPublicOrigin: string | null = null;
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/**
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* The instance's configured public address (auth.publicBaseUrl, BETTER_AUTH_URL,
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* BETTER_AUTH_BASE_URL), set once by createApp. Used after the live Cloud
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* address and the PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL family, which `runtimePublicOrigin` reads.
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*/
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export function setWorkloadIdentityConfiguredPublicOrigin(origin: string | null | undefined) {
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configuredPublicOrigin = origin?.trim() || null;
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}
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export function workloadIdentityPublicOrigin(): string | null {
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return runtimePublicOrigin() ?? configuredPublicOrigin;
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}
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/** AWS requires an https issuer with no port that it can reach from the internet. */
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export function workloadIdentityIssuerOrigin(origin: string | null = workloadIdentityPublicOrigin()): WorkloadIdentityIssuerOrigin {
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if (!origin) return { available: false, reason: "no_public_url" };
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let url: URL;
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try {
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url = new URL(origin);
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} catch {
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return { available: false, reason: "no_public_url" };
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}
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if (url.protocol !== "https:") return { available: false, reason: "not_https" };
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if (url.port !== "") return { available: false, reason: "has_port" };
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const host = url.hostname.toLowerCase();
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if (host === "localhost" || host.endsWith(".localhost") || host === "[::1]" || /^127\./.test(host)) {
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return { available: false, reason: "loopback" };
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}
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return { available: true, origin: url.origin };
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}
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export function workloadIdentityIssuer(origin: string, companyId: string): string {
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return `${origin}/oidc/companies/${companyId}`;
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}
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export function workloadIdentitySubject(connectionId: string): string {
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return `connection:${connectionId}`;
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}
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/** Only public EC members, so private material can never reach the published key set. */
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function publicJwkFor(row: Pick<KeyRow, "publicJwk" | "keyId">) {
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const jwk = row.publicJwk;
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return {
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kty: "EC",
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crv: jwk.crv,
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x: jwk.x,
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y: jwk.y,
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kid: row.keyId,
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alg: WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ALGORITHM,
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use: "sig",
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};
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}
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/** Only each company's current signing key is held decrypted; a rotated-out key is dropped. */
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const signingKeyCache = new Map<string, { keyId: string; privateKey: KeyObject }>();
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export function resetWorkloadIdentityKeyCacheForTests() {
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signingKeyCache.clear();
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}
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function base64Url(value: Buffer | string): string {
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return Buffer.from(value).toString("base64url");
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}
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export function workloadIdentityService(db: Db, options: { now?: () => Date } = {}) {
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const now = options.now ?? (() => new Date());
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async function newKeyValues(companyId: string, status: "next" | "active") {
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const generated = await generateClientKeyPair(WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ALGORITHM, now());
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const encrypted = await localEncryptedProvider.createSecret({ value: generated.privateKeyPem });
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const at = now();
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return {
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companyId,
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keyId: generated.publicKey.keyId,
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algorithm: WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ALGORITHM as "ES256",
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publicJwk: generated.publicKey.publicJwk as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
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privateKeyMaterial: encrypted.material,
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status,
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createdAt: at,
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statusChangedAt: at,
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};
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}
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async function assertCompany(companyId: string) {
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const [company] = await db.select({ id: companies.id }).from(companies).where(eq(companies.id, companyId));
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if (!company) throw notFound("Company not found");
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}
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async function activeKey(companyId: string): Promise<KeyRow | undefined> {
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const [row] = await db.select().from(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys).where(and(
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eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.companyId, companyId),
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eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.status, "active"),
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));
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return row;
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}
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/** The company's signing key, created on first use. Concurrent callers converge on one key. */
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async function ensureActiveKey(companyId: string): Promise<KeyRow> {
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const existing = await activeKey(companyId);
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if (existing) return existing;
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await assertCompany(companyId);
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await db.insert(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys).values(await newKeyValues(companyId, "active")).onConflictDoNothing();
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const created = await activeKey(companyId);
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if (!created) throw new Error("Workload identity key could not be created");
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return created;
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}
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async function privateKeyFor(row: KeyRow): Promise<KeyObject> {
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const cached = signingKeyCache.get(row.companyId);
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if (cached?.keyId === row.keyId) return cached.privateKey;
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const pem = await localEncryptedProvider.resolveVersion({ material: row.privateKeyMaterial, externalRef: null });
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const privateKey = createPrivateKey(pem);
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// Fail closed on corruption or a wrong master key; never sign with a key that isn't the published one.
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if (row.algorithm !== WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ALGORITHM || privateKey.asymmetricKeyType !== "ec"
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|| jwkThumbprint(createPublicKey(privateKey).export({ format: "jwk" })) !== row.keyId) {
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throw new Error("Workload identity private key does not match its published key");
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}
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signingKeyCache.set(row.companyId, { keyId: row.keyId, privateKey });
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return privateKey;
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}
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/** Published keys only, filtered in SQL so reads stay bounded however many rotations happened. */
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async function publishedKeyRows(companyId: string): Promise<KeyRow[]> {
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const graceStart = new Date(now().getTime() - WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_RETIRING_GRACE_MS);
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return db.select().from(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys).where(and(
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eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.companyId, companyId),
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or(
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inArray(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.status, ["next", "active"]),
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and(eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.status, "retiring"),
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gt(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.statusChangedAt, graceStart)),
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),
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));
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}
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/** Retiring keys past their grace period become retired, so they leave every view. */
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async function settleRetiring(tx: Db, companyId: string, at: Date) {
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await tx.update(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys).set({ status: "retired", statusChangedAt: at }).where(and(
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eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.companyId, companyId),
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eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.status, "retiring"),
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lte(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.statusChangedAt, new Date(at.getTime() - WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_RETIRING_GRACE_MS)),
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));
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}
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type RotationActor = Pick<LogActivityInput, "actorType" | "actorId">;
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/** Runs one rotation step and its activity entry in one transaction; publishes the entry after commit. */
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async function rotate(
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companyId: string,
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actor: RotationActor,
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step: "begin" | "complete" | "emergency",
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work: (tx: Db, at: Date) => Promise<{ keyId: string; created?: boolean }>,
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) {
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const { result, publication } = await db.transaction(async (rawTx) => {
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const tx = rawTx as unknown as Db;
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await lockCompany(tx, companyId);
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const at = now();
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await settleRetiring(tx, companyId, at);
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const result = await work(tx, at);
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// A repeated "begin" while a rotation is pending changes nothing, so it is not logged.
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if (result.created === false) return { result, publication: null };
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const { publication } = await persistActivity(tx, {
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companyId, ...actor,
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action: `workload_identity.rotation_${step}`,
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entityType: "company", entityId: companyId,
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details: { keyId: result.keyId },
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});
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return { result, publication };
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});
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if (publication) publishActivity(publication);
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if (step !== "begin") signingKeyCache.delete(companyId);
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return result;
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}
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async function lockCompany(tx: Db, companyId: string) {
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const [company] = await tx.select({ id: companies.id }).from(companies)
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.where(eq(companies.id, companyId)).for("update");
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if (!company) throw notFound("Company not found");
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}
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return {
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ensureActiveKey,
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/** Public key set, or null when the company has never created a key (callers answer 404). */
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async publicKeySet(companyId: string): Promise<{ keys: ReturnType<typeof publicJwkFor>[] } | null> {
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const keys = (await publishedKeyRows(companyId)).map(publicJwkFor);
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return keys.length > 0 ? { keys } : null;
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},
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/** OIDC discovery document, or null when the issuer isn't usable here or the company has no key. */
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async discoveryDocument(companyId: string, origin = workloadIdentityIssuerOrigin()) {
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if (!origin.available) return null;
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if ((await publishedKeyRows(companyId)).length === 0) return null;
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const issuer = workloadIdentityIssuer(origin.origin, companyId);
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return {
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issuer,
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jwks_uri: `${issuer}/jwks.json`,
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response_types_supported: ["id_token"],
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subject_types_supported: ["public"],
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id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: [WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ALGORITHM],
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claims_supported: ["aud", "exp", "iat", "iss", "jti", "nbf", "sub"],
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};
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},
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/**
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* A 5-minute token that names one connection. `sub` and `aud` come from the
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* connection and its method, never from agent input. The token itself is
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* never stored or logged.
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*/
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async signConnectionToken(input: {
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companyId: string;
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connectionId: string;
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audience: string;
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/** The issuer recorded when the connection was set up; signing stops if the instance address changed. */
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expectedIssuer?: string | null;
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origin?: WorkloadIdentityIssuerOrigin;
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}) {
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if (!/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(input.audience)) {
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throw unprocessable("Invalid workload identity audience", { code: "workload_identity_audience_invalid" });
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}
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const origin = input.origin ?? workloadIdentityIssuerOrigin();
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if (!origin.available) {
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throw unprocessable("This Paperclip instance needs a public HTTPS address to sign identity tokens.", {
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code: "workload_identity_unavailable", reason: origin.reason,
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});
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}
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const issuer = workloadIdentityIssuer(origin.origin, input.companyId);
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if (input.expectedIssuer && input.expectedIssuer !== issuer) {
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throw conflict("This Paperclip instance's address changed. Update the identity provider in your cloud account.", {
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code: "workload_identity_issuer_changed",
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});
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}
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const [connection] = await db.select({ status: toolConnections.status, enabled: toolConnections.enabled })
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.from(toolConnections).where(and(
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eq(toolConnections.id, input.connectionId), eq(toolConnections.companyId, input.companyId),
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));
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if (!connection) throw notFound("Connection not found");
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// Disabling a connection must stop new cloud credentials at once.
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// A draft is being set up and tested; a disabled, archived or switched-off connection gets nothing.
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const usable = connection.status === "draft" || (connection.status === "active" && connection.enabled);
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if (!usable) {
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throw unprocessable("This connection is not active.", { code: "workload_identity_connection_inactive" });
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}
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const key = await ensureActiveKey(input.companyId);
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const privateKey = await privateKeyFor(key);
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const issuedAt = Math.floor(now().getTime() / 1000);
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const expiresAt = issuedAt + WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_TOKEN_LIFETIME_SECONDS;
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const subject = workloadIdentitySubject(input.connectionId);
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const header = { alg: WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_ALGORITHM, typ: "JWT", kid: key.keyId };
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const claims = {
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iss: issuer, sub: subject, aud: input.audience,
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iat: issuedAt, nbf: issuedAt, exp: expiresAt, jti: randomUUID(),
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};
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const signingInput = `${base64Url(JSON.stringify(header))}.${base64Url(JSON.stringify(claims))}`;
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const signature = sign("sha256", Buffer.from(signingInput), { key: privateKey, dsaEncoding: "ieee-p1363" });
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await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
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companyId: input.companyId,
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connectionId: input.connectionId,
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actorType: "system",
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actorId: "workload-identity",
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action: "workload_identity.token_issued",
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outcome: "success",
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details: { keyId: key.keyId, audience: input.audience, expiresAt: new Date(expiresAt * 1000).toISOString() },
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
token: `${signingInput}.${base64Url(signature)}`,
|
|
issuer,
|
|
subject,
|
|
keyId: key.keyId,
|
|
expiresAt: new Date(expiresAt * 1000),
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/** Board view: issuer and the published keys with their states, with no private material. */
|
|
async describe(companyId: string, origin = workloadIdentityIssuerOrigin()) {
|
|
await assertCompany(companyId);
|
|
const rows = await publishedKeyRows(companyId);
|
|
return {
|
|
issuer: origin.available ? workloadIdentityIssuer(origin.origin, companyId) : null,
|
|
unavailableReason: origin.available ? null : origin.reason,
|
|
keys: rows
|
|
.sort((a, b) => a.createdAt.getTime() - b.createdAt.getTime())
|
|
.map((row) => ({
|
|
keyId: row.keyId,
|
|
status: row.status,
|
|
createdAt: row.createdAt.toISOString(),
|
|
statusChangedAt: row.statusChangedAt.toISOString(),
|
|
})),
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/** Step 1 of a planned rotation: publish a `next` key alongside the active one. */
|
|
async beginRotation(companyId: string, actor: RotationActor) {
|
|
return rotate(companyId, actor, "begin", async (tx) => {
|
|
const rows = await tx.select().from(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys).where(and(
|
|
eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.companyId, companyId),
|
|
inArray(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.status, ["next", "active"]),
|
|
));
|
|
if (!rows.some((row) => row.status === "active")) {
|
|
throw conflict("This company has no signing key to rotate yet.", { code: "workload_identity_no_key" });
|
|
}
|
|
const pending = rows.find((row) => row.status === "next");
|
|
if (pending) return { keyId: pending.keyId, created: false };
|
|
const [created] = await tx.insert(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys)
|
|
.values(await newKeyValues(companyId, "next")).returning();
|
|
return { keyId: created!.keyId, created: true };
|
|
});
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/** Step 2: once the `next` key has been published long enough, it signs; the old key stays published for a grace period. */
|
|
async completeRotation(companyId: string, actor: RotationActor) {
|
|
return rotate(companyId, actor, "complete", async (tx, at) => {
|
|
const [next] = await tx.select().from(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys).where(and(
|
|
eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.companyId, companyId),
|
|
eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.status, "next"),
|
|
));
|
|
if (!next) throw conflict("Start a rotation first.", { code: "workload_identity_no_rotation" });
|
|
const readyAt = new Date(next.createdAt.getTime() + WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_PUBLISH_BEFORE_USE_MS);
|
|
if (readyAt > at) {
|
|
throw conflict("The new key must be published for 24 hours before it can sign.", {
|
|
code: "workload_identity_rotation_not_ready", readyAt: readyAt.toISOString(),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
await tx.update(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys).set({ status: "retiring", statusChangedAt: at }).where(and(
|
|
eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.companyId, companyId),
|
|
eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.status, "active"),
|
|
));
|
|
await tx.update(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys).set({ status: "active", statusChangedAt: at })
|
|
.where(eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.id, next.id));
|
|
return { keyId: next.keyId };
|
|
});
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/** For a key believed exposed: stop publishing every current key and sign with a fresh one immediately. */
|
|
async emergencyRotation(companyId: string, actor: RotationActor) {
|
|
return rotate(companyId, actor, "emergency", async (tx, at) => {
|
|
await tx.update(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys).set({ status: "retired", statusChangedAt: at }).where(and(
|
|
eq(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.companyId, companyId),
|
|
inArray(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys.status, ["next", "active", "retiring"]),
|
|
));
|
|
const [created] = await tx.insert(companyWorkloadIdentityKeys)
|
|
.values(await newKeyValues(companyId, "active")).returning();
|
|
return { keyId: created!.keyId };
|
|
});
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export type WorkloadIdentityService = ReturnType<typeof workloadIdentityService>;
|