Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/realtime/runner-prp-outbound.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip adb69e8f09 feat: default new Codex agents to Paperclip Runner on Linux and macOS (#15683)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source control plane for agent companies.
> - People choose a harness when creating an agent.
> - The server should resolve that harness to a qualified runner.
> - Codex is the first harness in the staged default rollout.
> - Saved agents must retain their execution choices.
> - New Codex agents therefore use Paperclip Runner on qualified
macOS/Linux targets, with an explicit Legacy override.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #16028, #15555, #15673, #15422, #15631, #15926, #15932, #16149.

The runtime/install prerequisite and release repair are merged. This
slice owns Codex creation, setup, configuration and preservation. Other
harness defaults remain unchanged. It adds no database migration;
incoming master migrations, required maps and regression coverage are
retained.

## What Changed

- Resolve `runner: auto | paperclip | legacy` at the common creation
boundary across onboarding, API/CLI, hires, built-ins, plugins and
imports. Freeze pending hires and export resolved execution choices.
- Preserve existing runners on upgrades, unrelated edits and import
updates, including compatible accounts, workspace settings, Codex effort
and intentional clears.
- Use the underlying harness picker and branding; put the runner
override in Advanced. Use the shared dropdown and update
production-component stories and creation contracts.
- Support qualified Apple Silicon, Intel Mac, Linux x64 and Linux ARM64.
Linux requires GNU libc 2.39+. Disabled, external, unsupported and
unqualified combinations retain their applicable Legacy execution.
- Test the selected runtime/account/model/environment. Ordinary Connect
probes eligible immutable managed targets and refreshes scoped
discovery. Creation/discovery do not provision. Auth, dependency,
incompatible-setting and cleanup failures remain actionable without
changing runners.
- Keep setup probes read-only, preserve local/SSH isolation and resolve
packaged assets before staging credentials. Bound cleanup reads by the
remaining absolute deadline; physically close every owned ingress socket
before endpoint release. Unconfirmed cleanup retains recovery state.
- Preserve validated completed-onboarding callbacks through startup
recovery. First file-producing work belongs to the child task and uses
the existing dependency/block handoff and task-scoped registration.
- Reuse existing E2E fixtures, artifact checks, reporting and controls.
Keep Docker/Cargo/native compilation remote. Paperclip tarballs contain
no Codex payloads; official optional npm platform dependencies remain.

## Verification

Current tested head: `1c03a8815672d82c264a9b08d4ea1984e8fae107`.
**Merge-ready: required CI, fresh review, package qualification, Mac
core acceptance and Test task/follow-up acceptance pass.** The existing
attachment and native-continuity oracles independently verify both Test
downloads, run attribution and unchanged native/provider/workspace
identities. The maintainer authorized a code-owner-review exception for
this PR only. The first Test setup failure and normal Board
completion-review friction are retained below. Actual post-merge
packages and private Cloud distribution remain separate qualification
gates.

- [Current
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38564241625):
all 48 ordinary jobs and required verify/E2E pass. Attempt 1 retained
six simultaneous host-shutdown cancellations. One failed-only retry
passes those six lanes and two aggregates, preserving 40 successes.
Actual integration checkout `53104c1` combines this head with master
`c80`; it is not relabeled as the branch tree. Fresh exact-head Greptile
5/5, 30 resolved threads, no actionable findings.
- [Exact-source package
qualification](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38565287239):
nine applicable jobs pass, nine conditional jobs skip. Four remote
native producers; Linux x64 clean install; Intel Mac, Apple Silicon and
Linux ARM64 native startup/physical cleanup controls. All 18
tarballs/four daemon source/hash/manifest bindings and 343 migrations
through 0344 verify. No Codex payload is packed. These hosted tarballs
are not a published npm canary.
- Normal Apple Silicon installation and credential-free native
startup/cleanup pass using the packaged daemon, with no source build or
provider turn. Fresh installed DB initialization passes. Upgrade
651a→1c03 preserves all three complete execution configs, accounts, ten
recorded run profiles, paused budgets, active incidents, cost summaries
and two historical unpriced events. Historical recovery state is
retained.
- Cleanup regressions: four delayed-read baseline failures become 15
passing deadline/authority controls. No-acknowledgement and prior-error
socket ownership regressions become 12 passing controls. Direct
runtime/server types, maps: 35 areas / 176 IDs, diff checks and
independent reviews pass. Permission/auth/reconnect policy and the
10-second setup budget remain intact.
- Existing source coverage includes creation/selection/imports, pending
approvals, recovery, account/lifecycle handling, mounted forms,
dropdowns and E2E support. Full typechecks/tests/build/token and
applicable Storybook checks pass in the recorded current CI; no
duplicate suite or weakened grader.
- Literal 9546 live Mac proof: ordinary Auto Codex onboarding, useful
document, real completed-child callback/reply, seven successful native
runs, manual follow-up and independently downloaded1,101-byte child
file. Existing Legacy title edit/reload preserves execution; two real
Legacy runs produce independently checked15/34-byte files. These remain
historical source records.
- Current literal 1c03 Mac core acceptance passes independent checks:
ordinary Auto native Codex onboarding without runner override; only
timeout 180 seconds/concurrency 1 saved; six successful native runs and
six serialized turns (maximum overlap 1); both same-task continuity
checks and five mechanical callback checks; actual rendered parent reply
and exact child downloads. The useful handoff advances from revision 1
to 2. Both files are 48 bytes, SHA-256
`8b742bd4e8123a7c078f0a8d9f3449fbfa8a320d7d90be641a2818db3c53d92c` and
`f42db9774fa06e804ab7d596fc8b922a2b638921c418b87d0111151d290a6afe`;
exactly one byte changes and old history remains. The agent is paused
with zero active runs/errors. Both artifact work products have
`isPrimary=false`, and descriptive titles fail a stricter title-helper
assumption; these retained results are scoped editorial follow-up, not
new merge gates. Six source-bound screenshots are uploaded and verified
in the private primary QA report.
- [Literal 9546 managed
proof](https://d1p6rlowie26tp.cloudfront.net/runner-e2e/campaigns/gha-38485488621-1/index.html):
original 19 assertions and completed judge pass, four native turns,
child-bound240-byte file and session/workspace continuity. Checkout
reports a verified generated target-lock mutation; full final porcelain
was not retained. Signed execution-image identity remains separate from
Core source.
- Actual 651a Test deployment succeeds on one owned/pinned target. One
ordinary Auto API-key Connect then fails native cleanup before hire.
Controller turn/drain/suspend completion and service-recorded
environment cleanup are observed; they do not certify physical deletion
or native authority retirement. Failure/recovery/unknown holds are
retained. No Legacy switch or unchanged paid retry. The two source
repairs above require actual treatment.
- [Current immutable Core
preview](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38570365725)
and matching DB/shared artifacts pass. One owned, pinned Test target
serves exact `1c03`; identical migration history correctly skips the
migrator. Ordinary Auto Codex Connect succeeds and hires native; saved
native selection and QA bounds survive reload. The initial child
preparation attempt fails before provider work, with actual stdout
identifying `renewal_deadline`; its trigger remains unknown and the
failure is retained. Normal Board **Try again** and **Resume** recover
the child to Done, producing a browser-verified 44-byte file, SHA-256
`0a8458b1efcc2d7a0d815689458c4caab039a46c7c7a3e5805de6bc8b1a96ecc`. The
actual parent callback reports the completed child document/file. The
existing validator requires a parent-owned attachment, so recovery
enters normal Review; after byte checking, normal **Approve completion**
reaches parent Done. No forced status or duplicate parent file is used.
The validator is unchanged from integrated and current master.
Autonomous initial callback-to-Done is not proven. The same-child
follow-up completes document revision 2 and publishes a second
independently downloaded 44-byte file, SHA-256
`22022257300fae762784632d08d3bbe0bab61e2ce81f91864a14dcd7aa464591`; only
the revision digit changes. The unchanged existing native-continuity and
attachment oracles pass. All ten recorded runs are terminal: nine native
successes and the retained pre-provider setup failure. The QA agent is
paused with zero active runs. The pre-existing parent evidence scope
mismatch is a separate follow-up, with ordinary completion review
exercised rather than a forced status or relaxed validation. This
unsigned Core preview remains distinct from post-merge private Cloud
composition.

## Risks

- Saved agents are not migrated. Explicit runner changes use normal
configuration/session rules; historical runs retain their recorded
execution.
- Native readiness depends on verified assets and server-owned target
qualification. A Legacy probe, HTTP200 or successful account save cannot
prove native readiness.
- Recovery exceptions remain restricted to validated
completed-onboarding reports; process-loss, ownership and terminal-state
safeguards remain active. Unexecuted live journeys stay open.
- Linux ARM paid tasks, Windows, Alpine and 32-bit ARM remain deferred.
Cold Cargo cache misses are recorded; no warm-cache speedup is claimed.
- Historical invoices/physical cleanup remain unconfirmed and held.
After merge, exact published npm canary, signed standard image/migrator,
private composition and serving/live acceptance still require
qualification. Production deployment/default promotion is not
authorized.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, tools, code execution and
parallel agents. Exact serving snapshot and context-window size are not
exposed.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used with available version and
capability details
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have linked public issues or PRs above
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
ticket id
- [x] I have run the stated focused tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation
- [x] I have considered and documented risks
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green on the current candidate
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open findings on the current candidate
- [x] I will address all reviewer comments before requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-14 11:33:02 -05:00

418 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript

import WebSocket from "ws";
import type { RunnerIngressEndpoint } from "@paperclipai/adapter-utils/runner-connectivity";
import type {
DurablePrpControlPlane,
PrpWireConnection,
TransportCloseReason,
} from "../vendor/paperclip-runner/index.js";
const DEFAULT_STARTUP_DEADLINE_MS = 60_000;
const DEFAULT_RECOVERY_GRACE_MS = 120_000;
const MAX_FRAME_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
const RECONNECT_DELAYS_MS = [250, 500, 1_000, 2_000, 5_000] as const;
export type RunnerIngressFailureCode =
| "runner_ingress_unavailable"
| "runner_ingress_auth_failed";
export class RunnerIngressConnectionError extends Error {
constructor(
readonly code: RunnerIngressFailureCode,
message: string,
options?: ErrorOptions,
) {
super(`${code}: ${message}`, options);
this.name = "RunnerIngressConnectionError";
}
}
export class WsJsonWireConnection implements PrpWireConnection {
#onJson: ((value: unknown) => void) | null = null;
#onClose = new Set<(reason: TransportCloseReason) => void>();
#pendingJson: unknown[] = [];
#closeReason: TransportCloseReason | null = null;
constructor(readonly socket: WebSocket) {
socket.on("message", (data, isBinary) => {
if (isBinary) {
this.close(1003);
return;
}
try {
const value = JSON.parse(data.toString()) as unknown;
if (this.#onJson === null) {
this.#pendingJson.push(value);
} else {
this.#onJson(value);
}
} catch {
this.close(1007);
}
});
socket.on("close", (code, reason) => {
this.#notifyClose({ code, message: reason.toString() });
});
socket.on("error", (error) => {
this.#notifyClose({ message: "websocket_error", error });
});
}
sendJson(value: unknown): void {
if (this.socket.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN) {
this.socket.send(JSON.stringify(value));
}
}
close(code = 1000): void {
if (
this.socket.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN ||
this.socket.readyState === WebSocket.CONNECTING
) {
this.socket.close(code);
}
}
onJson(listener: (value: unknown) => void): void {
this.#onJson = listener;
for (const value of this.#pendingJson.splice(0)) listener(value);
}
onClose(listener: (reason: TransportCloseReason) => void): void {
if (this.#closeReason) listener(this.#closeReason);
else this.#onClose.add(listener);
}
#notifyClose(reason: TransportCloseReason): void {
if (this.#closeReason) return;
this.#closeReason = reason;
for (const listener of this.#onClose) listener(reason);
this.#onClose.clear();
}
}
function validateEndpoint(endpoint: RunnerIngressEndpoint): void {
const url = new URL(endpoint.websocketUrl);
if (
endpoint.kind !== "authenticated_websocket" ||
url.protocol !== "wss:" ||
url.username ||
url.password ||
url.search ||
url.hash
) {
throw new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
"runner_ingress_unavailable",
"The provider returned an invalid runner ingress endpoint.",
);
}
}
function endpointHeaders(endpoint: RunnerIngressEndpoint): Record<string, string> {
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const header of endpoint.secretHeaders) {
if (!/^[!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z-]+$/.test(header.name) || !header.value) {
throw new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
"runner_ingress_unavailable",
"The provider returned an invalid runner ingress credential.",
);
}
headers[header.name] = header.value;
}
return headers;
}
async function delay(ms: number, signal: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {
if (signal.aborted) return;
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
const timer = setTimeout(resolve, ms);
signal.addEventListener(
"abort",
() => {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve();
},
{ once: true },
);
});
}
async function awaitWithinDeadline<T>(input: {
operation: () => Promise<T>;
deadline: number;
signal: AbortSignal;
}): Promise<T> {
if (input.signal.aborted) {
throw new Error("runner ingress operation was cancelled");
}
const remaining = input.deadline - Date.now();
if (remaining <= 0) {
throw new Error("runner ingress operation deadline elapsed");
}
let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
let onAbort: (() => void) | undefined;
const gate = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {
timer = setTimeout(
() => reject(new Error("runner ingress operation deadline elapsed")),
remaining,
);
onAbort = () => reject(new Error("runner ingress operation was cancelled"));
input.signal.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
});
const operation = Promise.resolve().then(input.operation);
try {
return await Promise.race([operation, gate]);
} finally {
if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer);
if (onAbort) input.signal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
}
}
async function closeOwnedWire(wire: WsJsonWireConnection): Promise<void> {
const closed = wire.socket.readyState === WebSocket.CLOSED
? Promise.resolve()
: new Promise<void>((resolve) => wire.socket.once("close", () => resolve()));
wire.close(1001);
wire.socket.terminate();
await closed;
}
async function openEndpoint(input: {
endpoint: RunnerIngressEndpoint;
signal: AbortSignal;
onWire: (wire: WsJsonWireConnection) => void;
}): Promise<{ wire: WsJsonWireConnection; statusCode: number | null }> {
validateEndpoint(input.endpoint);
return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let statusCode: number | null = null;
const socket = new WebSocket(input.endpoint.websocketUrl, {
headers: endpointHeaders(input.endpoint),
followRedirects: false,
perMessageDeflate: false,
maxPayload: MAX_FRAME_BYTES,
handshakeTimeout: 15_000,
});
const wire = new WsJsonWireConnection(socket);
const onAbort = () => {
wire.close(1001);
reject(
new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
"runner_ingress_unavailable",
"Runner ingress connection was cancelled.",
),
);
};
input.signal.addEventListener("abort", onAbort, { once: true });
socket.once("unexpected-response", (_request, response) => {
statusCode = response.statusCode ?? null;
response.resume();
input.signal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
socket.terminate();
reject(
Object.assign(new Error("runner_ingress_upgrade_rejected"), {
statusCode,
}),
);
});
socket.once("open", () => {
input.signal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
resolve({ wire, statusCode });
});
socket.once("error", (error) => {
input.signal.removeEventListener("abort", onAbort);
reject(Object.assign(error, { statusCode }));
});
input.onWire(wire);
});
}
function socketClosed(wire: WsJsonWireConnection): Promise<void> {
return new Promise((resolve) => wire.onClose(() => resolve()));
}
async function waitForPrpReady(input: {
isAuthenticated: () => boolean;
wire: WsJsonWireConnection;
deadline: number;
signal: AbortSignal;
}): Promise<boolean> {
while (
!input.signal.aborted &&
input.wire.socket.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN &&
Date.now() < input.deadline
) {
if (input.isAuthenticated()) return true;
await delay(25, input.signal);
}
return false;
}
export interface RunnerPrpOutboundHandle {
readonly ready: Promise<void>;
/** Rejects only when active-run recovery has exhausted its fixed budget. */
readonly failure: Promise<never>;
close(): Promise<void>;
}
/**
* Keep a Paperclip-originated provider-ingress WebSocket attached to one PRP
* authority. Authentication is the readiness signal; HTTP success alone is not.
*/
export function connectRunnerPrpIngress(input: {
authority: DurablePrpControlPlane;
endpoint: RunnerIngressEndpoint;
startupDeadlineMs?: number;
recoveryGraceMs?: number;
random?: () => number;
onStateChange?: (
state: "connecting" | "authenticated" | "reconnecting" | "failed" | "closed",
failureCode?: RunnerIngressFailureCode,
) => void;
}): RunnerPrpOutboundHandle {
const abort = new AbortController();
const ownedWires = new Set<WsJsonWireConnection>();
let endpoint = input.endpoint;
const startupDeadline =
Date.now() + (input.startupDeadlineMs ?? DEFAULT_STARTUP_DEADLINE_MS);
const recoveryGraceMs = input.recoveryGraceMs ?? DEFAULT_RECOVERY_GRACE_MS;
const random = input.random ?? Math.random;
let readyResolve!: () => void;
let readyReject!: (error: unknown) => void;
let readySettled = false;
const ready = new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
readyResolve = resolve;
readyReject = reject;
});
let failureReject!: (error: unknown) => void;
const failure = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {
failureReject = reject;
});
// The owning native session normally races this promise against the provider
// turn. A turn can finish first, though, and a later preview outage must not
// become an unhandled process-level rejection. Keep the original promise
// rejected for explicit observers while registering an internal handler.
void failure.catch(() => undefined);
void ready.catch(() => undefined);
const loop = (async () => {
let attempt = 0;
let recoveryDeadline = startupDeadline;
while (!abort.signal.aborted) {
try {
input.onStateChange?.(attempt === 0 ? "connecting" : "reconnecting");
if (abort.signal.aborted) return;
const opened = await openEndpoint({
endpoint,
signal: abort.signal,
onWire: (wire) => {
ownedWires.add(wire);
wire.socket.once("close", () => ownedWires.delete(wire));
},
});
if (abort.signal.aborted) return;
const attachment = input.authority.attachWireConnection(opened.wire);
const authenticated = await waitForPrpReady({
isAuthenticated: attachment.isAuthenticated,
wire: opened.wire,
deadline: recoveryDeadline,
signal: abort.signal,
});
if (!authenticated) {
opened.wire.close(1008);
throw new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
"runner_ingress_auth_failed",
"Runner ingress did not complete PRP authentication before the deadline.",
);
}
if (!readySettled) {
readySettled = true;
readyResolve();
}
input.onStateChange?.("authenticated");
attempt = 0;
await socketClosed(opened.wire);
recoveryDeadline = Date.now() + recoveryGraceMs;
} catch (error) {
// close() owns intentional shutdown. openEndpoint rejects its pending
// handshake when the abort signal fires, but that cancellation is not
// an active-run transport failure and must not reject the long-lived
// failure promise (an unobserved rejection here can terminate Node).
if (abort.signal.aborted) return;
let failure: unknown = error;
const statusCode =
typeof error === "object" && error !== null && "statusCode" in error
? Number((error as { statusCode?: unknown }).statusCode)
: null;
if (
(statusCode === 401 || statusCode === 403) &&
Date.now() < recoveryDeadline
) {
try {
const refreshedEndpoint = await awaitWithinDeadline({
operation: () => endpoint.refresh(),
deadline: recoveryDeadline,
signal: abort.signal,
});
// Preview credentials can rotate without changing the sandbox
// generation. Refresh every rejected credential, but never let a
// successful refresh reset or step past the fixed recovery budget.
if (Date.now() < recoveryDeadline) {
endpoint = refreshedEndpoint;
continue;
}
} catch (refreshError) {
if (abort.signal.aborted) return;
failure = refreshError;
}
}
if (Date.now() >= recoveryDeadline) {
const terminal =
failure instanceof RunnerIngressConnectionError
? failure
: new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
statusCode === 401 || statusCode === 403
? "runner_ingress_auth_failed"
: "runner_ingress_unavailable",
"Runner ingress connection failed.",
{ cause: failure },
);
if (!readySettled) {
readySettled = true;
readyReject(terminal);
}
input.onStateChange?.("failed", terminal.code);
failureReject(terminal);
return;
}
const base = RECONNECT_DELAYS_MS[
Math.min(attempt, RECONNECT_DELAYS_MS.length - 1)
]!;
attempt += 1;
await delay(Math.max(1, Math.round(base * (0.75 + random() * 0.5))), abort.signal);
}
}
})();
return {
ready,
failure,
async close() {
abort.abort();
await Promise.all([...ownedWires].map(closeOwnedWire));
await loop;
await endpoint.close();
input.onStateChange?.("closed");
if (!readySettled) {
readySettled = true;
readyReject(
new RunnerIngressConnectionError(
"runner_ingress_unavailable",
"Runner ingress was closed before it became ready.",
),
);
}
},
};
}
export const __runnerPrpOutboundTesting = { awaitWithinDeadline };