DottaandPaperclip
c145475cae
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip agents use task context to complete assigned work. > - Sandboxed agents reach the controller through a bounded callback bridge. > - The bridge rejects several documented context routes before controller authorization runs. > - An authorized agent cannot read a task screenshot or referenced skill file, or inspect a missed monitor wake. > - This pull request admits only the exact context routes and supported methods. > - The controller continues to enforce company, resource, task and monitor authority. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** Both callback transports return `Route not allowed` for task asset content, company skill detail and files, wake diagnostics, and the monitor check-now action. These operations already exist in the controller. **Expected behavior** A sandboxed agent can use these documented operations when the controller authorizes its request. Other methods, deeper paths, skill mutations, and recovery resolution remain restricted. **Steps to reproduce** Use a sandbox callback to read an asset URL from a task description, read a company skill's referenced file, or inspect a task's wake diagnostics. The baseline bridge rejects each request. The new regression matrix runs all five operations against both transport allowlists. Related: #16772 documents refused callback routes. This PR fixes the context routes listed above; it does not add company-wide activity or labels access. ## What Changed - Admit asset content, skill detail/files, and wake diagnostic reads. - Admit the existing monitor check-now action with controller authorization. - Add a focused allow/deny matrix for both transports. - Update the operational API reference and access maps. ## Verification - With the pre-fix bridge rules, all 10 allowed-request cases fail with `Route not allowed` across the two transports; all 24 deny controls still pass. - With the fix restored, all 34 route cases pass. The matrix plus existing callback suite passes 119 tests across two files. - Local `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass. - The access-map checker, capability contract generation check, and capability inventory check pass. - Full repository CI passes on `97f9f06b2c`: typecheck/release registry, all test shards, build, Docker context, canary dry run, and aggregate verify. - The duplicate local full-suite run was stopped after 24 minutes once full CI passed; it is not claimed as a completed local pass. - Greptile is 5/5 on the current head with no inline findings. Independent source review checked asset, skill, wake-diagnostic, and monitor controller authorization and found no actionable issues. - The secondary Paperclip automated review is neutral/incomplete. Independent review covered its missing controller checks; the real Vitest cases and full CI provide execution evidence. ## Risks This widens transport admission for five existing operations. It does not change controller authorization. Asset reads still check company/task visibility; skill reads keep source policy; monitor checks keep ownership and management permission. No schema or UI change is required. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with tool use and code execution. The session does not expose the exact serving model ID or context window. The work used failing-before and passing-after regression tests. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api requires operator rollout admission, a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.