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PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map
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Paperclip agent access map

This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.

Initial inventory: 35 areas and 171 sub-features, source-reviewed on 2026-10-12 at f981fa3cc10cb8663a87dec60345fbff46d54d0a. All entries are baseline and source-only; none claims complete operation enumeration or freshly verified agent access. Existing API paths, native gaps, actor restrictions and local/operator exceptions are recorded separately. These statuses do not represent a live pass rate.

Areas

Area Product map Capabilities
Login, invitations, and access access 5
Dashboards, activity, and audit trails activity 5
Agent conversations and project handoff agent-chat 4
Hiring, agent configuration, and organization agents 5
App access, action permissions, and testing app-permissions 5
Costs, budgets, and spending controls budgets-costs 4
Cases and structured work records cases 4
External chat and email conversations chat-channels 5
CLI, API clients, and local worktrees cli-operations 5
Companies and portability companies 4
Connection setup connection-setup 8
Developer previews and diagnostic labs developer-labs 4
Documents, attachments, and work products documents-artifacts 5
Local, SSH, and sandbox environments execution-environments 5
Tool gateways and access profiles gateways-profiles 5
Goals and work alignment goals 3
Inbox, decisions, and search inbox-search 4
Installation, configuration, updates, and backups instance-operations 5
Navigation, profile, and announcements navigation-preferences 5
Onboarding and first work onboarding 5
Pipelines, review queues, and learnings pipelines 4
Plugins and contributed product surfaces plugins 4
Projects and repositories projects 4
Questions and approvals questions-and-approvals 8
Recovery recovery 8
Routines, schedules, and triggers routines 5
Runs, harnesses, and model accounts runs-adapters 4
Secrets, personal credentials, and proposals secrets 5
Skill discovery, authoring, and policy skills 5
Status cards and refreshed summaries status-cards 4
Steering and queued messages steering 7
Delegation, dependencies, and signoff task-coordination 4
Task creation and lifecycle tasks 5
Team packages and catalog installation teams 4
Execution workspaces, services, and files workspaces 5

Using an entry

Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.

For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.

Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps. Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly. Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.

Native REST transport

The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.

Native search_api / call_api requires operator rollout admission, a running authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.

Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.

Sources: API client, catalog, native authority, credential storage classification, snapshot access, and history redaction. The affected entries remain baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation. Targeted real-route proof lives in the API integration suite, including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.