mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-10-27 19:35:13 +01:00
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane for agent companies. > - People choose a harness when creating an agent. > - The server should resolve that harness to a qualified runner. > - Codex is the first harness in the staged default rollout. > - Saved agents must retain their execution choices. > - New Codex agents therefore use Paperclip Runner on qualified macOS/Linux targets, with an explicit Legacy override. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #16028, #15555, #15673, #15422, #15631, #15926, #15932, #16149. The runtime/install prerequisite and release repair are merged. This slice owns Codex creation, setup, configuration and preservation. Other harness defaults remain unchanged. It adds no database migration; incoming master migrations, required maps and regression coverage are retained. ## What Changed - Resolve `runner: auto | paperclip | legacy` at the common creation boundary across onboarding, API/CLI, hires, built-ins, plugins and imports. Freeze pending hires and export resolved execution choices. - Preserve existing runners on upgrades, unrelated edits and import updates, including compatible accounts, workspace settings, Codex effort and intentional clears. - Use the underlying harness picker and branding; put the runner override in Advanced. Use the shared dropdown and update production-component stories and creation contracts. - Support qualified Apple Silicon, Intel Mac, Linux x64 and Linux ARM64. Linux requires GNU libc 2.39+. Disabled, external, unsupported and unqualified combinations retain their applicable Legacy execution. - Test the selected runtime/account/model/environment. Ordinary Connect probes eligible immutable managed targets and refreshes scoped discovery. Creation/discovery do not provision. Auth, dependency, incompatible-setting and cleanup failures remain actionable without changing runners. - Keep setup probes read-only, preserve local/SSH isolation and resolve packaged assets before staging credentials. Bound cleanup reads by the remaining absolute deadline; physically close every owned ingress socket before endpoint release. Unconfirmed cleanup retains recovery state. - Preserve validated completed-onboarding callbacks through startup recovery. First file-producing work belongs to the child task and uses the existing dependency/block handoff and task-scoped registration. - Reuse existing E2E fixtures, artifact checks, reporting and controls. Keep Docker/Cargo/native compilation remote. Paperclip tarballs contain no Codex payloads; official optional npm platform dependencies remain. ## Verification Current tested head: `1c03a8815672d82c264a9b08d4ea1984e8fae107`. **Merge-ready: required CI, fresh review, package qualification, Mac core acceptance and Test task/follow-up acceptance pass.** The existing attachment and native-continuity oracles independently verify both Test downloads, run attribution and unchanged native/provider/workspace identities. The maintainer authorized a code-owner-review exception for this PR only. The first Test setup failure and normal Board completion-review friction are retained below. Actual post-merge packages and private Cloud distribution remain separate qualification gates. - [Current CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38564241625): all 48 ordinary jobs and required verify/E2E pass. Attempt 1 retained six simultaneous host-shutdown cancellations. One failed-only retry passes those six lanes and two aggregates, preserving 40 successes. Actual integration checkout `53104c1` combines this head with master `c80`; it is not relabeled as the branch tree. Fresh exact-head Greptile 5/5, 30 resolved threads, no actionable findings. - [Exact-source package qualification](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38565287239): nine applicable jobs pass, nine conditional jobs skip. Four remote native producers; Linux x64 clean install; Intel Mac, Apple Silicon and Linux ARM64 native startup/physical cleanup controls. All 18 tarballs/four daemon source/hash/manifest bindings and 343 migrations through 0344 verify. No Codex payload is packed. These hosted tarballs are not a published npm canary. - Normal Apple Silicon installation and credential-free native startup/cleanup pass using the packaged daemon, with no source build or provider turn. Fresh installed DB initialization passes. Upgrade 651a→1c03 preserves all three complete execution configs, accounts, ten recorded run profiles, paused budgets, active incidents, cost summaries and two historical unpriced events. Historical recovery state is retained. - Cleanup regressions: four delayed-read baseline failures become 15 passing deadline/authority controls. No-acknowledgement and prior-error socket ownership regressions become 12 passing controls. Direct runtime/server types, maps: 35 areas / 176 IDs, diff checks and independent reviews pass. Permission/auth/reconnect policy and the 10-second setup budget remain intact. - Existing source coverage includes creation/selection/imports, pending approvals, recovery, account/lifecycle handling, mounted forms, dropdowns and E2E support. Full typechecks/tests/build/token and applicable Storybook checks pass in the recorded current CI; no duplicate suite or weakened grader. - Literal 9546 live Mac proof: ordinary Auto Codex onboarding, useful document, real completed-child callback/reply, seven successful native runs, manual follow-up and independently downloaded1,101-byte child file. Existing Legacy title edit/reload preserves execution; two real Legacy runs produce independently checked15/34-byte files. These remain historical source records. - Current literal 1c03 Mac core acceptance passes independent checks: ordinary Auto native Codex onboarding without runner override; only timeout 180 seconds/concurrency 1 saved; six successful native runs and six serialized turns (maximum overlap 1); both same-task continuity checks and five mechanical callback checks; actual rendered parent reply and exact child downloads. The useful handoff advances from revision 1 to 2. Both files are 48 bytes, SHA-256 `8b742bd4e8123a7c078f0a8d9f3449fbfa8a320d7d90be641a2818db3c53d92c` and `f42db9774fa06e804ab7d596fc8b922a2b638921c418b87d0111151d290a6afe`; exactly one byte changes and old history remains. The agent is paused with zero active runs/errors. Both artifact work products have `isPrimary=false`, and descriptive titles fail a stricter title-helper assumption; these retained results are scoped editorial follow-up, not new merge gates. Six source-bound screenshots are uploaded and verified in the private primary QA report. - [Literal 9546 managed proof](https://d1p6rlowie26tp.cloudfront.net/runner-e2e/campaigns/gha-38485488621-1/index.html): original 19 assertions and completed judge pass, four native turns, child-bound240-byte file and session/workspace continuity. Checkout reports a verified generated target-lock mutation; full final porcelain was not retained. Signed execution-image identity remains separate from Core source. - Actual 651a Test deployment succeeds on one owned/pinned target. One ordinary Auto API-key Connect then fails native cleanup before hire. Controller turn/drain/suspend completion and service-recorded environment cleanup are observed; they do not certify physical deletion or native authority retirement. Failure/recovery/unknown holds are retained. No Legacy switch or unchanged paid retry. The two source repairs above require actual treatment. - [Current immutable Core preview](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38570365725) and matching DB/shared artifacts pass. One owned, pinned Test target serves exact `1c03`; identical migration history correctly skips the migrator. Ordinary Auto Codex Connect succeeds and hires native; saved native selection and QA bounds survive reload. The initial child preparation attempt fails before provider work, with actual stdout identifying `renewal_deadline`; its trigger remains unknown and the failure is retained. Normal Board **Try again** and **Resume** recover the child to Done, producing a browser-verified 44-byte file, SHA-256 `0a8458b1efcc2d7a0d815689458c4caab039a46c7c7a3e5805de6bc8b1a96ecc`. The actual parent callback reports the completed child document/file. The existing validator requires a parent-owned attachment, so recovery enters normal Review; after byte checking, normal **Approve completion** reaches parent Done. No forced status or duplicate parent file is used. The validator is unchanged from integrated and current master. Autonomous initial callback-to-Done is not proven. The same-child follow-up completes document revision 2 and publishes a second independently downloaded 44-byte file, SHA-256 `22022257300fae762784632d08d3bbe0bab61e2ce81f91864a14dcd7aa464591`; only the revision digit changes. The unchanged existing native-continuity and attachment oracles pass. All ten recorded runs are terminal: nine native successes and the retained pre-provider setup failure. The QA agent is paused with zero active runs. The pre-existing parent evidence scope mismatch is a separate follow-up, with ordinary completion review exercised rather than a forced status or relaxed validation. This unsigned Core preview remains distinct from post-merge private Cloud composition. ## Risks - Saved agents are not migrated. Explicit runner changes use normal configuration/session rules; historical runs retain their recorded execution. - Native readiness depends on verified assets and server-owned target qualification. A Legacy probe, HTTP200 or successful account save cannot prove native readiness. - Recovery exceptions remain restricted to validated completed-onboarding reports; process-loss, ownership and terminal-state safeguards remain active. Unexecuted live journeys stay open. - Linux ARM paid tasks, Windows, Alpine and 32-bit ARM remain deferred. Cold Cargo cache misses are recorded; no warm-cache speedup is claimed. - Historical invoices/physical cleanup remain unconfirmed and held. After merge, exact published npm canary, signed standard image/migrator, private composition and serving/live acceptance still require qualification. Production deployment/default promotion is not authorized. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, tools, code execution and parallel agents. Exact serving snapshot and context-window size are not exposed. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used with available version and capability details - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have linked public issues or PRs above - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal ticket id - [x] I have run the stated focused tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation - [x] I have considered and documented risks - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green on the current candidate - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open findings on the current candidate - [x] I will address all reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
418 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript
418 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript
import WebSocket from "ws";
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import type { RunnerIngressEndpoint } from "@paperclipai/adapter-utils/runner-connectivity";
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import type {
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DurablePrpControlPlane,
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PrpWireConnection,
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TransportCloseReason,
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} from "../vendor/paperclip-runner/index.js";
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const DEFAULT_STARTUP_DEADLINE_MS = 60_000;
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const DEFAULT_RECOVERY_GRACE_MS = 120_000;
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const MAX_FRAME_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
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const RECONNECT_DELAYS_MS = [250, 500, 1_000, 2_000, 5_000] as const;
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export type RunnerIngressFailureCode =
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| "runner_ingress_unavailable"
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| "runner_ingress_auth_failed";
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export class RunnerIngressConnectionError extends Error {
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constructor(
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readonly code: RunnerIngressFailureCode,
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message: string,
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options?: ErrorOptions,
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) {
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super(`${code}: ${message}`, options);
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this.name = "RunnerIngressConnectionError";
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}
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}
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export class WsJsonWireConnection implements PrpWireConnection {
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#onJson: ((value: unknown) => void) | null = null;
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#onClose = new Set<(reason: TransportCloseReason) => void>();
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#pendingJson: unknown[] = [];
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#closeReason: TransportCloseReason | null = null;
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constructor(readonly socket: WebSocket) {
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socket.on("message", (data, isBinary) => {
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if (isBinary) {
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this.close(1003);
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return;
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}
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try {
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const value = JSON.parse(data.toString()) as unknown;
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if (this.#onJson === null) {
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this.#pendingJson.push(value);
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} else {
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this.#onJson(value);
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}
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} catch {
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this.close(1007);
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}
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});
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socket.on("close", (code, reason) => {
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this.#notifyClose({ code, message: reason.toString() });
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});
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socket.on("error", (error) => {
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this.#notifyClose({ message: "websocket_error", error });
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});
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}
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sendJson(value: unknown): void {
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if (this.socket.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN) {
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this.socket.send(JSON.stringify(value));
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}
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}
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close(code = 1000): void {
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if (
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this.socket.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN ||
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this.socket.readyState === WebSocket.CONNECTING
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) {
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this.socket.close(code);
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}
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}
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onJson(listener: (value: unknown) => void): void {
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this.#onJson = listener;
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for (const value of this.#pendingJson.splice(0)) listener(value);
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}
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onClose(listener: (reason: TransportCloseReason) => void): void {
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if (this.#closeReason) listener(this.#closeReason);
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else this.#onClose.add(listener);
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}
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#notifyClose(reason: TransportCloseReason): void {
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if (this.#closeReason) return;
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this.#closeReason = reason;
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for (const listener of this.#onClose) listener(reason);
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this.#onClose.clear();
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}
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}
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function validateEndpoint(endpoint: RunnerIngressEndpoint): void {
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const url = new URL(endpoint.websocketUrl);
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if (
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endpoint.kind !== "authenticated_websocket" ||
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url.protocol !== "wss:" ||
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url.username ||
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url.password ||
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url.search ||
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url.hash
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) {
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throw new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
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"runner_ingress_unavailable",
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"The provider returned an invalid runner ingress endpoint.",
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);
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}
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}
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function endpointHeaders(endpoint: RunnerIngressEndpoint): Record<string, string> {
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const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
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for (const header of endpoint.secretHeaders) {
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if (!/^[!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z-]+$/.test(header.name) || !header.value) {
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throw new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
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"runner_ingress_unavailable",
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"The provider returned an invalid runner ingress credential.",
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);
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}
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headers[header.name] = header.value;
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}
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return headers;
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}
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async function delay(ms: number, signal: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {
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if (signal.aborted) return;
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await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
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const timer = setTimeout(resolve, ms);
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signal.addEventListener(
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"abort",
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() => {
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clearTimeout(timer);
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resolve();
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},
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{ once: true },
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);
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});
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}
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async function awaitWithinDeadline<T>(input: {
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operation: () => Promise<T>;
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deadline: number;
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signal: AbortSignal;
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}): Promise<T> {
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if (input.signal.aborted) {
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throw new Error("runner ingress operation was cancelled");
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}
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const remaining = input.deadline - Date.now();
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if (remaining <= 0) {
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throw new Error("runner ingress operation deadline elapsed");
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}
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let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
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let onAbort: (() => void) | undefined;
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const gate = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {
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timer = setTimeout(
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() => reject(new Error("runner ingress operation deadline elapsed")),
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remaining,
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);
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onAbort = () => reject(new Error("runner ingress operation was cancelled"));
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input.signal.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
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});
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const operation = Promise.resolve().then(input.operation);
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try {
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return await Promise.race([operation, gate]);
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} finally {
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if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer);
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if (onAbort) input.signal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
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}
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}
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async function closeOwnedWire(wire: WsJsonWireConnection): Promise<void> {
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const closed = wire.socket.readyState === WebSocket.CLOSED
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? Promise.resolve()
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: new Promise<void>((resolve) => wire.socket.once("close", () => resolve()));
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wire.close(1001);
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wire.socket.terminate();
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await closed;
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}
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async function openEndpoint(input: {
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endpoint: RunnerIngressEndpoint;
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signal: AbortSignal;
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onWire: (wire: WsJsonWireConnection) => void;
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}): Promise<{ wire: WsJsonWireConnection; statusCode: number | null }> {
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validateEndpoint(input.endpoint);
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return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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let statusCode: number | null = null;
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const socket = new WebSocket(input.endpoint.websocketUrl, {
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headers: endpointHeaders(input.endpoint),
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followRedirects: false,
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perMessageDeflate: false,
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maxPayload: MAX_FRAME_BYTES,
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handshakeTimeout: 15_000,
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});
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const wire = new WsJsonWireConnection(socket);
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const onAbort = () => {
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wire.close(1001);
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reject(
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new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
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"runner_ingress_unavailable",
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"Runner ingress connection was cancelled.",
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),
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);
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};
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input.signal.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
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socket.once("unexpected-response", (_request, response) => {
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statusCode = response.statusCode ?? null;
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response.resume();
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input.signal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
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socket.terminate();
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reject(
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Object.assign(new Error("runner_ingress_upgrade_rejected"), {
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statusCode,
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}),
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);
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});
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socket.once("open", () => {
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input.signal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
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resolve({ wire, statusCode });
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});
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socket.once("error", (error) => {
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input.signal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
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reject(Object.assign(error, { statusCode }));
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});
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input.onWire(wire);
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});
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}
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function socketClosed(wire: WsJsonWireConnection): Promise<void> {
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return new Promise((resolve) => wire.onClose(() => resolve()));
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}
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async function waitForPrpReady(input: {
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isAuthenticated: () => boolean;
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wire: WsJsonWireConnection;
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deadline: number;
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signal: AbortSignal;
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}): Promise<boolean> {
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while (
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!input.signal.aborted &&
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input.wire.socket.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN &&
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Date.now() < input.deadline
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) {
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if (input.isAuthenticated()) return true;
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await delay(25, input.signal);
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}
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return false;
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}
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export interface RunnerPrpOutboundHandle {
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readonly ready: Promise<void>;
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/** Rejects only when active-run recovery has exhausted its fixed budget. */
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readonly failure: Promise<never>;
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close(): Promise<void>;
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}
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/**
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* Keep a Paperclip-originated provider-ingress WebSocket attached to one PRP
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* authority. Authentication is the readiness signal; HTTP success alone is not.
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*/
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export function connectRunnerPrpIngress(input: {
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authority: DurablePrpControlPlane;
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endpoint: RunnerIngressEndpoint;
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startupDeadlineMs?: number;
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recoveryGraceMs?: number;
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random?: () => number;
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onStateChange?: (
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state: "connecting" | "authenticated" | "reconnecting" | "failed" | "closed",
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failureCode?: RunnerIngressFailureCode,
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) => void;
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}): RunnerPrpOutboundHandle {
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const abort = new AbortController();
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const ownedWires = new Set<WsJsonWireConnection>();
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let endpoint = input.endpoint;
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const startupDeadline =
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Date.now() + (input.startupDeadlineMs ?? DEFAULT_STARTUP_DEADLINE_MS);
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const recoveryGraceMs = input.recoveryGraceMs ?? DEFAULT_RECOVERY_GRACE_MS;
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const random = input.random ?? Math.random;
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let readyResolve!: () => void;
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let readyReject!: (error: unknown) => void;
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let readySettled = false;
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const ready = new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
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readyResolve = resolve;
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readyReject = reject;
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});
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let failureReject!: (error: unknown) => void;
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const failure = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {
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failureReject = reject;
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});
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// The owning native session normally races this promise against the provider
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// turn. A turn can finish first, though, and a later preview outage must not
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// become an unhandled process-level rejection. Keep the original promise
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// rejected for explicit observers while registering an internal handler.
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void failure.catch(() => undefined);
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void ready.catch(() => undefined);
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const loop = (async () => {
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let attempt = 0;
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let recoveryDeadline = startupDeadline;
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while (!abort.signal.aborted) {
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try {
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input.onStateChange?.(attempt === 0 ? "connecting" : "reconnecting");
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if (abort.signal.aborted) return;
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const opened = await openEndpoint({
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endpoint,
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signal: abort.signal,
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onWire: (wire) => {
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ownedWires.add(wire);
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wire.socket.once("close", () => ownedWires.delete(wire));
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},
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});
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if (abort.signal.aborted) return;
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const attachment = input.authority.attachWireConnection(opened.wire);
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const authenticated = await waitForPrpReady({
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isAuthenticated: attachment.isAuthenticated,
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wire: opened.wire,
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deadline: recoveryDeadline,
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signal: abort.signal,
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});
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if (!authenticated) {
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opened.wire.close(1008);
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throw new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
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"runner_ingress_auth_failed",
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"Runner ingress did not complete PRP authentication before the deadline.",
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);
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}
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if (!readySettled) {
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readySettled = true;
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readyResolve();
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}
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input.onStateChange?.("authenticated");
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attempt = 0;
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await socketClosed(opened.wire);
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recoveryDeadline = Date.now() + recoveryGraceMs;
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} catch (error) {
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// close() owns intentional shutdown. openEndpoint rejects its pending
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// handshake when the abort signal fires, but that cancellation is not
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// an active-run transport failure and must not reject the long-lived
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// failure promise (an unobserved rejection here can terminate Node).
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if (abort.signal.aborted) return;
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let failure: unknown = error;
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const statusCode =
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typeof error === "object" && error !== null && "statusCode" in error
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? Number((error as { statusCode?: unknown }).statusCode)
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: null;
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if (
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(statusCode === 401 || statusCode === 403) &&
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Date.now() < recoveryDeadline
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) {
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try {
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const refreshedEndpoint = await awaitWithinDeadline({
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operation: () => endpoint.refresh(),
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deadline: recoveryDeadline,
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signal: abort.signal,
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});
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// Preview credentials can rotate without changing the sandbox
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// generation. Refresh every rejected credential, but never let a
|
|
// successful refresh reset or step past the fixed recovery budget.
|
|
if (Date.now() < recoveryDeadline) {
|
|
endpoint = refreshedEndpoint;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (refreshError) {
|
|
if (abort.signal.aborted) return;
|
|
failure = refreshError;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (Date.now() >= recoveryDeadline) {
|
|
const terminal =
|
|
failure instanceof RunnerIngressConnectionError
|
|
? failure
|
|
: new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
|
|
statusCode === 401 || statusCode === 403
|
|
? "runner_ingress_auth_failed"
|
|
: "runner_ingress_unavailable",
|
|
"Runner ingress connection failed.",
|
|
{ cause: failure },
|
|
);
|
|
if (!readySettled) {
|
|
readySettled = true;
|
|
readyReject(terminal);
|
|
}
|
|
input.onStateChange?.("failed", terminal.code);
|
|
failureReject(terminal);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
const base = RECONNECT_DELAYS_MS[
|
|
Math.min(attempt, RECONNECT_DELAYS_MS.length - 1)
|
|
]!;
|
|
attempt += 1;
|
|
await delay(Math.max(1, Math.round(base * (0.75 + random() * 0.5))), abort.signal);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
})();
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
ready,
|
|
failure,
|
|
async close() {
|
|
abort.abort();
|
|
await Promise.all([...ownedWires].map(closeOwnedWire));
|
|
await loop;
|
|
await endpoint.close();
|
|
input.onStateChange?.("closed");
|
|
if (!readySettled) {
|
|
readySettled = true;
|
|
readyReject(
|
|
new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
|
|
"runner_ingress_unavailable",
|
|
"Runner ingress was closed before it became ready.",
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export const __runnerPrpOutboundTesting = { awaitWithinDeadline };
|