Files
PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 647116dd4b fix(adapter-utils): allow sandbox agents to read run diagnostics (#16575)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages agent work and its execution history.
> - Sandbox agents use a callback bridge to reach the control plane.
> - The API already provides authorized run diagnostics.
> - The bridge denied those read routes before the API could check
access.
> - Health scans could see task activity but could not inspect failed
runs.
> - This pull request admits exact GET routes on both bridge transports.
> - Linked task results also apply the caller's task-read filter.
> - Agents can inspect failures through their existing run identity.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

A sandbox health scan received `403 Route not allowed` for run history,
run details, events, and task recovery records. The same agent could
read task activity and connected provider state. The bridge stopped
these diagnostic requests before they reached the API.

**Expected behavior**

The bridge should admit the existing diagnostic GET routes. The API must
still enforce company and task access and redact run content. Execution
and recovery writes must stay denied by these rules.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Start an agent in a sandbox with the normal callback bridge.
2. Use its injected API credential to request company run history.
3. Request a run's details or events.
4. Observe the bridge's route denial before the API handles the request.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Reproduced with the callback route list on master at `9f4a956b906`.

**Deployment mode**

Authenticated server with a managed sandbox. Both queue and HTTP/2
transports use this route list.

Related work: Refs #15854 adds separate cost-read routes to this list.
It does not add run diagnostics. Searches found no duplicate
run-diagnostic change.

## What Changed

- Admit nine existing diagnostic GET paths: company history and live
runs; run details, events, logs, workspace operations and task links;
task runs and recovery records.
- Reject other methods, extra path segments, execution control, recovery
resolution, and provider-trace administration.
- Filter linked tasks by the caller's task-read predicate in both
activity and original-task queries. Keep those results in the run's
company. A readable run must not expose private task titles.
- Test both route lists and the HTTP/2 request path. Preserve query
parameters and controller denial responses. Add a database regression
with public and private tasks linked to a readable company run.
- Document bounded diagnostic reads, private-run stubs, access checks,
and credential handling in the agent API reference. Update both affected
run access maps with the sandbox entry points and verification limits.

## Verification

- Passed both bridge suites: 139 tests.
- Passed the server run-route, activity-route, and secret-redaction
suites: 117 tests, including the new task-link filter test. The cold
route-import test needed a 30-second timeout on this host.
- Passed `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, the adapter-utils typecheck,
both generated capability checks, and `node scripts/check-maps.mjs`.
- Attempted `pnpm test:run`. The bundled PostgreSQL binary cannot start
on this host. The native session suite reported 15 database startup
failures; the privacy suite skipped its 15 cases. Stopped that full
local attempt after those failures. No full local-suite pass is claimed.
The final 16-case privacy suite also skipped locally for the same host
limitation; Linux CI ran all 16 cases successfully.
- One unchanged queue-response test hit a file-read race during the
combined local run. A separate rerun of both complete bridge suites
passed all 139 cases. The transient race was not independently isolated;
the original failure is retained in this record.
- All CI gates pass on head `97c65cec459d3fc2787083d05ae6ec51e3fd7b70`.
Linux CI passed all 16 database-backed run privacy cases, including the
new public/private task-link regression. These also cover private-run
denial, authorized owner/reviewer reads, redacted list stubs, credential
diagnostics, and deleted-task handling: [serialized shard
1](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38925932547/job/117057907621).
- Apex reviewed the final head at 5/5. Both findings are addressed and
their review threads are resolved.
- After deployment, run a new sandbox audit. Confirm it can list and
inspect authorized failed runs without a board credential. This has not
been deployed or live-tested by this PR.

## Risks

- Sandbox agents can reach more diagnostic GET routes. The existing
server access checks and redaction still apply.
- Linked task results now omit tasks that the caller cannot read.
Authorized task links remain visible.
- This change does not grant execution control or recover a failed
workspace.
- Existing bridge sessions may need a new run to load the updated route
list.
- No schema, credential, UI, workflow, or lockfile change.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, assisted with implementation and
verification. The exact serving model ID and context-window limit are
not exposed in this session. Capabilities used: code editing, shell
execution, and test execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-16 09:04:07 -07:00
..

Paperclip agent access map

This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.

Browse access contracts

The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the published feature guide. Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.

Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.

Using an entry

Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.

For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.

Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps. Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly. Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.

Native REST transport

The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.

Native search_api / call_api requires operator rollout admission, a running authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.

Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.

Sources: API client, catalog, native authority, credential storage classification, snapshot access, and history redaction. The affected entries remain baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation. Targeted real-route proof lives in the API integration suite, including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.