mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-10-28 20:21:50 +01:00
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Issue interactions give agents and people a structured decision record. > - Resolver routes used different authorization rules. > - Some routes blocked valid agents, including task watchdogs with normal issue access. > - The API did not show who could resolve a pending interaction. > - This pull request gives every interaction kind one resolver policy evaluator. > - The benefit is a clear decision path with consistent governance and company isolation. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Fixes: #8087 Refs: #7403 Related PR: #11082 proposes board-only confirmation rules. This change keeps human-only review as an explicit policy. **What happened?** Agents could create issue interactions. Some resolver routes still required board access. This left valid agent confirmations pending. Task watchdogs could see the same problem without board identity. **Expected behavior** Every interaction kind must use one resolver policy contract. The contract must support `anyone`, `not_creator`, and `human_only`. It must also apply all normal governance controls. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Create a `request_confirmation` interaction as an agent. 2. Resolve it with another authorized agent. 3. Observe the board-only denial. **Paperclip version or commit** The problem exists on `master` before this change. **Deployment mode** Local development with `pnpm dev`. ## What Changed - Add canonical policies for `anyone`, `not_creator`, and `human_only`. - Use one server evaluator for every interaction kind. - Apply named addressees, company limits, review rules, and task watchdog scope. - Charge cross-issue resolutions to the existing per-run action limit. - Return the effective resolver audience in attention and interaction data. - Show the audience, governance choices, and denial reasons in the board UI. - Add telemetry, API documents, product documents, and regression fixtures. - Add migration provenance for safe legacy behavior. - Make migration `0218` safe for complete replays and partial prior runs. ## Product Rules - An interaction records a response. It does not grant authority for the next action. - `anyone` lets any authorized issue participant respond. - `not_creator` requires a responder other than the interaction creator. - `human_only` requires an authorized person. - A named addressee, company policy, or governed action can narrow the audience. - These controls cannot widen the audience. - A task watchdog uses the same rules as an ordinary agent. - A task watchdog does not receive board authority. - An agent resolution on another issue uses the shared cross-issue action limit. - Legacy pending interactions keep their earlier restrictions. - The UI shows the effective audience and a permanent denial reason. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck` - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/db/src/issue-thread-interaction-resolver-policy-migration.test.ts` - The focused PostgreSQL test applies migration `0218` twice. - The test also completes a partial prior run and preserves existing provenance. - The latest GitHub head has 29 successful checks. - The opt-in Storybook visual check skipped as expected. - Greptile reports 5/5 with no open comments. ## Risks - New interaction writes use `anyone` by default. - Callers must select `not_creator` or `human_only` when they need stricter review. - Legacy pending interactions keep the old creator and human restrictions. - Migration `0218` fills only missing provenance fields during recovery. - Cross-issue resolutions can reach the existing action limit. - The shared evaluator affects every interaction kind. - Route, service, database, shared contract, and UI tests cover these rules. > This work matches the Agent Reviews and Approvals direction in `ROADMAP.md`. It does not duplicate a planned item. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The runtime does not expose the exact deployment ID or context window. The agent used reasoning, repository tools, shell commands, and test execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either linked public issues or described the issue with the required labels - [x] I have not referenced internal Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal ticket id - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation - [x] I have considered and documented the risks - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open comments - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
204 lines
6.9 KiB
TypeScript
204 lines
6.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { and, count, eq } from "drizzle-orm";
|
|
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
|
|
import { activityLog, heartbeatRuns } from "@paperclipai/db";
|
|
import { isUuidLike, issueWriteDenialResponse } from "@paperclipai/shared";
|
|
import { forbidden } from "../errors.js";
|
|
import { logger } from "../middleware/logger.js";
|
|
|
|
export const CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_LIMIT = 20;
|
|
export const CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_ENFORCE_AT = new Date("2026-08-11T00:00:00.000Z");
|
|
|
|
const CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_ACTIVITY = "issue.cross_issue_influence_observed";
|
|
const CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_REJECTED_ACTIVITY = "issue.cross_issue_influence_cap_rejected";
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Every kind shares one per-run counter. `interaction_resolution` covers the
|
|
* issue-thread accept/reject/respond/verdict routes: an open `anyone` resolver
|
|
* audience is not a licence to resolve, wake, and spawn suggested tasks across
|
|
* the whole company from one run.
|
|
*/
|
|
export type CrossIssueInfluenceKind = "comment" | "update" | "interaction_resolution";
|
|
|
|
export type CrossIssueInfluenceDecision = {
|
|
allowed: boolean;
|
|
mode: "log_only" | "enforce";
|
|
count: number;
|
|
cap: number;
|
|
enforceAt: string;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
export function crossIssueInfluenceRunContextError() {
|
|
// Copy comes from the shared issue-write denial contract (the open cross-task write design (failure UX))
|
|
// so the agent reading this 403 is told the fix, not just the refusal.
|
|
const { body } = issueWriteDenialResponse("cross_issue_influence_run_context_required");
|
|
return forbidden(body.error, body.details);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function readRunSourceIssueId(contextSnapshot: unknown) {
|
|
if (!contextSnapshot || typeof contextSnapshot !== "object" || Array.isArray(contextSnapshot)) return null;
|
|
const context = contextSnapshot as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
for (const candidate of [context.issueId, context.taskId]) {
|
|
if (typeof candidate === "string" && candidate.trim()) return candidate.trim();
|
|
}
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function evaluateCrossIssueInfluenceLimit(input: {
|
|
priorCount: number;
|
|
now?: Date;
|
|
}): CrossIssueInfluenceDecision {
|
|
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
|
|
const mode = now >= CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_ENFORCE_AT ? "enforce" : "log_only";
|
|
const nextCount = input.priorCount + 1;
|
|
return {
|
|
allowed: mode === "log_only" || nextCount <= CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_LIMIT,
|
|
mode,
|
|
count: nextCount,
|
|
cap: CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_LIMIT,
|
|
enforceAt: CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_ENFORCE_AT.toISOString(),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Atomically observes one cross-issue influence attempt for a heartbeat run.
|
|
*
|
|
* Locking the run row serializes concurrent attempts from the same run. The
|
|
* observation is intentionally recorded before the route mutation: once the
|
|
* rollout reaches enforcement, failures cannot be used to race or probe past
|
|
* the fail-closed backstop.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function observeCrossIssueInfluence(
|
|
db: Db,
|
|
input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
runId: string;
|
|
agentId: string;
|
|
responsibleUserId?: string | null;
|
|
targetIssueId: string;
|
|
targetIssueIdentifier?: string | null;
|
|
kind: CrossIssueInfluenceKind;
|
|
now?: Date;
|
|
},
|
|
): Promise<CrossIssueInfluenceDecision | null> {
|
|
// API-key callers control the run header. Reject malformed UUIDs before the
|
|
// database can turn an untrusted identifier into a PostgreSQL cast error.
|
|
if (!isUuidLike(input.runId)) throw crossIssueInfluenceRunContextError();
|
|
|
|
return db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
const run = await tx
|
|
.select({
|
|
id: heartbeatRuns.id,
|
|
companyId: heartbeatRuns.companyId,
|
|
agentId: heartbeatRuns.agentId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: heartbeatRuns.responsibleUserId,
|
|
contextSnapshot: heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.id, input.runId),
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.agentId, input.agentId),
|
|
))
|
|
.for("update")
|
|
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
|
|
if (
|
|
!run ||
|
|
run.companyId !== input.companyId ||
|
|
run.agentId !== input.agentId
|
|
) {
|
|
throw crossIssueInfluenceRunContextError();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const sourceIssueId = readRunSourceIssueId(run.contextSnapshot);
|
|
if (!sourceIssueId) throw crossIssueInfluenceRunContextError();
|
|
if (
|
|
sourceIssueId === input.targetIssueId ||
|
|
(input.targetIssueIdentifier && sourceIssueId.toUpperCase() === input.targetIssueIdentifier.toUpperCase())
|
|
) {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const priorCount = await tx
|
|
.select({ count: count() })
|
|
.from(activityLog)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(activityLog.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(activityLog.runId, input.runId),
|
|
eq(activityLog.action, CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_ACTIVITY),
|
|
))
|
|
.then((rows) => Number(rows[0]?.count ?? 0));
|
|
const decision = evaluateCrossIssueInfluenceLimit({ priorCount, now: input.now });
|
|
|
|
await tx.insert(activityLog).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: "agent",
|
|
actorId: input.agentId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: input.responsibleUserId ?? run.responsibleUserId ?? null,
|
|
action: decision.allowed
|
|
? CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_ACTIVITY
|
|
: CROSS_ISSUE_INFLUENCE_REJECTED_ACTIVITY,
|
|
entityType: "issue",
|
|
entityId: input.targetIssueId,
|
|
details: {
|
|
kind: input.kind,
|
|
sourceIssueId,
|
|
targetIssueId: input.targetIssueId,
|
|
targetIssueIdentifier: input.targetIssueIdentifier ?? null,
|
|
count: decision.count,
|
|
cap: decision.cap,
|
|
mode: decision.mode,
|
|
enforceAt: decision.enforceAt,
|
|
allowed: decision.allowed,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const logContext = {
|
|
event: "cross_issue_influence_cap",
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
runId: input.runId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
sourceIssueId,
|
|
targetIssueId: input.targetIssueId,
|
|
kind: input.kind,
|
|
count: decision.count,
|
|
cap: decision.cap,
|
|
mode: decision.mode,
|
|
enforceAt: decision.enforceAt,
|
|
allowed: decision.allowed,
|
|
};
|
|
if (decision.allowed) {
|
|
logger.info(logContext, "cross-issue influence observed");
|
|
} else {
|
|
logger.warn(logContext, "cross-issue influence cap exceeded");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return decision;
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function crossIssueInfluenceLimitError(
|
|
decision: CrossIssueInfluenceDecision,
|
|
context: { actorLabel?: string | null; assigneeLabel?: string | null; issueIdentifier?: string | null } = {},
|
|
) {
|
|
// The cap is a rate backstop, not a permission decision — the shared copy
|
|
// contract says so explicitly, and names the next run as the way forward.
|
|
const { body } = issueWriteDenialResponse("cross_issue_influence_cap_exceeded", {
|
|
...context,
|
|
cap: decision.cap,
|
|
count: decision.count,
|
|
enforceAt: decision.enforceAt,
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
error: body.error,
|
|
details: {
|
|
...body.details,
|
|
cap: decision.cap,
|
|
count: decision.count,
|
|
mode: decision.mode,
|
|
enforceAt: decision.enforceAt,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|