Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/services/cloud-runtime-identity.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip 6be71028ad Prepare online ephemeral enrollment through signed Cloud control (#19660)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages agent work through a control-plane web server.
> - A replacement web server needs shared durable data and the original
signing identity.
> - Existing enrollment exports that identity only after a global drain
and offline migration.
> - Online enrollment needs a separate preparation operation while agent
work continues.
> - This change adds a purpose-bound Cloud control operation with
existing data and key owners.
> - The result is an audited preparation receipt, with no permission to
stop agents or detach storage.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19038. Refs #19024.

**What are you trying to improve?**
Allow Cloud to prepare an already migrated tenant for volume removal
without the offline migrator or a global-idle gate.

**What problem does this solve?**
Cloud must preserve the original decision key before starting a
replacement with static ephemeral mode. A tenant session must never gain
key-export authority.

**What would the improvement look like?**
A fresh exact-action Cloud assertion obtains a private, deployment-bound
preparation receipt. Unfinished durable-data migration and invalid
replacement configuration block export.

## What Changed

- Add the signed `ephemeral-enrollment:prepare` control action and a
strict UUID-only POST route.
- Check existing durable-data eligibility and ephemeral configuration
before reading the original key. Never create a missing key.
- Audit only public preparation metadata. Keep HTTP diagnostics
secret-sensitive and the response non-cacheable.
- Bind the receipt to the attempt, stack, build commit, Railway
deployment, time, static mode and key digest.
- Always return `enrollmentReady: false`. Cloud still needs to arm a
replacement, verify old writers have stopped, repeat eligibility and
qualify native handoff before detaching the retained volume.

## Verification

- PASS: 80 focused tests across the preparation owner, signed route,
existing Cloud control, HTTP privacy and OpenAPI route coverage.
- PASS: 2 real PostgreSQL cases. Concurrent copies of one signed request
export once; the durable receipt still rejects reuse after clearing the
process fence. Normal run admission before skill pins is allowed;
missing durable skill installation remains blocked.
- Genuine prepatch RED: the same two PostgreSQL cases exported twice and
rejected ordinary admission. The fixed owner was restored automatically
after the comparison.
- PASS: server TypeScript check with workspace dependencies built.
- Fixed the first CI route-coverage failure by declaring this private
control endpoint in the existing explicit OpenAPI exclusion registry.
- Initial local HTTP execution lacked sandbox socket permission; the
reviewed run passed. Initial PostgreSQL fixtures enabled durable files
too late and reused an issue prefix; those fixture defects were
corrected before the red/green comparison.
- All required CI gates pass on
5346721847. Fresh Greptile review is 5/5
and all review threads are resolved. No deployment, volume detachment,
admission change or agent stop is performed by this PR.

## Risks

- The private response contains the original signing key. Only a fresh
stack-bound assertion for this exact action can obtain it. The Cloud
consumer must pass it directly to its existing vault owner and must not
expose it through admin responses or registry metadata.
- Eligibility is an observation. It cannot replace static writer
restrictions or qualified ownership handoff. This PR deliberately
supplies no detach or readiness authorization.
- Cloud transition integration is still required. This PR alone does not
enroll an instance.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, code execution and browser
tools. The host does not expose the exact serving model ID or
context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 18:00:28 -06:00

590 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript

import { parseIdleCapabilities, type IdleCapabilities } from "./idle-incoming-wake-capability.js";
import { createPublicKey, timingSafeEqual, verify, type JsonWebKey } from "node:crypto";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import { instanceSettings } from "@paperclipai/db";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-paperclip-cloud-runtime-identity";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE = "paperclip-runtime-identity/v1";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER = "paperclip-cloud";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWS_TYPE = "paperclip-cloud-runtime-identity+jwt";
const SINGLETON_KEY = "cloud-runtime-identity/v1";
const MAX_ASSERTION_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 10 * 60;
const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 30;
const STACK_SLUG_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/;
type PersistedRuntimeIdentity = {
stackId: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
appliedAt: Date;
};
type RuntimeIdentityDb = Pick<Db, "select" | "insert">;
export type CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot = {
stackId: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
appliedAt: Date;
};
export type RuntimeIdentityClaims = {
v: 1;
iss: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER;
aud: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE;
sub: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
iat: number;
exp: number;
};
let initialized = false;
let startupOrigin: string | null = null;
let currentIdentity: CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null = null;
function nonEmpty(value: string | undefined): string | null {
const normalized = value?.trim();
return normalized ? normalized : null;
}
function exactHttpsOrigin(value: unknown): string | null {
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0 || value.length > 2048) return null;
try {
const parsed = new URL(value);
if (
parsed.protocol !== "https:"
|| parsed.username
|| parsed.password
|| parsed.pathname !== "/"
|| parsed.search
|| parsed.hash
|| parsed.origin !== value
) {
return null;
}
return parsed.origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function configuredStartupOrigin(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | null {
const candidate = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL);
return candidate ? exactHttpsOrigin(candidate) : null;
}
function snapshot(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity): CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot {
return {
stackId: row.stackId,
claimId: row.claimId,
previousOrigin: row.previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin: row.canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: row.stackSlug,
appliedAt: row.appliedAt,
};
}
function parsePersistedIdentity(row: {
general: Record<string, unknown>;
createdAt: Date;
}): PersistedRuntimeIdentity {
const value = row.general;
if (
value.v !== 1
|| typeof value.stackId !== "string"
|| typeof value.claimId !== "string"
|| typeof value.previousOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof value.canonicalOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof value.stackSlug !== "string"
) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity is malformed");
}
return {
stackId: value.stackId,
claimId: value.claimId,
previousOrigin: value.previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin: value.canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: value.stackSlug,
appliedAt: row.createdAt,
};
}
async function readPersistedIdentity(db: RuntimeIdentityDb): Promise<PersistedRuntimeIdentity | null> {
const row = await db
.select({
general: instanceSettings.general,
createdAt: instanceSettings.createdAt,
})
.from(instanceSettings)
.where(eq(instanceSettings.singletonKey, SINGLETON_KEY))
.limit(1)
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
return row ? parsePersistedIdentity(row) : null;
}
function applyCompatibilityEnvironment(identity: CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
const hostname = new URL(identity.canonicalOrigin).hostname;
env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_PRIMARY_HOST = hostname;
env.PAPERCLIP_STACK_SLUG = identity.stackSlug;
const existingCandidates = (() => {
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(env.PAPERCLIP_RUNTIME_API_CANDIDATES_JSON ?? "[]");
return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed.filter((value): value is string => typeof value === "string") : [];
} catch {
return [];
}
})();
env.PAPERCLIP_RUNTIME_API_CANDIDATES_JSON = JSON.stringify([
identity.canonicalOrigin,
...existingCandidates.filter((candidate) => candidate !== identity.canonicalOrigin),
]);
}
function assertPersistedIdentityMatchesStack(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
if (!configuredStackId || configuredStackId !== row.stackId) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity does not match PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID");
}
if (!exactHttpsOrigin(row.previousOrigin) || !exactHttpsOrigin(row.canonicalOrigin)) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity contains an invalid origin");
}
if (!STACK_SLUG_PATTERN.test(row.stackSlug) || new URL(row.canonicalOrigin).hostname.split(".")[0] !== row.stackSlug) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity contains an invalid stack slug");
}
}
/** Load the durable claim before auth, routes, and child-runtime configuration. */
export async function initializeCloudRuntimeIdentity(
db: Db,
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
): Promise<CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null> {
startupOrigin = configuredStartupOrigin(env);
// Self-hosted servers have no Cloud stack identity to restore. Avoid touching
// the singleton table on that path; besides keeping the feature inert, this
// preserves lightweight startup/test database seams that intentionally do
// not construct a database client.
if (!nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID)) {
initialized = true;
currentIdentity = null;
return null;
}
const row = await readPersistedIdentity(db);
initialized = true;
if (!row) {
currentIdentity = null;
return null;
}
assertPersistedIdentityMatchesStack(row, env);
currentIdentity = snapshot(row);
applyCompatibilityEnvironment(currentIdentity, env);
return currentIdentity;
}
export function getCloudRuntimeIdentity(): CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null {
return currentIdentity ? { ...currentIdentity } : null;
}
/** The live canonical origin, falling back to startup configuration off Cloud. */
export function runtimePublicOrigin(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string | null {
if (env === process.env && currentIdentity) return currentIdentity.canonicalOrigin;
const candidate = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL);
if (!candidate) return null;
try {
return new URL(candidate).origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** The asserted Cloud origin only. Callers retain their non-Cloud precedence. */
export function runtimeCanonicalOrigin(): string | null {
return currentIdentity?.canonicalOrigin ?? null;
}
function decodeJsonPart(part: string, label: string): Record<string, unknown> {
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(part)) throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(part, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
} catch {
throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
}
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
}
return parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
}
export function cloudRuntimePublicKeyForKid(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, kid: string) {
const raw = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS);
if (!raw) throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is not configured");
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
} catch {
throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is invalid");
}
const keys = parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed)
? (parsed as { keys?: unknown }).keys
: undefined;
if (!Array.isArray(keys)) throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is invalid");
const matches = keys.filter((candidate): candidate is JsonWebKey & { kid: string } => {
if (!candidate || typeof candidate !== "object" || Array.isArray(candidate)) return false;
const key = candidate as JsonWebKey & { kid?: unknown };
return key.kid === kid;
});
if (matches.length !== 1) throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity uses an unknown signing key");
const jwk = matches[0];
if (jwk.kty !== "OKP" || jwk.crv !== "Ed25519" || jwk.use !== "sig" || jwk.alg !== "EdDSA" || !jwk.x || jwk.d) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity signing key is invalid");
}
return createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: "jwk" });
}
function verifyClaims(input: {
compactJws: string;
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now: Date;
}): RuntimeIdentityClaims {
const parts = input.compactJws.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity assertion is not a compact JWS");
}
const [encodedHeader, encodedPayload, encodedSignature] = parts;
const header = decodeJsonPart(encodedHeader, "protected header");
if (
header.alg !== "EdDSA"
|| header.typ !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWS_TYPE
|| typeof header.kid !== "string"
|| !header.kid
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity protected header is invalid");
}
const key = cloudRuntimePublicKeyForKid(input.env, header.kid);
const signature = Buffer.from(encodedSignature, "base64url");
const signingInput = Buffer.from(`${encodedHeader}.${encodedPayload}`, "ascii");
if (!verify(null, signingInput, key, signature)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity signature is invalid");
}
const payload = decodeJsonPart(encodedPayload, "payload");
const nowSeconds = Math.floor(input.now.getTime() / 1000);
if (
payload.v !== 1
|| payload.iss !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER
|| payload.aud !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE
|| typeof payload.sub !== "string"
|| typeof payload.claimId !== "string"
|| typeof payload.previousOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof payload.canonicalOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof payload.stackSlug !== "string"
|| typeof payload.iat !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.iat)
|| typeof payload.exp !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.exp)
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity claims are incomplete");
}
if (
payload.exp <= nowSeconds
|| payload.iat > nowSeconds + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS
|| payload.exp <= payload.iat
|| payload.exp - payload.iat > MAX_ASSERTION_LIFETIME_SECONDS
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity assertion is expired or has an invalid lifetime");
}
return payload as RuntimeIdentityClaims;
}
/** Verify that an assertion is signed for this exact, still-unclaimed instance. */
export function verifyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion(input: {
compactJws: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
expectedPreviousOrigin: string | null;
}): RuntimeIdentityClaims {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
const claims = verifyClaims({ compactJws: input.compactJws, env, now: input.now ?? new Date() });
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
if (!configuredStackId || claims.sub !== configuredStackId) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity stack does not match this instance");
}
const previousOrigin = exactHttpsOrigin(claims.previousOrigin);
const canonicalOrigin = exactHttpsOrigin(claims.canonicalOrigin);
if (!previousOrigin || !canonicalOrigin || previousOrigin !== input.expectedPreviousOrigin) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity previous or canonical origin is invalid");
}
if (
!STACK_SLUG_PATTERN.test(claims.stackSlug)
|| new URL(canonicalOrigin).hostname.split(".")[0] !== claims.stackSlug
|| claims.claimId.length > 256
|| claims.claimId.trim() !== claims.claimId
|| !claims.claimId
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity destination is invalid");
}
return claims;
}
function assertionsEqual(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity, claims: RuntimeIdentityClaims): boolean {
const left = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
row.stackId,
row.claimId,
row.previousOrigin,
row.canonicalOrigin,
row.stackSlug,
]));
const right = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
claims.sub,
claims.claimId,
claims.previousOrigin,
claims.canonicalOrigin,
claims.stackSlug,
]));
return left.length === right.length && timingSafeEqual(left, right);
}
/** Verify and durably apply the one-time Cloud claim assertion. */
export async function applyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion(input: {
db: Db;
compactJws: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
}): Promise<CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot> {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
if (!initialized) throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity provider is not initialized");
const claims = verifyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion({
compactJws: input.compactJws,
env,
now: input.now,
// After a natural restart the provider env may already be canonical, but
// an identical retry of the original claim is still safe and idempotent.
// The durable row preserves the pool origin that assertion had to match
// on first application.
expectedPreviousOrigin: currentIdentity?.previousOrigin ?? startupOrigin,
});
const previousOrigin = claims.previousOrigin;
const canonicalOrigin = claims.canonicalOrigin;
const row = await input.db.transaction(async (tx) => {
const existing = await readPersistedIdentity(tx);
if (existing) {
if (!assertionsEqual(existing, claims)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity is already claimed by another assertion");
}
return existing;
}
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
await tx
.insert(instanceSettings)
.values({
singletonKey: SINGLETON_KEY,
general: {
v: 1,
stackId: claims.sub,
claimId: claims.claimId,
previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: claims.stackSlug,
},
experimental: {},
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
})
.onConflictDoNothing({ target: instanceSettings.singletonKey });
const durable = await readPersistedIdentity(tx);
if (!durable || !assertionsEqual(durable, claims)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity is already claimed by another assertion");
}
return durable;
});
currentIdentity = snapshot(row);
applyCompatibilityEnvironment(currentIdentity, env);
return { ...currentIdentity };
}
/** Test seam for modules that intentionally share a process. */
export function resetCloudRuntimeIdentityForTests() {
initialized = false;
startupOrigin = null;
currentIdentity = null;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Cloud control assertions
//
// A second, deliberately separate use of the same Cloud signing key: where the
// runtime identity assertion above is a ONE-TIME origin claim applied at
// bootstrap, a control assertion authorizes a single management call from the
// Cloud control plane — today, only the task-drain admission hold, so Cloud
// can stop new agent work and wait for quiescence before it restarts the
// container for a deploy. The audience, JWS type, and claim shape are
// disjoint from the runtime identity assertion, so neither token can ever be
// replayed as the other, and the verifier binds each assertion to one exact
// action so a "read status" token cannot start or stop a drain.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_HEADER = "x-paperclip-cloud-control";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE = "paperclip-cloud-control/v1";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_JWS_TYPE = "paperclip-cloud-control+jwt";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS = [
"ephemeral-enrollment:prepare",
"task-drain:read",
"task-drain:start",
"task-drain:stop",
"lifecycle:read",
"lifecycle:unarchive-primary",
"connector-events:wake",
] as const;
export type CloudControlAction = (typeof CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS)[number];
/** Control calls are immediate; a stolen assertion should age out fast. */
const CLOUD_CONTROL_MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 5 * 60;
/**
* Single-use fence: a verified assertion's requestId is consumed atomically
* (module state; JS execution is single-threaded per process) and a replay
* of the same id is rejected for as long as the original could still be
* alive. Process-local on purpose — the drain state this protects is
* itself process-local, so a restart clears both together. Entries prune
* lazily at their expiry.
*/
const consumedControlRequestIds = new Map<string, number>();
function consumeControlRequestId(requestId: string, expSeconds: number, nowMs: number): boolean {
for (const [id, expiresAtMs] of consumedControlRequestIds) {
if (expiresAtMs <= nowMs) consumedControlRequestIds.delete(id);
}
if (consumedControlRequestIds.has(requestId)) {
return false;
}
consumedControlRequestIds.set(requestId, expSeconds * 1000);
return true;
}
/** Test seam: modules sharing a process must be able to reset the fence. */
export function resetCloudControlReplayFenceForTests() {
consumedControlRequestIds.clear();
}
export type CloudControlClaims = {
v: 1;
iss: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER;
aud: typeof CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE;
sub: string;
action: CloudControlAction;
requestId: string;
idleCapabilities?: IdleCapabilities;
iat: number;
exp: number;
};
/**
* Verify a Cloud control assertion for one exact action on this instance.
* Signed with the same key set as the runtime identity assertion
* (PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS) but under its own JWS type and
* audience. Instances without a Cloud stack identity reject every assertion —
* the feature is inert when self-hosted.
*/
export function verifyCloudControlAssertion(input: {
compactJws: string;
expectedAction: CloudControlAction;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
}): CloudControlClaims {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
const parts = input.compactJws.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion is not a compact JWS");
}
const [encodedHeader, encodedPayload, encodedSignature] = parts;
const header = decodeJsonPart(encodedHeader, "protected header");
if (
header.alg !== "EdDSA"
|| header.typ !== CLOUD_CONTROL_JWS_TYPE
|| typeof header.kid !== "string"
|| !header.kid
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control protected header is invalid");
}
const key = cloudRuntimePublicKeyForKid(env, header.kid);
const signature = Buffer.from(encodedSignature, "base64url");
const signingInput = Buffer.from(`${encodedHeader}.${encodedPayload}`, "ascii");
if (!verify(null, signingInput, key, signature)) {
throw new Error("Cloud control signature is invalid");
}
const payload = decodeJsonPart(encodedPayload, "payload");
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
const nowSeconds = Math.floor(now.getTime() / 1000);
if (
payload.v !== 1
|| payload.iss !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER
|| payload.aud !== CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE
|| typeof payload.sub !== "string"
|| typeof payload.action !== "string"
|| typeof payload.requestId !== "string"
|| typeof payload.iat !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.iat)
|| typeof payload.exp !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.exp)
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control claims are incomplete");
}
if (!configuredStackId || payload.sub !== configuredStackId) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion stack does not match this instance");
}
if (
!(CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS as readonly string[]).includes(payload.action)
|| payload.action !== input.expectedAction
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion does not authorize this action");
}
if (
!payload.requestId
|| payload.requestId.trim() !== payload.requestId
|| payload.requestId.length > 256
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion request id is invalid");
}
if (
payload.exp <= nowSeconds
|| payload.iat > nowSeconds + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS
|| payload.exp <= payload.iat
|| payload.exp - payload.iat > CLOUD_CONTROL_MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion is expired or has an invalid lifetime");
}
if (payload.idleCapabilities !== undefined) {
if (payload.action !== "task-drain:read") throw new Error("Idle capabilities require task-drain:read");
payload.idleCapabilities = parseIdleCapabilities(payload.idleCapabilities);
}
// Consumed LAST, only after every other check passed: a rejected
// assertion must not burn its request id, or an attacker could deny a
// legitimate call by replaying a mangled copy of it first.
if (!consumeControlRequestId(payload.requestId, payload.exp + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, now.getTime())) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion has already been used");
}
return payload as CloudControlClaims;
}