DottaandPaperclip
4145b5048a
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Its feature map describes user journeys. Its access map describes the matching agent paths. > - The recent index and capability additions improved discovery and breadth. > - Broad baseline records still combined operations with different actors, permissions, and retry behavior. > - This pull request reviews the existing task, approval, secret, and recovery capabilities at operation level. > - Each operation now has its own access boundary, source evidence, and verification recipe. Source review remains separate from live proof. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs: #16987, #16990, #16025. These related pull requests are merged. The search found no open duplicate or matching issue. **Issue type** Missing documentation. **Where is the issue?** The paired task, questions-and-approvals, secrets, and recovery files under `maps/feature-map/` and `maps/agent-access-map/`. **What's wrong?** Baseline records do not show enough detail to verify who can perform each action, which state must persist, or what happens after a denial, race, or retry. A declared scenario tool can also be mistaken for an admitted production tool. **Suggested fix** Split the four areas into source-reviewed operation records. Add compact checkpoints to their user recipes. Preserve existing capability IDs and the map schema. ## What Changed - Promote 27 existing capability records to `operation-reviewed`, with 125 operation records: tasks 32, questions and approvals 39, secrets 28, recovery 26. - Give each operation its own API, agent surface, policy, source evidence, verification recipe, and remaining gap. - Separate human, legacy agent, run JWT, native binding, mode, and resource authority. Split operations where those rules differ. - Correct production completion paths, plan acceptance and handoff, question dismissal and withdrawal, secret proposal authority, runtime recovery grants, and explicit duplicate-risk decisions. - Preserve access gaps found in source, including the binding-proposal dependency cascade and narrower native/CLI fields. - Add one checkpoint table per product recipe for saved results, denial, races, and retries. - Keep all 191 existing capability IDs. Change only eight Markdown files. Keep every operation's evidence `source-only` and verification `not-run`; the subset below does not prove an entire operation across its actors and surfaces. ## Verification Source review uses revision `3bbc2104b65caf9f7763938a01260a5673e12f7a`. Read-only area reviews and a second source review covered the changed pairs. Passed: - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs`: 35 paired areas, 191 capability IDs, valid references and fields. This is structural verification. - `node --test scripts/check-maps.test.mjs scripts/storybook-feature-index.test.mjs`: 17 passed. - `node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs`: 308 files, 2,899 stories. Generated outputs remain ignored. - Capability comparison with the base: all 191 IDs unchanged; the four reviewed areas contain 27 capabilities and 125 source-only operation records. - `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build`. - `git diff --check`. - Focused existing interaction and proposal route tests: 80 passed. The two selected DB-backed suites skipped 119 tests because local embedded PostgreSQL could not start. These skipped tests are not passes. Live subset on a fresh local instance with a disposable PostgreSQL container: - Created the company and an unassigned task through the browser. Added a comment and completed the task. The saved status and comment survived reload. - Created a managed secret with inert dummy data through the browser. Its metadata and version survived reload. The metadata response did not contain the dummy value. - Created a question fixture through board REST. Invalid input returned 422 and left it pending. Browser dismissal kept it pending and preserved the draft. Reopening restored the choice. Submission survived reload. A duplicate response returned 409 and left the saved answer unchanged. - Used a real issued legacy agent API key. Task read and safe company-secret catalog returned 200. Full secret listing and run-only secret list/value routes returned 403. Revoked the key after the checks. - Read an empty recovery projection. Resolving a nonexistent action returned 404 and left the task unchanged. This did not execute recovery. - Closed the owned browser tab and stopped only the verified test runtime and labelled database container. Evidence survived cleanup. No provider or model ran. Limits and retained failures: - Native embedded PostgreSQL launch failed because the host could not allocate semaphores. The container-backed app was the successful alternate environment. - Full `pnpm test:run` was attempted. Fifteen DB-dependent native-session cases failed at database startup, and several DB suites skipped. The run was stopped after repeated failures of that prerequisite. The full local suite did not pass. - The sandboxed build attempt failed at the local tsx IPC socket. The required build passed outside the sandbox. - The first CI build job passed compilation and production boot, then its npm-install check was interrupted when the runner received a shutdown signal. The corrected head passed the full CI run, including the build and public-install checks. - Initial Greptile review found the recovery note field and native search/history limits were inaccurate. Corrected `resolutionNote` and the production cap of 100, then reran the map checks. Greptile reviewed the corrected head at 5/5; both earlier threads are resolved. - An initial harness used a nonexistent generic secret-value URL and received 404. The actual mapped agent routes were then checked separately. An initial recovery assertion expected 409; the actual missing-action contract returned 404. These were harness corrections, not product fixes. - Native run bindings, two-person ownership, secret delivery/rotation, external vaults, provider-stop proof, workspace repair, and actual recovery execution remain unexecuted. The map does not claim those journeys passed. The separate external **Paperclip Review** check is still in progress on `904509df80cc6de16d36906a410a66786f619b20`. The reviewer reports that its full changed-file request is pending. CI is green and Greptile is 5/5, but this external review has not published a final assessment. Its review service must finish that request and assessment. ## Risks Documentation can become stale as policy and runtime bindings change. Each operation cites source and retains its verification gaps. The records describe observed enforcement; they do not authorize broader access or certify live behavior. This pull request changes no product code, schema, or permission enforcement. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, `gpt-6.1-sol`; 475,000-token context window; xhigh reasoning; tool use and code execution. Read-only source agents assisted the area reviews. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (focused map and route checks; full-suite host blocker recorded above) - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable (existing map regression tests cover this documentation-only change) - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file:
onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps.
The feature index lists feature and
capability IDs; IDs and references
explains entry-point references and stable naming.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api requires operator rollout admission, a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.